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Abstract	  	  Growden,	  Michael	  Alan	  (Ph.D.,	  Philosophy)	  	  Postwar	  Moral	  Obligation:	  The	  Duties	  of	  Victory	  	  Thesis	  directed	  by	  Professor	  Alastair	  Norcross	  	  	   In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  aim	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  question:	  what	  postwar	  moral	  obligations	  do	  just	  war	  victors	  incur	  at	  war’s	  end?	  	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  I	  begin	  the	  project	  by	  sketching	  the	  just	  war	  framework	  from	  within	  which	  my	  analysis	  proceeds.	  	  Specifically,	  I	  present	  a	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  defensive	  wartime	  harming	  that	  draws	  heavily	  from	  Jeff	  McMahan’s	  recent	  work	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  ideas	  underlying	  this	  justice-­‐based	  approach	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  harming	  in	  war	  reduce	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  governing	  defensive	  harming	  in	  domestic	  defense	  cases.	  	   Working	  from	  the	  preceding	  reductive	  claim,	  I	  proceed	  by	  surveying	  a	  series	  of	  domestic	  self-­‐defense	  cases	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  the	  possible	  grounds	  explaining	  why	  defenders	  sometimes	  incur	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations.	  	  Through	  this	  process,	  I	  identify	  four	  such	  possible	  grounds:	  (1)	  the	  use	  of	  unnecessary	  or	  excessive	  force;	  (2)	  when	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  imperils	  aggressor’s	  life	  and	  victim	  can	  save	  aggressor	  without	  threat	  to	  self;	  (3)	  when	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  harms	  or	  imperils	  bystanders;	  and	  (4)	  when	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  threatens	  future	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	   Next,	  I	  extend	  these	  normative	  grounds	  to	  national	  defenses	  situations	  to	  determine	  whether	  just	  war	  victors	  incur	  analogous	  post-­‐conflict	  duties.	  	  My	  conclusion	  is	  that	  just	  war	  victors	  sometimes	  do	  incur	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  These	  
	   v	  
duties	  potentially	  include	  (1)	  providing	  safety	  and	  security	  in	  the	  defeated	  state;	  (2)	  mitigating	  postwar	  environmental	  threats	  such	  as	  unexploded	  ordnance	  or	  environmental	  contamination;	  (3)	  paying	  restitution	  to	  parties	  wrongfully	  harmed	  during	  war;	  and	  (4)	  facilitating	  postwar	  accountability	  and	  justice.	  	  However,	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  a	  victorious	  state’s	  potential	  postwar	  obligations	  might	  be	  mitigated	  or	  completely	  negated	  by	  considerations	  of	  risk,	  time,	  and	  expense,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  these	  obligations	  should	  instead	  fall	  to	  the	  defeated	  unjust	  state	  when	  possible.	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CHAPTER	  1	  	  This	  dissertation	  project	  lies	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  two	  recent	  developments	  in	  just	  war	  theory.	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  justified	  defensive	  harming	  during	  war,	  and	  the	  second	  is	  the	  relatively	  recent	  development	  of	  a	  third	  just	  war	  category	  governing	  justice	  after	  war,	  or	  jus	  post	  bellum.	  	  Yet	  surprisingly,	  no	  advocate	  of	  the	  justice-­‐based	  approach	  to	  war	  has	  tendered	  a	  jus	  
post	  bellum	  account.	  	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  fill	  part	  of	  that	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  by	  focusing	  on	  one	  aspect	  of	  post	  bellum	  theory.	  	  Specifically,	  I	  aim	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  question:	  what	  postwar	  obligations	  do	  just	  war	  victors	  incur	  at	  war’s	  end?	  
1.	  Introduction	  Just	  war	  theory	  is	  a	  normative	  framework	  for	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  war.	  	  Just	  war	  theory	  stands	  between	  pacifism	  (the	  view	  that	  war	  is	  never	  morally	  justified)	  and	  realism	  (the	  view	  war	  is	  not	  a	  morality-­‐governed	  activity).	  	  Against	  pacifism,	  just	  war	  theory	  holds	  that	  war	  sometimes	  can	  be	  morally	  justified,	  and	  against	  realism,	  just	  war	  theory	  holds	  that	  morality	  constricts	  the	  initiation	  and	  prosecution	  of	  war.	  	   Historically,	  just	  war	  theory	  has	  focused	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  the	  justice	  of	  initiating	  war	  (jus	  ad	  bellum),	  and	  the	  justice	  of	  how	  war	  is	  fought	  (jus	  in	  bello).	  	  In	  his	  1977	  classic	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  Michael	  Walzer	  writes:	  War	  is	  always	  judged	  twice,	  first	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  reasons	  states	  have	  for	  fighting,	  secondly	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  means	  they	  adopt	  …	  Jus	  ad	  bellum	  requires	  us	  to	  make	  judgments	  about	  aggression	  and	  self-­‐defense;	  jus	  in	  bello	  about	  the	  observance	  or	  violation	  of	  the	  customary	  and	  positive	  rules	  of	  engagement.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars:	  A	  Moral	  Argument	  with	  Historical	  
Illustrations,	  4th	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  2006),	  21.	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Yet	  as	  Walzer	  now	  acknowledges,	  we	  actually	  judge	  war	  three	  times:	  we	  also	  judge	  war’s	  aftermath.	  	  So,	  Walzer	  argues,	  we	  need	  to	  expand	  just	  war	  theory	  beyond	  jus	  
ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello:	  “Now	  we	  have	  to	  add	  to	  those	  two	  an	  account	  of	  jus	  post	  
bellum	  (justice	  after	  war).”2	  	  Just	  as	  we	  have	  normative	  criteria	  for	  judging	  the	  initiation	  and	  conduct	  of	  war,	  the	  argument	  goes,	  so	  too	  we	  need	  a	  category	  of	  normative	  criteria	  for	  judging	  postwar	  conduct.3	  	  Otherwise,	  it’s	  possible	  that	  a	  war	  initiated	  and	  fought	  justly	  might	  nevertheless	  result	  in	  an	  unjust	  outcome	  if	  certain	  conditions	  are	  not	  fulfilled	  in	  war’s	  aftermath.	  Although	  theorists	  have	  continuously	  debated	  and	  developed	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello	  since	  Augustine	  and	  Aquinas	  wrote	  on	  the	  subject,	  jus	  post	  bellum	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  substantive	  just	  war	  category	  only	  within	  the	  past	  two	  decades.4	  	  Historically,	  most	  just	  war	  theorists	  had	  little	  to	  say	  about	  justice	  after	  war.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  “Introduction,”	  in	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Arguing	  about	  War	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  xiii.	  	  See	  also	  Michael	  Walzer,	  "Just	  and	  Unjust	  Occupations,"	  Dissent	  
Magazine	  (2004):	  61.	  3	  Not	  all	  just	  war	  theorists	  agree	  that	  jus	  post	  bellum	  should	  be	  an	  independent	  just	  war	  category.	  	  Nicholas	  Rengger,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  jus	  post	  bellum	  considerations	  are	  already	  implicit	  in	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello.	  	  See	  Nicholas	  Rengger,	  "The	  Judgment	  of	  War:	  On	  the	  Idea	  of	  Legitimate	  Force	  in	  World	  Politics,"	  
Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  31,	  no.	  S1	  (2005):	  154.	  	  Bellamy	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  too	  many	  unanswered	  questions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  ad	  bellum	  and	  post	  
bellum	  criteria	  to	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  whether	  jus	  post	  bellum	  should	  become	  a	  third	  just	  war	  component.	  	  See	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy,	  "The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory:	  Jus	  
Post	  Bellum	  and	  the	  Just	  War,"	  Review	  of	  International	  Studies	  34,	  no.	  4	  (2008):	  622.	  For	  broader	  criticism	  of	  jus	  post	  bellum	  in	  general,	  see	  Seth	  Lazar’s	  “Skepticism	  About	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  in	  Morality,	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,	  and	  International	  Law,	  ed.	  Larry	  May	  and	  Andrew	  Forcehimes	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  204-­‐222.	  	  Since	  my	  interest	  lies	  in	  identifying	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  postwar	  obligation,	  I	  won’t	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  which	  of	  the	  just	  war	  categories	  these	  criteria	  should	  be	  included	  under.	  4	  Michael	  Schuck	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  first	  theorists	  to	  suggest	  an	  independent	  category	  for	  evaluating	  postwar	  conduct,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  first	  to	  suggest	  the	  “jus	  post	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Nevertheless,	  nascent	  elements	  of	  postwar	  justice	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  at	  least	  to	  the	  16th	  century	  natural	  law	  concept	  of	  jus	  victoriae	  –	  first	  attributed	  to	  Vitoria,	  though	  later	  embraced	  by	  Gentili	  and	  others.5	  	  The	  underlying	  claim	  behind	  jus	  
victoriae	  was	  the	  requirement	  for	  just	  war	  victors	  to	  act	  with	  moderation	  toward	  their	  defeated	  adversaries.	  	  Victors	  were	  permitted	  to	  vindicate	  the	  rights	  violations	  that	  justified	  war	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  but	  prohibited	  from	  seeking	  any	  additional	  gains.6	  	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  considered	  permissible	  for	  just	  war	  victors	  to	  reclaim	  all	  the	  wrongful	  losses	  they	  suffered	  during	  war	  or	  secure	  equivalent	  reparation,7	  as	  well	  as	  to	  take	  reasonable	  action	  to	  secure	  against	  future	  attack.8	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  victors	  were	  prohibited	  from	  looting,9	  continuing	  to	  kill	  the	  enemy	  after	  war’s	  end,10	  and	  from	  enslaving	  the	  vanquished.11	  Because	  jus	  victoriae	  stressed	  restoration	  of	  the	  victors’	  rights,	  its	  content	  consisted	  entirely	  of	  permissible	  and	  prohibited	  actions.	  	  The	  principle	  aim	  behind	  this	  moderating	  principle	  was	  to	  reign	  in	  the	  excesses	  of	  victor’s	  justice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  bellum”	  terminology.	  	  See	  Michael	  J.	  Schuck,	  "When	  the	  Shooting	  Stops:	  Missing	  Elements	  in	  just	  War	  Theory,"	  Christian	  Century	  111,	  no.	  26	  (1994):	  982-­‐83.	  5	  Stephen	  Neff,	  “Conflict	  Termination	  and	  Peace-­‐Making	  in	  the	  Law	  of	  Nations:	  A	  Historical	  Perspective,”	  in	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  Towards	  a	  Law	  of	  Transition	  from	  Conflict	  
to	  Peace,	  ed.	  Carsten	  Stahn	  and	  Jann	  K.	  Kleffner	  (West	  Nyack,	  NY:	  T.M.C.	  Asser	  Press,	  2008a),	  79.	  6	  Ibid.,	  80.	  7	  Francisco	  de	  Vitoria,	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  War,	  in	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War:	  Classic	  and	  
Contemporary	  Readings,	  ed.	  Gregory	  M.	  Reichberg,	  Henrik	  Syse,	  and	  Endre	  Begby	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2006),	  315;	  Hugo	  Grotius,	  The	  Rights	  of	  War	  and	  
Peace,	  ed.	  Richard	  Tuck,	  trans.	  Jean	  Barbeyrac	  (Indianapolis:	  Liberty	  Fund,	  2005):	  Book	  III,	  Chapter	  XX,	  1558.	  8	  Vitoria,	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  War,	  in	  Reichberg,	  Syse,	  and	  Begby,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War,	  315.	  9	  Ibid.,	  303.	  10	  Vitoria,	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  War,	  303;	  Grotius,	  The	  Rights	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  Book	  III,	  Chapter	  XX,	  1586;	  Emer	  de	  Vattel,	  The	  Law	  of	  Nations,	  ed.	  Bela	  Kapossy	  and	  Richard	  Whatmore	  (Indianapolis:	  Liberty	  Fund,	  2008),	  Book	  IV,	  Chapter	  I,	  654.	  11	  Vitoria,	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  War,	  327.	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Accordingly,	  the	  only	  duties	  comprising	  jus	  victoriae	  were	  negative	  duties	  of	  forbearance.	  	  Obligations	  requiring	  positive	  action	  were	  wholly	  absent.	  Some	  modern	  theorists	  have	  developed	  post	  bellum	  accounts	  largely	  modeled	  on	  jus	  victoriae’s	  permissions	  and	  prohibitions.	  	  An	  example	  is	  that	  offered	  by	  Brian	  Orend,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  and	  most	  vocal	  advocates	  for	  an	  independent	  jus	  
post	  bellum.	  	  Orend	  proposes	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  intended	  to	  determine	  “what	  a	  just	  state	  justly	  prosecuting	  a	  just	  war,	  may	  permissibly	  do	  …	  during	  the	  termination	  phase	  of	  a	  war.”12	  	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  holding	  war	  criminals	  accountable,13	  Orend	  doesn’t	  identify	  postwar	  obligations	  requiring	  the	  victorious	  state	  to	  take	  positive	  action.	  	   Alex	  Bellamy	  helpfully	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  broad	  approaches	  to	  postwar	  justice:	  minimalist	  and	  maximalist	  accounts.14	  	  Minimalist	  theories	  “envisage	  jus	  post	  bellum	  as	  a	  series	  of	  restraints	  on	  what	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  victors	  to	  do	  once	  the	  war	  is	  over,”15	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  prohibiting	  any	  actions	  beyond	  rights	  vindication.	  	  So	  using	  Bellamy’s	  terminology,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  jus	  victoriae	  –	  as	  well	  modern	  variants	  such	  as	  Orend’s	  –	  as	  minimalist	  theories.	  	  The	  common	  thread	  running	  through	  minimalist	  theories	  is	  that	  they’re	  comprised	  entirely	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  non-­‐obligatory	  permissions	  with	  prohibitions	  involving	  negative	  duties	  of	  forbearance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Brian	  Orend,	  War	  and	  International	  Justice:	  A	  Kantian	  Perspective	  (Waterloo,	  Ont:	  Wilfrid	  Laurier	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  223,	  my	  emphasis.	  13	  Ibid.,	  229-­‐31.	  14	  Bellamy,	  The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory,	  602	  15	  Ibid.	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   In	  contrast,	  maximalist	  post	  bellum	  theories	  hold	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  permissions	  and	  prohibitions,	  victors	  also	  sometimes	  incur	  positive	  obligations	  at	  war’s	  end:	  required	  actions	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  not	  to	  perform.16	  	  Examples	  might	  include	  the	  duty	  to	  occupy	  a	  defeated	  state	  whose	  government	  has	  collapsed,	  or	  an	  obligation	  to	  help	  reconstruct	  the	  defeated	  state.17	  	  On	  a	  maximalist	  account,	  failure	  to	  perform	  a	  postwar	  obligation	  would	  be	  a	  blameworthy	  omission.	  	   But	  according	  to	  Bellamy,	  the	  problem	  with	  maximalist	  jus	  post	  bellum	  theories	  is	  that	  they	  lack	  a	  justification	  as	  for	  why	  victors	  incur	  positive	  postwar	  obligations	  in	  the	  first	  place.18	  	  As	  Bellamy	  says,	  “maximalist	  ideas	  are	  almost	  utterly	  alien	  to	  classical	  Just	  War	  considerations.”19	  	  Perhaps	  Bellamy	  is	  right	  to	  say	  that	  maximalist	  theories	  are	  alien	  to	  traditional	  just	  war	  theory,	  but	  that’s	  just	  to	  say	  that	  historical	  just	  war	  theory	  is	  in	  need	  of	  revision.	  In	  this	  project,	  I’ll	  defend	  a	  maximalist	  account;	  I	  think	  victorious	  states	  sometimes	  do	  incur	  positive	  obligations	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  tender	  a	  complete	  post	  bellum	  theory,	  which	  would	  need	  to	  encompass	  the	  prohibited	  and	  permissible	  actions	  that	  comprise	  minimalist	  theories	  in	  addition	  to	  those	  positive	  actions	  that	  are	  morally	  required.	  	  Instead,	  I’ll	  focus	  only	  on	  those	  actions	  that	  mark	  maximalist	  accounts	  off	  from	  minimalist	  accounts:	  the	  supposed	  existence	  of	  the	  victor’s	  positive	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  Specifically,	  I	  aim	  to	  answer	  the	  following	  question:	  what	  positive	  obligations	  do	  just	  war	  victors	  incur	  at	  war’s	  
end?	  	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  just	  war	  victors	  sometimes	  incur	  positive	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ibid.,	  602,	  612.	  17	  Ibid.,	  612-­‐15.	  18	  Ibid.,	  619.	  19	  Ibid.,	  621.	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And	  contrary	  to	  Bellamy’s	  claim,	  I’ll	  provide	  the	  normative	  justification	  for	  these	  obligations.	  	   But	  before	  proceeding,	  I	  should	  clarify	  exactly	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  the	  expression	  “positive	  obligation.”	  	  By	  “obligation,”	  I	  mean	  actions	  that	  one	  is	  required	  to	  do	  or	  refrain	  from	  doing.20	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  words	  “obligation”	  and	  “duty”	  interchangeably.21	  	   By	  “positive”	  obligations,	  I	  mean	  to	  identify	  those	  actions	  agents	  are	  required	  to	  perform.22	  	  Positive	  obligations	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  “negative”	  obligations,	  which	  require	  refraining	  from	  performing	  certain	  actions	  (i.e.,	  duties	  of	  forbearance).	  	  So	  in	  the	  context	  of	  war’s	  aftermath,	  examples	  of	  positive	  obligations	  might	  include	  protecting	  innocent	  people	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  and	  compensating	  wrongfully	  harmed	  parties.	  
1.1	  Additional	  Context:	  Situating	  the	  Project	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  a	  state’s	  postwar	  obligations,	  an	  important	  factor	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  is	  whether	  the	  state	  fought	  on	  the	  just	  side	  of	  the	  war.	  	  In	  domestic	  defense	  cases,	  aggressors	  and	  victims	  incur	  different	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  given	  the	  disparity	  between	  the	  justness	  and	  unjustness	  of	  each	  party’s	  actions.	  	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  following	  war.	  	  We	  should	  expect	  just	  war	  victors	  to	  incur	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Joel	  Feinberg,	  “Duties,	  Rights,	  and	  Claims,”	  in	  Rights,	  Justice,	  and	  the	  Bounds	  of	  
Liberty:	  Essays	  in	  Social	  Philosophy	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  136.	  21	  For	  some	  conceptual	  differences	  between	  these	  two	  terms,	  see	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  
Moral	  Principles	  and	  Political	  Obligations	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1979),	  Ch.	  1;	  Richard	  B.	  Brandt,	  "The	  Concepts	  of	  Obligation	  and	  Duty,"	  Mind	  (1964):	  374-­‐93.	  22	  	  James	  S.	  Fishkin,	  The	  Limits	  of	  Obligation	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1982),	  8.	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postwar	  obligations	  (if	  any)	  than	  those	  incurred	  by	  defeated	  unjust	  aggressors.	  Walzer	  gets	  this	  point	  exactly	  right:	  “We	  need	  criteria	  for	  jus	  post	  bellum	  that	  are	  distinct	  from	  (though	  not	  wholly	  independent	  of)	  those	  that	  we	  use	  to	  judge	  the	  war	  and	  its	  conduct.”23	  	  There’s	  a	  normative	  connection	  between	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  
post	  bellum;	  the	  former	  importantly	  informs	  –	  and	  largely	  determines	  –	  the	  latter.	  Yet	  we	  can’t	  determine	  post	  bellum	  obligations	  by	  considering	  only	  the	  ad	  
bellum	  justness	  of	  a	  state’s	  war.	  	  Instead,	  we	  must	  consider	  the	  justness	  of	  a	  state’s	  war	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  justifies	  wartime	  harming	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Different	  foundational	  theories	  of	  defensive	  harming	  will	  likely	  generate	  different	  responsibilities	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  And	  the	  differing	  theoretical	  approaches	  to	  self-­‐defense	  vary	  widely.	  24	  	  For	  example,	  many	  theorists	  advocate	  a	  rights-­‐based	  approach	  to	  justify	  self-­‐defense,25	  while	  others	  appeal	  to	  double-­‐effect	  reasoning.26	  However,	  much	  of	  the	  recent	  theoretical	  work	  in	  the	  self-­‐defense	  literature	  has	  focused	  on	  so-­‐called	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  defensive	  harming.	  	  Most	  justice-­‐based	  accounts	  of	  defensive	  harming	  trace	  back	  to	  Phillip	  Montague’s	  work	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Walzer,	  “Just	  and	  Unjust	  Occupations,”	  163,	  my	  emphasis.	  24	  For	  a	  concise	  and	  helpful	  overview	  of	  the	  various	  theoretical	  justifications	  for	  defensive	  harming,	  see	  Tyler	  Doggett,	  "Recent	  Work	  on	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Self-­‐Defense,"	  
Philosophy	  Compass	  6,	  no.	  4	  (2011):	  220-­‐33.	  25	  See,	  among	  others,	  Judith	  Jarvis	  Thomson,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Rights,”	  in	  Rights,	  
Restitution,	  and	  Risk:	  Essays	  in	  Moral	  Theory	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  33-­‐48;	  Judith	  Jarvis	  Thomson,	  "Self-­‐Defense,"	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  20,	  no.	  4	  (1991):	  283-­‐310;	  Suzanne	  Uniacke,	  Permissible	  Killing:	  The	  Self-­‐Defence	  
Justification	  of	  Homicide	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  26	  See,	  for	  example,	  Whitley	  R.	  P.	  Kaufman,	  Justified	  Killing:	  The	  Paradox	  of	  Self-­‐
Defense	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2009).	  
	   8	  
forced-­‐choice	  theory.27	  	  According	  to	  Montague,	  the	  underlying	  justification	  for	  self-­‐defense	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  justice	  (or	  fairness)	  permits	  agents	  to	  redistribute	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm	  to	  those	  parties	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  wrongful	  threats.	  Drawing	  from	  Montague’s	  forced-­‐choice	  framework,	  some	  theorists	  have	  developed	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  defensive	  warfare.28	  	  Most	  of	  these	  theories	  tend	  to	  be	  individualist-­‐reductive	  accounts.	  	  The	  individualist	  claim	  is	  that	  war	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  individuals,	  or	  groups	  of	  individuals;	  statements	  about	  groups	  of	  people	  and	  group	  actions	  during	  war	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  statements	  about	  individuals	  and	  individual	  actions.	  	  The	  reductive	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  war	  reduce	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  that	  govern	  individual	  defense.	  	  Thus,	  theorists	  who	  embrace	  the	  individualist-­‐reductive	  approach	  argue	  that	  war	  can	  be	  understood	  and	  evaluated	  as	  a	  complex	  activity	  involving	  many	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  various	  acts	  of	  aggression	  and	  self-­‐defense.	  	  As	  McMahan	  explains,	  the	  justifications	  for	  killing	  people	  in	  war	  are	  of	  the	  same	  forms	  as	  the	  justifications	  for	  the	  killing	  of	  persons	  in	  other	  contexts.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  war	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  conflict	  is	  a	  difference	  only	  of	  degree	  and	  thus	  the	  moral	  principles	  that	  govern	  killing	  in	  lesser	  forms	  of	  conflict	  govern	  killing	  in	  war	  as	  well.29	  	  At	  root,	  individual	  defense	  and	  national	  defense	  are	  but	  two	  instances	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  with	  both	  governed	  by	  the	  same	  moral	  principles.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  especially	  Phillip	  Montague,	  "Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Choosing	  between	  Lives,"	  
Philosophical	  Studies	  40,	  no.	  2	  (1981):	  207-­‐19;	  Phillip	  Montague,	  "Forced	  Choices	  and	  Self-­‐Defence,"	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Philosophy	  12,	  no.	  1	  (1995):	  89-­‐93;	  Phillip	  Montague,	  Punishment	  as	  Societal-­‐Defense	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  1995).	  28	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2009b);	  Phillip	  Montague,	  "War	  and	  Self-­‐Defence:	  A	  Critique	  and	  a	  Proposal,"	  Diametros,	  no.	  23	  (2010):	  69-­‐83.	  29	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  156.	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In	  contrast,	  collectivists	  argue	  that	  war	  is	  primarily	  an	  activity	  between	  political	  communities,	  typically	  in	  the	  form	  of	  states.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  justification	  for	  killing	  in	  war	  cannot	  simply	  reduce	  to	  the	  normative	  principles	  governing	  individual	  defense.	  	  For	  collectivists,	  war	  is	  a	  unique	  activity	  governed	  by	  moral	  principles	  distinct	  from	  those	  that	  govern	  individual	  defense.	  	  Walzer’s	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars	  remains	  the	  classic	  modern	  statement	  of	  the	  collectivist	  approach	  to	  war.	  For	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  argue	  from	  within	  a	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  war	  that	  is	  both	  individualist	  and	  reductive.	  	  Among	  such	  accounts,	  Jeff	  McMahan’s	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  the	  most	  complete	  and	  influential.	  	  Because	  I	  largely	  agree	  with	  McMahan’s	  normative	  framework	  for	  justified	  defensive	  killing	  during	  war,30	  I	  will	  use	  McMahan’s	  work	  as	  the	  jumping	  off	  point	  from	  which	  to	  begin	  my	  own	  analysis	  of	  postwar	  obligation.	  Yet	  despite	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  justice-­‐based	  reductive	  approaches	  to	  just	  war	  theory,	  not	  a	  single	  theorist	  who	  advocates	  for	  this	  approach	  has	  offered	  an	  account	  of	  postwar	  obligation.	  	  McMahan,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  citizens	  on	  the	  unjust	  side	  of	  a	  war	  may	  be	  liable	  to	  occupation,	  but	  he	  says	  nothing	  about	  whether	  the	  victorious	  state	  is	  ever	  obligated	  to	  occupy	  the	  unjust	  state	  (I’ll	  argue	  just	  states	  are	  sometimes	  so	  obligated).	  	  Similar	  issues	  remain	  unresolved.	  	  Do	  victorious	  just	  combatants	  have	  responsibilities	  to	  defuse	  unexploded	  ordnance	  before	  withdrawing	  from	  the	  defeated	  state?	  	  Does	  the	  just	  citizenry	  owe	  restitution	  to	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  For	  general	  criticism	  of	  the	  reductive	  approach	  to	  war,	  see	  David	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  
Self-­‐Defense	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2002),	  127-­‐29.	  	  For	  rebuttal	  arguments	  against	  Rodin’s	  criticism,	  see	  Helen	  Frowe,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Peace:	  An	  
Introduction	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  35-­‐39.	  	  For	  specific	  criticism	  against	  McMahan’s	  recent	  work,	  see	  Seth	  Lazar,	  "The	  Responsibility	  Dilemma	  for	  Killing	  in	  War:	  A	  Review	  Essay,"	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  38,	  no.	  2	  (2010):	  180-­‐213.	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parties	  collaterally	  harmed	  during	  war?	  	  These	  are	  pressing	  questions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  answered.	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  by	  developing	  a	  broad	  normative	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  postwar	  obligation.	  	  As	  stated,	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  determine	  what	  positive	  postwar	  obligations	  just	  war	  victors	  incur	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  And	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  subject	  through	  the	  theoretical	  lens	  of	  a	  justice-­‐based,	  individualist-­‐reductive	  account	  of	  war.	  
1.2	  Assumptions	  and	  Methodology	  I	  will	  make	  several	  foundational	  assumptions	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  project	  to	  a	  manageable	  size.	  	  First,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  classic	  interstate	  war	  between	  nation-­‐states.	  	  The	  dissertation	  will	  not	  discuss	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  such	  as	  civil	  wars	  and	  revolutions,	  nor	  humanitarian	  interventions,	  or	  conflicts	  involving	  non-­‐state	  actors	  such	  as	  terrorism.	  	  Focusing	  on	  interstate	  war	  between	  clear-­‐cut	  aggressors	  and	  victims	  offers	  the	  clearest	  path	  for	  analyzing	  the	  topic.	  	  A	  separate	  project	  would	  be	  to	  explore	  whether	  the	  principles	  and	  conclusions	  we	  draw	  from	  our	  analysis	  of	  interstate	  war	  also	  extend	  to	  these	  other	  kinds	  of	  conflicts.	  	   Second,	  because	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  postwar	  obligations,	  I	  will	  begin	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  most	  of	  a	  war’s	  active	  hostilities	  have	  ended,	  whether	  by	  cease-­‐fire,	  truce,	  or	  other	  arrangement.	  	  One	  cannot	  meaningfully	  speak	  of	  the	  postwar	  period	  until	  the	  fighting	  has	  abated.	  There’s	  been	  some	  interesting	  recent	  work	  done	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  war	  termination.	  	  Some	  commentators	  advocate	  for	  an	  additional	  just	  war	  category	  to	  evaluate	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  termination.	  	  David	  Rodin,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  we	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need	  jus	  terminatio	  criteria	  for	  determining	  “when	  it	  is	  obligatory	  to	  terminate	  a	  state	  of	  war	  and	  how	  this	  can	  be	  done	  in	  the	  morally	  best	  way.”31	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Darrel	  Mollendorf	  has	  advocated	  for	  a	  set	  of	  jus	  ex	  bello	  criteria	  to	  provide	  “guidance	  on	  questions	  such	  as	  whether	  and	  how	  a	  war,	  once	  begun,	  should	  be	  ended.”32	  	  Orend,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  views	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  termination	  as	  embedded	  within	  the	  broader	  framework	  of	  jus	  post	  bellum.33	  	  Rodin,	  Mollendorf,	  and	  Orend	  raise	  interesting	  points	  regarding	  the	  issue	  of	  war	  termination.	  	  Yet,	  because	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  postwar	  obligation,	  I	  will	  not	  take	  a	  position	  on	  the	  termination	  issue.	  	  Instead,	  I	  will	  simply	  assume	  that	  the	  wars	  under	  consideration	  have	  been	  terminated	  in	  a	  morally	  acceptable	  way	  –	  and	  thus	  the	  postwar	  period	  has	  begun.	  Third,	  I	  will	  assume	  the	  victorious	  state	  fought	  a	  just	  war	  in	  a	  just	  manner,	  with	  no	  culpable	  inducement	  on	  that	  state’s	  part	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  war.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  the	  victimized	  state	  fought	  a	  self-­‐defensive	  war	  in	  a	  morally	  acceptable	  way,	  thus	  fulfilling	  the	  requirements	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  
bello.	   Finally,	  the	  project	  will	  focus	  only	  on	  those	  obligations	  that	  might	  fall	  to	  the	  victorious	  just	  state.	  	  I	  do	  so	  two	  reasons.	  	  The	  first	  reason	  is	  pragmatic:	  to	  help	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  project	  to	  a	  manageable	  size.	  	  There’s	  a	  host	  of	  separate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  David	  Rodin,	  "Ending	  War,"	  Ethics	  &	  International	  Affairs	  25,	  no.	  03	  (2011):	  360.	  	  See	  also	  David	  Rodin,	  “Two	  Emerging	  Issues	  of	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  War	  Termination	  and	  the	  Liability	  of	  Soldiers	  for	  Crimes	  of	  Aggression,”	  in	  Stahn,	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  
Towards	  a	  Law	  of	  Transition,	  54.	  32	  Darrel	  Mollendorf,	  "Jus	  Ex	  Bello,"	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  16,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  131.	  	  See	  also	  Seth	  Lazar,	  “Skepticism	  about	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  218.	  33	  Orend,	  War	  and	  International	  Justice,	  218-­‐23.	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issues	  surrounding	  the	  obligations	  that	  may	  fall	  to	  defeated	  aggressors	  or,	  worse	  still,	  to	  victorious	  aggressors.	  	  I	  intend	  to	  set	  those	  projects	  aside	  for	  another	  day.	  The	  second	  reason	  I’ll	  focus	  on	  the	  just	  side	  of	  the	  war	  rather	  than	  the	  unjust	  side	  is	  because	  doing	  so	  is	  more	  theoretically	  interesting.	  	  If	  we	  can	  determine	  what	  obligations	  just	  war	  victors	  incur,	  then	  doing	  so	  will	  show	  us	  what	  a	  completely	  just	  war	  would	  look	  like:	  from	  its	  initiation,	  through	  its	  prosecution,	  and	  to	  its	  just	  aftermath.	  	  Such	  an	  account	  would	  show	  us	  what	  victimized	  states	  should	  ideally	  aspire	  to	  not	  only	  in	  declaring	  and	  fighting	  a	  defensive	  war,	  but	  what	  they	  should	  aspire	  to	  after	  war	  ends.	  Let	  me	  close	  with	  a	  quick	  note	  about	  methodology.	  	  If	  the	  individualist-­‐reductive	  account	  of	  war	  is	  right	  –	  and	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  war	  reduce	  to	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  individual	  defense	  –	  then	  our	  intuitions	  and	  judgments	  about	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation	  in	  individual	  defense	  cases	  should	  be	  a	  workable	  model	  for	  thinking	  about	  obligations	  following	  war.	  	  Or	  put	  slightly	  differently,	  postwar	  obligations	  should	  reduce	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  reasons	  that	  ground	  a	  victim’s	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  after	  successfully	  defending	  herself.	  Because	  of	  the	  preceding	  reductive	  claim,	  I’ll	  frequently	  present	  and	  analyze	  domestic	  self-­‐defense	  cases	  throughout	  the	  paper.	  	  My	  aim	  in	  doing	  so	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  basic	  moral	  principles	  that	  underlie	  our	  judgments	  in	  more	  familiar	  domestic	  defense	  cases,	  and	  then	  extend	  those	  principles	  to	  help	  illuminate	  less	  familiar	  interstate	  war	  analogues.	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1.3	  Dissertation	  Structure	  The	  dissertation	  will	  be	  structured	  as	  follows.	  	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I’ll	  review	  McMahan’s	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  defensive	  harming.	  	  As	  mentioned,	  McMahan’s	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  war	  will	  provide	  the	  broad	  framework	  from	  within	  which	  my	  analysis	  of	  postwar	  obligation	  will	  proceed.	  	  But	  because	  the	  basic	  principle	  underlying	  McMahan’s	  theory	  actually	  traces	  back	  to	  Montague,	  I’ll	  begin	  with	  a	  quick	  look	  at	  the	  latter’s	  work.	  	  Montague’s	  key	  idea	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  forced-­‐choice	  structure	  inherent	  to	  self-­‐defense	  situations.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  an	  aggressor	  unjustly	  attacks	  victim,	  aggressor	  forces	  victim	  to	  make	  a	  choice:	  either	  accept	  the	  unjust	  harm,	  or	  attempt	  to	  redistribute	  the	  harm.	  	  According	  to	  Montague,	  there’s	  an	  important	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties;	  aggressor	  culpably	  created	  the	  situation,	  whereas	  victim	  is	  innocent.	  	  Montague	  argues	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice	  (or	  fairness),	  this	  moral	  asymmetry	  permits	  victim	  to	  redistribute	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  aggressor.	  	   After	  a	  quick	  review	  of	  Montague,	  the	  remainder	  of	  Chapter	  2	  surveys	  McMahan’s	  theory.	  	  McMahan	  adopts	  Montague’s	  theoretical	  explanation	  for	  justified	  defensive	  harming	  in	  forced	  choice	  situations,	  though	  with	  one	  crucial	  difference.	  	  Whereas	  Montague	  grounds	  a	  person’s	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  based	  on	  considerations	  of	  culpability,	  McMahan	  argues	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  is	  sufficient	  to	  make	  a	  person	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  This	  move	  greatly	  widens	  the	  liability	  net	  because	  many	  people	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  of	  harm	  without	  being	  culpable.	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   Then	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  Chapter	  2,	  we’ll	  then	  look	  at	  how	  McMahan	  extends	  his	  theory	  of	  defensive	  harming	  to	  explain	  just	  and	  unjust	  killing	  during	  war.	  	  Because	  most	  civilians	  and	  combatants	  in	  the	  victim	  state	  (collectively,	  “just	  citizens”)	  bear	  no	  responsibility	  for	  any	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm,	  most	  just	  citizens	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  Conversely,	  most	  aggressor	  state	  combatants	  (“unjust	  combatants”)	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  contributing	  to	  objectively	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm,	  and	  thus	  become	  liable	  to	  wartime	  harm.	  	  Aggressor	  state	  civilians	  (“unjust	  civilians”),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  almost	  never	  morally	  responsible	  enough	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  to	  render	  them	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.	  	  However,	  McMahan	  argues	  they	  may	  become	  liable	  to	  collateral	  or	  lesser	  harms	  if	  they’ve	  acted	  complicitously	  to	  support	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  or	  have	  made	  significant	  contributions	  toward	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	   While	  I	  agree	  with	  McMahan’s	  general	  framework,	  I	  disagree	  with	  his	  position	  on	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  	  So	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  present	  a	  sustained	  critique	  of	  McMahan’s	  position	  on	  this	  topic.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  if	  we	  follow	  McMahan’s	  theory	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  should	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms,	  even	  if	  they	  haven’t	  acted	  complicitiously	  or	  made	  significant	  war	  contributions.	  	  The	  problem,	  I	  argue,	  is	  that	  McMahan	  employs	  a	  different	  liability	  criterion	  to	  unjust	  civilians	  than	  he	  does	  to	  unjust	  combatants.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  unjust	  combatants,	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  liable	  to	  harm	  even	  though	  they	  aren’t	  culpable,	  and	  even	  if	  they	  make	  only	  small	  contributions	  to	  the	  war	  effort.	  	  But	  in	  the	  case	  of	  unjust	  civilians,	  McMahan	  argues	  they	  aren’t	  liable	  unless	  they’ve	  acted	  complicitously	  (i.e.,	  culpably),	  or	  have	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  war	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effort.	  	  If	  that’s	  right,	  McMahan	  has	  done	  nothing	  to	  justify	  these	  asymmetric	  criteria	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Instead,	  I	  argue	  that	  because	  most	  civilians	  bear	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  causally	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  they	  should	  be	  liable	  to	  harm	  as	  well.	  	  And	  this	  conclusion	  naturally	  follows	  from	  within	  McMahan’s	  own	  framework.	  	   My	  aim	  in	  Chapter	  4	  is	  twofold.	  	  First,	  I’ll	  augment	  my	  argument	  from	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	  But	  whereas	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  I	  argue	  for	  this	  conclusion	  from	  within	  McMahan’s	  theory,	  in	  Chapter	  4	  I’ll	  offer	  additional	  argumentation.	  	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  argument	  I	  introduce	  here	  is	  that	  most	  civilians	  who	  participate	  in,	  maintain,	  and	  benefit	  from	  powerful	  state	  institutions	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  when	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  their	  institutions	  from	  unjustly	  harming	  innocent	  others.	  	  And	  to	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  means	  that	  others	  can	  harm	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  without	  wronging	  them.	  	   My	  second	  aim	  in	  the	  chapter	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  qualification	  that	  “most”	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  In	  short,	  citizenship	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  to	  ground	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Some	  citizens	  –	  such	  as	  children,	  or	  citizens	  persecuted	  by	  their	  own	  state	  –	  do	  not	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  actions,	  and	  thus	  aren’t	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  during	  war.	  Chapter	  5	  begins	  the	  actual	  analysis	  of	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  I’ll	  begin	  the	  chapter	  by	  considering	  a	  series	  of	  domestic	  defense	  cases	  in	  order	  to	  isolate	  the	  possible	  grounds	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  following	  the	  use	  of	  defensive	  force.	  	  Through	  this	  process,	  I	  identify	  four	  possible	  grounds	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation:	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(1)	  the	  use	  of	  unnecessary	  or	  excessive	  force;	  (2)	  when	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  imperils	  aggressor’s	  life	  and	  victim	  can	  save	  aggressor	  without	  threat	  to	  self;	  (3)	  when	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  harms	  or	  imperils	  bystanders;	  and	  (4)	  when	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  threatens	  future	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  Next,	  I	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  extending	  these	  four	  possible	  grounds	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation	  to	  wartime	  scenarios.	  	  Because	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  most	  postwar	  obligations	  are	  grounded	  in	  considerations	  about	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  I	  clarify	  who’s	  considered	  a	  bystander	  during	  war.	  	  Then,	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  discuss	  several	  topics	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wartime	  harm	  bystanders	  suffer.	  	  I	  conclude	  that	  although	  several	  parties	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight,	  most	  of	  the	  responsibility	  shifts	  to	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice	  that	  led	  to	  the	  bystanders	  being	  harmed.	  	  Thus,	  most	  of	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  shifts	  to	  the	  aggressor	  state’s	  leaders,	  combatants,	  and	  most	  unjust	  civilians.	  Finally,	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7,	  I	  analyze	  the	  specific	  postwar	  obligations	  that	  
might	  fall	  to	  the	  just	  war	  victors.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  potential	  obligations	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  The	  first	  is	  whether	  victorious	  just	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  provide	  safety	  and	  security	  in	  the	  defeated	  state	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  war,	  many	  people	  in	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state	  may	  be	  left	  vulnerable.	  	  Common	  threats	  include	  genocide,	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  persecution,	  looters,	  rapists,	  predation	  by	  neighboring	  political	  communities,	  and	  starvation	  and	  disease.	  	  In	  such	  conditions,	  are	  the	  victorious	  forces	  obligated	  to	  protect	  the	  local	  populace?	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The	  second	  obligation	  I’ll	  consider	  in	  Chapter	  6	  is	  whether	  the	  just	  state	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  mitigate	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  guns	  of	  war	  fall	  silent,	  lethal	  threats	  such	  as	  unexploded	  ordnance	  or	  environmental	  contamination	  continue	  to	  threaten.	  	  The	  question	  I	  explore	  is	  whether	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  help	  mitigate	  the	  threats	  posed	  by	  war	  remnants,	  or	  whether	  doing	  so	  is	  merely	  a	  discretional	  act	  of	  beneficence.	  	  I’ll	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  both	  obligations:	  just	  war	  victors	  are	  sometimes	  obligated	  to	  protect	  the	  local	  populace,	  and	  also	  to	  help	  safe	  the	  environment.	  	  But,	  I’ll	  argue,	  these	  obligations	  may	  be	  limited	  by	  considerations	  of	  risk,	  time,	  and	  expense.	  Then	  in	  Chapter	  7,	  I	  consider	  four	  additional	  potential	  obligations.	  	  The	  first	  concerns	  whether	  the	  just	  citizenry	  carries	  any	  restitutive	  duties	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  Second,	  I	  examine	  whether	  the	  victorious	  state	  must	  help	  physically	  reconstruct	  the	  defeated	  state’s	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions.	  	  The	  third	  issue	  is	  whether	  victorious	  states	  must	  hold	  parties	  accountable	  for	  wrongs	  committed	  during	  war	  (transitional	  justice).	  	  And	  finally,	  I’ll	  consider	  whether	  a	  just	  state	  has	  any	  obligations	  to	  help	  politically	  reconstruct	  toppled	  or	  failed	  regimes.	  Of	  these	  four	  potential	  obligations,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  compelling	  case	  can	  be	  made	  only	  for	  postwar	  restitutive	  and	  transitional	  justice	  duties,	  though	  victorious	  states	  may	  incur	  some	  parasitic	  duties	  to	  help	  facilitate	  political	  reconstruction.	  	  Finally,	  we’ll	  consider	  how	  these	  duties	  may	  also	  be	  limited	  by	  considerations	  of	  risk,	  time,	  and	  expense.
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CHAPTER	  2	  	  
2.	  Justice-­‐Based	  Theories	  of	  Self-­‐Defense	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  aim	  to	  provide	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  the	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense,	  and	  its	  application	  to	  war.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  chapter	  forms	  the	  grounding	  theory	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  dissertation	  project.	  	  The	  overview	  will	  aim	  for	  some	  comprehensiveness	  since	  the	  complete	  conceptual	  framework	  will	  be	  necessary	  for	  determining	  postwar	  obligations.	  	   Jeff	  McMahan	  has	  articulated	  and	  defended	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense1,	  and	  his	  extension	  of	  the	  theory	  to	  include	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  has	  proven	  especially	  influential.	  	  I	  find	  myself	  largely	  in	  agreement	  with	  most	  of	  McMahan’s	  positions.	  	  Because	  my	  dissertation	  project	  will	  largely	  extend	  from	  his	  theoretic	  framework,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  be	  committed	  to	  a	  review	  of	  McMahan’s	  theory.	  Yet	  as	  McMahan	  and	  others	  note,2	  the	  genesis	  of	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  self-­‐defense	  effectively	  trace	  back	  to	  Phillip	  Montague’s	  forced-­‐choice	  theory.	  	  Given	  the	  foundational	  role	  Montague’s	  ideas	  play	  in	  McMahan’s	  work,	  the	  chapter	  first	  will	  briefly	  review	  Montague’s	  theory.	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  then	  look	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  similar	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  see	  George	  Draper,	  "Fairness	  and	  Self-­‐Defense,"	  Social	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  19,	  no.	  1	  (1993),	  73;	  Re'em	  Segev,	  "Fairness,	  Responsibility	  and	  Self-­‐Defense,"	  Santa	  Clara	  Law	  Review	  45,	  no.	  2	  (2005),	  383;	  Shlomit	  Wallerstein,	  "Justifying	  the	  Right	  to	  Self-­‐Defense:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Forced	  Consequences,"	  Virginia	  Law	  Review	  (2005):	  999.	  2	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing:	  Problems	  at	  the	  Margins	  of	  Life	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  516,	  footnotes	  122	  and	  123;	  Seth	  Lazar,	  "Responsibility,	  Risk,	  and	  Killing	  in	  Self-­‐Defense,"	  Ethics	  119,	  no.	  4	  (2009):	  704,	  footnote	  20;	  Whitley	  Kaufman,	  "Torture	  and	  the	  ‘Distributive	  Justice’	  Theory	  of	  Self-­‐Defense:	  An	  Assessment,"	  Ethics	  &	  International	  Affairs	  22,	  no.	  1	  (2008):	  95.	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at	  McMahan’s	  subsequent	  development	  of	  the	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  with	  special	  emphasis	  on	  its	  extension	  to	  wartime	  killing.	  
2.1.	  Phillip	  Montague’s	  Distributive	  Justice	  Theory	  of	  Self-­‐Defense	  Montague’s	  forced-­‐choice	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense	  traces	  back	  to	  his	  1981	  paper	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Choosing	  Between	  Lives,”	  and	  further	  developed	  elsewhere.3	  	  Montague	  begins	  his	  analysis	  of	  self-­‐defense	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  forced	  choice	  nature	  inherent	  in	  such	  encounters.	  	  Essentially,	  all	  self-­‐defensive	  situations	  involve	  victims	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  choice:	  either	  accept	  the	  threatened	  harm,	  or	  attempt	  to	  redistribute	  the	  harm	  elsewhere.	  So	  for	  illustration,	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  where	  Aggressor	  unjustly	  attacks	  Victim.	  	  By	  unjustly	  attacking	  Victim,	  Aggressor	  forces	  Victim	  to	  make	  a	  choice:	  accept	  the	  harm,	  or	  redistribute	  the	  harm	  by	  way	  of	  defensive	  force.	  	  Montague’s	  claim	  is	  that	  since	  Aggressor	  culpably	  created	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation	  now	  confronting	  Victim,	  Victim	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  redistributing	  the	  harm	  to	  Aggressor	  rather	  than	  accepting	  the	  harm	  onto	  herself.	  	  The	  justification	  behind	  this	  claim	  is	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  harm	  should	  be	  distributed	  to	  the	  party	  who	  culpably	  created	  it;	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  expect	  Victim	  to	  bear	  the	  costs.	  Montague’s	  approach	  to	  self-­‐defense	  is	  considered	  a	  distributive	  justice	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense	  because	  it	  views	  the	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  as	  a	  way	  of	  fairly	  distributing	  inevitable	  harm.	  	  As	  Montague	  notes,	  although	  it	  is	  common	  to	  think	  about	  distributive	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  benefits	  such	  as	  resources,	  opportunities,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	  especially	  Montague,	  Punishment	  as	  Societal-­‐Defense,	  175;	  Phillip	  Montague,	  "Self-­‐Defense,	  Culpability,	  and	  Distributive	  Justice,"	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	  29,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  75;	  Montague,	  “Forced	  Choices	  and	  Self-­‐Defence,”	  89-­‐93.	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so	  on,	  we	  also	  think	  there	  are	  fair	  and	  unfair	  ways	  to	  distribute	  unavoidable	  burdens	  and	  costs	  between	  parties	  such	  as	  taxes,	  where	  to	  build	  undesirable	  facilities	  such	  as	  waste	  plants,	  and	  so	  on.4	  	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  we	  should	  think	  about	  unavoidable,	  culpably	  threatened	  harms	  by	  asking	  what	  is	  the	  fairest	  way	  to	  distribute	  the	  harm	  among	  the	  involved	  parties.	  	   In	  answering	  the	  above	  question,	  Montague	  breaks	  his	  analysis	  of	  self-­‐defensive	  situations	  down	  as	  follows:	  (i)	  Individuals	  X1,	  …,	  Xn	  are	  situated	  so	  that	  harm	  will	  unavoidably	  befall	  some	  but	  not	  all	  of	  them;	  (ii)	  that	  they	  are	  so	  situated	  is	  the	  fault	  of	  some	  but	  not	  all	  members	  of	  the	  group;	  (iii)	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  harm	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  individuals	  who	  are	  harmed;	  (iv)	  Y,	  who	  is	  not	  necessarily	  included	  in	  X1,	  …,	  
Xn	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  determine	  who	  will	  be	  harmed.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  quite	  clear	  that,	  if	  Y	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  the	  endangered	  group,	  he	  is	  required,	  as	  a	  
matter	  of	  basic	  justice,	  to	  direct	  the	  harm	  towards	  those	  whose	  fault	  it	  is	  that	  some	  will	  be	  harmed.	  	  If,	  however,	  Y	  is	  part	  of	  the	  threatened	  group	  but	  is	  in	  no	  way	  responsible	  for	  their	  predicament,	  then	  he	  is	  not	  required	  to	  direct	  the	  harm	  away	  from	  himself	  and	  towards	  those	  who	  are	  responsible,	  but	  he	  is	  surely	  free	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  for	  an	  outsider	  to	  prevent	  innocent	  members	  of	  the	  group	  from	  protecting	  themselves	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  those	  who	  are	  guilty	  –	  no	  matter	  how	  many	  of	  the	  latter	  are	  harmed	  as	  a	  result.5	  	  Several	  points	  are	  worth	  noting	  about	  this	  passage.	  	  First,	  what’s	  doing	  the	  justificatory	  work	  in	  permitting	  (or	  sometimes	  requiring)	  distributions	  of	  harm	  is	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  involved	  parties.	  	  Because	  Aggressor	  culpably	  creates	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation	  Victim	  now	  faces,	  there	  exists	  a	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  that	  grounds	  Victim’s	  permission	  to	  harm	  Aggressor.	  	  Thus,	  culpability	  and	  innocence	  become	  the	  criteria	  for	  determining	  which	  possible	  harm	  distributions	  are	  justified.	  	  The	  underlying	  explanation	  for	  determining	  harm	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Montague,	  Punishment	  as	  Societal-­‐Defense,	  43;	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Distributive	  Justice,”	  90.	  5	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Choosing,”	  215.	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distributions	  based	  on	  moral	  asymmetry	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  harmful	  outcomes	  should	  be	  appropriately	  connected	  to	  an	  agent’s	  behavior	  –	  this	  is	  what	  Montague	  means	  by	  his	  expression	  “as	  a	  matter	  of	  basic	  justice.”	  	  What	  makes	  the	  distribution	  of	  harm	  just	  or	  unjust	  is	  whether	  the	  harm	  falls	  to	  the	  innocent	  or	  the	  culpable	  party.	  With	  its	  focus	  on	  culpability,	  Montague’s	  is	  a	  fault-­‐based	  distributive	  justice	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense.6	  	  An	  agent’s	  actions	  are	  faulty	  or	  culpable	  when	  performed	  in	  a	  morally	  defective	  way,7	  and	  actions	  can	  be	  performed	  in	  a	  morally	  defective	  manner	  intentionally,	  recklessly,	  or	  negligently.8	  	  So	  if	  a	  person’s	  intentional,	  reckless,	  or	  negligent	  behavior	  creates	  a	  threat	  of	  harm	  that	  must	  fall	  to	  one	  of	  two	  or	  more	  parties,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice	  the	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  faulty	  party	  rather	  than	  the	  innocent.9	  	  Or	  put	  slightly	  differently,	  justice	  permits	  an	  innocent	  person	  to	  preserve	  her	  life	  instead	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  culpable	  person	  whose	  faulty	  behavior	  put	  her	  in	  peril.10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Montague	  describes	  the	  distributive	  justice	  principle	  underlying	  the	  forced	  choice	  account	  of	  self-­‐defense	  as	  having	  a	  necessary	  “blameworthiness	  condition.”	  	  See	  Montague,	  “Forced	  Choices	  and	  Self-­‐Defence,”	  92.	  7	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Distributive	  Justice,”	  86.	  8	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Choosing,”	  211.	  9	  Ibid.,	  216.	  	  As	  an	  example	  of	  a	  culpably	  created	  forced	  choice	  scenario	  involving	  negligence,	  Montague	  offers	  a	  hypothetical	  where	  the	  owner	  of	  a	  chemical	  factory	  allows	  toxic	  materials	  to	  contaminate	  nearby	  fields,	  forcing	  the	  local	  ruler	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  distribute	  the	  associated	  burdens.	  	  See	  Montague,	  Punishment	  as	  Societal-­‐
Defense,	  43-­‐45.	  	  Regarding	  a	  culpable	  forced	  choice	  scenario	  based	  on	  recklessness,	  Montague	  discusses	  a	  case	  where	  an	  agent’s	  reckless	  steering	  of	  a	  boat	  with	  passenger	  aboard	  results	  in	  an	  accident,	  forcing	  a	  passing	  boater	  to	  determine	  whether	  to	  save	  the	  passenger	  or	  reckless	  operator	  (assuming	  only	  one	  life	  can	  be	  saved).	  	  See	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Distributive	  Justice,”	  85.	  10	  Importantly	  though,	  Montague	  later	  argues	  that	  victim’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  must	  be	  proportional	  in	  that	  it	  must	  not	  cause	  more	  harm	  to	  each	  culpable	  party	  than	  the	  innocent	  party	  would	  suffer	  under	  a	  different	  distribution.	  	  Additionally,	  Montague	  acknowledges	  that	  if	  distributing	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  culpable	  party	  would	  harm	  innocent	  bystanders,	  his	  distributive	  justice	  principle	  does	  not	  tender	  a	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A	  second	  point	  worth	  noting	  is	  that	  if	  the	  imperiled	  party	  is	  the	  party	  in	  a	  position	  to	  distribute	  the	  threatened	  harm,	  she	  is	  permitted	  to	  do	  so	  and	  others	  would	  be	  wrong	  in	  preventing	  her	  from	  protecting	  herself	  –	  including	  Aggressor,	  who	  cannot	  claim	  self-­‐defense	  against	  Victim’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  force.	  	  Thus,	  Victim	  has	  a	  claim	  right	  to	  use	  self-­‐defensive	  force.11	  	  Relatedly,	  if	  a	  third	  party	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  distribute	  the	  threatened	  harm,	  then	  not	  only	  is	  she	  justified	  in	  distributing	  the	  harm	  away	  from	  the	  innocent	  party	  onto	  the	  culpable	  party	  if	  she	  intervenes,	  but	  she	  is	  morally	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  	  This	  last	  point	  has	  two	  important	  implications:	  it	  grounds	  the	  notion	  of	  other-­‐defense,	  and	  it	  also	  blocks	  agents	  from	  intervening	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  culpable	  party	  (one	  would	  not	  be	  justified	  in	  coming	  to	  the	  aid	  of	  an	  aggressor	  to	  defend	  him	  from	  harm).	  Third,	  note	  that	  Montague	  claims	  that	  any	  number	  of	  culpable	  agents	  can	  be	  harmed	  in	  defense	  of	  the	  innocent.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  putting	  the	  claim	  is	  to	  say	  that	  harm	  to	  multiple	  culpable	  parties	  is	  not	  aggregated	  for	  purposes	  of	  proportionality	  considerations.	  	  The	  apparent	  explanation	  here	  must	  be	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  an	  innocent	  victim	  and	  each	  of	  any	  number	  of	  her	  culpable	  aggressors.	  	  Yet	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  only	  exists	  between	  the	  victim	  and	  the	  culpable	  agent	  relative	  to	  the	  threatened	  harm	  that	  the	  culpable	  agent	  created.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  victim	  (or	  third	  party)	  is	  forced	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  regarding	  only	  the	  threatened	  harm.	  	  A	  culpable	  party	  can	  only	  be	  harmed	  when	  necessary	  to	  avert	  the	  threat	  he	  created;	  he	  can’t	  be	  harmed	  to	  avert	  a	  separate	  threat	  he	  didn’t	  create.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  straightforward	  answer	  regarding	  the	  permissibility	  of	  acting.	  	  See	  Montague,	  
Punishment	  as	  Societal-­‐Defense,	  45-­‐46.	  11	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Choosing,”	  211;	  Phillip	  Montague,	  "Self-­‐Defence	  and	  Innocence:	  Aggressors	  and	  Active	  Threats,"	  Utilitas	  12,	  no.	  01	  (2000):	  63.	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2.1.1	  Limitations	  of	  Montague’s	  Theory	  Montague’s	  forced	  choice	  theory	  provides	  a	  compelling	  explanatory	  account	  for	  why	  victims	  may	  sometimes	  justifiably	  use	  defensive	  harm	  against	  culpable	  parties.	  	  But	  extending	  the	  framework	  to	  evaluate	  defensive	  killing	  in	  war	  isn’t	  as	  compelling	  under	  Montague’s	  hand.	  	  In	  brief	  remarks,	  Montague	  argues	  his	  distributive	  justice	  theory	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  defensive	  warfare	  by	  viewing	  nations	  “as	  sometimes	  faced	  with	  forced	  choices	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  burdens	  whose	  existence	  is	  the	  fault	  of	  other,	  aggressor	  nations	  and	  then	  infer	  that	  the	  former	  have	  a	  right,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  to	  distribute	  the	  burdens	  in	  their	  own	  favor.”12	  	  Several	  points	  can	  be	  raised	  against	  this	  approach,	  such	  as	  its	  reliance	  on	  a	  questionable	  domestic	  analogy,	  or	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  lacks	  important	  nuance	  in	  that	  it	  only	  leads	  to	  the	  broad	  generalization	  that	  one	  state	  is	  justified	  in	  using	  force,	  while	  the	  other	  is	  not.	  The	  more	  telling	  point,	  however,	  is	  that	  Montague’s	  framework	  simply	  can’t	  capture	  the	  many	  nuances	  of	  wartime	  killing.	  	  Montague’s	  original	  insight	  was	  to	  see	  that	  the	  broad,	  widely	  accepted	  ideas	  of	  distributive	  justice	  and	  fairness	  could	  provide	  an	  explanatory	  account	  for	  justified	  self-­‐defensive	  harm.	  	  But	  as	  Montague	  points	  out,	  his	  theoretical	  framework	  only	  applies	  to	  situations	  involving	  culpable	  agents;	  his	  theory	  is	  non-­‐applicable	  to	  situations	  involving	  non-­‐culpable	  agents,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  straightforwardly.13	  	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  during	  war	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  combatants	  are	  truly	  culpable;	  many	  have	  excusing	  conditions	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Montague,	  Punishment	  as	  Societal-­‐Defense,	  60.	  13	  Montague,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  Distributive	  Justice,”	  86;	  Montague,	  Punishment	  as	  
Societal-­‐Defense,	  46.	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absolve	  or	  mitigate	  their	  culpability,	  while	  others	  yet	  are	  completely	  innocent.	  	  So	  Montague’s	  theory	  appears	  too	  limited	  for	  evaluating	  complex	  wartime	  killing.	  Relatedly,	  during	  war	  many	  people	  lack	  culpability	  and	  yet	  bear	  moral	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  forced	  choice	  situations	  that	  innocent	  persons	  face.	  	  But	  given	  their	  lack	  of	  culpability,	  Montague’s	  forced	  choice	  theory	  allows	  these	  responsible	  individuals	  to	  fall	  outside	  the	  liability	  net.	  	  One	  might	  think	  this	  result	  unfair	  given	  that	  such	  individuals	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  threatening	  situation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  innocent	  threatened	  victims	  don’t.	  	  Enter	  McMahan’s	  theory.	  	  McMahan’s	  approach	  draws	  heavily	  from	  Montague’s	  in	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  is	  also	  grounded	  in	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  agents.	  	  But	  McMahan	  expands	  Montague’s	  basic	  framework	  by	  shifting	  the	  liability	  criterion	  from	  
culpability	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  to	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  He	  also	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  application	  of	  his	  theory	  to	  wartime	  killing.	  	  So	  we	  turn	  now	  to	  an	  evaluation	  of	  McMahan’s	  theory.	  
2.2.	  Jeff	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  of	  War	  as	  Self-­‐Defense	  Over	  many	  years	  and	  through	  numerous	  publications,	  McMahan	  has	  tendered	  an	  ever-­‐increasingly	  influential	  theory	  of	  justified	  defensive	  harm	  covering	  both	  individual	  and	  national	  defense	  situations.14	  	  Given	  the	  extent	  of	  his	  work,	  a	  full	  survey	  is	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  Instead,	  the	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  give	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  McMahan’s	  theory,	  highlighting	  along	  the	  way	  those	  aspects	  that	  will	  later	  prove	  especially	  salient	  for	  analyzing	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Although	  McMahan’s	  theory	  has	  garnered	  much	  support,	  his	  position	  is	  not	  without	  its	  critics.	  	  For	  some	  of	  the	  more	  challenging	  objections,	  see	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  
Self-­‐Defense,	  especially	  Ch.	  5;	  Lazar,	  “Responsibility,	  Risk,	  and	  Killing,”	  699-­‐728;	  Lazar,	  “The	  Responsibility	  Dilemma,”	  180-­‐213.	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Although	  he	  follows	  the	  general	  outline	  of	  Montague’s	  forced	  choice	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  McMahan	  nevertheless	  considerably	  broadens	  Montague’s	  distributive	  justice	  theory	  in	  two	  important	  ways.	  	  First,	  McMahan	  lowers	  the	  threshold	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  defensive	  harm;	  whereas	  Montague	  focused	  on	  an	  agent’s	  culpability	  in	  creating	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation,	  McMahan	  argues	  instead	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation	  is	  the	  threshold	  for	  justifying	  defensive	  harm.	  	  This	  move	  greatly	  expands	  the	  pool	  of	  liability	  because	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  more	  inclusive	  than	  culpability	  regarding	  unjust	  threats:	  all	  culpable	  agents	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  threats,	  but	  even	  more	  agents	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  threats	  while	  lacking	  culpability.	  Second,	  working	  from	  the	  reductive	  claim	  that	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  war	  reduce	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  governing	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense,	  McMahan	  extends	  his	  theory	  to	  justify	  defensive	  force	  during	  war.	  	  McMahan’s	  symmetrical	  thesis	  is	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  both	  individual	  and	  national	  defense,	  if	  unavoidable	  harm	  must	  fall	  to	  either	  an	  innocent	  party	  or	  a	  party	  morally	  responsible	  for	  creating	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  the	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  responsible	  party	  rather	  than	  the	  innocent.	  
2.2.1.	  Montague’s	  Influence	  on	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  Before	  proceeding,	  it	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  Montague’s	  theoretical	  influence	  on	  McMahan’s	  work.	  	  Numerous	  passages	  throughout	  McMahan’s	  work	  confirm	  this	  point.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  earlier	  work	  McMahan	  states	  that	  “in	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  person’s	  culpable	  action	  has	  made	  it	  inevitable	  that	  someone	  must	  suffer	  harm,	  it	  is	  normally	  permissible,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  culpable	  person	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himself	  suffers	  the	  costs	  of	  his	  own	  wrongful	  action	  rather	  than	  to	  allow	  those	  costs	  to	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  innocent.”15	  In	  a	  similar	  vein	  McMahan	  writes:	  Consider	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  unavoidable	  that	  one	  of	  two	  people	  will	  die	  and	  in	  which	  one	  of	  the	  two	  bears	  a	  slight	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  for	  this	  fact	  while	  the	  other	  bears	  no	  responsibility	  at	  all.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  this,	  even	  a	  slight	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  for	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  someone	  must	  die,	  and	  especially	  a	  very	  slight	  degree	  of	  culpability,	  can	  be	  sufficient	  to	  override	  the	  presumption	  against	  intentional	  killing.16	  	  Elsewhere,	  McMahan	  notes	  that	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  follows	  from	  “the	  distribution	  of	  harm	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  justice”17,	  and	  that	  “self-­‐defense	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  ex	  ante	  distribution	  of	  unavoidable	  harm”.18	  	  These	  references	  clearly	  situate	  McMahan’s	  work	  within	  the	  broad	  distributive	  justice	  framework	  for	  justifying	  defensive	  harm	  –	  a	  framework	  first	  articulated	  by	  Montague.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  extending	  the	  distributive	  justice	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense	  by	  focusing	  on	  moral	  responsibility,	  McMahan’s	  project	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  nuanced	  elaboration	  and	  defense	  of	  Montague’s	  original	  framework.	  
2.2.2	  McMahan’s	  Terminology	  In	  order	  to	  discuss	  McMahan’s	  work	  more	  efficiently,	  it	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  clarify	  some	  terminology.	  	  McMahan	  refers	  to	  his	  overall	  theory	  as	  a	  “Responsibility	  Account”	  of	  the	  justified	  use	  of	  defensive	  force,	  which	  applies	  symmetrically	  to	  both	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War,"	  Ethics	  114,	  no.	  4	  (2004):	  401.	  	  See	  also	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "Self-­‐Defense	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  the	  Innocent	  Attacker,"	  Ethics	  104,	  no.	  2	  (1994):	  259.	  16	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  227.	  17	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability	  in	  War,"	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Philosophy	  16,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  234.	  18	  Ibid.	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individual	  and	  national	  defense	  situations.19	  	  When	  discussing	  war	  in	  particular,	  McMahan	  employs	  the	  following	  technical	  terms	  to	  refer	  to	  various	  agents.20	  	  Individuals	  fighting	  on	  the	  just	  side	  of	  a	  war	  are	  “just	  combatants,”	  while	  those	  fighting	  on	  the	  unjust	  side	  are	  “unjust	  combatants.”21	  	  Parallel	  claims	  hold	  true	  for	  civilians:	  “just	  civilians”	  are	  those	  within	  a	  state	  fighting	  a	  just	  war,	  and	  “unjust	  civilians”	  are	  those	  within	  the	  state	  fighting	  an	  unjust	  cause.	  	  “Neutral	  civilians”	  are	  civilians	  located	  in	  neutral	  states.22	  	  Although	  McMahan	  acknowledges	  that	  “civilian”	  and	  “noncombatant”	  are	  not	  actually	  synonyms	  on	  his	  account,	  he	  nonetheless	  uses	  them	  interchangeably.	  	  The	  term	  “bystander”	  refers	  to	  a	  person	  not	  causally	  implicated	  in	  a	  threat,	  though	  importantly	  the	  person	  could	  still	  bear	  moral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	  his	  earlier	  writings,	  McMahan	  referred	  to	  his	  theory	  as	  a	  “justice-­‐based	  account”	  of	  self-­‐defense.	  	  See	  McMahan,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing,	  402;	  McMahan,	  “Self-­‐Defense	  and	  the	  Problem,”	  259.	  	  Elsewhere,	  McMahan	  refers	  to	  his	  theory	  as	  a	  “liability	  account.”	  	  See	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm	  Between	  Combatants	  and	  Noncombatants,"	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  38,	  no.	  4	  (2010):	  351.	  	  McMahan	  has	  more	  recently	  called	  his	  theory	  a	  “responsibility	  account.”	  	  See	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable	  to	  be	  Killed	  in	  War,"	  Analysis	  71,	  no.	  3	  (2011):	  545.	  	  I	  will	  follow	  the	  “responsibility	  account”	  terminology.	  20	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  345;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  212.	  21	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  5;	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  345.	  	  For	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  we	  can	  roughly	  say	  that	  McMahan’s	  use	  of	  the	  category	  “combatants”	  includes	  men	  and	  women	  in	  uniform	  during	  times	  of	  war,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  small	  number	  of	  civilians	  who	  either	  pose	  a	  threat	  during	  war,	  or	  provide	  the	  materials	  that	  make	  warfighters	  dangerous	  –	  such	  as	  munitions	  workers.	  22	  Because	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  discuss	  connections	  between	  citizenship	  and	  civilian	  status,	  his	  tripartite	  civilian	  classification	  could	  seem	  misleading.	  	  For	  instance,	  a	  neutral	  state	  citizen	  who	  happens	  to	  be	  located	  within	  an	  unjust	  state	  during	  war	  (suppose	  she	  was	  traveling	  through	  when	  war	  broke	  out)	  is	  by	  definition	  an	  “unjust	  civilian”	  rather	  than	  a	  “neutral	  civilian.”	  	  I	  think	  the	  more	  natural	  way	  to	  read	  McMahan	  on	  this	  point	  is	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  citizens	  of	  the	  state	  lacking	  a	  just	  cause.	  	  Citizens	  of	  other	  states	  who	  happen	  to	  be	  located	  within	  the	  unjust	  state	  and	  who	  aren’t	  otherwise	  implicated	  by	  supporting	  the	  unjust	  threat	  would	  be	  considered	  neutral	  bystanders	  (or	  perhaps	  neutral	  third	  parties).	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responsibility	  for	  the	  threat.23	  	  Finally,	  McMahan	  refers	  to	  foreseeable	  but	  unintended	  harm	  to	  civilians	  resulting	  from	  military	  operations	  as	  “side-­‐effect	  harm.”24	  	  I	  will	  follow	  McMahan’s	  terminology	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  “side-­‐effect	  harm,”	  for	  which	  I	  will	  use	  the	  more	  traditional	  expression	  “collateral	  harm.”	  
2.2.3	  McMahan’s	  Criteria	  for	  Liability	  to	  Defensive	  Harm	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  is	  a	  forfeiture	  theory	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  working	  from	  the	  foundational	  assumption	  that	  everyone	  has	  a	  presumptive	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  others	  –	  a	  right	  that	  can	  be	  forfeited	  through	  one’s	  actions.	  	  As	  McMahan	  notes,	  “to	  attack	  someone	  who	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  attacked	  is	  neither	  to	  violate	  nor	  to	  infringe	  that	  person’s	  right,	  for	  the	  person’s	  being	  liable	  to	  attack	  just	  is	  his	  having	  
forfeited	  his	  right	  not	  to	  be	  attacked,	  in	  the	  circumstances.”25	  	  Forfeiting	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  just	  is	  to	  become	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed,	  and	  if	  one	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed,	  then	  one	  is	  not	  wronged	  when	  harmed.	  	   The	  expression	  “in	  the	  circumstances”	  in	  the	  previous	  quote	  is	  important.	  	  One	  can	  forfeit	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  but	  such	  forfeiture	  doesn’t	  entail	  a	  forfeiture	  of	  rights	  in	  general;	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  any	  person	  can	  harm	  a	  liable	  party	  for	  any	  reason.	  	  Rather,	  harming	  a	  liable	  party	  must	  be	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  threatened	  party.	  	  For	  illustration,	  imagine	  a	  scenario	  where	  Aggressor	  unjustifiably	  attacks	  Victim.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  Aggressor	  has	  forfeited	  his	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  in	  a	  very	  specific	  way	  relative	  to	  Victim.	  	  Specifically,	  two	  conditions	  must	  be	  met:	  harming	  Aggressor	  must	  be	  absolutely	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  the	  wrongful	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  172.	  24	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  345.	  25	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  10,	  original	  emphasis.	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harm	  to	  Victim	  for	  which	  Aggressor	  is	  responsible,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  harm	  to	  Aggressor	  must	  not	  be	  excessive	  relative	  to	  the	  averted	  harm	  to	  Victim.26	  	  McMahan	  refers	  to	  these	  two	  conditions	  using	  the	  traditional	  just	  war	  terms	  “necessity”	  and	  “proportionality.”	  In	  a	  novel	  move	  breaking	  from	  traditional	  just	  war	  literature,	  McMahan	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  proportionality	  requirements:	  narrow	  proportionality	  and	  wide	  proportionality.27	  	  Narrow	  proportionality	  requires	  that	  the	  harm	  to	  potential	  liable	  parties	  not	  be	  excessive	  relative	  to	  the	  threat	  the	  liable	  parties	  pose.	  	  So	  if	  Aggressor	  threatens	  to	  bruise	  Victim,	  Victim’s	  use	  of	  lethal	  force	  against	  Aggressor	  would	  be	  narrowly	  disproportionate.	  	  Wide	  proportionality,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  requires	  that	  unintended	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  not	  be	  excessive	  relative	  to	  the	  act’s	  intended	  goal.	  	  Suppose	  Aggressor	  attacks	  with	  a	  knife;	  if	  Victim’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  would	  kill	  several	  bystanders	  in	  addition	  to	  Aggressor,	  then	  Victim’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  would	  be	  disproportionate	  in	  the	  wide	  sense.	  	  	  McMahan	  claims	  that	  liability’s	  necessity	  and	  proportionality	  restrictions	  are	  “internal”	  to	  liability	  itself.28	  	  So	  if	  harming	  Aggressor	  would	  either	  prove	  unnecessary	  or	  cause	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  harm	  to	  Aggressor	  or	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  then	  Aggressor	  would	  be	  non-­‐liable	  and	  Victim’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  harm	  would	  be	  unjustified.	  Note	  the	  completely	  pragmatic	  nature	  of	  the	  necessity	  requirement:	  the	  justification	  behind	  harming	  a	  liable	  party	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  10.	  27	  Ibid.,	  20-­‐21.	  28	  Ibid.,10.	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instrumental	  purpose	  of	  protecting	  the	  victim.29	  	  On	  the	  Responsibility	  Account,	  harming	  a	  liable	  party	  is	  not	  judged	  as	  good	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  	  But	  if	  harming	  a	  liable	  party	  can	  help	  protect	  the	  threatened	  party,	  then	  such	  harm	  is	  justified;	  if	  justified,	  then	  the	  threatened	  party	  can	  harm	  the	  liable	  party	  in	  self-­‐defense.	  	  And	  since	  the	  reasons	  for	  harming	  the	  liable	  party	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  agent-­‐neutral	  notion	  of	  fairness,	  such	  reasons	  also	  justify	  others	  in	  distributing	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  liable	  party	  (commonly	  called	  “other-­‐defense”).	  	  Because	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense	  are	  justified	  harming,	  others	  cannot	  prevent	  the	  harm.	  	   With	  this	  understanding	  of	  liability	  in	  place,	  we	  can	  now	  examine	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  Account.	  	  McMahan’s	  criterion	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  is:	  In	  both	  individual	  and	  national	  defense,	  an	  individual	  is	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  if	  he	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat,	  or	  a	  threat	  of	  wrongful	  harm.30	  	  	  So	  if	  an	  Agent	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  creating	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation	  where	  harm	  is	  threatened	  to	  innocent	  Victim,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  Agent	  is	  liable	  to	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  harm	  for	  purposes	  of	  averting	  harm	  to	  Victim.	  	  Importantly,	  one	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  of	  harm	  without	  being	  the	  party	  who	  actually	  threatens	  the	  harm.31	  	  For	  example,	  if	  Agent	  hires	  Thug	  to	  murder	  Victim,	  Agent	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat	  even	  though	  Thug	  is	  the	  agent	  who	  poses	  the	  threat	  (Thug	  of	  course	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  well).	  	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  Agent	  is	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  if	  harming	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  8,	  19.	  30	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  227,	  234;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War:	  35,	  157.	  31	  Ibid.,	  157,	  207.	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Agent	  would	  avert	  the	  harm	  to	  Victim	  –	  even	  though	  Agent	  doesn’t	  directly	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  Victim.	  	  Thug	  would	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  as	  well.	  It’s	  worth	  underscoring	  the	  objective	  nature	  of	  McMahan’s	  approach.	  	  On	  the	  Responsibility	  Account,	  whether	  a	  threat	  of	  harm	  stands	  as	  just	  or	  unjust	  is	  an	  all	  things	  considered	  objective	  determination.	  	  The	  threatening	  agent’s	  subjective	  viewpoint	  does	  not	  determine	  the	  objective	  permissibility	  of	  her	  action;	  rather,	  the	  wrongness	  of	  an	  act	  hinges	  on	  whether	  the	  threatened	  party	  is	  liable	  to	  the	  threatened	  harm.	  	  The	  key	  point	  for	  liability	  purposes	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  act	  subjectively	  permissibly	  but	  objectively	  impermissibly.32	  	  The	  objective	  nature	  of	  a	  threat	  is	  what	  grounds	  liability	  to	  defensive	  force;	  the	  threatening	  agent’s	  subjective	  assessment	  can	  at	  best	  excuse	  her	  blameworthiness	  regarding	  the	  threat	  for	  which	  she	  is	  responsible.	  
2.2.4	  Moral	  Responsibility	  for	  an	  Objectively	  Unjust	  Threat	  Both	  Montague	  and	  McMahan	  ground	  their	  accounts	  of	  defensive	  harm	  on	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  involved	  parties.	  	  But	  whereas	  Montague	  focuses	  on	  an	  agent’s	  culpability	  in	  creating	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation,	  McMahan	  shifts	  the	  focus	  to	  an	  agent’s	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice.	  	  Importantly,	  one	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  a	  wrongful	  harm	  without	  being	  blameworthy.	  	  	  For	  McMahan,	  there	  are	  two	  necessary	  and	  jointly	  sufficient	  conditions	  that	  entail	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  harm.	  	  For	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  harm	  x,	  agent	  must	  (1)	  voluntarily	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  (2)	  foreseeably	  poses	  a	  risk	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  x	  to	  a	  non-­‐liable	  party.	  	  If	  agent	  meets	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  164.	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both	  of	  these	  conditions	  and	  wrongful	  harm	  x	  materializes,	  then	  agent	  can	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  force	  to	  prevent	  harm	  x.	  	  According	  to	  McMahan	  “a	  person	  cannot	  become	  liable	  to	  defensive	  action	  without	  having	  engaged	  in	  some	  form	  of	  voluntary	  action	  that	  had	  some	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  risk	  of	  creating	  a	  wrongful	  threat.”33	  The	  idea	  that	  foreseeability	  is	  a	  necessary	  requirement	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  a	  common	  sentiment,	  echoed	  here	  by	  Peter	  Vallentyne:	  Suppose	  someone	  flicks	  on	  a	  light	  switch	  and,	  unbeknownst	  to	  her,	  sets	  off	  a	  bomb.	  	  Setting	  off	  the	  bomb	  is	  an	  unforeseen	  outcome	  of	  her	  choice.	  	  It’s	  relatively	  uncontroversial	  that,	  where	  agents	  do	  not	  foresee	  an	  outcome	  and	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  failure	  to	  foresee	  it,	  they	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  that	  outcome.	  	  Such	  unforeseen	  outcomes	  play	  no	  role	  in	  choice	  deliberations	  and	  agents	  are	  thus	  not	  responsible	  for	  them.34	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  William	  Rowe	  writes:	  When	  a	  person	  does	  something	  that	  results	  in	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  obtaining	  that	  would	  not	  have	  obtained	  had	  he	  not	  done	  what	  he	  did,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  person	  causes	  (or	  causally	  contributes	  to)	  the	  obtaining	  of	  that	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  Moreover,	  if	  the	  person	  could	  have	  avoided	  doing	  what	  he	  did,	  thus	  preventing	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  from	  obtaining,	  the	  person	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  provided	  he	  foresaw	  (or	  ought	  to	  have	  foreseen)	  that	  it	  would	  result	  from	  his	  action.35	  	  Both	  Vallentyne’s	  and	  Rowe’s	  remarks	  encompass	  two	  important	  claims.	  	  First,	  an	  agent	  (A)	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  causing	  unjustified	  harm	  x	  if	  A	  chooses	  to	  act	  while	  foreseeing	  that	  her	  act	  might	  cause	  x.	  	  Second,	  A	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  x	  if	  A	  acts	  in	  a	  way	  that	  causes	  x	  and	  A	  should	  have	  foreseen	  the	  possibility	  that	  her	  act	  might	  cause	  x.	  	  In	  the	  former	  case,	  A	  knowingly	  puts	  others	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  177.	  34	  Peter	  Vallentyne,	  “Responsibility	  and	  False	  Beliefs,”	  in	  Carl	  Knight	  and	  Zofia	  Stemplowska,	  Responsibility	  and	  Distributive	  Justice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  178.	  35	  William	  Rowe,	  “Causing	  and	  Being	  Responsible	  for	  What	  Is	  Inevitable,”	  in	  John	  Martin	  Fischer	  and	  Mark	  Ravizza,	  Perspectives	  on	  Moral	  Responsibility	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  310,	  original	  emphasis.	  
	   33	  
risk	  of	  x,	  while	  in	  the	  latter	  case,	  A’s	  moral	  responsibility	  hinges	  on	  her	  blameworthiness	  in	  failing	  to	  foresee	  the	  risk	  she	  should	  have	  foreseen	  (i.e.,	  A	  is	  epistemically	  negligent).	  McMahan	  captures	  the	  forgoing	  conception	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  in	  the	  following	  example:	  
The	  Conscientious	  Driver.	  	  A	  person	  who	  always	  keeps	  her	  car	  well	  maintained	  and	  always	  drives	  carefully	  and	  alertly	  decides	  to	  drive	  to	  the	  cinema.	  	  On	  the	  way,	  a	  freak	  event	  that	  she	  could	  not	  have	  anticipated	  occurs	  that	  causes	  her	  car	  to	  veer	  out	  of	  control	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  pedestrian.36	  	  Driver	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  she	  poses	  to	  pedestrian	  because	  driver	  meets	  the	  necessary	  and	  jointly	  sufficient	  conditions.	  	  Driver’s	  threat	  is	  objectively	  unjustified	  because	  pedestrian	  did	  nothing	  to	  make	  himself	  liable	  to	  harm;	  if	  run	  over,	  pedestrian	  would	  be	  wrongfully	  harmed.	  	  Additionally,	  driver’s	  action	  was	  voluntary	  because	  she	  could	  have	  chosen	  otherwise.	  	  It	  was	  also	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  that	  operating	  a	  2,000-­‐pound	  vehicle	  could	  wrongfully	  harm	  an	  innocent	  person	  –	  even	  if	  the	  vehicle	  is	  well	  maintained	  and	  driven	  carefully.	  	  So	  for	  McMahan,	  driver	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  and	  therefore	  liable	  to	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  harm	  to	  protect	  pedestrian	  –	  up	  to	  and	  including	  deadly	  force.	  	   If	  one	  shares	  the	  intuition	  that	  pedestrian	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  using	  defensive	  force	  to	  preserve	  her	  life,	  then	  clearly	  culpability	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Driver	  highlights	  the	  crucial	  fact	  that	  even	  a	  slight	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  parties	  based	  on	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  165.	  	  McMahan	  previously	  presented	  a	  version	  of	  this	  hypothetical	  titled	  “The	  Inadvertent	  Attacker.”	  	  See	  McMahan,	  “The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing	  in	  War,”	  403.	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unjust	  threat	  can	  ground	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  if	  unavoidable	  harm	  must	  fall	  to	  one	  of	  two	  parties,	  the	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  party	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation,	  even	  if	  that	  level	  of	  responsibility	  is	  quite	  low	  and	  unintentional.	  	  Driver’s	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  in	  fact	  low:	  she	  carefully	  drove	  a	  well-­‐maintained	  car.	  	  But	  driver	  voluntarily	  chose	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  foreseeably	  risk-­‐imposing	  activity	  and,	  through	  bad	  luck,	  the	  foreseeable	  harm	  materialized.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  pedestrian	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  bear	  the	  lethal	  harm	  that	  driver	  created.	  Perhaps	  more	  applicable	  for	  purposes	  of	  evaluating	  liability	  during	  war,	  McMahan	  offers	  the	  following	  example	  that	  includes	  intent	  to	  harm:	  
The	  Resident.	  	  The	  identical	  twin	  of	  a	  notorious	  mass	  murderer	  is	  driving	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  stormy	  night	  in	  a	  remote	  area	  when	  his	  car	  breaks	  down.	  	  He	  is	  nonculpably	  unaware	  that	  his	  twin	  brother,	  the	  murderer,	  has	  within	  the	  past	  few	  hours	  escaped	  from	  prison	  in	  just	  this	  area,	  and	  that	  the	  residents	  have	  been	  warned	  of	  the	  escape.	  	  The	  murderer’s	  notoriety	  derives	  from	  his	  invariable	  modus	  operandi:	  he	  violently	  breaks	  into	  people’s	  homes	  and	  kills	  them	  instantly.	  	  As	  the	  twin	  whose	  car	  has	  broken	  down	  approaches	  a	  house	  to	  request	  to	  use	  the	  telephone,	  the	  resident	  of	  the	  house	  takes	  aim	  to	  shoot	  him,	  preemptively,	  believing	  him	  to	  be	  the	  murderer.37	  	  Resident’s	  action	  is	  objectively	  wrong	  because	  he	  intends	  to	  kill	  an	  innocent	  person	  who	  isn’t	  liable	  to	  be	  killed.	  	  Resident	  acts	  voluntarily	  in	  that	  he	  chooses	  to	  shoot	  twin;	  he	  could	  have	  chosen	  instead	  to	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  harmed,	  or	  attempted	  evasion,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Moreover,	  it’s	  reasonable	  to	  foresee	  that	  choosing	  to	  shoot	  someone	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  harming	  an	  innocent	  person.	  	  Mistaken	  identity	  is	  a	  genuine	  possibility,	  which	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  case	  here.	  	  On	  McMahan’s	  analysis,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	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resident	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  posing	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  to	  an	  innocent	  person.	  	  Accordingly,	  resident	  is	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  At	  this	  point	  the	  natural	  reaction	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  resident’s	  actions	  are	  reasonable	  given	  the	  situation.	  	  He	  seems	  epistemically	  justified	  in	  believing	  that	  twin	  is	  the	  murderer	  given	  his	  identical	  likeness,	  coupled	  with	  resident’s	  ignorance	  that	  murderer	  had	  a	  twin.	  	  Moreover,	  resident	  clearly	  acts	  in	  what	  he	  reasonably	  perceives	  as	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  situation	  and	  so	  acts	  under	  duress.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  points	  gesture	  toward	  the	  important	  issue	  of	  excuses	  and	  the	  role	  they	  play	  in	  the	  Responsibility	  Account.	  McMahan’s	  discussion	  of	  excuses	  is	  extensive,	  running	  a	  whole	  chapter	  in	  
Killing	  in	  War.38	  	  McMahan	  identifies	  three	  general	  types	  of	  excuse:	  epistemic	  limitation,	  duress,	  and	  diminished	  responsibility,39	  though	  only	  the	  first	  two	  are	  generally	  applicable	  during	  war.40	  	  The	  conceptual	  claim	  underlying	  an	  excuse	  is	  the	  judgment	  that	  although	  an	  agent	  performs	  a	  wrongful	  act,	  she	  shouldn’t	  be	  considered	  blameworthy	  because	  of	  some	  special	  excusing	  condition.	  	  Excuses	  vary	  in	  strength,	  running	  from	  partial	  to	  full.	  	  Whereas	  partial	  excuses	  can	  mitigate	  an	  agent’s	  culpability	  for	  wrongdoing,	  a	  full	  excuse	  can	  completely	  absolve	  an	  agent’s	  culpability.	  In	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  resident	  seemingly	  has	  an	  excuse	  of	  epistemic	  limitation	  given	  his	  justifiable	  but	  mistaken	  belief	  that	  twin	  is	  the	  murderer.	  	  Epistemic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  Ch.	  4.	  39	  Ibid.,	  116.	  40	  The	  third	  is	  sometimes	  applicable	  in	  cases	  of	  child	  soldiers.	  	  Ibid.,	  200-­‐02.	  	  But	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  child	  soldiers,	  McMahan	  thinks	  most	  still	  bear	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  threats	  they	  pose	  because	  children	  as	  young	  as	  ten	  are	  still	  able	  to	  make	  moral	  assessments.	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limitation	  can	  excuse	  an	  agent	  if	  his	  act	  would	  not	  have	  been	  wrongful	  had	  his	  mistaken	  belief	  been	  true.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  resident	  would	  not	  have	  acted	  wrongly	  had	  it	  been	  true	  that	  he	  was	  about	  to	  be	  slain	  by	  murderer.	  	  Additionally,	  although	  resident	  is	  mistaken	  about	  his	  reasonable	  belief	  that	  he	  is	  in	  a	  life-­‐threatening	  situation,	  his	  perceived	  situation	  also	  raises	  the	  excuse	  of	  duress.	  	  The	  root	  claim	  underlying	  duress	  is	  that	  some	  threats	  of	  harm	  or	  coercive	  force	  can	  so	  overwhelm	  an	  agent’s	  will	  that	  she	  can’t	  help	  but	  respond	  in	  a	  given	  way.	  Yet	  importantly,	  McMahan	  thinks	  resident	  is	  still	  liable	  to	  defensive	  force.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  resident,	  excuses	  only	  defeat	  culpability,	  not	  moral	  responsibility.41	  	  The	  explanation	  is	  straightforward;	  neither	  epistemic	  mistake	  nor	  duress	  negate	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  agent	  has	  voluntarily	  chosen	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  harming	  innocent	  people.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  epistemic	  mistake,	  it	  was	  foreseeable	  that	  resident’s	  intended	  victim	  might	  in	  fact	  be	  innocent,	  but	  resident	  still	  chose	  to	  employ	  deadly	  force.	  Regarding	  the	  claim	  of	  duress,	  it	  is	  almost	  never	  the	  case	  that	  an	  agent	  couldn’t	  have	  chosen	  otherwise;	  acting	  under	  duress	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  involuntariness.	  	  As	  McMahan	  points	  out,	  “duress	  is	  never	  literally	  irresistible.”42	  	  The	  fact	  that	  others	  can	  resist	  the	  coercive	  pressures	  of	  most	  duress	  situations	  establishes	  the	  possibility	  of	  choice,	  even	  if	  the	  number	  is	  small.43	  	  A	  person’s	  will	  is	  almost	  never	  overwhelmed	  to	  the	  point	  of	  literally	  not	  being	  able	  to	  make	  a	  choice,	  and	  so	  duress	  almost	  never	  absolves	  an	  agent	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  If	  an	  agent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  162.	  42	  Ibid.,	  175.	  43	  Ibid.,	  162.	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could	  have	  chosen	  otherwise,	  then	  the	  act	  is	  still	  his.44	  	  Thus,	  agents	  possessing	  partial	  and	  full	  excusing	  conditions	  for	  the	  unjust	  threats	  they	  pose	  are	  nevertheless	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  given	  their	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  expect	  an	  innocent	  victim	  to	  bear	  a	  threatened	  harm	  rather	  than	  the	  agent	  who	  created	  it	  –	  even	  if	  the	  latter	  acted	  under	  duress	  or	  mistaken	  belief.	  Finally,	  for	  sake	  of	  completeness,	  let’s	  revisit	  the	  foreseeability	  condition	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  by	  contrasting	  Resident	  and	  Driver	  with	  Cell	  Phone	  Operator:	  A	  man’s	  cell	  phone	  has,	  without	  his	  knowledge,	  been	  reprogrammed	  so	  that	  when	  he	  next	  presses	  the	  “send”	  button,	  the	  phone	  will	  send	  a	  signal	  that	  will	  detonate	  a	  bomb	  that	  will	  then	  kill	  an	  innocent	  person.	  	  Operator	  neither	  chooses	  to	  harm	  (unlike	  resident),	  nor	  engages	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  reasonably	  poses	  a	  foreseeable	  risk	  of	  harm	  (unlike	  driver).	  	  It	  is	  unreasonable	  for	  operator	  to	  foresee	  that	  his	  act	  of	  pressing	  the	  send	  button	  might	  result	  in	  a	  lethal	  threat	  to	  someone;	  such	  anticipation	  would	  be	  bizarre.	  	  If	  one	  engages	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  eventuates	  in	  a	  completely	  unforeseeable	  forced-­‐choice	  scenario,	  then	  one	  isn’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat.	  	  So	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  Account,	  even	  though	  operator	  poses	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat,	  he	  lacks	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  threat	  he	  poses	  because	  the	  threat	  wasn’t	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  (he’s	  a	  “non-­‐responsible	  threat”).	  	  Accordingly,	  operator	  isn’t	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm;	  the	  potential	  victim	  or	  someone	  acting	  on	  her	  behalf	  would	  be	  unjustified	  in	  preemptively	  killing	  operator.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Arthur	  Ripstein,	  Equality,	  Responsibility,	  and	  the	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999):	  Ch.	  5.	  
	   38	  
2.2.5	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  Applied	  to	  War	  According	  to	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  war,	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  war	  reduce	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  governing	  individual	  defense.	  	  The	  difference	  between	  individual	  and	  national	  defense	  thus	  comes	  down	  to	  the	  increased	  complexity	  and	  scope	  of	  war.	  	  Yet	  if	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  war	  and	  McMahan’s	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  defensive	  harm	  are	  both	  true,	  then	  the	  Responsibility	  Account	  should	  extend	  to	  provide	  justification	  for	  defensive	  harming	  during	  war.	  	   One	  crucial	  aspect	  for	  understanding	  McMahan’s	  analysis	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  is	  the	  objective	  rightness	  or	  wrongness	  of	  the	  war	  itself.	  	  Whether	  a	  state	  is	  the	  aggressor	  or	  defender	  profoundly	  impacts	  the	  liability	  determinations	  of	  its	  combatants	  and	  civilians.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  traditional	  just	  war	  theory,	  which	  holds	  that	  combatants	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  war	  are	  morally	  justified	  in	  killing	  each	  other,45	  while	  noncombatants	  on	  both	  sides	  lack	  liability	  altogether.	  	  The	  differences	  between	  the	  traditional	  theory	  and	  McMahan’s	  revisionist	  approach	  will	  readily	  become	  apparent.	  
2.2.6	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  Applied	  to	  Just	  Combatants	  Applying	  the	  Responsibility	  Account	  to	  combatants	  who	  fight	  on	  the	  just	  side	  of	  a	  war	  is	  straightforward.	  	  Just	  combatants	  have	  positive	  moral	  reason	  to	  harm	  parties	  who’ve	  made	  themselves	  liable,	  and	  so	  just	  combatants	  harm	  with	  objective	  justification.	  	  Given	  that	  they	  harm	  with	  justification,	  just	  combatants	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  forfeit	  their	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  and	  are	  thus	  not	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  during	  war.	  	  Additionally,	  because	  just	  combatants	  are	  justified	  in	  using	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  The	  classic	  statement	  of	  the	  traditional	  view	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  
Unjust	  Wars,	  esp.	  Ch.	  3.	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defensive	  force	  in	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense,	  others	  would	  be	  wrong	  in	  attempting	  to	  prevent	  their	  use	  of	  force.	  	  Thus,	  all	  killing	  of	  just	  combatants	  by	  unjust	  combatants	  is	  unjustified	  and	  wrongful.46	  	  McMahan	  writes,	  Those	  who	  fight	  solely	  to	  defend	  themselves	  and	  other	  innocent	  people	  from	  a	  wrongful	  threat	  of	  attack,	  and	  who	  threaten	  no	  one	  but	  the	  wrongful	  aggressors,	  do	  not	  make	  themselves	  morally	  liable	  to	  defensive	  attack.	  	  By	  engaging	  in	  morally	  justified	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense,	  they	  do	  nothing	  to	  forfeit	  their	  right	  not	  to	  be	  attacked	  or	  killed.47	  	  A	  combatant	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  killed	  if	  he	  poses	  or	  contributes	  to	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Since	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  pose	  unjust	  threats,	  they	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  killed.	  
2.2.7	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  Applied	  to	  Unjust	  Combatants	  As	  should	  be	  obvious,	  there	  is	  a	  profound	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  just	  and	  unjust	  combatants	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  Account.	  	  Whereas	  just	  combatants	  fight	  with	  objective	  justification	  and	  do	  not	  forfeit	  their	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed,	  the	  same	  can’t	  be	  said	  of	  unjust	  soldiers.	  	  By	  fighting	  in	  an	  unjust	  war,	  unjust	  combatants	  engage	  in	  objective	  wrongdoing	  because	  the	  people	  they	  harm	  aren’t	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  Specifically,	  unjust	  combatants	  harm	  just	  combatants	  and	  just	  civilians	  –	  people	  who	  lack	  liability	  to	  be	  harmed.48	  	   But	  as	  previously	  noted,	  posing	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  of	  harm	  isn’t	  sufficient	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  One	  must	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  Section	  2.2.4,	  to	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  The	  possible	  exception	  to	  this	  general	  prohibition	  occurs	  when	  just	  combatants	  pursue	  their	  just	  aims	  by	  unjust	  means,	  which	  happens	  when	  they	  violate	  in	  bello	  requirements	  of	  necessity	  and	  proportionality.	  	  Because	  one	  of	  my	  beginning	  assumptions	  is	  that	  the	  victim	  state	  fights	  a	  just	  war	  in	  a	  just	  manner,	  I	  won’t	  pursue	  this	  possible	  complication	  here.	  47	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  14.	  48	  Ibid.,	  16,	  155.	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threat	  of	  harm,	  an	  agent	  must	  (1)	  voluntarily	  engage	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  (2)	  reasonably	  poses	  a	  foreseeable	  unjust	  harm	  to	  a	  non-­‐liable	  party.	  	  Drawing	  from	  the	  earlier	  analyses	  of	  Driver	  and	  Resident,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  unjust	  combatants	  meet	  both	  these	  criteria	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  	   The	  issue	  of	  determining	  whether	  unjust	  combatants	  voluntarily	  pose	  an	  unjust	  threat	  takes	  us	  back	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  duress.	  	  Driver’s	  liability	  follows	  from	  her	  earlier	  choice	  to	  drive;49	  she	  could	  have	  chosen	  differently.	  	  Similarly	  for	  McMahan,	  unjust	  combatants	  either	  chose	  to	  join	  the	  military,	  or	  chose	  to	  allow	  themselves	  to	  be	  conscripted	  into	  the	  military;50	  either	  way,	  unjust	  combatants	  have	  voluntarily	  chosen	  to	  become	  deadly	  state	  agents.	  	  It’s	  true	  these	  men	  and	  women	  may	  have	  faced	  economic	  or	  social	  pressures	  prompting	  them	  to	  join	  the	  military,	  or	  coercive	  pressures	  in	  the	  case	  of	  forced	  conscription.	  	  But	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  duress	  is	  never	  literally	  irresistible.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  some	  agents	  resist	  in	  these	  types	  of	  situations	  establishes	  the	  possibility	  of	  choice.	  	  Because	  unjust	  combatants	  have	  acted	  voluntarily,	  duress	  claims	  can	  at	  most	  absolve	  their	  culpability,	  not	  their	  moral	  responsibility.51	  
2.2.8	  The	  Foreseeability	  of	  Posing	  an	  Unjust	  Threat	  Even	  if	  one	  agrees	  that	  unjust	  combatants	  act	  voluntarily,	  one	  might	  still	  wonder	  why	  unjust	  combatants	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  threats	  they	  pose.	  	  Suppose	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  subjectively	  justified	  in	  believing	  their	  state’s	  claim	  that	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  231.	  50	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  183.	  51	  That’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	  unjust	  soldiers’	  excuses	  aren’t	  important;	  by	  mitigating	  or	  absolving	  unjust	  combatants’	  culpability,	  excusing	  conditions	  explain	  why	  unjust	  soldiers	  generally	  should	  not	  be	  punished	  at	  war’s	  end.	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fight	  with	  justice	  on	  their	  side.	  	  Does	  this	  fact	  not	  absolve	  them	  of	  responsibility	  should	  their	  threats	  eventually	  prove	  unjust?	  	   McMahan’s	  answer	  is	  that	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threats	  they	  pose	  because	  when	  they	  joined	  the	  military	  ranks	  they	  foresaw	  –	  or	  should	  have	  foreseen	  –	  the	  possibility	  that	  their	  future	  threats	  might	  be	  objectively	  unjust.	  	  Consider	  again	  Conscientious	  Driver.	  	  Driver	  justifiably	  believes	  that	  she	  won’t	  pose	  an	  unjust	  threat	  to	  others	  because	  she	  carefully	  drives	  a	  well-­‐maintained	  car.	  	  But	  nonetheless	  she	  foresaw	  the	  possibility	  of	  harming	  others	  through	  bad	  luck.	  	  Similarly,	  and	  more	  analogous	  to	  the	  situation	  of	  unjust	  combatants,	  resident’s	  use	  of	  violence	  foreseeably	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  harming	  an	  innocent,	  non-­‐liable	  person	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mistaken	  identity).	  Because	  Resident	  involves	  the	  uncommon	  occurrence	  of	  mistaking	  an	  innocent	  person	  for	  a	  culpable	  threat,	  McMahan	  acknowledges	  it	  is	  a	  bit	  contrived.52	  	  	  However,	  the	  problem	  of	  mistake	  is	  likelier	  in	  cases	  of	  war,	  where	  unjust	  combatants	  can	  reasonably	  be	  mistaken	  about	  their	  enemy’s	  liability	  status.	  	  Still,	  just	  as	  driver	  and	  resident	  participate	  in	  activities	  that	  pose	  a	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  threat	  of	  unjust	  harm,	  so	  too	  combatants	  voluntarily	  participate	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  reasonably	  and	  foreseeably	  risks	  harming	  non-­‐liable	  parties.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  combatants	  who	  believe	  their	  state’s	  war	  is	  just,	  it	  may	  turn	  out	  instead	  that	  they	  kill	  innocent	  people.	  Additionally,	  combatants	  have	  reason	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  their	  government’s	  claim	  to	  just	  war.	  	  As	  McMahan	  points	  out,	  at	  least	  50	  percent	  of	  wars	  are	  unjust	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  185.	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one	  side,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  higher	  given	  that	  states	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  war	  could	  lack	  just	  cause.53	  	  Also,	  most	  combatants	  can	  see	  that	  combatants	  on	  the	  other	  side	  also	  believe	  their	  cause	  to	  be	  just	  –	  and	  yet	  both	  sides	  can’t	  be	  right.	  	  Soldiers	  tend	  to	  believe	  their	  governments,	  and	  historically	  governments	  have	  often	  lied	  or	  misled	  their	  troops.54	  	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  combatants	  should	  foresee	  the	  possibility	  that	  they	  may	  end	  up	  fighting	  an	  unjust	  war	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	  unjustly	  threaten	  innocent	  people.	  	  If	  combatants	  fail	  to	  consider	  and	  foresee	  this	  possibility,	  then	  given	  the	  grave	  nature	  of	  their	  profession	  they	  stand	  negligent	  for	  failing	  to	  fulfill	  their	  epistemic	  duties.55	  	  If	  combatants	  are	  negligent	  then	  they	  are	  culpable,	  in	  which	  case	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  unjust	  threats	  is	  grounded	  in	  their	  blameworthiness.	  At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  object	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  many	  unjust	  combatants	  don’t	  actually	  pose	  a	  threat	  because	  they	  perform	  support	  functions,	  or	  are	  stationed	  in	  the	  rear,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Only	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  combatants	  actually	  kill,	  the	  claim	  goes.	  	  But	  if	  they	  don’t	  personally	  pose	  a	  threat,	  how	  could	  such	  combatants	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat?	  The	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  threefold.	  	  First,	  although	  many	  unjust	  combatants	  aren’t	  stationed	  at	  the	  front,	  nonetheless	  they	  are	  trained	  and	  prepared	  to	  kill.	  	  These	  soldiers	  are	  potential	  killers	  who	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  luck	  haven’t	  yet	  been	  pressed	  into	  action	  –	  but	  they	  stand	  ready	  to.	  	  Given	  that	  they	  will	  simply	  backfill	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  142,	  185.	  54	  Ibid.,	  185.	  55	  Ibid.,	  186.	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their	  fallen	  peers,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  kill	  both	  frontline	  troops	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  the	  rear.	  Second,	  unjust	  combatants	  in	  support	  roles	  enable	  the	  frontline	  troops	  to	  kill,	  thus	  making	  significant	  contributions	  to	  unjust	  threats.	  	  As	  McMahan	  puts	  it,	  “in	  both	  their	  support	  role	  and	  their	  potential	  combat	  role,	  they	  [unjust	  combatants]	  substantially	  increase	  the	  objective	  risk	  that	  innocent	  people	  will	  be	  killed.”56	  Third,	  unjust	  combatants	  contribute	  to	  unjust	  threats	  by	  their	  mere	  presence	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  	  Even	  if	  some	  unjust	  combatants	  have	  no	  intention	  to	  kill	  (imagine	  conscripted	  pacifists),	  their	  just	  counterparts	  can’t	  discern	  this	  fact.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  docile	  unjust	  combatants	  will	  draw	  fire	  away	  from	  their	  deadlier	  comrades	  who	  do	  intend	  to	  kill,	  the	  effect	  of	  which	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  possibility	  that	  some	  of	  the	  deadly	  unjust	  combatants	  will	  live	  to	  fight	  on	  for	  their	  wrongful	  cause.57	  	  Simply	  by	  being	  on	  the	  battlefield	  dressed	  as	  an	  enemy	  combatant,	  non-­‐threatening	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  responsible	  for	  inducing	  just	  combatants	  to	  believe	  they	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  innocent	  people.58	  	  Thus,	  even	  unjust	  combatants	  who	  intend	  no	  harm	  still	  contribute	  to	  unjust	  threats,	  or	  are	  responsible	  for	  appearing	  to	  intend	  to	  kill	  innocent	  people;	  either	  way,	  non-­‐threatening	  unjust	  combatants	  bear	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	  establishes	  that	  unjust	  combatants	  hold	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  objectively	  unjust	  threats	  they	  pose.	  	  Although	  McMahan	  thinks	  most	  unjust	  combatants	  possess	  at	  least	  partial	  excuse	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  549.	  57	  Ibid.,	  556.	  58	  Ibid.,	  555-­‐56.	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for	  their	  unjust	  threats,59	  they	  still	  remain	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  unjust	  threats	  and	  are	  thus	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  McMahan	  argues,	  “the	  basis	  for	  their	  liability	  is	  simply	  that	  they	  know	  they	  are	  intentionally	  harming,	  or	  foreseeably	  harming,	  or	  imposing	  a	  risk	  of	  harm,	  and	  also	  know	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  those	  they	  harm	  may	  be	  innocent.”60	  	  Accordingly,	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  
2.2.9	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  Applied	  to	  Just	  Civilians	  Applying	  the	  Responsibility	  Account	  to	  just	  civilians	  is	  simple.	  	  Just	  civilians	  do	  nothing	  during	  war	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  either	  intentional	  or	  collateral	  harm.	  	  Any	  harm	  to	  just	  civilians	  during	  war	  is	  unjustified	  and	  wrongful.	  
2.2.10	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  Applied	  to	  Unjust	  Civilians	  McMahan’s	  analysis	  of	  unjust	  combatant	  liability	  is	  fairly	  straightforward;	  less	  straightforward	  is	  his	  analysis	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  	  Specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  McMahan’s	  analysis	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  misses	  the	  mark	  based	  on	  his	  own	  liability	  account.	  	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  issue	  for	  purposes	  of	  determining	  postwar	  obligations,	  the	  issue	  will	  be	  vigorously	  pursued	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  For	  now,	  I’ll	  sketch	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  broad	  contours	  of	  McMahan’s	  position	  on	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  
2.2.11	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  to	  Intentional	  Attack	  Civilians	  who	  directly	  pose	  a	  threat	  during	  war	  are	  combatants.	  	  So	  the	  issue	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  attack	  focuses	  on	  whether	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  be	  sufficiently	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threats	  of	  others,	  which	  includes	  both	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  186,	  193.	  60	  Ibid.,	  182.	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the	  initiating	  of	  unjust	  war,	  and	  supporting	  unjust	  acts	  of	  war.	  	  In	  general,	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  almost	  never	  sufficiently	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  threats	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  and	  therefore	  are	  almost	  never	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.61	  McMahan	  does	  cite	  a	  couple	  of	  rare	  cases	  where	  civilians	  bear	  sufficient	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  unjust	  threats,	  such	  as	  when	  United	  Fruit	  Company	  executives	  induced	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Guatemalan	  government	  in	  1954,	  or	  the	  claim	  that	  Israeli	  settlers	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  threaten	  to	  dispossess	  Palestinians	  of	  their	  ancestral	  lands	  via	  long-­‐term	  occupation.62	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  McMahan	  thinks	  the	  civilians	  are	  sufficiently	  responsible	  to	  ground	  liability	  to	  intentional	  attack	  if	  doing	  so	  would	  have	  averted	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  non-­‐liable	  parties.	  	  Yet	  as	  McMahan	  acknowledges,	  both	  cases	  are	  highly	  anomalous.	  	   Although	  it’s	  unlikely	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  hold	  a	  high	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  they	  likely	  bear	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  For	  example,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  participate	  in	  the	  local	  economy	  and	  pay	  taxes,	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  enable	  the	  state	  to	  bankroll	  its	  unjust	  war.	  	  Some	  unjust	  citizens	  may	  have	  voted	  the	  warring	  regime	  into	  power,	  and	  others	  may	  have	  failed	  to	  protest	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  	  McMahan’s	  reply	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  for	  each	  citizen	  considered	  individually,	  these	  activities	  make	  but	  a	  negligible	  contribution	  to	  the	  initiating	  and	  fighting	  of	  unjust	  wars	  –	  too	  low	  an	  amount	  to	  ground	  liability	  to	  intentional	  attack.63	  	  Unjust	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Interestingly,	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  address	  the	  topic	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  politicians’	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  initiating	  unjust	  wars,	  and	  what	  their	  liability	  to	  attack	  or	  assassination	  might	  be.	  62	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  Ch.	  5.	  63	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  549-­‐51;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  225.	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citizens	  are	  also	  likely	  justified	  in	  performing	  these	  activities,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  they	  have	  positive	  moral	  reason	  for	  doing	  what	  they	  do.	  Pragmatic	  considerations	  also	  speak	  against	  intentionally	  targeting	  civilians.	  	  Even	  if	  one	  could	  identify	  significantly	  responsible	  unjust	  civilians,	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  located	  within	  large	  groups	  of	  innocent	  unjust	  civilians,	  which	  raises	  wide	  proportionality	  issues.	  	  Moreover,	  even	  when	  one	  is	  able	  to	  isolate	  and	  target	  highly	  responsible	  civilians,	  rarely	  does	  doing	  so	  prevent	  any	  future	  harm	  since	  their	  contributions	  lie	  largely	  in	  the	  past.	  	  If	  killing	  a	  person	  won’t	  actually	  help	  avert	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  then	  doing	  so	  is	  unjustified	  for	  failing	  to	  satisfy	  liability’s	  internal	  necessity	  requirement.	  	  All	  of	  these	  reasons	  point	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  almost	  never	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.	  
2.2.12	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  to	  Lesser	  Harms	  Most	  unjust	  civilians	  lack	  sufficient	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  render	  them	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.	  	  But	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  Account,	  liability	  isn’t	  an	  all	  or	  nothing	  concept.	  	  Rather,	  because	  moral	  responsibility	  comes	  in	  matters	  of	  degree,	  so	  too	  does	  liability.	  	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  correspondence	  claim	  between	  an	  agent’s	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  and	  her	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Whereas	  a	  significantly	  high	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  might	  make	  one	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack,	  lower	  levels	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  might	  make	  one	  liable	  to	  lesser	  harms,	  which	  include	  liability	  to	  occupation,	  payment	  of	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reparations,	  economic	  sanctions,	  property	  destruction,	  and	  sometimes	  being	  collaterally	  harmed.64	  The	  primary	  basis	  for	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harm	  that	  McMahan	  highlights	  is	  complicity	  in	  unjust	  state	  aggression.	  	  The	  root	  idea	  underlying	  complicity	  is	  that	  one	  can	  be	  derivatively	  liable	  for	  another	  agent’s	  wrongdoing	  if	  the	  complicit	  party	  intentionally	  induces,	  aids,	  or	  abets	  the	  wrongful	  act.	  	  So	  if	  unjust	  civilians	  induce	  others	  to	  initiate	  unjust	  war,	  or	  aid	  or	  abet	  unjust	  acts	  of	  war,	  they	  can	  become	  liable	  to	  harm	  lesser	  than	  intentional	  attack.	  McMahan	  mentions	  two	  historical	  examples	  of	  such	  complicity:	  he	  thinks	  most	  adult	  Germans	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  were	  complicit,65	  as	  well	  as	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Serbian	  civilians	  during	  the	  persecution	  of	  Albanians	  in	  1999.66	  	  Both	  groups	  bore	  responsibility	  for	  the	  culture	  from	  which	  such	  evil	  acts	  emerged,	  to	  include	  the	  citizenry’s	  apparent	  pro-­‐attitude	  toward	  the	  unjust	  aggression.	  	  For	  McMahan,	  their	  complicitous	  behavior	  was	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  lesser	  harm	  liability.67	  	  Unfortunately,	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  clarify	  exactly	  which	  lesser	  harms	  the	  Germans	  and	  Serbs	  were	  liable	  to,	  nor	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  liability.	  Elsewhere,	  McMahan	  stipulates	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  who	  make	  significant	  contributions	  to	  unjust	  wars	  can	  become	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm.68	  	  Unfortunately,	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  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  345,	  356-­‐58;	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,"	  Loyola	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  International	  and	  
Comparative	  Law	  Review	  31,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  103-­‐04;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  218-­‐21.	  65	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  114.	  66	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  375.	  67	  My	  personal	  view	  is	  that	  McMahan’s	  appeal	  to	  complicity	  here	  is	  problematic;	  I’ll	  return	  to	  and	  elaborate	  on	  this	  claim	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  68	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  351.	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McMahan	  doesn’t	  specify	  exactly	  what	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  are	  for	  such	  liability.	  	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  substantively	  revisited	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
2.2.13	  The	  Lesser	  Evil	  Justification	  for	  Harming	  Unjust	  Civilians	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  significant	  moral	  responsibility	  or	  complicitous	  behavior,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  aren’t	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  during	  war.	  	  Yet	  during	  most	  wars	  unjust	  civilians	  inevitably	  will	  be	  killed.	  	  If	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  aren’t	  liable	  to	  be	  killed,	  and	  yet	  many	  civilians	  will	  be	  killed	  during	  war,	  then	  one	  might	  ask	  whether	  just	  combatants	  engage	  in	  massive	  unjustified	  wrongdoing	  when	  fighting	  a	  self-­‐defensive	  war.	  	  The	  answer	  is	  generally	  they	  do	  not.	  Just	  combatants	  can	  be	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  collaterally	  harming	  non-­‐liable	  unjust	  civilians	  by	  way	  of	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification.	  	  The	  criterion	  for	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  must	  avert	  a	  significantly	  greater	  harm.69	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  foreseeable	  but	  unintended	  collateral	  harm	  during	  war,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  military	  objective	  necessary	  for	  averting	  harm	  to	  just	  combatants	  and	  just	  citizens	  must	  significantly	  outweigh	  the	  harm	  to	  innocent	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  harmed	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  are	  neither	  forfeited	  nor	  waived,	  but	  rather	  are	  overridden,	  resulting	  in	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  justified	  rights	  infringement.70	  	  Importantly,	  such	  collaterally	  harmed	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  wronged	  in	  the	  process	  because	  their	  rights	  are	  infringed.	  	  This	  last	  point	  is	  crucial	  for	  purposes	  of	  determining	  postwar	  obligations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  McMahan,	  "The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  377;	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation”	  108.	  70	  David	  Rodin,	  "Justifying	  Harm,"	  Ethics	  122,	  no.	  1	  (2011):	  86.	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because	  rights	  infringements	  generally	  give	  rise	  to	  obligations	  of	  restitution	  (this	  topic	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  Chapter	  7).	  
2.3	  Chapter	  Summary	  Phillip	  Montague	  was	  the	  first	  to	  articulate	  a	  justice-­‐based	  account	  of	  defensive	  harm.	  	  By	  drawing	  on	  the	  widely	  embraced	  distributive	  justice	  notion	  of	  fairness,	  Montague’s	  forced	  choice	  theory	  ably	  provides	  an	  explanatory	  account	  of	  why	  it	  is	  sometimes	  justifiable	  to	  harm	  others	  defensively.	  	  One	  shortcoming,	  though,	  is	  that	  the	  account	  isn’t	  especially	  adept	  at	  evaluating	  wartime	  killing	  given	  the	  theory’s	  culpability	  criterion	  for	  liability.	  	   Jeff	  McMahan	  further	  develops	  Montague’s	  framework	  in	  two	  important	  ways.	  	  First,	  McMahan	  greatly	  expands	  the	  scope	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  by	  changing	  the	  liability	  criterion	  from	  culpability	  to	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Second,	  McMahan	  shows	  how	  on	  the	  reductive	  account	  the	  theory	  extends	  to	  include	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  of	  killing	  during	  war.	  	   Applying	  the	  Responsibility	  Account	  to	  war	  yields	  the	  following	  broad	  conclusions.	  	  Because	  their	  state	  fights	  with	  justice	  on	  its	  side,	  just	  combatants	  and	  just	  civilians	  do	  nothing	  to	  make	  themselves	  morally	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Conversely,	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  posing	  or	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats,	  thus	  rendering	  them	  liable	  to	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  harm.	  	  On	  rare	  occasion,	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  bear	  enough	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.	  	  More	  commonly,	  unjust	  civilians	  either	  bear	  no	  responsibility,	  thus	  making	  them	  non-­‐liable	  to	  defensive	  harm,	  or	  they	  bear	  a	  minimal	  level	  of	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responsibility	  such	  as	  to	  make	  them	  liable	  to	  harms	  lesser	  than	  intentional	  attack.	  	  As	  indicated,	  I	  disagree	  with	  McMahan’s	  analysis	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  noncombatant	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harm.	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  pick	  up	  with	  a	  sustained	  analysis	  of	  this	  disagreement.
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CHAPTER	  3	  	  
3.	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  I	  think	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  is	  the	  most	  compelling	  normative	  framework	  yet	  offered	  for	  evaluating	  wartime	  killing.	  	  But	  although	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  broad	  framework	  of	  the	  theory,	  I	  ended	  the	  previous	  chapter	  by	  noting	  my	  disagreement	  with	  McMahan’s	  position	  on	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	  McMahan	  seemingly	  thinks	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  should	  be	  liable	  to	  harm	  only	  when	  they’ve	  acted	  complicitously	  or	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  I	  disagree.	  	  I	  think	  that	  if	  we	  follow	  the	  Responsibility	  Account	  to	  its	  logical	  conclusion,	  we	  should	  conclude	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  wartime	  harm.	  	  That	  is	  a	  conclusion	  McMahan	  seems	  unwilling	  to	  embrace.	  Therefore,	  my	  aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  claim	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  bear	  liability	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	  The	  chapter	  will	  proceed	  by	  first	  trying	  to	  pin	  down	  McMahan’s	  exact	  position	  on	  the	  topic,	  which	  in	  my	  view	  can	  at	  times	  be	  somewhat	  opaque.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  clarifying	  the	  criterion	  he	  uses	  for	  determining	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  	  The	  natural	  way	  to	  read	  McMahan	  on	  this	  point	  is	  that	  he	  employs	  a	  different	  liability	  criterion	  to	  unjust	  civilians	  than	  he	  does	  to	  unjust	  combatants.	  	  If	  so,	  this	  asymmetry	  of	  liability	  criteria	  would	  be	  a	  troubling	  inconsistency	  for	  the	  Responsibility	  Account.	  Throughout	  the	  chapter,	  I’ll	  consider	  and	  respond	  to	  two	  different	  types	  of	  objections	  against	  my	  position.	  	  One	  set	  of	  objections	  is	  aimed	  at	  undermining	  the	  claim	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  wartime	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threats.	  	  The	  second	  set	  of	  objections	  holds	  that	  even	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  the	  civilians	  nevertheless	  shouldn’t	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  all	  the	  objections	  can	  be	  overcome.	  Ultimately,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  a	  consistent	  application	  of	  the	  responsibility	  framework	  entails	  the	  conclusion	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	  Yet	  apparently	  unlike	  McMahan,	  I	  don’t	  see	  that	  conclusion	  as	  one	  to	  avoid.	  	  More	  importantly,	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  conclusion	  will	  profoundly	  affect	  the	  determination	  of	  postwar	  obligations	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	  
3.1	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  to	  Defensive	  and	  Lesser	  Harms	  As	  briefly	  discussed	  (2.2.12),	  McMahan	  clearly	  thinks	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  collaterally	  harmed,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  harms	  lesser	  than	  intentional	  attack,	  including	  liability	  to	  occupation,	  payment	  of	  reparations,	  economic	  sanctions,	  and	  the	  destruction	  of	  personal	  property.1	  	  The	  underlying	  idea	  behind	  this	  claim	  is	  that	  one’s	  liability	  should	  correspond	  with	  one’s	  level	  of	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Only	  highly	  responsible	  persons	  should	  be	  intentionally	  killed;	  lesser	  responsible	  persons	  should	  only	  be	  liable	  to	  harm	  lesser	  than	  intentional	  attack.	  	  Call	  this	  the	  ‘correspondence	  claim’	  between	  responsibility	  and	  liability.	  	  McMahan	  nicely	  summarizes	  the	  correspondence	  claim	  here:	   For	  proportionality	  in	  defensive	  action	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  which	  depends	  in	  part	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  218-­‐19;	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  103-­‐04;	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  548;	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  345,	  footnote	  3.	  
	   53	  
on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  that	  individual	  has	  causally	  contributed	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  that	  threat.	  	  Civilians	  seldom	  make	  significant	  individual	  causal	  contributions	  to	  an	  unjust	  war;	  hence	  while	  they	  may	  bear	  sufficient	  causal	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  be	  liable	  to	  suffer	  the	  effects	  of	  economic	  sanctions,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  to	  suffer	  certain	  side	  effects	  of	  military	  action,	  they	  are	  rarely	  sufficiently	  responsible	  to	  be	  liable	  to	  intentional	  military	  attack.2	  	  For	  McMahan,	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  liability	  are	  scalar	  concepts	  that	  go	  hand	  and	  hand;	  as	  one’s	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  increases,	  one’s	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  correspondingly	  increases	  also.	  	  The	  more	  liable	  an	  agent	  is,	  the	  more	  she	  can	  be	  intentionally	  harmed	  without	  being	  wronged.	  	  Additionally,	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  at	  some	  threshold	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  just	  combatants	  may	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  impose	  significant	  side	  effect	  harm	  on	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  Although	  I	  do	  think	  there	  is	  something	  right	  about	  the	  correspondence	  claim,	  my	  interpretation	  is	  different	  –	  a	  point	  I’ll	  return	  to	  later	  in	  the	  chapter	  at	  3.8.	  	   What’s	  clear	  is	  this:	  McMahan	  thinks	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  lesser	  and	  collateral	  harms.	  	  What	  is	  less	  clear	  is	  identifying	  the	  precise	  criterion	  used	  to	  establish	  such	  liability.	  	  What	  exactly	  must	  unjust	  civilians	  do	  to	  render	  themselves	  liable	  to	  collateral	  and	  lesser	  harms?	  
3.2	  Complicity	  as	  the	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  Criterion	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  natural	  way	  to	  read	  McMahan	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  is	  to	  conclude	  that	  complicity	  is	  the	  criterion	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  threshold	  for	  establishing	  civilian	  liability	  to	  harms	  other	  than	  intentional	  attack.	  	  McMahan’s	  repeated	  statements	  about	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  support	  such	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  103-­‐04.	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reading.	  	  A	  brief	  sampling	  of	  his	  comments	  on	  this	  subject	  proves	  illuminating	  (all	  emphases	  are	  mine):	  They	  [unjust	  civilians]	  can	  be	  Culpable	  Causes	  of	  unjust	  wars	  and	  of	  unjust	  acts	  of	  war.	  	  They	  can	  be	  instigators	  of	  unjust	  wars,	  or	  aiders	  and	  abettors	  who	  share	  responsibility	  for	  unjust	  acts	  of	  war	  perpetrated	  by	  unjust	  combatants.3	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  there	  are	  ways	  in	  which	  civilians	  can	  be	  accessories	  to	  the	  fighting	  of	  an	  unjust	  war,	  and	  in	  that	  way	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  war.4	  	  Those	  in	  collusion	  with	  the	  government	  waging	  an	  unjust	  war	  might	  be	  liable	  to	  economic	  sanctions.5	  	  
Civilian	  complicity	  might	  render	  one	  liable	  to	  destruction	  of	  civilian	  property.6	  	  Civilian	  complicity	  in	  an	  unjust	  war	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  intentional	  destruction	  of	  civilian	  property.7	  	  Some	  civilians,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  complicit	  in	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  war	  their	  country	  is	  fighting,	  can	  be	  liable	  at	  least	  to	  certain	  risks	  of	  being	  harmed	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  attacks	  against	  legitimate	  military	  targets.8	  	  The	  common	  denominator	  found	  in	  all	  of	  these	  claims	  is	  some	  variation	  of	  complicity:	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  be	  liable	  to	  various	  lesser	  and	  collateral	  harms	  because	  they	  have	  acted	  as	  culpable	  causes,	  aiders,	  abettors,	  accessories,	  or	  otherwise	  acted	  in	  some	  type	  of	  collusion	  with	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  aggression.	  In	  addition	  to	  his	  statements	  on	  the	  topic,	  McMahan’s	  use	  of	  examples	  also	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  that	  he	  views	  complicity	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harm.	  	  In	  fact,	  every	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  example	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  208.	  4	  Ibid.,	  218.	  5	  Ibid.	  6	  Ibid.,	  219.	  7	  Ibid.,	  219.	  8	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  232,	  footnote	  3.	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McMahan	  offers	  involves	  complicitous	  civilian	  behavior.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  examples.	  	   McMahan	  argues	  that	  most	  Serbian	  civilians	  were	  complicit	  in	  Milosevic’s	  attempted	  expulsion	  of	  the	  Albanians	  from	  Kosovar	  given	  the	  Serbians’	  widespread	  support	  for	  the	  unjust	  persecution,	  and	  accordingly	  made	  themselves	  liable	  to	  suffer	  collateral	  harm	  stemming	  from	  justified	  military	  strikes	  aimed	  at	  defending	  the	  Albanians.9	  	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  McMahan	  offers	  a	  hypothetical	  aimed	  at	  determining	  whether	  a	  victim	  state	  should	  collaterally	  harm	  unjust	  civilians	  or	  bystander	  civilians	  in	  a	  neighboring	  neutral	  state.10	  	  The	  choice	  is	  whether	  to	  opt	  for	  a	  military	  strike	  against	  an	  aggressor	  state	  village	  known	  to	  harbor	  200	  civilian	  supporters	  of	  the	  unjust	  war	  who	  have	  contributed	  to	  and	  benefitted	  from	  the	  aggression,	  or	  striking	  targets	  in	  a	  neutral	  state	  village	  with	  150	  civilians	  present.	  	  Crucially,	  the	  justification	  for	  risking	  collateral	  harm	  to	  200	  unjust	  civilians	  rather	  than	  150	  neutral	  civilians	  is	  that	  the	  former	  were	  complicit	  in	  the	  wrongdoing	  whereas	  the	  latter	  were	  not.	  	   Elsewhere,	  McMahan	  discusses	  Hezbollah’s	  firing	  of	  thousands	  of	  rockets	  from	  southern	  Lebanon	  into	  Israel	  in	  2006.	  	  Because	  many	  of	  the	  rockets	  were	  launched	  from	  Lebanese	  villages,	  Israeli	  counterstrikes	  against	  the	  launch	  sites	  killed	  several	  Lebanese	  civilians.	  	  Suppose,	  McMahan	  says,	  that	  the	  villagers	  could	  have	  prevented	  the	  rocket	  launches	  by	  protesting,	  but	  chose	  not	  to	  because	  they	  approved	  of	  the	  attacks	  on	  Israel.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  because	  they	  contributed	  to	  the	  unjust	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  375;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  220.	  10	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  219-­‐20.	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attacks	  by	  allowing	  the	  rockets	  to	  be	  launched	  from	  their	  neighborhoods,	  McMahan	  concludes	  that	  the	  villagers	  would	  have	  had	  no	  justified	  complaint	  against	  being	  collaterally	  harmed	  by	  Israeli	  strikes	  against	  the	  launch	  sites.	  	   Finally,	  consider	  McMahan’s	  analysis	  of	  German	  aggression	  during	  WWII.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  most	  German	  civilians	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  culture	  from	  which	  Nazi	  aggression	  emerged,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  popularly	  supporting	  the	  war.11	  	  Resultantly,	  the	  majority	  of	  adult	  Germans	  “were	  therefore	  complicit	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degree	  in	  Germany’s	  unjust	  war”12	  and	  that	  “by	  being	  active	  or	  passive	  accessories	  to	  Nazi	  aggression,	  made	  themselves	  morally	  liable	  to	  suffer	  the	  burdens	  of	  occupation.”13	  From	  the	  statements	  about	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  previously	  cited,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  examples	  he	  employs,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  conclude	  that	  McMahan	  views	  complicity	  as	  the	  unjust	  civilian	  criterion	  for	  lesser	  and	  collateral	  harm.	  	  This	  conclusion	  should	  give	  us	  pause.	  	  The	  troubling	  part	  of	  the	  conclusion	  is	  not	  the	  judgment	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  be	  liable	  to	  lesser	  harm;	  they	  most	  often	  should	  be.	  	  Rather,	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  implied	  suggestion	  that	  complicity	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harm.	  
3.2.1	  The	  Problem	  with	  Complicity	  as	  the	  Liability	  Criterion	  Complicity	  is	  a	  type	  of	  derivative	  liability	  where	  a	  secondary	  agent	  is	  derivatively	  liable	  for	  the	  wrongdoing	  of	  a	  primary	  agent,	  generally	  conceived	  of	  as	  “participation	  in	  guilt.”14	  	  The	  underlying	  idea	  behind	  complicity	  is	  that	  the	  secondary	  agent	  acts	  wrongfully	  by	  inducing	  or	  contributing	  to	  the	  primary	  agent’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  104,	  114.	  12	  Ibid.,	  114.	  13	  Ibid.	  14	  Black’s	  Law	  Dictionary,	  6th	  ed.,	  s.v.	  “Complicity.”	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wrongdoing.	  	  Importantly,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  complicity	  is	  that	  the	  secondary	  agent	  must	  act	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  induce,	  advance,	  or	  somehow	  further	  the	  primary	  agent’s	  culpable	  action.15	  	  Complicity	  can	  therefore	  be	  of	  two	  broad	  kinds:	  (1)	  intentionally	  attempting	  to	  influence	  a	  primary	  actor	  to	  commit	  a	  wrong,	  or	  (2)	  intentionally	  assisting	  a	  primary	  actor’s	  wrongful	  action.	  	  Additionally,	  one	  can	  assist	  a	  primary	  actor’s	  wrongful	  action	  by	  failing	  to	  prevent	  it	  –	  so	  long	  as	  the	  secondary	  agent’s	  abstention	  was	  done	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  promote	  or	  facilitate	  the	  wrongful	  act’s	  commission.16	  	  Complicity	  is	  also	  known	  as	  aiding	  and	  abetting,	  or	  as	  accessorial	  liability;	  note	  that	  all	  of	  these	  cognates	  are	  found	  in	  McMahan’s	  quotes	  cited	  above.	  So	  if	  we	  return	  to	  McMahan’s	  complicity	  examples,	  the	  Serbian	  civilians,	  German	  civilians,	  civilians	  in	  the	  hypothetical	  case,	  and	  the	  Lebanese	  villagers	  all	  engaged	  in	  complicitous	  behavior	  given	  that	  they	  acted	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  inducing	  or	  furthering	  the	  unjust	  acts	  of	  others,	  or	  failed	  to	  prevent	  the	  unjust	  acts	  of	  others	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  facilitate	  their	  commission.	  	  On	  the	  Responsibility	  Account,	  their	  complicitous	  behavior	  made	  them	  liable	  to	  collateral	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  Now	  as	  a	  minor	  point,	  one	  might	  first	  question	  McMahan’s	  descriptive	  claims	  of	  complicity	  given	  the	  intent	  condition.	  	  For	  example,	  go	  back	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  most	  adult	  Germans	  were	  complicit	  in	  Nazi	  aggression.	  	  Even	  in	  a	  case	  such	  as	  this	  –	  one	  involving	  massive	  state-­‐sponsored	  wrongdoing	  –	  one	  might	  nevertheless	  balk	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Sanford	  Kadish,	  “Complicity,	  Cause	  and	  Blame:	  A	  Study	  in	  the	  Interpretation	  of	  Doctrine,”	  in	  Jules	  Coleman,	  Crimes	  and	  Punishments	  (New	  York:	  Garland	  Pub.,	  1994),	  428.	  16	  Black’s	  Law	  Dictionary,	  6th	  ed.,	  s.v.	  “Accomplice.”	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claim	  of	  widespread	  civilian	  complicity	  (McMahan’s	  claim	  is	  that	  most	  German	  civilians	  were	  complicit).	  It	  seems	  questionable	  to	  claim	  that	  most	  adult	  German	  civilians	  acted	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  producing	  a	  culture	  for	  purposes	  of	  invading	  neighboring	  states	  or	  exterminating	  the	  nation’s	  Jewish	  population.	  	  It’s	  possible	  that	  many	  Germans	  might	  have	  intended	  to	  support	  a	  strong,	  resurgent	  German	  state	  without	  intending	  war	  or	  genocide.	  	  Certainly	  there’s	  a	  distinction	  between	  nationalism	  and	  war	  mongering;	  one	  can	  intend	  the	  former	  without	  intending	  the	  latter.	  	  Many	  adult	  Germans	  might	  have	  embraced	  nationalism	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  deep	  national	  pride)	  without	  wishing	  for	  war.	  	  For	  McMahan’s	  complicity	  claim	  to	  hold,	  it	  must	  actually	  have	  been	  the	  case	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  adult	  Germans	  intended	  to	  induce	  or	  further	  Nazi	  aggression.	  But	  suppose	  we	  grant	  the	  point	  that	  most	  Germans	  were	  somehow	  complicit	  in	  Nazi	  aggression.17	  	  This	  adjudication	  simply	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  main	  problem.	  	  If	  
complicity	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harm,	  then	  
McMahan	  is	  employing	  two	  different	  criteria	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm:	  one	  criterion	  for	  unjust	  combatants,	  and	  a	  separate	  criterion	  for	  unjust	  civilians.	  McMahan	  has	  consistently	  argued	  that	  the	  criterion	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  is	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat.	  	  One	  can	  be	  morally	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  A	  more	  reasonable	  claim	  might	  be	  to	  accuse	  most	  German	  civilians	  of	  connivance,	  which	  involves	  the	  intentional	  ignoring	  of	  another’s	  wrongdoing	  because	  one	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  wrongdoer’s	  chosen	  end.	  	  See	  Black’s	  Law	  Dictionary,	  6th	  ed.,	  s.v.	  “Connivance”;	  Chiara	  Lepora	  and	  Robert	  Goodin,	  On	  Complicity	  and	  Compromise	  (Oxford	  University	  Press:	  Oxford,	  2013),	  44.	  	  Still,	  the	  connivance	  model	  would	  be	  problematic	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  as	  the	  complicity	  model	  given	  that	  both	  require	  an	  element	  of	  blameworthiness.	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responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  she	  directly	  poses,	  and	  one	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  posed	  by	  another	  agent.	  	  And	  as	  discussed,	  one	  can	  be	  responsible	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  without	  being	  blameworthy	  or	  culpable	  –	  this	  is	  the	  very	  point	  McMahan	  drives	  home	  in	  Conscientious	  Driver.	  But	  if	  complicity	  is	  the	  criterion	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harm,	  notice	  what	  has	  subtly	  happened.	  	  Complicity	  requires	  the	  intent	  to	  induce	  or	  advance	  someone	  else’s	  wrongdoing,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  complicity	  requires	  
culpable	  action	  on	  the	  secondary	  agent’s	  part.	  	  So	  an	  appeal	  to	  complicity	  smuggles	  in	  a	  culpability	  requirement:	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  have	  to	  be	  blameworthy	  in	  order	  to	  become	  liable.	  Yet	  as	  McMahan	  has	  already	  argued	  for	  at	  great	  length,	  culpability	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  McMahan	  consistently	  applies	  that	  standard	  to	  unjust	  combatants.	  	  Recall	  from	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  unjust	  soldiers	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  even	  if	  their	  excusing	  conditions	  of	  duress	  and	  epistemic	  limitation	  render	  them	  non-­‐culpable.	  	  So	  if	  unjust	  combatants	  can	  be	  liable	  to	  harm	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  culpability,	  the	  same	  should	  hold	  true	  for	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  If	  that’s	  true,	  then	  complicity	  cannot	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  But	  to	  say	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  make	  themselves	  non-­‐culpably	  liable	  to	  lesser	  harms	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  complicity	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  liability	  determinations.	  Complicitous	  behavior	  increases	  one’s	  amount	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  of	  harm,	  and	  thus	  correspondingly	  increases	  the	  amount	  of	  harm	  to	  which	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one	  becomes	  liable.18	  	  For	  example,	  instead	  of	  Conscientious	  Driver,	  imagine	  that	  reckless	  driver	  knowingly	  drove	  her	  car	  in	  the	  snow	  with	  bald	  tires	  or,	  worse	  still,	  culpable	  driver	  spitefully	  intended	  to	  run	  down	  pedestrian.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  driver’s	  blameworthiness	  increases	  her	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility:	  if	  pedestrian	  doesn’t	  defend	  himself	  and	  is	  killed,	  reckless	  driver	  might	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  wrongful	  death	  action,	  and	  culpable	  driver	  to	  murder	  charges,	  whereas	  conscientious	  driver	  wouldn’t	  be	  liable	  to	  any	  criminal	  charges.	  The	  point	  is	  further	  underscored	  by	  that	  fact	  that	  culpable	  driver	  would	  be	  liable	  to	  intentional	  killing	  even	  if	  the	  likelihood	  of	  successfully	  achieving	  his	  goal	  remained	  low,	  whereas	  in	  the	  original	  case	  conscientious	  driver	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  until	  his	  driving	  poses	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  wrongful	  harm.19	  	  What	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  a	  wrongful	  threat	  can	  be	  sufficient	  to	  
ground	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  If	  the	  morally	  responsible	  agent	  is	  also	  culpable,	  then	  the	  agent	  bears	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  and,	  for	  McMahan,	  a	  subsequent	  increase	  in	  liability.	  	  As	  McMahan	  puts	  it,	  “liability	  …	  is	  sensitive	  to	  culpability.”20	  So	  while	  culpability	  can	  increase	  an	  agent’s	  liability,	  an	  absence	  of	  culpability	  doesn’t	  absolve	  liability	  for	  an	  agent	  who	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Conscientious	  driver	  is	  still	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  If	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	  is	  correct,	  we	  seem	  left	  with	  two	  options.	  	  The	  first	  option	  is	  to	  read	  McMahan	  as	  introducing	  a	  culpability-­‐based	  liability	  criterion	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Rodin	  refers	  to	  culpability	  as	  an	  ‘aggravating	  condition’	  that	  can	  increase	  a	  morally	  responsible	  agent’s	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  See	  Rodin,	  “Justifying	  Harm,”	  89.	  19	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  231.	  20	  Ibid.	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unjust	  civilians,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  separate	  and	  unique	  criterion	  from	  that	  used	  to	  judge	  unjust	  combatant	  liability.	  	  Such	  a	  move	  on	  McMahan’s	  part	  seems	  unlikely.	  	  He	  has	  systematically	  argued	  for	  many	  years	  that	  the	  liability	  criterion	  for	  defensive	  harm	  is	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat.	  	  It	  seems	  improbable	  that	  McMahan	  would	  inadvertently	  shift	  the	  liability	  criterion,	  and	  even	  more	  doubtful	  that	  he’d	  purposely	  introduce	  a	  culpability-­‐based	  criterion	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  Instead,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  second	  option,	  which	  is	  to	  read	  McMahan	  as	  arguing	  that	  complicity	  is	  a	  sufficient	  but	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  –	  a	  move	  that	  would	  avoid	  the	  asymmetry	  charge.	  	  This	  would	  be	  the	  more	  charitable	  reading,	  and	  the	  one	  I	  will	  follow.	  	  However,	  an	  important	  implication	  of	  this	  interpretation	  is	  that	  it	  opens	  the	  possibility	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  be	  non-­‐culpably	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  
3.3	  Significant	  Contribution	  as	  the	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  Criterion	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  last	  section,	  I	  suggested	  that	  if	  we	  wish	  to	  apply	  McMahan’s	  liability	  criterion	  consistently,	  then	  we	  should	  conclude	  that	  complicity	  does	  not	  exhaust	  the	  grounds	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  collateral	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  should	  expect	  there	  to	  be	  non-­‐complicitous	  ways	  for	  unjust	  civilians	  to	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  just	  as	  there	  are	  ways	  for	  unjust	  combatants	  to	  bear	  liability	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  culpability.	  While	  most	  all	  of	  McMahan’s	  statements	  and	  examples	  suggest	  that	  complicity	  is	  the	  threshold	  for	  civilian	  liability,	  he	  very	  briefly	  notes	  elsewhere	  that	  making	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  can	  make	  one	  liable	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to	  collateral	  harm.	  	  McMahan	  notes	  that	  “some	  civilians	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  making	  significant	  contributions	  to	  an	  unjust	  war	  may	  be	  liable	  to	  suffer	  certain	  harms	  –	  for	  example,	  harms	  that	  result	  as	  side	  effects	  of	  necessary	  military	  action	  by	  just	  combatants.”21	  	  So	  the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  if	  unjust	  civilians	  have	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  an	  unjust	  war,	  they	  can	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed.	  Unfortunately,	  McMahan	  offers	  no	  further	  analysis	  regarding	  the	  ‘significant	  contribution’	  claim	  just	  quoted.	  	  That’s	  unfortunate,	  because	  the	  significant	  contribution	  threshold	  seemingly	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  toward	  absolving	  most	  non-­‐complicitous	  unjust	  civilians	  of	  liability.	  	  To	  see	  how,	  consider	  a	  concern	  raised	  by	  several	  theorists:	  unjust	  civilians	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  state’s	  economy,	  paying	  taxes,	  and	  failing	  to	  protest	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.22	  McMahan	  acknowledges	  that	  such	  actions	  do	  contribute	  something	  toward	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,23	  and	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  make	  such	  contributions	  both	  intentionally	  and	  unintentionally.24	  	  For	  example,	  war	  cannot	  be	  fought	  unless	  civilians	  finance	  them	  through	  taxes.25	  	  On	  its	  face,	  such	  an	  admission	  might	  seem	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  a	  claim	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  	  Yet	  for	  McMahan	  that	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm”	  351.	  22	  See,	  for	  example,	  Victor	  Tadros,	  "Duty	  and	  Liability,"	  Utilitas	  24,	  no.	  2	  (2012):	  273-­‐76;	  Lazar,	  “The	  Responsibility	  Dilemma,”	  192.	  23	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "Individual	  Liability	  in	  War:	  A	  Response	  to	  Fabre,	  Leveringhaus	  and	  Tadros,"	  Utilitas	  24,	  no.	  02	  (2012):	  297.	  24	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  214-­‐15.	  25	  Ibid.,	  215.	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On	  McMahan’s	  analysis,	  even	  though	  many	  unjust	  civilians	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  their	  contributions	  tend	  to	  be	  negligible.	  	  After	  surveying	  the	  numerous	  actions	  unjust	  civilians	  perform	  that	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  (such	  as	  voting,	  paying	  taxes,	  and	  so	  on),	  McMahan	  concludes	  that	  “none	  of	  these	  activities	  makes	  more	  than	  a	  negligible	  causal	  contribution	  to	  the	  prosecution	  of	  an	  unjust	  war,”26	  elsewhere	  referring	  to	  such	  actions	  as	  “comparatively	  trivial	  sources	  of	  responsibility.”27	  If	  most	  unjust	  civilians’	  contributions	  were	  merely	  negligible,	  they	  would	  fall	  below	  the	  significant	  contribution	  liability	  threshold.28	  	  So	  apparently,	  most	  non-­‐complicituous	  unjust	  civilians	  aren’t	  liable	  to	  collateral	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	  This	  last	  point	  is	  supported	  by	  McMahan’s	  judgment	  about	  the	  status	  of	  Iraqi	  civilians	  during	  their	  state’s	  1980	  unjust	  invasion	  of	  Iran.	  	  After	  discussing	  popularly	  supported	  wars	  of	  aggression	  such	  as	  WWII	  Germany’s,	  McMahan	  contrastingly	  notes	  that	  there	  are	  unjust	  wars	  of	  aggression	  that	  are	  not	  the	  product	  of	  a	  society	  and	  its	  culture,	  but	  are	  initiated	  within	  an	  undemocratic	  country	  by	  a	  dictatorial	  elite	  whose	  commands	  it	  would	  be	  virtually	  suicidal	  to	  defy	  or	  oppose.	  	  The	  war	  fought	  by	  Iraq	  against	  Iran	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  such	  a	  war.	  	  The	  civilian	  citizens	  would	  bear	  little	  or	  no	  responsibility	  for	  a	  war	  of	  this	  sort	  and	  thus	  would	  not	  be	  liable	  to	  occupation	  following	  its	  defeat.29	  	  Although	  McMahan’s	  focus	  in	  the	  passage	  is	  on	  the	  postwar	  lesser	  harm	  of	  occupation,	  his	  broader	  judgment	  regarding	  unjust	  civilian	  responsibility	  remains	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  549.	  27	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  225.	  28	  For	  an	  analysis	  concluding	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  make	  only	  marginal	  causal	  contributions	  toward	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  see	  Cécile	  Fabre,	  "Guns,	  Food,	  and	  Liability	  to	  Attack	  in	  War,"	  Ethics	  120,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  36-­‐63.	  29	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  106.	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illuminating.	  	  Because	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  acted	  neither	  complicitously	  with	  Saddam’s	  regime,	  nor	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  they	  bore	  little	  to	  no	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  invasion.30	  Two	  points	  are	  worth	  making	  here,	  one	  minor	  and	  one	  substantive.	  	  The	  minor	  point	  concerns	  McMahan’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  opposing	  a	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  somehow	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  absolving	  unjust	  citizens’	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  We	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  discount	  such	  a	  claim.	  	  As	  previously	  noted,	  McMahan	  thinks	  most	  German	  civilians	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  during	  WWII.	  	  Yet	  the	  prospects	  for	  defying	  Hitler’s	  Gestapo	  and	  SS	  forces	  were	  no	  less	  daunting	  than	  the	  prospects	  Iraqi	  civilians	  faced	  in	  opposing	  Saddam’s	  Mukhabarat	  directorate.	  	  Most	  Germans	  stood	  impotent	  in	  the	  shadows	  of	  Hitler’s	  iron-­‐fist	  regime,	  just	  as	  most	  Iraqis	  also	  did	  in	  the	  shadows	  of	  Saddam’s	  regime.	  So	  if	  most	  German	  civilians	  bore	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  whereas	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  didn’t,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  resisting	  their	  respective	  governments	  can’t	  be	  doing	  much	  work	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  two.	  	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  most	  Iraqis	  faced	  a	  daunting	  task	  in	  pushing	  back	  against	  Saddam’s	  Iranian	  aggression,	  such	  a	  fact	  would	  only	  support	  a	  claim	  of	  duress.	  	  Yet	  as	  McMahan	  has	  persuasively	  argued	  (2.2.4),	  a	  duress	  excuse	  would	  only	  absolve	  the	  Iraqis	  of	  culpability;	  the	  excuse	  would	  not	  nullify	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  contributing	  to	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  There	  is	  of	  course	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  bearing	  some	  (even	  minimal)	  responsibility,	  and	  bearing	  no	  responsibility	  –	  a	  point	  to	  be	  revisited	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	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So	  if	  there	  exists	  a	  liability	  difference	  between	  the	  Germans	  and	  the	  Iraqis,	  the	  difference	  must	  hinge	  on	  something	  other	  than	  the	  viability	  of	  resisting	  their	  regime’s	  unjust	  aggression.	  	  Somehow,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  were	  negligible,	  whereas	  most	  Germans’	  contributions	  were	  significant.	  	  But	  what	  establishes	  the	  supposed	  line	  of	  demarcation	  between	  significant	  and	  negligible	  contributions?	  	  Returning	  to	  McMahan’s	  passage	  cited	  above,	  the	  difference	  hinges	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  Germans	  made	  significant	  contributions	  given	  their	  responsibility	  for	  the	  culture	  from	  which	  WWII	  emerged,	  whereas	  most	  Iraqis’	  contributions	  such	  as	  paying	  taxes	  were	  merely	  negligible	  (apparently	  assuming	  the	  Iraqi	  invasion	  of	  Iran	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  Iraqi	  culture	  writ	  large).	  	   But	  this	  supposed	  qualitative	  difference	  between	  the	  German	  and	  Iraqi	  contributions	  is	  puzzling,	  which	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  substantive	  point.	  	  Even	  if	  one	  were	  to	  agree	  with	  McMahan	  that	  most	  German	  civilians	  engaged	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  complicity,	  their	  individual	  complicitous	  acts	  considered	  in	  isolation	  seemingly	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  Germany’s	  aggression.	  	  Supposedly,	  their	  complicity	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  bore	  responsibility	  for	  their	  culture.	  	  But	  what	  kind	  culture	  act(s)	  did	  each	  German	  individually	  perform	  such	  that	  each	  civilian	  made	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  war	  effort?	  
3.3.1	  The	  Problem	  of	  Aggregation	  The	  only	  way	  to	  establish	  that	  most	  Germans	  were	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  culture	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  them	  liable	  to	  collateral	  and	  lesser	  harms	  is	  by	  
aggregating	  their	  individual	  actions.	  	  We	  can’t	  say	  that	  for	  each	  German	  civilian,	  his	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or	  her	  cultural	  contributions	  were	  somehow	  significant	  for	  bringing	  about	  the	  Blitzkriegs	  or	  the	  Holocaust.	  	  Considered	  in	  isolation,	  few	  individual	  Germans	  could	  have	  made	  more	  than	  a	  negligible	  cultural	  contribution	  to	  Nazi	  aggression.	  	  Instead,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  aggregating	  the	  individual	  negligible	  contributions	  of	  most	  German	  civilians	  that	  we	  can	  meaningfully	  speak	  of	  their	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  the	  culture	  from	  which	  Nazi	  aggression	  emerged	  and	  their	  subsequent	  liability	  to	  lesser	  harms.	  	  But	  if	  that	  is	  true,	  the	  conclusion	  we	  should	  walk	  away	  with	  is	  that	  less-­‐than-­‐significant	  causal	  contributions	  can	  ground	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	   But	  if	  we’re	  going	  to	  aggregate	  the	  negligible	  contributions	  of	  most	  Germans	  and	  conclude	  that	  they	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  their	  culture	  and	  thus	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  Nazi	  aggression	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  them	  liable	  to	  lesser	  harms,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  analytic	  consistency	  we	  should	  similarly	  aggregate	  the	  negligible	  causal	  contributions	  made	  by	  most	  other	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  should	  also	  aggregate	  the	  negligible	  contributions	  of	  Iraqi	  civilians	  and	  conclude	  that	  they	  shared	  some	  responsibility	  for	  the	  invasion	  of	  Iran.	  	  Most	  unjust	  civilians	  should	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  based	  on	  their	  aggregated	  causal	  contributions	  such	  as	  paying	  taxes,	  voting,	  failing	  to	  protest	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  participating	  in	  their	  state’s	  institutions	  and	  economy,	  and	  so	  on.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  McMahan	  does	  not	  aggregate	  most	  non-­‐complicitous	  unjust	  civilian	  contributions:	  It	  is	  …	  doubtful	  that	  an	  individual	  civilian’s	  vote	  makes	  a	  causal	  difference	  at	  all;	  for	  in	  virtually	  every	  case	  the	  outcome	  would	  have	  been	  exactly	  the	  same	  had	  that	  individual	  voted	  differently	  or	  not	  voted	  at	  all.	  	  Similar	  remarks	  apply	  to	  the	  payment	  of	  taxes.	  	  The	  proportion	  of	  an	  individual’s	  tax	  payment	  that	  is	  devoted	  to	  war	  is	  usually	  small.	  …	  A	  citizen’s	  failure	  to	  protest	  an	  unjust	  war	  is	  an	  improbable	  basis	  of	  liability	  to	  be	  killed.	  …	  Each	  citizen	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knows,	  moreover,	  that	  nothing	  that	  he	  or	  she	  does	  can	  make	  more	  than	  a	  tiny,	  probably	  negligible,	  contribution	  to	  ending	  the	  war.31	  	  McMahan	  is	  right	  to	  conclude	  that	  when	  considered	  in	  isolation,	  an	  individual	  citizen’s	  contributions	  such	  as	  paying	  taxes	  or	  failing	  to	  protest	  likely	  make	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  his	  or	  her	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	  The	  problem	  is,	  their	  aggregated	  minor	  contributions	  result	  in	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  unjust	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  But	  just	  because	  unjust	  civilians	  individually	  make	  only	  minor	  contributions,	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  each	  citizen	  therefore	  doesn’t	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression.32	  
3.3.2	  Aggregated	  Contributions	  can	  Ground	  Moral	  Responsibility	  Aggregation	  is	  a	  common	  phenomenon	  when	  analyzing	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  jointly	  created	  harmful	  outcomes.	  	  For	  example,	  consider	  a	  case	  in	  which	  thousands	  of	  people	  unjustly	  stone	  to	  death	  an	  innocent	  person.33	  	  Imagine	  that	  each	  stone	  is	  fairly	  small,	  capable	  of	  delivering	  only	  a	  tiny	  amount	  of	  harm.	  	  The	  contribution	  of	  each	  stone	  doesn’t	  make	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  lethal	  outcome.	  	  But	  clearly	  the	  aggregate	  harm	  of	  all	  the	  rocks	  thrown	  is	  significant:	  their	  combined	  synergistic	  effect	  kills	  an	  innocent	  person.	  Without	  factoring	  aggregation	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  cases	  like	  this,	  we’d	  be	  left	  with	  a	  counterintuitive	  conclusion.	  	  Considered	  in	  isolation,	  each	  agent	  made	  only	  a	  tiny	  contribution	  that	  was	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  for	  the	  harmful	  outcome.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  550.	  32	  In	  fairness	  to	  McMahan,	  the	  two	  statements	  quoted	  above	  were	  embedded	  in	  a	  discussion	  about	  civilian	  liability	  to	  intentional	  attack.	  	  Still,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  is	  analyzing	  civilian	  liability	  to	  intentional	  or	  collateral	  harm,	  the	  issue	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  still	  hinges	  on	  morally	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  threats.	  33	  I	  borrow	  this	  example	  from	  Cécile	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  76.	  	  Fabre	  in	  turn	  attributes	  the	  example	  to	  Jon	  Quong.	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So	  the	  conclusion	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  that	  each	  agent	  lacks	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  death	  given	  each	  agent’s	  miniscule	  contribution.	  	  But	  the	  obvious	  reply	  is	  that	  all	  the	  participating	  agents	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  death,	  even	  though	  none	  of	  the	  agents	  made	  an	  individually	  significant	  contribution.	  	  Small	  causal	  contributions	  can	  ground	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  harm	  when	  it	  is	  foreseeable	  that	  the	  aggregated	  effect	  of	  the	  small	  contributions	  foreseeably	  risks	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  In	  response,	  some	  readers	  might	  be	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  stone-­‐throwers	  each	  made	  a	  small	  but	  culpable	  contribution	  to	  the	  death,	  and	  it	  is	  their	  culpability	  that	  grounds	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  killing	  (just	  as	  it	  might	  have	  been	  most	  German	  citizens’	  culpability	  that	  made	  them	  morally	  responsible	  for	  Nazi	  aggression).	  	  Additionally,	  the	  stoning	  example	  involves	  coordinated	  intentional	  acts.	  	  Maybe	  the	  combination	  of	  these	  factors	  explains	  why	  each	  stone	  thrower	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  harm	  to	  the	  victim,	  whereas	  the	  lack	  of	  these	  three	  factors	  explains	  why	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  lack	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats.	  But	  I	  think	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  culpability,	  small	  causal	  contributions	  can	  still	  ground	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  a	  wrongful	  harm,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  contributions	  are	  uncoordinated	  and	  the	  resultant	  harm	  unintended.	  	  Consider	  global	  warming.	  	  Most	  people	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  driving	  of	  automobiles	  emits	  emissions	  that	  foreseeably	  contribute	  to	  global	  warming	  threats.	  	  For	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  drivers,	  their	  negligible	  contributions	  that	  risk	  future	  harmful	  outcomes	  (assuming	  it	  hasn’t	  yet	  sufficiently	  eventuated	  in	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties)	  are	  not	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coordinated,	  nor	  are	  the	  harmful	  outcomes	  intended.	  	  And	  even	  if	  one	  thinks	  that	  much	  driving	  is	  justified,	  such	  as	  commuting	  to	  work	  or	  taking	  someone	  to	  the	  hospital,	  most	  all	  drivers	  would	  have	  to	  admit	  to	  driving	  even	  when	  they	  lacked	  positive	  moral	  reason	  for	  doing	  so,	  or	  when	  they	  could	  have	  taken	  alternate	  transportation	  such	  as	  walking	  or	  biking.	  For	  most	  drivers	  it	  was	  foreseeable	  that	  the	  aggregation	  of	  their	  minimal	  causal	  contributions	  along	  with	  all	  other	  drivers’	  contributions	  together	  risked	  unjust	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties.	  	  As	  with	  the	  stoning	  example,	  the	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  in	  the	  global	  warming	  case	  is	  that	  most	  drivers	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  threatened	  global	  warming	  harms.	  	  Given	  their	  individual	  moral	  responsibility,	  most	  drivers	  would	  have	  no	  legitimate	  complaint	  against	  being	  specially	  taxed	  in	  order	  to	  fund	  a	  solution	  deemed	  necessary	  and	  effective	  for	  protecting	  against	  the	  impending	  unjust	  harms.	  	  Stated	  slightly	  differently,	  most	  drivers	  have	  made	  themselves	  liable	  to	  be	  specially	  taxed	  (a	  type	  of	  harm),	  and	  their	  liability	  is	  grounded	  in	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat	  to	  which	  they	  contributed	  –	  even	  though	  their	  individual	  contributions	  were	  small,	  non-­‐culpable,	  uncoordinated,	  and	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  unintended.	  One	  might	  flag	  an	  important	  difference	  amongst	  the	  preceding	  examples:	  the	  drivers	  and	  the	  stone-­‐throwers	  could	  have	  fairly	  easily	  avoided	  contributing	  to	  their	  unjust	  threats,	  whereas	  the	  German	  and	  Iraqi	  civilians	  faced	  significant	  costs	  to	  avoid	  contributing.	  	  Although	  true,	  this	  excusing	  condition	  of	  duress	  only	  lowers	  the	  civilians’	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  it	  doesn’t	  absolve	  it.	  	  We	  can	  still	  conclude	  that	  all	  the	  parties	  in	  these	  examples	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  contributing	  to	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unjust	  threats	  while	  granting	  that	  they	  hold	  varying	  degrees	  of	  responsibility	  compared	  against	  one	  another.	  Also,	  some	  readers	  might	  resist	  the	  global	  warming	  example	  by	  arguing	  that	  instead	  of	  contributing	  to	  a	  risk	  of	  future	  unjust	  harm,	  the	  drivers	  contributed	  to	  a	  known	  future	  unjust	  harm.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  drivers	  actually	  acted	  recklessly,	  and	  thus	  culpably.	  	  For	  sake	  of	  argument,	  let’s	  grant	  that	  point.	  	  The	  stone	  throwers	  harmed	  intentionally	  and	  the	  drivers	  harmed	  recklessly,	  with	  the	  result	  being	  that	  both	  groups	  acted	  culpably.	  	  Let’s	  further	  grant	  McMahan’s	  claim	  that	  most	  German	  citizens	  acted	  complicitously	  (Germany’s	  war	  enjoyed	  “popular	  support”),	  and	  thus	  also	  acted	  culpably.	  The	  suggestion	  now	  might	  be	  that	  only	  culpable	  causal	  contributions	  should	  be	  aggregated	  for	  liability	  purposes.	  	  Thus,	  the	  stone	  throwers,	  the	  drivers,	  and	  most	  German	  citizens	  would	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  respective	  wrongful	  threats.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  actions	  of	  agents	  who	  make	  non-­‐culpable	  causal	  contributions	  to	  wrongful	  harms	  should	  not	  be	  aggregated	  for	  liability	  purposes.	  	  Thus,	  most	  non-­‐complicitous	  unjust	  civilians	  (like	  the	  Iraqis)	  wouldn’t	  be	  morally	  responsible	  given	  their	  negligible	  contributions	  toward	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  suggestion	  (that	  culpable	  contributions	  should	  be	  aggregated	  whereas	  non-­‐culpable	  contributions	  should	  not)	  seems	  entirely	  ad	  hoc.	  	  What’s	  necessary	  for	  liability	  to	  harm	  is	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat,	  and	  what’s	  necessary	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  is	  that	  one	  voluntarily	  acted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  posing	  an	  unjust	  threat	  to	  a	  non-­‐liable	  party.	  	  Considerations	  such	  as	  culpability	  and	  intent	  can	  surely	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affect	  the	  level	  of	  one’s	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  but	  culpability	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  –	  as	  established	  in	  Conscientious	  
Driver.	  	  Thus,	  culpability	  can’t	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  liability	  to	  harm.	  So	  there	  is	  no	  principled	  reason	  for	  not	  aggregating	  all	  civilian	  actions	  that	  causally	  contribute	  to	  a	  threat	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  for	  purposes	  of	  determining	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  If	  both	  the	  German	  and	  Iraqi	  citizens	  voluntarily	  acted	  in	  ways	  that	  causally	  contributed	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggressions	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  unjust	  threats	  to	  others,	  then	  all	  the	  members	  of	  each	  group	  share	  some	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  (We’ll	  return	  to	  the	  foreseeability	  condition	  in	  the	  next	  section)	  McMahan	  is	  right	  to	  say	  that	  most	  German	  civilians	  bore	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  Nazi	  aggression.	  	  But	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  analytic	  consistency,	  he	  should	  also	  have	  said	  that	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  bore	  some	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  1980	  invasion	  of	  Iran.	  	  Although	  it	  might	  be	  true	  that	  most	  Iraqis	  made	  comparatively	  small	  contributions,	  the	  sum	  of	  their	  actions	  causally	  and	  foreseeably	  contributed	  to	  unjust	  violence	  against	  innocent	  others.	  	  Their	  moral	  responsibility	  hinges	  not	  only	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  what	  they	  contributed	  as	  individuals,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  their	  jointly	  created	  harms.	  	  Given	  that	  their	  contributions	  are	  individually	  small,	  they	  correspondingly	  bore	  only	  a	  small	  level	  of	  responsibility.	  	  But	  in	  forced	  choice	  cases	  involving	  indivisible	  lethal	  harm,	  small	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  parties	  can	  be	  decisive.	  	  (This	  last	  point	  will	  be	  revisited	  shortly.)	  To	  be	  clear,	  the	  intended	  takeaway	  from	  the	  foregoing	  analysis	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  an	  all	  or	  nothing	  concept.	  	  Rather,	  moral	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responsibility	  is	  a	  scalar	  concept	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  responsibility.34	  	  Importantly,	  the	  line	  of	  demarcation	  between	  significant	  and	  minimal	  causal	  contributions	  explains	  why	  it	  is	  generally	  impermissible	  to	  intentionally	  attack	  civilians.	  	  Because	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  make	  only	  minimal	  causal	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats,	  intentionally	  attacking	  such	  civilians	  tends	  to	  be	  an	  ineffective	  means	  for	  eliminating	  the	  unjust	  threats.	  	  If	  targeting	  civilians	  doesn’t	  effectively	  avert	  unjust	  aggression,	  then	  the	  civilians	  can’t	  be	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack	  based	  on	  considerations	  of	  necessity.35	  	  	  Instead,	  the	  intended	  takeaway	  from	  the	  preceding	  analysis	  is	  to	  show	  that	  
significant	  contribution,	  like	  complicity,	  is	  a	  sufficient	  but	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  
moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  While	  McMahan	  is	  surely	  right	  to	  say	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  who	  make	  significant	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms,	  that	  statement	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  prohibiting	  similar	  liability	  for	  unjust	  civilians	  who’ve	  made	  lesser	  contributions.	  	  If	  we	  carefully	  read	  a	  couple	  of	  his	  statements,	  McMahan	  appears	  to	  acknowledge	  as	  much:	  
Many	  …	  civilians	  have	  been	  actively	  complicit	  in	  the	  waging	  of	  the	  [unjust	  war],	  and	  most	  of	  them	  share	  some	  responsibility	  for	  it.36	  	  The	  ‘many’	  and	  ‘most’	  language	  is	  telling:	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  even	  though	  only	  many	  are	  complicit.	  	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "The	  Basis	  of	  Moral	  Liability	  to	  Defensive	  Killing,"	  Philosophical	  
Issues	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2005):	  395.	  35	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  550.	  36	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  96,	  my	  emphasis.	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follows	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  compicitous	  behavior.	  	  McMahan	  elsewhere	  observes	  that	  it	  is	  rare	  for	  any	  civilian	  to	  bear	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  war,	  or	  for	  any	  of	  the	  particular	  acts	  of	  war	  of	  which	  the	  war	  is	  composed.37	  	  Reading	  this	  quote	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  first,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  bear	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  (first	  quote),	  and	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  aren’t	  complicit	  (first	  quote)	  and	  don’t	  make	  significant	  contributions	  (second	  quote),	  then	  many	  unjust	  civilians	  must	  bear	  responsibility	  based	  on	  less	  than	  complicit	  and	  significant	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	  So	  neither	  complicity	  nor	  significant	  contribution	  is	  necessary	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  	  Instead,	  both	  types	  of	  actions	  should	  be	  read	  as	  sufficient	  for	  grounding	  liability	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harm,	  while	  also	  allowing	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  grounded	  in	  non-­‐complicitous	  and	  less	  than	  significant	  causal	  contributions.	  
3.4	  The	  Foreseeability	  Objection	  to	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  Assuming	  aggregation,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  some	  responsibility,	  even	  if	  not	  complicit	  and	  even	  if	  their	  individual	  contributions	  were	  small.	  	  Some	  may	  be	  hesitant	  to	  embrace	  such	  a	  conclusion,	  and	  might	  do	  so	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  foreseeability	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility.	  Recall	  that	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  Account,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  is	  that	  it	  must	  have	  been	  foreseeable	  to	  the	  agent	  that	  her	  action	  risked	  creating	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  The	  foreseeability	  condition	  is	  underscored	  in	  McMahan’s	  Cell	  Phone	  Operator	  (2.2.4),	  where	  it	  wasn’t	  reasonably	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  225.	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foreseeable	  to	  operator	  that	  his	  pressing	  of	  the	  ‘send’	  button	  would	  detonate	  a	  bomb.	  	  Accordingly,	  operator	  is	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  ensuing	  harm.	  	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  one	  might	  object	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  aren’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  because	  it	  wasn’t	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  that	  their	  actions	  (such	  as	  paying	  taxes)	  would	  contribute	  to	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  war.	  	   The	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  straightforward.	  	  By	  choosing	  to	  maintain	  citizenship	  in	  state	  S,	  paying	  state	  S	  taxes,	  and	  participating	  in	  S’s	  economy,	  unjust	  civilians	  help	  fund	  and	  sustain	  S’s	  state	  institutions.	  	  Additionally,	  doing	  so	  reasonably	  and	  foreseeably	  risks	  wrongfully	  threatening	  others	  given	  that	  all	  modern	  states	  maintain	  standing	  armies.	  	  Kant	  and	  the	  Federalist	  Papers	  long	  ago	  warned	  of	  the	  dangers	  standing	  armies	  pose.38	  	  Every	  war	  necessarily	  involves	  the	  unjustified	  use	  of	  military	  force	  by	  at	  least	  one	  state’s	  armed	  forces.	  	  One	  cannot	  feasibly	  claim	  that	  it	  was	  unforeseeable	  her	  state	  institutions	  might	  wrongfully	  threaten	  harm	  to	  others.	  It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  to	  say	  that	  one’s	  voluntary	  actions	  reasonably	  pose	  a	  foreseeable	  risk	  of	  unjust	  harm	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  risk	  materializing	  must	  be	  high.	  	  As	  McMahan	  argues,	  “voluntary	  engagement	  in	  an	  activity	  known	  to	  impose	  a	  risk	  of	  wrongful	  harm,	  even	  if	  the	  ex	  ante	  risk	  is	  very	  low,	  is	  a	  basis	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  action	  if	  the	  probability	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  becomes	  unexpectedly	  high.”39	  	  An	  agent	  can	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  harm	  even	  though	  the	  harm	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  materialize	  (i.e.,	  the	  ex	  ante	  risk	  is	  very	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  “Toward	  Perpetual	  Peace,”	  Section	  I,	  in	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Practical	  
Philosophy,	  ed.	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor,	  trans.	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  668;	  “Federalist	  No.	  41.”	  39	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  231.	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low).	  	  The	  necessary	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  harm	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  was	  reasonably	  foreseeable,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  unjust	  threat	  was	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  being	  a	  normally	  foreseeable	  possibility.	  	  That’s	  why	  cell	  phone	  operator	  isn’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat	  he	  poses:	  the	  everyday	  use	  of	  a	  cell	  phone	  poses	  no	  foreseeable	  risk	  of	  detonating	  a	  bomb.	  	  So	  return	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  civilians.	  	  The	  Iraqi	  civilians’	  decisions	  to	  remain	  within	  Iraq,	  maintain	  citizenship,	  pay	  state	  taxes,	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  state	  economy	  all	  contributed	  toward	  supporting	  state	  institutions.	  	  Their	  doing	  so	  helped	  fund	  and	  maintain	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  standing	  armies	  –	  with	  a	  dictator	  at	  the	  helm	  no	  less.	  	  Their	  actions	  contributed	  to	  the	  reasonably	  foreseeable	  risk	  that	  Iraqi	  state	  institutions	  would	  unjustly	  harm	  others.	  	  When	  that	  foreseeable	  risk	  eventuated,	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  were	  implicated	  by	  their	  contributions	  and	  thus	  shared	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  aggression.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  such	  harm	  wasn’t	  foreseeable	  is	  belied	  by	  the	  historical	  facts:	  Iraq’s	  invasion	  of	  Iran	  in	  1980,	  its	  genocidal	  campaign	  against	  the	  Kurds	  from	  1986	  –	  1989,	  and	  its	  subsequent	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait	  in	  1990.	  
3.5	  Moral	  Responsibility	  as	  the	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  Criterion	  As	  McMahan	  has	  repeatedly	  argued	  throughout	  his	  writings,	  the	  criterion	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  is	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Most	  unjust	  civilians	  meet	  this	  criterion.	  	  They	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats	  by	  remaining	  within	  its	  territory,	  participating	  in	  its	  culture	  and	  economy,	  maintaining	  citizenship,	  paying	  taxes,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  all	  actions	  that	  help	  support	  and	  sustain	  state	  institutions	  that	  foreseeably	  run	  the	  risk	  of	  unjustly	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threatening	  others.	  	  When	  such	  threats	  materialize,	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  those	  ensuing	  threats.	  	   The	  fact	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  bear	  some	  responsibility	  for	  the	  lethal	  forced	  choice	  situation	  that	  the	  innocent	  victim	  state	  citizenry	  faces	  establishes	  a	  crucial	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties.	  	  Although	  unjust	  civilians’	  level	  of	  responsibility	  is	  minimal	  given	  their	  small	  individual	  causal	  contributions,	  in	  aggregate	  their	  small	  contributions	  eventuate	  in	  significant	  lethal	  threats	  to	  others.	  	  This	  small	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  just	  civilians	  and	  just	  combatants	  on	  the	  other	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  the	  former’s	  liability	  to	  proportionate	  defensive	  harm	  when	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  latter.	  Before	  preceding,	  I	  should	  point	  out	  that	  if	  unjust	  civilians	  have	  made	  themselves	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm,	  then	  they	  have	  also	  made	  themselves	  liable	  to	  lesser	  harms	  such	  as	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  economic	  sanctions,	  or	  being	  taxed	  for	  purposes	  of	  paying	  war	  reparations	  to	  the	  victim	  state.	  	  Because	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  on	  obligations	  that	  fall	  to	  the	  victor	  state,	  the	  issue	  of	  collateral	  harm	  will	  play	  a	  more	  crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  So	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  establishing	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  to	  collateral	  harm.	  	  The	  reader	  should	  understand	  that	  if	  through	  their	  actions	  unjust	  civilians	  become	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed,	  then	  I	  think	  they	  have	  also	  made	  themselves	  liable	  to	  the	  various	  lesser	  harms.	  	   But	  to	  which	  kinds	  of	  harms	  should	  unjust	  civilians	  be	  liable?	  	  Since	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  make	  only	  negligible	  causal	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  intentionally	  attacking	  them	  is	  almost	  never	  an	  effective	  defensive	  means	  of	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defending	  against	  aggression.40	  	  If	  harming	  someone	  can’t	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  avert	  a	  wrongful	  threat,	  then	  liability’s	  internal	  requirement	  of	  necessity	  prohibits	  harming	  that	  party.	  So	  a	  natural	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  at	  this	  point	  is	  that	  the	  Responsibility	  Account	  prohibits	  physically	  harming	  most	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  Perhaps	  unjust	  civilians	  should	  be	  liable	  only	  to	  non-­‐physical	  harms	  such	  as	  paying	  reparations	  or	  suffering	  the	  effects	  of	  economic	  sanctions.	  	  Yet	  such	  a	  conclusion	  would	  be	  too	  quick.	  	  While	  it	  might	  be	  true	  to	  say	  that	  intentionally	  harming	  civilians	  almost	  never	  operates	  in	  an	  effective	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  manner,	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  about	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  while	  striking	  justified	  targets.	  Although	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  offer	  a	  sustained	  analysis	  of	  collateral	  harm,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  side	  effect	  harm	  against	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  be	  justified.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  passage:	  Suppose	  that	  some	  great	  harm	  is	  unavoidable.	  	  It	  will	  befall	  one	  or	  the	  other	  of	  two	  people;	  it	  cannot	  be	  divided	  between	  them.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  person	  will	  kill	  another	  unless	  the	  other	  kills	  him	  in	  self-­‐defence.	  	  Suppose	  that	  there	  are	  no	  relevant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  except	  that	  the	  threatener	  bears	  a	  very	  slight	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  them	  must	  die.	  	  He	  is	  not	  culpable	  but	  permissibly	  chose	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  involved	  a	  tiny	  risk	  that	  he	  would	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  another.	  	  Through	  bad	  luck	  alone,	  he	  now	  threatens	  a	  person	  who	  bears	  no	  responsibility	  at	  all	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  of	  them	  must	  be	  killed.	  …	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  minimally	  responsible	  threatener	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  killed.41	  	  Drawing	  from	  this	  claim,	  McMahan	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  principle	  the	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  could	  justify	  intentionally	  killing	  civilians	  if	  doing	  so	  would	  effectively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  548;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  225.	  41	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  551;	  see	  also	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  227.	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help	  avert	  the	  threatened	  harm.	  	  But	  killing	  minimally	  responsible	  civilians	  during	  war	  almost	  never	  operates	  in	  an	  effective	  defensive	  way.	  	  Intentionally	  killing	  them	  does	  nothing	  to	  stop	  the	  unjust	  aggression	  because	  their	  contributions	  are	  minimal	  and	  mostly	  lie	  in	  the	  past.	  	  If	  harming	  civilians	  doesn’t	  effectively	  contribute	  toward	  the	  good	  of	  protecting	  innocent	  victims,	  then	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  aren’t	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  Thus,	  McMahan	  concludes,	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  almost	  never	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.42	  	   Unfortunately,	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  systematically	  pursue	  the	  possibility	  that	  just	  combatants	  can	  attack	  military	  targets	  in	  a	  defensive	  manner	  while	  foreseeing	  that	  doing	  so	  risks	  harming	  nearby	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  intentionally	  killing	  civilians	  isn’t	  defensive	  harming,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  just	  combatants	  defensively	  harm	  unjust	  civilians	  as	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  striking	  necessary	  military	  targets	  during	  defensive	  warfare.	  	  According	  to	  McMahan,	  killing	  civilians	  almost	  never	  operates	  in	  a	  defensive	  manner.	  	  But	  the	  opposite	  seems	  true:	  the	  widespread	  collateral	  harming	  of	  civilians	  
just	  is	  defensive	  harming.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  McMahan	  also	  considers	  whether	  the	  intentional	  non-­‐defensive	  killing	  of	  civilians	  (i.e.,	  terroristic	  killing)	  might	  be	  justifiable:	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  553;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  226.	  	  Drawing	  from	  Warren	  Quinn’s	  work,	  McMahan	  argues	  that	  because	  terrorism	  involves	  opportunistic	  rather	  than	  defensive	  harming,	  the	  justificatory	  burden	  is	  especially	  stringent.	  	  Such	  killings	  are	  opportunist	  because	  they	  involve	  the	  intentional	  exploitation	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  Nonetheless,	  McMahan	  concedes	  that	  in	  theory,	  terrorist	  tactics	  might	  be	  justified	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  just	  cause	  if	  the	  consequences	  of	  not	  achieving	  the	  just	  cause	  would	  be	  considerably	  worse.	  	  See	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  22,	  231-­‐35.	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3.5.1	  The	  Defensive	  Nature	  of	  Collateral	  Harm	  The	  claim	  that	  collaterally	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  is	  defensive	  in	  nature	  hinges	  on	  their	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  the	  forced	  choice	  confronting	  the	  victim	  state.	  	  If	  the	  arguments	  up	  to	  this	  point	  are	  sound,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  and	  thus	  share	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  it.	  	  If	  true,	  then	  they	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation	  that	  now	  threatens	  indivisible	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  During	  war,	  the	  violence	  must	  fall	  to	  someone.	  	  And	  as	  McMahan	  rightly	  points	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  quote,	  in	  such	  situations	  slight	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  parties	  can	  be	  decisive	  when	  distributing	  the	  inevitable	  harm.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  non-­‐responsible	  parties	  are	  justified	  in	  shifting	  the	  harms	  to	  the	  responsible	  parties,	  even	  if	  the	  latter	  are	  non-­‐culpably,	  minimally	  responsible.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  expect	  the	  innocent	  victims	  to	  bear	  the	  harms	  that	  the	  responsible	  parties	  foreseeably	  created.	  So	  consider	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  victim	  state	  citizenry.	  	  Assuming	  the	  aggressor	  state	  unjustly	  attacks	  victim	  state	  with	  no	  culpable	  inducement	  or	  provocation	  on	  the	  latter’s	  part,	  it	  follows	  that	  all	  just	  citizens	  (both	  combatant	  and	  civilian)	  are	  morally	  non-­‐responsible.	  	  Conversely,	  all	  combatants	  and	  most	  civilians	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  share	  various	  degrees	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  These	  conditions	  create	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  just	  and	  unjust	  citizens	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  just	  combatants	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  on	  the	  other.	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Now	  imagine	  the	  situation	  just	  combatants	  face.	  	  Few	  modern	  wars	  can	  be	  won	  only	  by	  striking	  targets	  that	  run	  zero	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  civilians.	  	  Instead,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  targeting	  options	  carry	  some	  risk	  of	  harming	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  just	  citizens	  are	  often	  forced	  with	  a	  stark	  choice:	  either	  accept	  military	  defeat	  by	  the	  aggressor	  state,	  or	  attempt	  to	  avert	  the	  harm	  by	  intentionally	  attacking	  military	  targets	  while	  risking	  harm	  to	  unjust	  civilians	  in	  the	  process.	  	  Given	  the	  forced	  choice	  nature	  of	  war	  and	  the	  inevitable	  harm	  it	  threatens,	  just	  combatants	  are	  fully	  justified	  in	  choosing	  to	  risk	  collateral	  harm	  to	  civilians,	  with	  the	  justification	  grounded	  in	  the	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  the	  parties.	  	  To	  say	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  justified	  in	  foreseeably	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  
collaterally	  harmed	  given	  their	  shared	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Because	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed,	  they	  are	  not	  wronged	  when	  collaterally	  harmed.	  	  Put	  slightly	  differently,	  unjust	  combatants	  and	  unjust	  civilians	  have	  no	  valid	  complaint	  against	  being	  harmed	  either	  intentionally	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  combatants)	  or	  collaterally	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  most	  civilians).	  	  McMahan	  comes	  close	  to	  making	  a	  similar	  claim.	  	  He	  writes	  that	  a	  fixed	  degree	  of	  responsibility	  for	  a	  wrong	  may	  be	  sufficient	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  liable	  to	  suffer	  a	  certain	  harm	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  the	  means	  of	  preventing	  that	  wrong	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  make	  him	  liable	  to	  the	  intentional	  infliction	  of	  the	  same	  harm	  as	  a	  means	  of	  preventing	  the	  same	  wrong.43	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  passage	  is	  that	  the	  expression	  “a	  fixed	  degree	  of	  responsibility”	  is	  vaguely	  qualified.	  	  As	  previously	  argued,	  McMahan’s	  collective	  statements	  on	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  suggest	  the	  “fixed	  degree	  of	  responsibility”	  is	  either	  complicity	  or	  significantly	  contributing	  to	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  	  But	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  219.	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consistency,	  McMahan	  should	  have	  dropped	  the	  “fixed	  degree”	  qualification	  and	  simply	  have	  written	  that	  the	  threshold	  for	  liability	  to	  side	  effect	  harm	  is	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  which	  in	  fact	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share.	  
3.6	  The	  Justification	  Objection	  to	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  In	  response	  to	  my	  liability	  claims,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  although	  unjust	  civilians’	  actions	  do	  contribute	  toward	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  their	  contributory	  actions	  are	  morally	  justified	  and	  thus	  preclude	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  McMahan	  himself	  runs	  this	  argument.	  	  He	  notes	  that	  civilians	  have	  positive	  moral	  reason	  to	  pay	  their	  taxes	  given	  the	  worthwhile	  aims	  toward	  which	  the	  funds	  are	  used;	  thus,	  taxation	  can’t	  be	  a	  source	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.44	  	  Civilians	  are	  similarly	  justified	  in	  working	  and	  participating	  in	  the	  economy,	  even	  though	  doing	  so	  contributes	  to	  the	  economic	  strength	  of	  the	  state	  and	  provides	  the	  wealth	  necessary	  for	  waging	  war.45	  	   The	  critical	  point	  here	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  justification	  defeats	  liability.	  	  McMahan	  notes	  “while	  responsibility	  for	  posing	  a	  threat	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  is	  normally	  a	  basis	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm,	  it	  is	  not	  when	  the	  responsible	  agent	  is	  morally	  justified	  in	  doing	  what	  threatens	  to	  inflict	  the	  harm.”46	  	  For	  an	  act	  to	  be	  morally	  justified	  the	  act	  must	  be	  permissible	  in	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  agent	  must	  have	  positive	  moral	  reason	  to	  perform	  the	  act.47	  	  In	  such	  situations,	  moral	  justification	  precludes	  liability.	  	  So	  according	  to	  the	  objection,	  because	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  both	  permitted	  to	  pay	  their	  taxes	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  state’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  550.	  45	  Ibid.,	  550;	  McMahan,	  “Individual	  Liability	  in	  War,”	  297.	  46	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  231.	  	  See	  also	  McMahan,	  “Individual	  Liability	  in	  War,”	  297;	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  550;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  42.	  47	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  43.	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economic	  institutions,	  and	  have	  positive	  moral	  reason	  for	  doing	  so,	  these	  actions	  are	  justified	  and	  thus	  don’t	  render	  civilians	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  This	  objection	  has	  much	  prima	  facie	  plausibility.	  	   Yet	  surprisingly,	  McMahan	  has	  already	  provided	  the	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  when	  he	  argues	  that	  “justification	  provides	  exemption	  from	  liability	  only	  when	  it	  is	  objective.”48	  	  For	  an	  act	  to	  be	  objectively	  justified,	  the	  reasons	  that	  ground	  the	  act’s	  justification	  must	  be	  independent	  of	  the	  agent’s	  subjective	  beliefs	  about	  the	  act.	  	  So	  when	  unjust	  civilians	  participate	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  pay	  their	  taxes	  and	  so	  on,	  their	  doing	  so	  must	  be	  objectively	  justified	  regardless	  of	  their	  beliefs	  about	  whether	  their	  tax	  money	  and	  economic	  contributions	  will	  be	  used	  for	  good	  or	  ill.	  But	  when	  considered	  impartially	  from	  an	  objective	  perspective,	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  not	  be	  objectively	  justified	  in	  paying	  their	  taxes	  and	  economically	  bankrolling	  their	  state	  if	  they	  knew	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  enable	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  killing	  during	  a	  war	  of	  aggression.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  conscientious	  driver	  would	  be	  unjustified	  in	  driving	  if	  he	  knew	  the	  car	  would	  careen	  out	  of	  control	  toward	  an	  innocent	  pedestrian,49	  so	  too	  if	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  knew	  in	  advance	  that	  their	  actions	  would	  contribute	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people,	  they	  would	  be	  unjustified	  in	  contributing.	  	  The	  wrongful	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people	  during	  war	  will	  almost	  always	  outweigh	  the	  public	  goods	  funded	  by	  taxes.	  	   The	  explanation	  for	  the	  preceding	  claim	  hinges	  on	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  harming	  and	  allowing	  harm	  to	  occur	  or,	  more	  specifically	  for	  the	  cases	  at	  hand,	  between	  killing	  and	  letting	  die.	  	  McMahan	  has	  long	  recognized	  and	  invoked	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  43,	  original	  emphasis.	  49	  McMahan,	  “The	  Basis	  of	  Moral	  Liability,”	  395.	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this	  distinction,	  which	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  more	  morally	  objectionable	  to	  kill	  than	  to	  let	  die,	  others	  things	  being	  equal.50	  	  If	  the	  killing/letting	  die	  distinction	  is	  valid,	  and	  if	  the	  number	  of	  people	  harmed	  by	  war	  would	  be	  close	  to	  the	  number	  of	  needy	  people	  whose	  lives	  would	  be	  saved	  by	  tax-­‐funded	  programs,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  morally	  worse	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  positive	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people	  than	  to	  refrain	  from	  actions	  that	  contribute	  to	  helping	  fellow	  citizens.	  	  Because	  tax	  payments	  would	  contribute	  both	  to	  the	  funding	  of	  an	  unjust	  war	  and	  to	  the	  funding	  of	  state	  projects	  that	  help	  people	  in	  need,	  objectively	  speaking	  one	  should	  be	  prohibited	  from	  contributing	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  funding	  the	  beneficial	  programs.	  	  The	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  lack	  objective	  justification	  for	  causally	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  aggression	  in	  a	  way	  that	  negates	  their	  liability.	  
3.6.1	  Liability	  &	  Lesser	  Evil	  Justifications	  One	  might	  argue	  against	  the	  last	  conclusion	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  qualification	  of	  the	  distinction:	  killing	  is	  morally	  worse	  than	  letting	  die,	  other	  things	  being	  equal.	  	  But	  suppose	  things	  were	  drastically	  unequal,	  such	  as	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  number	  of	  lives	  saved	  by	  tax-­‐funded	  unjust	  state	  programs	  would	  significantly	  outnumber	  the	  innocent	  lives	  lost	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  unjust	  war.	  	  For	  example,	  imagine	  that	  a	  wealthy	  state	  with	  a	  vast	  social	  safety	  net,	  extensive	  vaccination	  and	  medical	  research	  programs,	  etc.,	  decides	  to	  invade	  a	  nearby	  moderately	  inhabited	  island	  nation.	  	  The	  question	  now	  is	  whether	  the	  civilians	  would	  be	  objectively	  justified	  in	  paying	  their	  taxes	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  exempt	  them	  from	  liability	  to	  collateral	  harm	  from	  the	  islanders’	  defensive	  war.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  McMahan,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing,	  378-­‐92;	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  369-­‐71;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  94,	  113-­‐14.	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One	  might	  argue	  that	  if	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  knew	  all	  this	  information,	  they	  would	  still	  be	  objectively	  justified	  in	  paying	  their	  taxes	  because	  they	  would	  have	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  doing	  so:	  if	  they	  didn’t	  pay	  their	  taxes,	  significantly	  more	  people	  would	  suffer	  compared	  to	  the	  smaller	  number	  of	  islanders	  who	  would	  be	  imperiled	  by	  the	  unjust	  war.	  	  And	  since	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  be	  objectively	  justified	  in	  their	  causal	  contributions	  to	  the	  aggression,	  they	  would	  not	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  by	  the	  island	  community.	  I	  think	  this	  argument	  fails.	  	  It	  might	  be	  true	  that	  in	  the	  case	  as	  described,	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  be	  objectively	  justified	  in	  causally	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  because	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  the	  lesser	  evil.	  	  But	  because	  they	  act	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification,	  they	  nonetheless	  causally	  contribute	  to	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  against	  the	  islanders	  whose	  rights	  would	  be	  infringed.51	  	  The	  problem	  is	  the	  islanders	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed;	  they	  are	  innocent	  victims	  in	  every	  sense.	  	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  Islanders	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  roll	  over	  and	  accept	  the	  invasion.	  	  Surely	  they	  are	  justified	  in	  defending	  themselves.	  	  Thus,	  even	  if	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  all	  things	  considered	  objectively	  justified	  in	  paying	  their	  taxes	  and	  thus	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  their	  justification	  does	  not	  block	  their	  liability	  to	  the	  islanders’	  defensive	  force.	  McMahan	  at	  least	  partially	  agrees	  on	  this	  last	  point,	  which	  he	  acknowledges	  in	  the	  somewhat	  analogous	  case	  of	  the	  tactical	  bomber.	  	  The	  tactical	  bomber	  is	  a	  just	  combatant	  who	  threatens	  to	  collaterally	  harm	  innocent	  civilians	  while	  attacking	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Technically,	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  infringe	  the	  islanders’	  rights,	  and	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  would	  violate	  the	  islanders’	  rights.	  	  This	  is	  because	  the	  civilians	  have	  a	  justification	  for	  contributing	  to	  the	  unjust	  harm,	  whereas	  the	  combatants	  lack	  justification	  for	  harming	  the	  islanders.	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military	  target.	  	  Because	  the	  civilians	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  the	  bomber’s	  harm,	  bomber	  threatens	  them	  with	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  The	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  civilians	  could	  justifiably	  defend	  themselves	  by	  shooting	  at	  the	  bomber	  using	  a	  nearby	  anti-­‐aircraft	  gun.	  	  McMahan	  concludes:	  Innocent	  civilians	  have	  a	  right	  not	  to	  be	  killed.	  	  Just	  combatants	  who	  threaten	  to	  kill	  innocent	  civilians	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  military	  action	  will	  infringe	  those	  civilians’	  rights	  even	  if	  their	  action	  is	  morally	  justified,	  or	  even	  morally	  required.	  	  Unless	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  is	  so	  important	  that	  the	  civilians	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  sacrifice	  themselves	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  just	  combatants’	  mission,	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	  protect	  their	  rights	  against	  infringement.52	  	  I	  disagree	  with	  McMahan’s	  finer	  point	  in	  this	  example	  because	  I	  think	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  necessary	  collateral	  harm.	  	  And	  if	  the	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  the	  bomber’s	  collateral	  harm,	  they	  aren’t	  justified	  in	  fighting	  back.	  	  But	  I	  agree	  with	  McMahan’s	  broader	  point:	  if	  the	  imperiled	  victims	  were	  non-­‐liable,	  then	  they	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  defend	  themselves	  even	  though	  the	  party	  who	  endangers	  them	  acts	  with	  justification	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  bomber).	  	  So	  if	  instead	  we	  imagine	  that	  while	  striking	  a	  target	  near	  the	  border	  the	  bomber	  threatens	  to	  collaterally	  harm	  innocent	  civilians	  in	  a	  bordering	  neutral	  state,	  then	  I	  agree	  with	  McMahan	  that	  the	  innocent	  citizens	  justifiably	  could	  defend	  themselves.	  With	  that	  agreement	  noted,	  I	  depart	  from	  McMahan’s	  further	  claim	  that	  if	  the	  civilians	  shoot	  at	  the	  bomber,	  bomber	  is	  permitted	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  the	  civilians.	  	  Because	  the	  bomber	  acts	  with	  justification,	  McMahan	  concludes	  that	  he	  threatens	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  the	  innocent	  civilians	  without	  making	  himself	  liable	  to	  their	  defensive	  harm.	  	  And	  since	  the	  civilians	  now	  threaten	  him	  with	  wrongful	  harm,	  bomber	  is	  permitted	  to	  preemptively	  kill	  the	  civilians.	  	  Neither	  party	  is	  liable,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  47.	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both	  are	  permitted	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  the	  other.	  	  McMahan	  refers	  to	  such	  situations	  as	  “symmetrical	  defense	  cases.”53	  My	  take	  on	  the	  bomber	  example	  is	  this:	  when	  one	  acts	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  that	  threatens	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  both	  liable	  and	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  the	  
justification	  only	  blocks	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  from	  the	  parties	  who	  were	  liable	  to	  
be	  harmed.	  	  If	  one’s	  objectively	  justified	  action	  threatens	  to	  infringe	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  non-­‐liable	  victim,	  victim	  can	  justifiably	  use	  defensive	  force	  to	  protect	  her	  rights	  –	  to	  include	  harming	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  the	  rights	  infringement	  when	  necessary.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  one’s	  justification	  doesn’t	  defeat	  liability	  against	  the	  infringed	  victim’s	  defensive	  harm.54	  The	  reason	  I	  disagree	  with	  McMahan	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  because	  I	  deny	  his	  claim	  that	  one	  can	  be	  morally	  required	  to	  act	  on	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  defensive	  purposes.	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  point,	  so	  I	  will	  quote	  McMahan	  at	  length	  here	  (all	  emphases	  are	  mine):	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  236;	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  180.	  	  For	  a	  compelling	  argument	  that	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  potentially	  grounds	  several	  different	  kinds	  of	  wartime	  symmetric	  defense	  cases,	  see	  David	  R.	  Mapel,	  "Moral	  Liability	  to	  Defensive	  Killing	  and	  Symmetrical	  Self-­‐defense,"	  Journal	  of	  
Political	  Philosophy	  18,	  no.	  2	  (2010),	  198.	  	  My	  own	  view	  is	  that	  because	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  necessary	  collateral	  harm,	  the	  only	  symmetric	  defense	  cases	  that	  arise	  involve	  threats	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  neutral	  state	  citizens	  (though	  the	  latter	  may	  be	  located	  both	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  and	  the	  surrounding	  warzone).	  54	  My	  terminology	  here	  does	  not	  quite	  follow	  McMahan’s.	  	  Although	  McMahan	  says	  the	  civilians	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  shooting	  at	  tactical	  bomber,	  he	  does	  not	  think	  the	  civilians	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  doing	  so	  because	  the	  bomber	  has	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  himself	  liable.	  	  Effectively,	  McMahan	  introduces	  a	  fourth	  justification	  for	  harming	  (in	  addition	  to	  liability,	  lesser	  evil,	  and	  consent	  justifications).	  	  He	  does	  not,	  however,	  name	  the	  fourth	  justification.	  	  See	  McMahan,	  
Killing	  in	  War,	  47-­‐8.	  	  Because	  bomber’s	  actions	  provide	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  with	  a	  justification	  for	  harming	  him,	  I	  prefer	  to	  say	  that	  bomber	  has	  made	  himself	  liable.	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An	  act	  that	  is	  morally	  justified	  may	  be	  morally	  required	  or	  it	  may	  instead	  be	  optional.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  justification	  defeats	  liability	  may	  seem	  more	  compelling	  in	  the	  case	  of	  justified	  acts	  that	  are	  morally	  required.	  	  If	  so,	  and	  if	  acts	  of	  war	  by	  just	  combatants	  that	  kill	  innocent	  people	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  are	  optional	  rather	  than	  required,	  this	  would	  weaken	  the	  case	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  such	  acts	  do	  not	  thereby	  become	  liable.	  	  Yet	  contemporary	  wars	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  fought	  without	  killing	  innocent	  people,	  and	  if	  there	  are	  wars	  that	  are	  morally	  necessary	  or	  imperative	  to	  fight,	  then	  morality	  does	  often	  require	  just	  combatants	  to	  conduct	  attacks	  that	  will	  
foreseeably	  kill	  the	  innocent.	  	  I	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  wars	  that	  countries	  are	  
morally	  required	  to	  fight,	  and	  therefore	  that	  some	  individuals	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  participate	  in	  –	  for	  example,	  a	  war	  of	  defense	  in	  which	  innocent	  people	  in	  a	  country	  that	  has	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  unjust	  aggression	  will	  suffer	  significantly	  greater	  harm	  if	  their	  army	  does	  not	  fight	  than	  innocent	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  country	  will	  suffer	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  if	  the	  army	  does	  fight.	  	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  case,	  there	  will	  be	  some	  attacks	  that	  will	  foreseeably	  kill	  innocent	  
civilians	  but	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  nevertheless	  morally	  required	  to	  
conduct.55	  	  McMahan’s	  claim	  in	  this	  passage	  is	  that	  one	  can	  be	  morally	  required	  to	  engage	  in	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defense,	  and	  that	  during	  war	  this	  moral	  requirement	  entails	  that	  just	  combatants	  will	  be	  required	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  threaten	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  persons.	  Given	  that	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  collaterally	  harm	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  with	  a	  liability	  or	  consent	  justification,	  combatants	  can	  only	  do	  so	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  themselves	  or	  others.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  lesser	  evil	  justifications	  that	  threaten	  to	  kill	  innocent	  people	  generally	  are	  only	  permitted,	  not	  required.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  standard	  trolley	  problem,	  bystander	  is	  permitted	  to	  switch	  the	  track	  from	  the	  five	  imperiled	  people	  to	  the	  one,	  but	  I	  don’t	  think	  he	  is	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  	  And	  even	  if	  one	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  bystander	  would	  be	  required	  to	  flip	  the	  track,	  certainly	  the	  five	  imperiled	  people	  on	  the	  tracks	  would	  not	  be	  morally	  required	  to	  switch	  the	  track	  if	  they	  had	  the	  ability	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  234-­‐35.	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to	  do	  so	  themselves.	  	  They	  would	  be	  morally	  permitted	  to	  allow	  themselves	  to	  be	  killed	  (suppose	  they	  all	  agreed).	  	  But	  McMahan	  apparently	  denies	  this	  last	  claim,	  arguing	  instead	  that	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defenses	  are	  at	  least	  sometimes	  morally	  required,	  even	  if	  doing	  so	  foreseeably	  will	  kill	  innocent	  people	  in	  the	  process.	  	  On	  my	  view,	  self-­‐defense	  is	  a	  justified	  permission,	  not	  a	  moral	  requirement.	  	   One	  might	  reply	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  the	  tactical	  bomber	  and	  the	  trolley	  problem	  bystander.	  	  In	  the	  trolley	  problem,	  bystander	  is	  permitted	  but	  not	  obligated	  to	  switch	  the	  track.56	  	  But	  one	  might	  think	  the	  bomber	  pilot	  has	  a	  role-­‐based	  obligation	  to	  protect	  his	  fellow	  citizens.	  	  If	  we	  assume	  the	  just	  citizenry	  refuses	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  aggressor	  state’s	  unjust	  threats,	  and	  if	  the	  pilot	  has	  a	  role-­‐based	  duty	  to	  defend	  those	  citizens,	  then	  it’s	  reasonable	  to	  think	  the	  pilot	  should	  not	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  since	  he’s	  only	  doing	  what	  he’s	  obligated	  to	  do.	  	   The	  problem	  with	  this	  suggestion	  is	  that	  the	  pilot’s	  role-­‐based	  obligations	  are	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons	  that	  matter	  only	  amongst	  the	  just	  citizenry.	  	  If	  the	  just	  citizenry	  decides	  to	  defend,	  the	  pilot’s	  role	  in	  society	  provides	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons	  for	  singling	  him	  out	  as	  a	  party	  obligated	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  	  But	  surely	  those	  reasons	  aren’t	  agent-­‐neutral	  considerations	  that	  should	  matter	  to	  the	  wrongly	  imperiled	  civilians.	  	  It	  would	  be	  odd	  of	  the	  pilot	  to	  say	  to	  them,	  “You	  see,	  I’m	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Some	  consequentialists	  may	  deny	  this	  claim	  by	  arguing	  that	  one	  is	  morally	  required	  to	  switch	  the	  track.	  	  For	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  here	  to	  argue	  against	  this	  consequentialist	  suggestion,	  other	  than	  to	  assume	  that	  morality	  
generally	  does	  not	  require	  one	  to	  intervene	  on	  lesser	  evil	  grounds	  if	  one	  foresees	  that	  her	  intervention	  will	  kill	  innocent	  people.	  	  And	  even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  threshold	  level	  at	  which	  intervention	  is	  required,	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  required	  intervention	  necessarily	  defeats	  the	  wrongly	  imperiled	  party’s	  right	  to	  attempt	  to	  defend	  her	  life.	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obligated	  by	  my	  role	  in	  our	  society	  to	  protect	  these	  people,	  and	  thus	  you	  must	  not	  interfere	  with	  my	  mission;	  instead,	  you	  must	  allow	  me	  to	  infringe	  your	  rights	  so	  that	  I	  can	  fulfill	  my	  obligation	  to	  my	  fellow	  citizens.”	  	  So	  although	  we	  might	  grant	  that	  the	  pilot	  is	  obligated	  to	  engage	  in	  other	  defense,	  he’s	  not	  obligated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  precludes	  the	  civilians	  from	  protecting	  themselves.	  The	  broader	  point	  is	  that	  one	  cannot	  choose	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  that	  imperils	  an	  innocent	  person	  and	  in	  the	  process	  become	  exempt	  from	  defensive	  harm	  when	  that	  person	  tries	  to	  defend	  her	  life.	  	  One	  is	  permitted	  to	  choose	  the	  lesser	  evil	  and	  risk	  killing	  innocent	  people	  in	  the	  process,	  but	  by	  doing	  so	  one	  makes	  oneself	  liable	  to	  the	  innocent	  peoples’	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Moreover,	  because	  one	  makes	  oneself	  liable	  to	  the	  innocent	  victim’s	  defensive	  harm,	  one	  cannot	  use	  her	  attack	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  intentionally	  harming	  her	  in	  return.	  So	  in	  the	  bomber	  case,	  bomber	  chooses	  to	  act	  on	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  collaterally	  harming	  the	  innocent	  neutral	  civilians	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  his	  military	  action.	  	  Against	  McMahan,	  I	  think	  bomber	  thus	  does	  something	  to	  make	  himself	  liable:	  he	  chooses	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  threatens	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  Accordingly,	  bomber	  makes	  himself	  liable	  to	  the	  civilians’	  defensive	  harm,	  and	  the	  civilians	  in	  turn	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  defensively	  shooting	  at	  bomber.	  	  Because	  the	  civilians	  do	  not	  wrong	  the	  bomber	  when	  they	  shoot	  at	  him,	  he	  has	  no	  justification	  for	  intentionally	  shooting	  back	  at	  them.	  	  In	  sum,	  bomber	  may	  continue	  with	  his	  mission	  to	  strike	  the	  original	  target,	  but	  he’s	  prohibited	  from	  strafing	  the	  innocent	  civilians	  with	  his	  machine	  guns	  while	  en	  route,	  whether	  preemptively	  or	  defensively.	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The	  upshot	  of	  this	  analysis	  for	  the	  original	  taxpayer	  case	  is	  as	  follows.	  	  The	  taxpayers	  are	  permitted	  to	  choose	  the	  lesser	  evil,57	  which	  is	  to	  pay	  their	  taxes	  to	  fund	  the	  life-­‐preserving	  social	  programs	  while	  foreseeing	  that	  doing	  so	  will	  result	  in	  wrongful	  threats	  to	  the	  innocent	  islanders.	  	  But	  the	  taxpayers	  are	  not	  required	  to	  choose	  the	  lesser	  evil	  because	  morality	  generally	  doesn’t	  require	  agents	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  world	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  foreseeably	  kill	  innocent	  people	  –	  just	  as	  bystander	  is	  not	  required	  to	  flip	  the	  track	  in	  the	  trolley	  problem.	  	  Because	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  choose	  to	  act	  on	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  that	  foreseeably	  causally	  contributes	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  their	  justification	  does	  not	  exempt	  them	  from	  liability	  to	  the	  islanders’	  defensive	  harm.	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  not	  wronged	  when	  collaterally	  harmed	  by	  the	  islanders’	  defensive	  action,	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  have	  no	  justification	  to	  harm	  the	  islanders	  defensively,	  nor	  do	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  The	  islanders	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  collaterally	  harming	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  who	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  infringing	  their	  rights,	  and	  to	  intentionally	  harm	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  who	  violate	  their	  rights.	  The	  foregoing	  analysis	  is	  intended	  to	  show	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  don’t	  possess	  an	  objective	  justification	  for	  causally	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  in	  a	  way	  that	  exempts	  them	  from	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  as	  McMahan	  had	  claimed.	  	  They	  would	  be	  objectively	  unjustified	  in	  paying	  their	  taxes,	  for	  example,	  if	  they	  knew	  they	  would	  be	  funding	  the	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  And	  even	  if	  they	  had	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  McMahan	  also	  points	  out	  that	  taxes	  are	  coercive,	  but	  the	  reply	  to	  this	  point	  is	  the	  simple	  refrain	  repeated	  throughout	  these	  first	  two	  chapters:	  duress	  is	  an	  excuse	  capable	  of	  absolving	  only	  culpability,	  not	  moral	  responsibility.	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lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  doing	  so,	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  would	  not	  absolve	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  from	  liability	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed	  by	  the	  just	  combatants’	  use	  of	  defensive	  force.	  
3.7	  The	  Proportionality	  Objection	  to	  Collaterally	  Harming	  Civilians	  Some	  might	  object	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm	  by	  arguing	  that	  even	  if	  unintended,	  the	  killing	  and	  maiming	  of	  unjust	  civilians	  is	  disproportionate	  relative	  to	  their	  minimal	  responsibility.	  	  Such	  objectors	  might	  mean	  one	  of	  two	  different	  things.	  	  First,	  they	  might	  be	  claiming	  that	  the	  physical	  harming	  of	  each	  individual	  unjust	  civilian	  is	  disproportionate	  relative	  to	  his	  or	  her	  minimal	  causal	  contribution.	  	  Second,	  they	  might	  be	  claiming	  that	  even	  if	  collaterally	  harming	  each	  unjust	  civilian	  were	  justified,	  the	  aggregate	  harm	  to	  many	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  make	  the	  unintended	  harming	  disproportionate.	  	  Each	  objection	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  turn.	  Before	  proceeding,	  however,	  it	  is	  worth	  clarifying	  that	  the	  issue	  here	  is	  one	  of	  what	  McMahan	  calls	  narrow	  proportionality.	  	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  narrow	  proportionality	  considerations,	  both	  of	  which	  address	  harm	  to	  potentially	  liable	  persons.58	  	  The	  first	  category	  of	  narrow	  proportionality	  evaluates	  intentional	  harm	  to	  potentially	  liable	  persons,	  whereas	  the	  second	  category	  evaluates	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harm	  to	  potentially	  liable	  persons.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  potentially	  liable	  person	  must	  not	  be	  excessive	  when	  weighed	  against	  the	  expected	  instrumental	  good	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  harming	  that	  person.	  	  So	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Recall	  that	  proportionality	  is	  internal	  to	  liability	  itself;	  if	  the	  harm	  to	  a	  potentially	  liable	  person	  is	  disproportionate,	  that	  person	  is	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	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collateral	  harm	  to	  potentially	  liable	  civilians,	  this	  section	  will	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  second	  category	  of	  narrow	  proportionality.	  In	  contrast	  to	  narrow	  proportionality,	  wide	  proportionality	  evaluates	  harm	  to	  potential	  non-­‐liable	  parties.	  	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  comprised	  of	  two	  categories:	  one	  concerned	  with	  intentional	  harm,	  the	  other	  with	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms.	  	  Because	  most	  just	  war	  theorists	  believe	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  innocent	  in	  the	  non-­‐liable	  sense,	  their	  proportionality	  discussions	  of	  collateral	  harm	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  this	  last	  category.	  	  However,	  if	  I	  am	  right	  in	  claiming	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  and	  thus	  are	  potentially	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm,	  then	  the	  topic	  of	  proportionate	  harm	  shifts	  from	  wide	  to	  narrow	  proportionality.	  	  (The	  issue	  of	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  neutral	  citizens	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6.)	  
3.7.1	  The	  Excessive	  Individual	  Harm	  Objection	  So	  returning	  to	  the	  first	  objection,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  harm	  each	  unjust	  citizen	  might	  suffer	  is	  excessive	  relative	  to	  his	  or	  her	  low	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  harm	  is	  unintended,	  it	  still	  kills	  and	  maims.	  	  This	  kind	  of	  harm,	  the	  objection	  goes,	  is	  surely	  excessive	  relative	  to	  the	  minimal	  contributions	  that	  each	  civilian	  makes.	  	  This	  is	  a	  challenging	  objection,	  and	  one	  that	  merits	  a	  somewhat	  lengthy	  response.	  To	  help	  illustrate	  this	  objection,	  we	  can	  draw	  from	  a	  case	  McMahan	  introduces	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  wartime	  narrow	  proportionality	  violation.	  	  He	  imagines	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  ten	  innocent	  civilians	  are	  unjustly	  imprisoned	  by	  500	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military	  guards.59	  	  On	  McMahan’s	  analysis,	  each	  guard	  is	  individually	  liable	  to	  be	  killed	  in	  an	  attempted	  rescue	  mission,	  and	  the	  rescuers	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  executing	  the	  mission	  if	  they	  had	  to	  kill	  only	  one	  of	  the	  guards.	  	  But,	  McMahan	  argues,	  if	  we	  knew	  that	  the	  guards	  were	  reluctant	  conscripts,	  and	  if	  it	  were	  necessary	  to	  kill	  all	  500	  guards	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  ten,	  he	  concludes	  that	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  would	  be	  narrowly	  disproportionate	  and	  thus	  prohibited.	  	  The	  reason	  is	  because	  each	  guard	  only	  minimally	  contributes	  to	  the	  imprisonment,	  and	  so	  	  killing	  him	  would	  make	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  to	  the	  release	  of	  the	  prisoners.	  	  The	  good	  that	  would	  be	  produced	  by	  killing	  him	  alone	  is	  therefore	  insufficient	  for	  the	  harm	  he	  would	  thereby	  suffer	  to	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate	  –	  that	  is,	  proportionate	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  potential	  liability.60	  	  Essentially,	  one	  must	  kill	  a	  minimally	  contributing	  person	  whose	  death	  makes	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  to	  the	  prisoners’	  release.	  	  So,	  McMahan	  concludes,	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  individually	  would	  be	  narrowly	  disproportionate.	  This	  is	  a	  surprising	  conclusion.	  	  As	  McMahan	  himself	  points	  out,	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  number	  of	  individually	  liable	  guards	  can	  affect	  narrow	  proportionality	  since	  that	  concept	  concerns	  only	  individual	  liability	  –	  and	  thus	  aggregation	  can	  play	  no	  part	  in	  the	  equation.	  	  So	  to	  reach	  his	  conclusion,	  McMahan	  must	  establish	  that	  the	  individual	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  is	  wrong.	  	  His	  move	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  killing	  each	  guard	  is	  excessive	  given	  the	  small	  instrumental	  role	  his	  death	  would	  play	  in	  the	  goal	  of	  rescuing	  the	  prisoners.	  Toward	  that	  end,	  McMahan	  interjects	  several	  factors	  into	  the	  case.	  	  Notice	  that	  the	  500	  guards	  are	  reluctant	  conscripts,	  which	  presumably	  is	  meant	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  23.	  60	  Ibid.,	  24.	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introduce	  an	  excusing	  condition	  to	  negate	  their	  blameworthiness.	  	  Also,	  because	  the	  500	  guards	  are	  holding	  just	  ten	  prisoners,	  each	  guard	  only	  minimally	  contributes	  to	  the	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  The	  combined	  result	  is	  that	  each	  guard	  is	  apparently	  something	  like	  a	  non-­‐culpable,	  minimally	  responsible	  agent.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  their	  moral	  status	  isn’t	  too	  far	  removed	  from	  that	  of	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  during	  war.	  	  So	  if	  McMahan	  can	  establish	  that	  it	  is	  narrowly	  disproportionate	  to	  kill	  the	  guards	  in	  the	  rescue	  operation,	  then	  that	  might	  go	  a	  long	  way	  toward	  establishing	  that	  killing	  most	  civilians	  during	  wartime	  will	  also	  likewise	  be	  narrowly	  disproportionate.	  My	  last	  point	  was	  a	  bit	  too	  quick,	  for	  the	  prisoner	  scenario	  involves	  
intentionally	  killing	  the	  guards.	  	  This	  last	  fact	  places	  the	  example	  in	  the	  other	  narrow	  proportionality	  category	  that	  evaluates	  intentional	  harm	  to	  potentially	  liable	  parties.61	  	  But	  the	  only	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  categories	  of	  narrow	  proportionality	  is	  that	  the	  justification	  burden	  for	  intentionally	  killing	  a	  liable	  party	  is	  more	  demanding	  than	  the	  justification	  burden	  for	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  killing	  a	  liable	  party.62	  	  If	  that’s	  true,	  then	  if	  we	  can	  establish	  that	  it’s	  narrowly	  proportionate	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  the	  500	  guards,	  it	  necessarily	  follows	  that	  it	  would	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate	  to	  collaterally	  kill	  the	  guards	  during	  the	  rescue	  attempt.63	  	  So	  the	  hope	  is	  that	  we	  can	  benefit	  from	  this	  loosely	  analogous	  case	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  An	  interesting	  question	  is	  whether	  McMahan	  would	  think	  it	  proportionate	  if	  the	  rescue	  involved	  collaterally	  harming	  the	  500	  guards.	  	  Presumably	  he	  would	  not.	  62	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  21,	  113;	  Rodin,	  “Justifying	  Harm,”	  95.	  63	  Importantly,	  establishing	  that	  it	  would	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate	  to	  harm	  the	  500	  guards	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  the	  intervening	  forces	  would	  be	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  the	  rescue	  mission.	  	  See	  the	  lesser	  evil	  discussion	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  collateral	  harm	  to	  minimally	  responsible,	  potentially	  liable	  parties.	  	   Before	  proceeding,	  it	  is	  worth	  wondering	  whether	  the	  under-­‐described	  nature	  of	  the	  scenario	  might	  skew	  some	  intuitions	  in	  this	  case.	  	  Specifically,	  it	  might	  be	  important	  that	  the	  future	  plight	  of	  the	  prisoners	  is	  unknown.	  	  When	  adjudicating	  the	  narrow	  proportionality	  of	  the	  rescue	  mission,	  we’re	  left	  weighing	  the	  clear	  magnitude	  of	  killing	  the	  guards	  against	  the	  somewhat	  uncertain	  magnitude	  of	  being	  held	  captive	  with	  an	  unknown	  future.	  	  Obviously	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  latter	  threatened	  harm	  pales	  in	  comparison	  to	  being	  killed.	  	  So	  to	  help	  clarify	  the	  magnitudes,	  let	  us	  suppose	  instead	  that	  the	  ten	  prisoners	  are	  awaiting	  execution.	  	   Now	  the	  issue	  becomes	  one	  of	  whether	  each	  guard	  would	  have	  a	  valid	  complaint	  against	  being	  killed	  for	  the	  instrumental	  purpose	  of	  saving	  the	  soon	  to	  be	  executed	  prisoners.	  	  Even	  in	  this	  variant	  scenario,	  McMahan’s	  reasoning	  still	  suggests	  we	  should	  judge	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  as	  narrowly	  disproportionate.	  	  According	  to	  his	  analysis,	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  makes	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  toward	  the	  good	  of	  saving	  the	  prisoners	  –	  an	  amount	  of	  harm	  that	  seems	  excessive	  given	  their	  minimal	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  threatened	  wrongful	  harm.	  But	  in	  response	  to	  McMahan’s	  reasoning,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  the	  supposed	  moral	  difference	  is	  between	  killing	  driver	  in	  Conscientious	  Driver	  (which	  is	  proportionate),	  and	  killing	  a	  prison	  guard	  (which	  supposedly	  is	  disproportionate).	  	  The	  killing	  of	  driver	  is	  necessary	  to	  save	  pedestrian’s	  life,	  as	  is	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  to	  save	  the	  prisoners’	  lives.	  	  Additionally,	  killing	  driver	  is	  instrumentally	  effective	  in	  saving	  an	  innocent	  party,	  and	  likewise	  killing	  each	  guard	  is	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instrumentally	  effective	  in	  doing	  the	  same	  (so	  long	  as	  all	  500	  are	  killed).	  	  So	  why	  should	  it	  matter	  how	  much	  of	  a	  contribution	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  makes?	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  both	  the	  pedestrian	  and	  the	  ten	  imprisoned	  civilians,	  innocent	  victims	  are	  wrongly	  threatened	  with	  impending	  death,	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  avert	  those	  wrongful	  threats	  is	  by	  killing	  the	  minimally	  responsible	  parties.	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  McMahan	  cannot	  explain	  the	  supposed	  moral	  difference	  between	  killing	  the	  driver	  and	  killing	  a	  guard.	  	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  the	  only	  difference	  McMahan	  points	  to	  between	  the	  two	  cases	  is	  the	  amount	  of	  contribution	  each	  death	  will	  make	  toward	  averting	  the	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  But	  on	  what	  principled	  basis	  is	  it	  determined	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  contribution	  threshold	  amount	  that	  decides	  whether	  killing	  a	  morally	  responsible	  party	  is	  narrowly	  proportionate?	  	  This	  threshold	  requirement	  seems	  very	  ad	  hoc.	  Unfortunately,	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  elaborate	  on	  this	  important	  threshold	  claim;	  instead,	  he	  appears	  simply	  to	  take	  it	  for	  granted,	  perhaps	  on	  intuitive	  appeal.	  	  If	  so,	  I	  don’t	  share	  that	  intuition.	  	  I	  think	  each	  guard	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  killed,	  regardless	  of	  how	  significant	  of	  a	  contribution	  his	  death	  will	  make	  toward	  the	  prisoners’	  release.	  	  The	  explanation	  why	  is	  as	  follows,	  and	  should	  sound	  familiar.	  
3.7.2	  Forced	  Choices,	  Indivisible	  Harm,	  and	  Narrow	  Proportionality	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  prisoner	  case	  closely	  parallels	  that	  of	  the	  conscientious	  driver.	  	  What	  justifies	  killing	  the	  driver	  is	  the	  slight	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  driver	  and	  pedestrian,	  coupled	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  killing	  the	  driver	  will	  be	  instrumentally	  effective	  in	  saving	  the	  innocent	  pedestrian’s	  life.	  	  But	  the	  same	  holds	  true	  in	  the	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prisoner	  case:	  there’s	  a	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  each	  guard	  and	  each	  prisoner	  –	  and	  an	  even	  larger	  asymmetry	  between	  each	  guard	  and	  all	  ten	  prisoners.	  In	  the	  prisoner	  case,	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	  forced	  choice	  scenario	  involving	  inevitable,	  indivisible	  harm:	  either	  the	  guards	  must	  be	  killed,	  or	  the	  ten	  civilians	  must	  be	  left	  to	  execution.	  	  Because	  narrow	  proportionality	  is	  concerned	  with	  individual	  liability,	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  is	  considered	  in	  isolation.	  	  So	  guard1	  bears	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  lethal	  threat	  to	  the	  ten	  civilians,	  whereas	  the	  ten	  civilians	  are	  completely	  innocent.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  just	  combatants	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  distributing	  the	  harm	  to	  guard1	  rather	  than	  allow	  the	  harm	  to	  fall	  to	  the	  civilians;	  this	  fairness	  justification	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties.	  	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  guard2,	  guard3,	  up	  through	  guard500.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  killing	  each	  guard	  makes	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  toward	  the	  prisoners’	  rescue,	  but	  in	  each	  case	  that	  fact	  can’t	  trump	  the	  combined	  weight	  of:	  (1)	  the	  necessity	  of	  killing	  each	  guard	  to	  save	  the	  ten	  innocent	  lives,	  and	  (2)	  each	  guard’s	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  lethal	  threats	  to	  the	  civilians.	  	  From	  a	  
liability	  perspective,	  it	  is	  of	  no	  moral	  consequence	  that	  killing	  a	  guard	  makes	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  toward	  saving	  the	  innocent	  victims.	  	  So	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties,	  that	  fact	  should	  be	  decisive.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  would	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate,	  and	  thus	  each	  guard	  is	  liable.	  To	  deny	  the	  last	  claim	  would	  be	  to	  argue	  that,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  inevitable	  harm	  should	  fall	  instead	  to	  the	  civilians.	  	  But	  that	  can’t	  be	  right.	  	  The	  civilians	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed,	  whereas	  the	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guards	  are	  morally	  implicated	  in	  the	  wrongful	  imprisonment	  and	  pending	  executions.	  	  Although	  the	  guards	  may	  be	  reluctant	  conscripts	  and	  thus	  minimally	  responsible,	  the	  moral	  asymmetry	  between	  them	  and	  the	  civilians	  is	  decisive	  in	  determining	  that	  the	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  each	  of	  them.	  	  Considered	  individually,	  each	  guard	  has	  no	  justified	  complaint	  in	  being	  killed	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  innocent	  civilians.	  Many	  readers	  might	  still	  be	  put	  off	  by	  this	  conclusion.	  	  In	  response,	  let	  me	  point	  out	  two	  things.	  	  First,	  even	  if	  each	  guard	  is	  individually	  liable	  to	  be	  killed,	  the	  just	  combatants	  still	  might	  lack	  an	  all	  things	  considered	  justification	  for	  killing	  all	  500	  guards.	  	  This	  possibility	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  which	  focuses	  on	  the	  aggregate	  harm	  objection.	  Second,	  some	  readers	  might	  think	  that	  the	  guards	  simply	  don’t	  deserve	  to	  die	  given	  their	  individually	  small	  contributions,	  and	  thus	  that	  it	  would	  be	  narrowly	  disproportionate	  to	  kill	  each	  of	  them.	  	  But	  as	  McMahan	  rightly	  points	  out,	  the	  concept	  of	  liability	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  desert.64	  	  We	  can	  say	  that	  the	  fair	  distribution	  of	  the	  inevitable	  and	  indivisible	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  guards	  without	  claiming	  that	  they	  deserve	  to	  be	  killed.	  	  In	  fact,	  since	  the	  guards	  are	  reluctant	  conscripts	  and	  the	  civilians	  are	  innocent,	  neither	  of	  the	  parties	  deserves	  to	  die.	  	  But	  the	  prisoner	  example	  isn’t	  a	  problem	  about	  desert;	  it	  is	  a	  problem	  about	  liability.	  	  And	  the	  liability	  problem	  is	  about	  determining	  who	  should	  bear	  the	  inevitable	  harm	  –	  an	  adjudication	  based	  on	  considerations	  of	  fairness	  grounded	  in	  the	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  the	  involved	  parties.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  552.	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3.7.3	  Excessive	  Harm	  Objection	  Applied	  to	  Unjust	  Civilians	  The	  prison	  guards	  are	  non-­‐culpable,	  morally	  responsible	  agents	  who	  make	  only	  small	  contributions	  to	  unjustified	  threats	  against	  innocent	  people.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  would	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate	  for	  just	  combatants	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  each	  guard	  even	  though	  doing	  so	  would	  make	  only	  a	  small	  contribution	  toward	  saving	  the	  ten	  innocent	  lives.	  	  Thus,	  each	  guard	  is	  liable	  to	  killed.	  	  Assuming	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  justification	  burden	  for	  intentionally	  killing	  a	  potentially	  liable	  person	  is	  more	  stringent	  than	  the	  justification	  burden	  for	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  killing	  potentially	  liable	  person,	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  prison	  guards	  would	  also	  be	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed	  during	  the	  rescue	  mission	  (assuming	  all	  else	  is	  equal).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  narrow	  proportionality	  objection	  can	  be	  overcome.	  If	  I	  am	  right	  in	  arguing	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  non-­‐culpable,	  morally	  responsible	  agents	  who	  make	  small	  contributions	  toward	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats	  against	  innocent	  people,	  then	  by	  the	  same	  reasoning	  involved	  in	  the	  prison	  guard	  example,	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  individually	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm	  during	  war	  when	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  innocent	  victims.	  	  I	  previously	  argued	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  prison	  guard	  case	  closely	  parallels	  that	  of	  conscientious	  driver.	  	  My	  claim	  now	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  civilian	  liability	  to	  collateral	  harm	  during	  war	  closely	  parallels	  that	  of	  the	  prison	  guard	  case	  (and	  in	  turn	  of	  conscientious	  driver).	  	   During	  war,	  significant	  harm	  must	  fall	  to	  someone.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  parties	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  aggression.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  the	  unjust	  civilians,	  they	  are	  implicated	  in	  the	  unjust	  threats	  and	  thus	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  impending	  harm	  in	  a	  way	  the	  victim	  state	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citizens	  do	  not.	  	  If	  some	  unjust	  civilians	  must	  be	  collaterally	  harmed	  in	  order	  to	  distribute	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  away	  from	  the	  innocent	  victims,	  then	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate.	  	  As	  with	  the	  guards,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  killing	  of	  any	  one	  individual	  unjust	  civilian	  will	  make	  only	  a	  miniscule	  contribution	  toward	  halting	  the	  unjust	  aggression	  does	  not	  exempt	  him	  or	  her	  from	  liability	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  McMahan’s	  contribution	  threshold	  claim	  doesn’t	  apply	  to	  unintended	  harms	  to	  potentially	  liable	  parties;	  otherwise,	  liability	  to	  collateral	  harm	  wouldn’t	  be	  a	  possibility	  as	  McMahan	  thinks	  it	  is.	  	  If	  harming	  or	  killing	  a	  person	  had	  to	  make	  more	  than	  a	  small	  causal	  contribution	  toward	  achieving	  the	  desired	  good	  of	  a	  military	  strike,	  then	  no	  collateral	  harming	  could	  rise	  above	  that	  threshold.	  	  In	  most	  situations,	  the	  reason	  a	  foreseen	  harm	  would	  be	  unintended	  presumably	  is	  because	  the	  harming	  of	  that	  person	  makes	  no	  
causal	  contribution	  toward	  the	  expected	  good	  of	  the	  military	  strike.65	  	  It’s	  true	  that	  the	  collateral	  harm	  is	  causally	  necessary:	  the	  target	  cannot	  be	  destroyed	  without	  also	  killing	  the	  civilians.	  	  But	  the	  civilian	  deaths	  don’t	  causally	  contribute	  as	  a	  means	  to	  bringing	  about	  the	  target	  destruction.	  	  We	  can	  see	  this	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  I	  use	  the	  expression	  “in	  most	  situations”	  because	  due	  to	  mistake	  of	  fact,	  the	  just	  combatants	  could	  intend	  to	  kill	  the	  civilians	  as	  a	  means	  toward	  their	  good	  end	  even	  though	  the	  civilian	  deaths	  would	  not	  causally	  contribute	  toward	  that	  end.	  	  On	  this	  point,	  one	  should	  recall	  that	  McMahan’s	  account	  of	  justification	  is	  objective.	  	  Although	  the	  combatants	  would	  be	  subjectively	  justified	  in	  acting	  if	  their	  mistake	  of	  fact	  were	  reasonable,	  they	  would	  still	  be	  objectively	  unjustified	  in	  killing	  the	  civilians.	  	  But	  for	  McMahan,	  their	  epistemic	  limitation	  would	  excuse	  their	  wrongdoing.	  	  Also,	  it’s	  possible	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  might	  merely	  foresee	  harm	  to	  civilians	  without	  realizing	  that	  their	  deaths	  will	  in	  fact	  causally	  contribute	  toward	  the	  intended	  good	  end.	  	  Still,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  possibility	  undermines	  the	  broader	  point	  I’m	  making	  against	  McMahan’s	  contributory	  threshold	  claim.	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civilians	  weren’t	  present	  near	  the	  target,	  the	  just	  combatants	  would	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  alter	  their	  mission.	  	  In	  cases	  of	  collateral	  harm,	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harming	  is	  not	  instrumentally	  necessary	  to	  destroy	  the	  target	  because	  the	  unintended	  harm	  causally	  makes	  no	  contribution;	  it	  is	  an	  incidental	  harm	  that	  merely	  accompanies	  destruction	  of	  the	  target.	  If	  liability	  to	  collateral	  harm	  weren’t	  a	  possibility,	  then	  the	  only	  justification	  just	  combatants	  would	  have	  for	  collaterally	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  be	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification.	  	  But	  to	  return	  to	  a	  previous	  quote,	  McMahan	  expressly	  says	  that	  “some	  civilians,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  complicit	  in	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  war	  their	  country	  is	  fighting,	  can	  be	  liable	  at	  least	  to	  certain	  risks	  of	  being	  harmed	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  attacks	  against	  legitimate	  military	  targets.66	  	  So	  it	  seems	  the	  only	  conclusion	  to	  draw	  is	  that	  the	  contribution	  threshold	  requirement	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  intentional	  harming	  of	  liable	  parties.67	  It	  might	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  by	  the	  reasoning	  I’ve	  provided,	  we	  should	  conclude	  not	  only	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm	  just	  as	  the	  500	  guards	  are,	  but	  also	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack	  the	  way	  that	  the	  500	  guards	  can	  be	  intentionally	  killed.	  	  In	  general,	  I	  deny	  that	  claim.	  	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  killing	  the	  guards	  is	  instrumentally	  effective	  in	  averting	  the	  unjust	  harm,	  whereas	  that	  is	  almost	  never	  true	  about	  intentionally	  killing	  unjust	  civilians	  during	  war.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  232,	  footnote	  3.	  67	  But	  as	  argued	  above,	  my	  view	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  contribution	  threshold	  requirement	  for	  narrow	  proportionality,	  which	  explains	  why	  I	  think	  each	  of	  the	  500	  guards	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  killed.	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But	  if	  it	  were	  contingently	  true	  that	  it	  would	  be	  both	  (1)	  necessary	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  unjust	  civilians	  to	  halt	  an	  unjust	  war,	  and	  that	  (2)	  killing	  the	  civilians	  would	  be	  instrumentally	  effective,	  then	  at	  that	  point	  I	  do	  think	  each	  unjust	  civilian	  would	  be	  liable	  to	  intentional	  attack.68	  	  But	  in	  such	  an	  extreme	  scenario,	  I	  don’t	  see	  that	  conclusion	  as	  a	  vice.69	  
3.8	  The	  Aggregate	  Harm	  Objection	  Whereas	  the	  previous	  objection	  focused	  on	  excessive	  harm	  to	  the	  individual,	  the	  second	  objection	  centers	  on	  excessive	  aggregated	  harm.	  	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  harm	  that	  each	  individual	  unjust	  civilian	  suffers,	  we	  should	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  aggregate	  harm	  to	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  So	  even	  if	  we	  grant	  the	  reply	  to	  the	  first	  objection	  and	  conclude	  that	  each	  unjust	  civilian	  is	  individually	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed,	  still	  one	  might	  think	  that	  collaterally	  harming	  a	  large	  enough	  number	  of	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  become	  disproportionate.	  The	  response	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  the	  traditional	  view	  that	  harms	  to	  liable	  parties	  are	  not	  aggregated	  for	  proportionality	  considerations	  –	  a	  view	  McMahan	  and	  many	  theorists	  endorse.70	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  each	  individual	  unjust	  civilian	  is	  liable	  to	  necessary	  collateral	  harm,	  then	  the	  numbers	  of	  collaterally	  harmed	  civilians	  aren’t	  aggregated	  for	  proportionality	  purposes.	  	  So	  long	  as	  the	  collaterally	  harmed	  civilians	  are	  individually	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed	  (which	  assumes	  the	  first	  objection	  can	  be	  overcome),	  then	  the	  collateral	  harming	  of	  each	  civilian	  will	  be	  weighed	  individually	  against	  the	  expected	  good	  of	  harming	  that	  person.	  	  Assuming	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  McMahan	  embraces	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  	  See	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  552.	  69	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  227-­‐28.	  70	  Ibid.,	  19;	  Rodin,	  “Justifying	  Harm,”	  99.	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just	  combatants	  are	  collaterally	  harming	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  because	  doing	  so	  is	  instrumentally	  necessary	  toward	  their	  just	  cause,	  most	  collateral	  damage	  will	  be	  narrowly	  proportionate.71	  	  Thus,	  if	  the	  traditional	  view	  is	  right	  –	  which	  I	  think	  it	  is	  –	  then	  the	  second	  objection	  is	  vacuous	  and	  easily	  defeated.	  However,	  even	  supposing	  the	  traditional	  view	  is	  right,	  there	  is	  another	  possible	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  aggregate	  harm	  to	  large	  numbers	  of	  liable	  civilians	  might	  be	  morally	  prohibited.	  	  David	  Rodin	  raises	  an	  interesting	  possibility.	  	  In	  evaluating	  McMahan’s	  prisoner	  example,	  Rodin	  grants	  that	  each	  of	  the	  500	  guards	  is	  in	  fact	  individually	  liable	  to	  be	  killed.	  	  Nonetheless,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  killing	  of	  each	  guard	  still	  produces	  a	  residual	  bad	  effect.72	  	  If	  that	  claim	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  residual	  badness	  of	  killing	  each	  additional	  guard	  begins	  to	  add	  up.	  	  Rodin’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Though	  to	  be	  clear,	  just	  combatants	  still	  have	  compelling	  moral	  reason	  to	  minimize	  collateral	  harm	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  	  But	  if	  minimizing	  collateral	  harm	  endangers	  the	  just	  combatants’	  lives	  (such	  as	  flying	  at	  lower	  altitudes),	  then	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  not	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  	  They	  are,	  after,	  all	  innocent	  people.	  	  McMahan	  disagrees,	  arguing	  that	  just	  combatants	  have	  role-­‐based	  obligations	  to	  take	  on	  additional	  risk	  so	  as	  to	  minimize	  collateral	  harm	  to	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  However,	  McMahan’s	  argument	  is	  apparently	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  in	  those	  situations,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  innocent,	  which	  I	  deny.	  	  See	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”342-­‐379.	  72	  As	  Rodin	  points	  out,	  McMahan	  agrees	  with	  this	  claim	  regarding	  the	  residual	  badness	  of	  harming	  even	  liable	  parties.	  	  McMahan	  writes,	  “Harms	  to	  which	  people	  are	  liable	  are	  bad	  not	  only	  for	  those	  who	  suffer	  them	  but	  also	  from	  an	  impersonal	  point	  of	  view.	  	  Although	  their	  weight	  is	  discounted	  in	  proportionality	  calculations,	  they	  are	  never	  of	  merely	  neutral	  or	  positive	  value.”	  	  See	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  8.	  More	  recently,	  McMahan	  has	  suggested	  that	  these	  “moral	  remainders”	  can	  sufficiently	  add	  up	  so	  as	  to	  outweigh	  the	  defender’s	  justification	  for	  harming.	  	  But	  McMahan	  qualifies	  this	  claim	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  moral	  remainders	  only	  apply	  in	  cases	  of	  harming	  minimally	  responsible	  liable	  parties;	  there	  is	  no	  such	  remainder	  when	  harming	  fully	  culpable	  parties.	  	  See	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  554.	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the	  aggregated	  harm	  of	  killing	  all	  500	  guards	  would	  actually	  be	  a	  greater	  evil	  than	  keeping	  the	  ten	  civilians	  captive.73	  Moreover,	  that	  conclusion	  apparently	  would	  hold	  true	  whether	  the	  guards	  would	  be	  killed	  intentionally	  or	  collaterally.	  	  Either	  way,	  considered	  impartially	  there	  would	  be	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  continuing	  the	  unjust	  imprisonment.	  	  Or,	  more	  precisely,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  lesser	  evil	  restriction	  against	  the	  rescue	  mission.	  	  If	  one	  shares	  the	  intuition	  that	  killing	  all	  500	  guards	  seems	  excessive	  in	  order	  to	  release	  the	  civilians,	  the	  lesser	  evil	  restriction	  might	  explain	  why.	  	  	  For	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  I	  won’t	  argue	  directly	  against	  Rodin’s	  suggested	  lesser	  evil	  restriction.	  	  Instead,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  even	  if	  one	  agrees	  with	  his	  reasoning	  in	  the	  guard	  example,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  applicable	  his	  point	  is	  to	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  wartime	  collateral	  harm	  to	  unjust	  civilians.	  We	  can	  start	  by	  realizing	  that	  for	  Rodin’s	  lesser	  evil	  restriction	  to	  gain	  traction	  against	  excessive	  harm	  to	  unjust	  civilians,	  the	  aggregate	  amount	  of	  collateral	  harm	  would	  have	  to	  be	  extreme	  in	  order	  to	  render	  the	  harm	  as	  the	  greater	  evil	  (and	  thus	  prohibited).	  	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  prisoner	  scenario	  the	  ratio	  of	  guards	  who	  must	  be	  killed	  is	  exceptionally	  high	  relative	  to	  the	  number	  of	  innocent	  people	  who	  will	  be	  saved.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  example	  involves	  a	  ratio	  of	  harming	  fifty	  minimally	  responsible	  guards	  for	  the	  rescue	  of	  each	  innocent	  person.	  	  Suppose	  we	  grant	  that	  this	  fifty-­‐to-­‐one	  ratio	  of	  killed	  guards	  to	  rescued	  prisoners	  would	  be	  the	  greater	  evil.	  	  Still,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  much	  bearing	  that	  judgment	  has	  on	  the	  broader	  issue	  of	  collateral	  harm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Rodin,	  “Justifying	  Harm,”	  99-­‐100.	  
	   105	  
On	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  worth	  returning	  yet	  again	  to	  Conscientious	  Driver.	  	  That	  case	  involves	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  ratio	  of	  a	  harmed	  minimally	  responsible	  party	  to	  a	  defended	  innocent	  party.	  	  If	  McMahan	  is	  right	  that	  pedestrian	  is	  justified	  in	  intentionally	  killing	  driver,	  and	  the	  justification	  burden	  is	  higher	  for	  intentionally	  killing	  a	  liable	  party	  than	  to	  do	  so	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally,	  then	  the	  collateral	  harming	  of	  minimally	  responsible	  unjust	  civilians	  should	  be	  justified	  assuming	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  ratio	  of	  harmed	  unjust	  civilians	  to	  defended	  innocent	  parties.	  In	  actuality,	  I	  think	  the	  ratio	  of	  harmed	  responsible	  parties	  to	  protected	  victims	  could	  be	  much	  higher	  than	  one-­‐to-­‐one.	  	  Imagine	  a	  variant	  of	  Conscientious	  
Driver,	  where	  passenger	  prompts	  driver	  to	  go	  for	  a	  joy	  ride	  and	  puts	  gas	  in	  driver’s	  car.	  	  Unfortunately,	  driver’s	  car	  experiences	  a	  freak	  mechanical	  problem	  and	  veers	  uncontrollably	  toward	  innocent	  pedestrian.	  	  In	  this	  case	  as	  described,	  I	  think	  pedestrian	  is	  justified	  in	  defensively	  killing	  both	  car	  occupants	  if	  necessary.	  	  If	  that’s	  true,	  then	  even	  in	  cases	  involving	  the	  intentional	  killing	  of	  minimally	  responsible	  agents	  and	  a	  two-­‐to-­‐one	  harmed/defended	  ratio,	  unjustly	  threatened	  victims	  could	  still	  kill	  without	  violating	  a	  greater	  evil	  restriction.	  The	  same	  ratio	  should	  hold	  true	  for	  exponentially	  larger	  numbers	  of	  people.	  Just	  combatants	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  intentionally	  killing	  500	  minimally	  responsible	  guards	  in	  order	  to	  save	  250	  innocent	  civilians	  awaiting	  execution,	  and	  perhaps	  to	  kill	  even	  more	  collaterally.	  If	  Rodin’s	  claim	  about	  lesser	  evil	  restrictions	  on	  aggregate	  harm	  to	  liable	  parties	  is	  valid,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  at	  what	  ratio	  the	  principle	  kicks	  in	  to	  preclude	  unjustly	  imperiled	  victims	  from	  using	  defensive	  force	  against	  otherwise	  liable	  parties.	  	  But	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that	  problem	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  be	  solved	  here.	  	  The	  reason	  why	  is	  because	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  harm	  merely	  in	  defending	  themselves;	  they	  harm	  for	  the	  instrumental	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  their	  just	  cause,	  which	  is	  to	  defend	  the	  just	  state’s	  citizenry.	  In	  Rodin’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  prisoner	  example,	  the	  aggregated	  evil	  of	  killing	  the	  500	  guards	  is	  weighed	  only	  against	  the	  evil	  of	  allowing	  the	  ten	  civilians	  to	  remain	  captive.	  	  His	  point	  about	  the	  prisoner	  example	  might	  hold	  because	  the	  operation	  seems	  uniquely	  isolated	  from	  the	  broader	  war	  itself.	  	  But	  suppose	  the	  civilians	  were	  high-­‐ranking	  defense	  officials,	  or	  possessed	  vital	  intelligence	  knowledge.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  killing	  the	  500	  might	  be	  the	  lesser	  evil	  because	  of	  the	  role	  the	  rescued	  civilians	  might	  play	  toward	  bringing	  the	  unjust	  war	  to	  an	  end.	  	  But	  now	  we’re	  back	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  standard	  narrow	  proportionality	  considerations.	  	  Given	  that	  Rodin	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  500	  guards	  are	  individually	  liable,	  coupled	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  precluding	  the	  rescue,	  it	  seems	  the	  just	  combatants	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  killing	  the	  guards.	  	  And	  if	  the	  guards	  could	  be	  intentionally	  killed	  to	  free	  the	  civilians,	  then	  it	  certainly	  follows	  that	  the	  intervening	  forces	  could	  collaterally	  kill	  the	  guards.	  Let	  us	  assume	  the	  ten	  civilians	  possess	  no	  special	  knowledge	  or	  position	  that	  would	  affect	  the	  war	  effort.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  Rodin	  might	  be	  right	  that	  the	  guards	  should	  not	  be	  killed.	  	  But	  the	  guard	  example	  is	  an	  exception.	  	  Generally	  during	  war,	  just	  combatants	  collaterally	  harm	  unjust	  civilians	  for	  the	  instrumental	  purpose	  of	  achieving	  their	  just	  cause,	  which	  is	  to	  defend	  their	  state’s	  citizenry.	  	  But	  if	  their	  state’s	  citizenry	  counts	  as	  protected	  victims,	  then	  their	  numbers	  must	  also	  be	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factored	  into	  the	  broader	  proportionality	  equation.	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  their	  large	  numbers	  will	  weigh	  heavily	  toward	  justifying	  the	  just	  combatants’	  missions.	  	  This	  is	  what	  McMahan	  must	  have	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  argues,	  “because	  the	  military	  action	  of	  just	  combatants	  supports	  a	  just	  cause,	  a	  particular	  act	  of	  war	  by	  just	  combatants	  may	  be	  justified	  even	  if	  the	  number	  of	  innocent	  civilians	  it	  kills	  on	  the	  other	  side	  exceeds	  the	  number	  of	  innocent	  people	  it	  saves	  on	  their	  own	  side.”74	  	  So	  even	  though	  each	  particular	  act	  of	  war	  may	  threaten	  moderate	  collateral	  harm,	  each	  act	  will	  most	  often	  be	  justified	  if	  it	  is	  reasonably	  expected	  to	  contribute	  toward	  the	  victim	  state’s	  just	  cause.	  Moreover,	  we	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  hoped	  for	  synergistic	  effects	  of	  destroying	  numerous	  targets.	  	  Imagine	  just	  combatants	  begin	  attacking	  from	  among	  target	  set	  {A,	  B,	  …,	  Z.}	  	  Suppose	  striking	  each	  target	  risks	  considerable	  harm	  to	  nearby	  civilians.	  	  As	  the	  attacks	  continue,	  the	  aggregate	  amount	  of	  collateral	  harm	  begins	  to	  appear	  excessive	  relative	  to	  the	  small	  impact	  each	  strike	  makes	  on	  the	  overall	  war.	  	  However,	  if	  it’s	  reasonably	  believed	  that	  the	  eventual	  synergistic	  effect	  of	  striking	  some	  number	  of	  targets	  from	  the	  target	  set	  {A,	  B,	  …,	  Z.}	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  halt	  the	  unjust	  war	  and	  protect	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  innocent	  lives,75	  then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  232.	  75	  Some	  might	  object	  that	  in	  most	  wars,	  the	  entire	  victim	  state	  citizenry	  isn’t	  threatened	  with	  deadly	  force;	  thus,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  just	  citizens	  shouldn’t	  factor	  into	  proportionality	  calculations.	  	  A	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  lethally	  threatening	  many	  lives,	  war	  also	  threatens	  paramount	  values	  such	  as	  communal	  integrity,	  political	  autonomy,	  and	  a	  secure	  and	  stable	  national	  life	  –	  values	  of	  such	  importance	  that	  their	  defense	  merits	  weight	  in	  proportionality	  considerations.	  	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  tracks	  similar	  domestic	  analogues	  such	  as	  home	  invasion	  and	  rape.	  	  Although	  these	  latter	  acts	  might	  not	  necessarily	  threaten	  their	  victims’	  lives,	  the	  values	  they	  do	  threaten	  (a	  secure	  home	  life,	  bodily	  integrity)	  are	  so	  important	  that	  their	  defense	  is	  factored	  into	  narrow	  proportionality	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just	  combatants	  would	  be	  subjectively	  justified	  in	  continuing	  with	  the	  attacks.	  	  Their	  actions	  would	  violate	  neither	  narrow	  proportionality	  nor	  lesser	  evil	  restrictions.	  	  Should	  the	  just	  combatants’	  efforts	  result	  in	  winning	  the	  war,	  they	  actions	  would	  have	  been	  both	  subjectively	  and	  objectively	  justified.	  	  However,	  should	  their	  efforts	  fail,	  they	  still	  would	  have	  been	  subjectively	  justified	  in	  continuing	  with	  the	  additional	  strikes,	  and	  thus	  would	  be	  excused	  for	  the	  unnecessary	  collateral	  harm	  caused.	  	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  the	  threshold	  limit	  of	  collateral	  harm	  to	  potentially	  liable	  parties	  is.	  	  Recall	  the	  discussion	  above	  about	  the	  ratios	  of	  harmed	  responsible	  parties	  to	  defended	  innocent	  victims.	  	  If	  just	  combatants	  are	  justified	  in	  collaterally	  causing	  at	  least	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  ratio	  of	  harmed	  minimally	  responsible	  parties	  (unjust	  civilians)	  to	  defended	  innocent	  parties	  (just	  citizens),	  and	  the	  just	  citizenry	  numbers	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  defended	  innocent	  parties,	  then	  just	  combatants	  would	  be	  objectively	  morally	  justified	  in	  collaterally	  killing	  a	  sum	  of	  unjust	  civilians	  equal	  to	  the	  just	  state	  population.76	  	  Yet	  it	  is	  almost	  unimaginable	  to	  think	  of	  a	  modern	  war	  where	  the	  number	  of	  potentially	  collaterally	  harmed	  unjust	  civilians	  would	  approach	  that	  number.	  	  The	  result	  is	  that	  just	  combatants	  will	  likely	  never	  face	  a	  lesser	  evil	  restriction	  that	  prohibits	  their	  wartime	  missions	  against	  liable	  parties.	  Instead,	  lesser	  evil	  restrictions	  likely	  will	  restrict	  only	  wartime	  acts	  against	  liable	  parties	  where	  the	  proposed	  act	  doesn’t	  factor	  into	  the	  broader	  just	  cause	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  calculations	  –	  as	  evinced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  deadly	  force	  tends	  to	  be	  both	  morally	  and	  legally	  justified	  in	  both	  cases.	  76	  But	  as	  previously	  stated,	  even	  though	  just	  combatants	  are	  justified	  in	  collaterally	  harming	  many	  unjust	  civilians,	  the	  just	  combatants	  still	  have	  compelling	  moral	  reason	  to	  minimize	  the	  collateral	  killings.	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the	  war.	  	  The	  original	  prisoner	  scenario	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this,	  but	  such	  examples	  are	  rare.	  	  For	  most	  wartime	  collateral	  harm,	  lesser	  evil	  restrictions	  won’t	  play	  a	  prohibitory	  role.	  
3.9	  McMahan’s	  Correspondence	  Claim,	  Revisited	  McMahan’s	  claim	  is	  that	  a	  person’s	  liability	  should	  correspond	  with	  his	  or	  her	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  (3.1).	  	  I	  called	  this	  the	  correspondence	  claim.	  	  Unless	  they’ve	  acted	  culpably	  or	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  McMahan	  thinks	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  collateral	  or	  lesser	  harms.	  But	  if	  my	  arguments	  up	  to	  this	  point	  are	  right,	  I’ve	  established	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  generally	  liable	  to	  collateral	  and	  lesser	  harms	  –	  even	  when	  they	  don’t	  act	  culpably	  or	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  And	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm,	  and	  collateral	  harm	  includes	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  killed,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  being	  killed	  during	  war.	  	  Yet	  considered	  individually,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  make	  only	  small	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  war	  aggressive	  war.	  	  Thus,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  small	  contributions	  can	  ground	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  –	  to	  include	  death,	  when	  necessary.	  	  And	  if	  that’s	  right,	  then	  McMahan’s	  correspondence	  claim	  must	  be	  wrong.	  	   That	  said,	  I	  do	  think	  there’s	  something	  fundamentally	  right	  about	  the	  correspondence	  claim	  in	  lethal	  forced	  choice	  situations.	  	  My	  interpretation	  of	  the	  correspondence	  claim	  is	  this.	  	  Although	  an	  agent’s	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  doesn’t	  straightforwardly	  set	  limits	  to	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  harm	  she	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might	  be	  liable	  to	  as	  McMahan	  suggests,	  it	  is	  a	  weighty	  consideration	  when	  one	  is	  able	  to	  distribute	  harm	  among	  liable	  parties.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  moral	  responsibility	  levels	  give	  us	  positive	  reason	  to	  shift	  more	  harm	  to	  more	  highly	  responsible	  parties	  when	  possible,	  and	  less	  harm	  to	  lesser	  responsible	  parties.	  	  Moreover,	  I	  think	  this	  consideration	  applies	  both	  during	  and	  after	  war.	  	   For	  example,	  suppose	  just	  combatants	  were	  choosing	  between	  striking	  two	  military	  communication	  targets:	  A	  or	  B.	  	  Striking	  each	  target	  foreseeably	  risks	  killing	  ten	  people;	  ten	  culpable	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  located	  near	  A,	  and	  ten	  minimally	  responsible	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  present	  at	  B.	  	  Assuming	  only	  one	  of	  the	  two	  targets	  needs	  to	  be	  destroyed	  (the	  military	  advantage	  will	  be	  the	  same),	  the	  difference	  in	  moral	  responsibility	  among	  the	  unjust	  parties	  favors	  striking	  target	  A.	  	   The	  same	  correspondence	  consideration	  holds	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  When	  possible,	  just	  victors	  should	  steer	  greater	  amounts	  of	  postwar	  harm	  toward	  more	  highly	  responsible	  unjust	  parties,	  and	  less	  postwar	  harm	  toward	  less	  responsible	  citizens.	  	  For	  example,	  highly	  responsible	  unjust	  political	  and	  military	  leaders	  might	  be	  subjected	  to	  postwar	  punishment	  and	  the	  seizure	  of	  personal	  assets,	  whereas	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  might	  be	  subjected	  to	  endure	  the	  inconveniences	  of	  occupation	  or	  to	  help	  pay	  restitution	  or	  reparations	  at	  war’s	  end.77	  So	  although	  I	  think	  there’s	  an	  important	  role	  for	  something	  like	  a	  correspondence	  claim,	  it	  doesn’t	  perform	  the	  precise	  function	  McMahan	  thinks	  it	  does.	  	  It’s	  a	  consideration	  for	  distributing	  harm	  among	  liable	  parties;	  it	  doesn’t	  determine	  threshold	  harm	  limits.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  These	  potential	  postwar	  obligations	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7.	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3.10	  Chapter	  Summary	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I’ve	  reviewed	  McMahan’s	  position	  on	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	  	  As	  discussed,	  his	  writings	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  must	  act	  either	  complicitously	  or	  make	  significant	  contributions	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  in	  order	  to	  become	  liable	  to	  collateral	  or	  lesser	  harms.	  	  But	  if	  that	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  McMahan	  would	  be	  establishing	  asymmetric	  liability	  criteria	  for	  unjust	  combatants	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  unjust	  civilians	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Such	  a	  move	  would	  threaten	  the	  broad	  appeal	  and	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  Account.	  	   Instead,	  I	  argue	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  consistency	  the	  same	  liability	  criterion	  should	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  as	  that	  used	  to	  establish	  unjust	  combatant	  liability:	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  objectively	  unjust	  threat	  to	  non-­‐liable	  persons.	  	  Most	  unjust	  civilians	  meet	  this	  threshold	  by	  remaining	  in	  the	  unjust	  state,	  participating	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  paying	  taxes,	  contributing	  to	  the	  culture,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  all	  of	  which	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  civilians’	  contributions	  are	  often	  small.	  	  But	  when	  minimally	  contributing	  agents	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  in	  aggregate	  foreseeably	  pose	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm	  to	  innocent	  others,	  then	  all	  the	  contributing	  agents	  share	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm.	  	  And	  in	  forced	  choice	  situations	  involving	  inevitable	  and	  indivisible	  harm,	  small	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  minimally	  responsible	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  innocent	  victim	  state	  citizens	  can	  be	  decisive	  in	  rendering	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms.	  	   Against	  this	  conclusion,	  we	  looked	  at	  several	  objections	  arguing	  that	  either	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  (the	  foreseeability	  objection),	  or	  if	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they	  are	  morally	  responsible,	  nonetheless	  they	  should	  not	  be	  liable	  to	  harm	  (the	  justification,	  proportionality,	  and	  lesser	  evil	  objections).	  	  I	  think	  all	  these	  objections	  can	  be	  overcome.	  	  Thus,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  harms	  when	  necessary	  to	  protect	  wrongfully	  imperiled	  innocent	  victims.	  
3.10.1	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability:	  What’s	  Really	  at	  Stake	  The	  important	  takeaway	  from	  this	  chapter	  is	  that	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm,	  then	  the	  moral	  evaluation	  involved	  is	  one	  of	  narrow	  rather	  than	  wide	  proportionality.	  	  If	  collaterally	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  is	  narrowly	  proportionate,	  then	  they	  are	  not	  wronged	  when	  so	  harmed.	  	  McMahan’s	  position	  apparently	  is	  that	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  complicity	  or	  significant	  contribution	  (or	  some	  “fixed	  degree	  of	  responsibility”),	  defensively	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  is	  justified	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  rather	  than	  a	  liability	  justification.	  	  So	  returning	  to	  Iraq’s	  invasion	  of	  Iran,	  since	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  bore	  little	  to	  no	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  invasion,	  apparently	  he	  would	  claim	  that	  the	  Iranians	  had	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  collaterally	  harming	  Iraqi	  civilians.	  This	  interpretation	  of	  McMahan	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  following	  passage,	  where	  he	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  now	  to	  fight	  wars	  without	  killing	  significant	  numbers	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  But	  when	  just	  combatants	  are	  justified	  in	  attacking	  a	  military	  target	  even	  though	  they	  foresee	  that	  their	  action	  will	  harm	  or	  kill	  innocent	  civilians	  as	  a	  side	  effect,	  their	  action,	  though	  justified,	  nonetheless	  threatens	  those	  civilians	  with	  wrongful	  harm.78	  	  So	  even	  though	  it	  is	  inevitable	  in	  most	  modern	  warfare	  that	  just	  combatants	  will	  collaterally	  kill	  significant	  numbers	  of	  unjust	  civilians,	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  38-­‐9.	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lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  doing	  so	  given	  the	  weighty	  value	  of	  the	  just	  cause	  for	  which	  they	  fight.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  position	  I’ve	  argued	  for	  holds	  that	  most	  Iraqis	  shared	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  When	  this	  fact	  is	  coupled	  with	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation	  that	  confronted	  the	  imperiled	  Iranians,	  my	  position	  entails	  that	  the	  Iranian	  combatants	  had	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  collaterally	  harming	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  (assuming	  the	  military	  strikes	  were	  reasonably	  expected	  to	  contribute	  to	  halting	  the	  unjust	  war).	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  overstate	  the	  substantive	  difference	  between	  McMahan’s	  position	  and	  mine	  own	  regarding	  the	  topic	  of	  civilian	  liability	  to	  collateral	  harm.	  	  At	  first,	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  think	  there	  is	  little	  practical	  difference	  between	  our	  positions	  because	  whether	  just	  combatants	  possess	  a	  lesser	  evil	  or	  liability	  justification,	  the	  result	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  same:	  just	  combatants	  would	  be	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  harm	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  But	  that	  conclusion	  would	  be	  mistaken.	  The	  reason	  why	  is	  that	  when	  just	  combatants	  harm	  civilians	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification,	  the	  just	  combatants	  wrong	  the	  civilians	  even	  though	  doing	  so	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  justified.	  	  Conversely,	  when	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  harming	  unjust	  civilians,	  the	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  wrong	  the	  
civilians.	  	  Given	  that	  wronging	  a	  person	  normally	  carries	  a	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  of	  redress	  to	  the	  wronged	  party	  (most	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  compensation),	  it	  follows	  that	  much	  is	  at	  stake	  depending	  on	  which	  justification	  just	  combatants	  have	  for	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collaterally	  harming	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  these	  two	  justifications	  for	  collaterally	  harming	  will	  figure	  prominently	  in	  following	  chapters.
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CHAPTER	  4	  	  
4.	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability,	  Continued	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  twofold.	  	  First,	  given	  the	  contentious	  nature	  of	  the	  conclusion	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  I’ll	  attempt	  to	  augment	  and	  strengthen	  my	  claim	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  and	  lesser	  wartime	  harms	  (collectively,	  “defensive	  harm”	  for	  short).	  	  Second,	  because	  I	  qualified	  my	  claims	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  by	  stating	  that	  “most”	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable,	  I’ll	  explain	  the	  reasoning	  behind	  that	  qualification.	  Spending	  a	  second	  chapter	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  might	  seem	  like	  overkill,	  especially	  for	  a	  project	  focused	  on	  postwar	  obligation.	  	  However,	  I	  think	  doing	  so	  is	  warranted	  because	  the	  issue	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  carries	  profound	  implications	  for	  determining	  a	  victor’s	  obligations	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  Many	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  in	  individual	  defense	  cases	  are	  grounded	  in	  unintentional	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  	  I	  think	  the	  same	  holds	  true	  in	  national	  defense	  situations.	  	  Thus,	  it	  will	  be	  crucially	  important	  to	  determine	  whether	  most	  aggressor	  state	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  the	  just	  state’s	  defensive	  force,	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  instead	  innocent	  bystanders.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  for	  the	  former.	  Much	  of	  the	  following	  discussion	  will	  touch	  on	  issues	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  theory.	  	  Given	  obvious	  limitations	  of	  scope,	  I	  will	  not	  attempt	  to	  offer	  a	  foundational	  theory	  of	  political	  morality	  here.	  	  Instead,	  what	  follows	  is	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  a	  theoretical	  grounding	  for	  unjust	  civilian	  liability.	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4.1	  The	  Basis	  of	  Unjust	  Civilian	  Liability	  Unjust	  civilian	  liability	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	  Although	  they	  may	  vote	  or	  provide	  moral	  support	  for	  their	  troops,	  the	  primary	  contributions	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  make	  are	  financial.	  	  By	  participating	  in	  their	  state’s	  economy	  and	  paying	  taxes,	  citizens	  generate	  the	  wealth	  necessary	  to	  fund	  state	  institutions,	  which	  in	  turn	  enables	  their	  country’s	  war-­‐fighting	  ability.	  	  This	  contribution	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  	  Without	  a	  citizen	  tax	  base,	  few	  states	  (if	  any)	  could	  wrongly	  kill	  innocent	  people	  during	  aggressive	  warfare.	  In	  turn,	  the	  citizens	  normally	  benefit	  from	  their	  state’s	  institutions.	  	  They	  accept	  the	  presumptive	  goods	  of	  safety	  and	  security	  from	  threats	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  state,	  and	  also	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  that	  such	  security	  enables,	  such	  as	  coordinated	  economic	  activity	  and	  public	  infrastructure.	  	  In	  short,	  states	  generally	  provide	  those	  things	  necessary	  to	  live	  a	  minimally	  decent	  life,	  and	  citizens	  sustain	  the	  institutions	  that	  make	  those	  goods	  possible.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  by	  maintaining	  residency	  and	  citizenship,	  and	  by	  participating	  in,	  funding,	  and	  benefitting	  from	  their	  state	  institutions,	  citizens	  know	  (or	  should	  know)	  that	  the	  state	  will	  use	  those	  funds	  to	  act	  in	  the	  citizens’	  names	  and	  ostensibly	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  Each	  citizen	  who	  meets	  the	  forgoing	  criteria	  effectively	  creates	  and	  sustains	  a	  normative	  relationship	  with	  his	  or	  her	  state	  –	  a	  relationship	  that	  carries	  moral	  implication.	  Although	  the	  contribution	  each	  citizen	  makes	  toward	  maintaining	  state	  institutions	  may	  seem	  relatively	  small,	  the	  aggregate	  of	  these	  individual	  contributions	  creates	  powerful	  institutions	  that	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  military	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institutions	  –	  wield	  incredible	  power.	  	  And	  unsurprisingly,	  such	  power	  can	  be	  used	  justly	  or	  unjustly.	  	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  it’s	  completely	  foreseeable	  that	  powerful	  institutions	  such	  as	  standing	  armies	  might	  threaten	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  others	  (3.4).	  	  And	  even	  if	  citizens	  do	  not	  actually	  foresee	  this	  possibility,	  they	  should.1	  	  So	  by	  voluntarily	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  threats	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  others,	  most	  citizens	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  threats	  their	  institutions	  pose.	  Jeffrey	  Reiman	  perfectly	  captures	  this	  notion	  of	  institutional	  responsibility:	  “Since	  the	  state’s	  power	  is	  dangerous,	  and	  since	  citizens	  play	  roles	  that	  create	  and	  maintain	  that	  power,	  it	  follows	  that	  citizens	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  actions	  by	  means	  of	  which	  they	  create	  and	  maintain	  the	  state’s	  power.”2	  	  Iris	  Young	  echoes	  Reiman’s	  claim,	  noting	  that	  citizens	  are	  not	  morally	  independent	  from	  their	  state	  institutions.	  	  She	  writes:	  “We	  ought	  to	  view	  the	  coercive	  and	  bureaucratic	  institutions	  of	  government	  as	  mediated	  instruments	  for	  the	  coordinated	  action	  of	  those	  who	  share	  responsibility	  for	  structures,	  rather	  than	  as	  distinct	  actors	  independent	  of	  us.”3	  	  When	  state	  institutions	  act,	  most	  citizens	  are	  not	  isolated	  from	  those	  actions;	  rather,	  most	  citizens	  share	  responsibility	  for	  those	  state	  actions,	  especially	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  institutions	  pose	  threats	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  others.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  As	  Erin	  Kelly	  says,	  “we	  have	  a	  responsibility	  as	  members	  of	  larger	  groups	  to	  explore	  the	  implications	  of	  our	  participation.”	  	  Erin	  Kelly,	  “The	  Burdens	  of	  Collective	  Liability,”	  in	  Ethics	  and	  Foreign	  Intervention,	  ed.	  Deen	  K.	  Chatterjee	  and	  Don	  E.	  Scheid	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  126.	  2	  Jeffrey	  Reiman,	  "A	  Moral	  Equivalent	  of	  Consent	  of	  the	  Governed,"	  Ratio	  Juris	  26,	  no.	  3	  (2013):	  367.	  3	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Responsibility	  for	  Justice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  112.	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4.2	  An	  Enforceable	  Duty	  to	  Avert	  Wrongful	  Harm	  The	  importance	  of	  citizens’	  institutional	  responsibility	  is	  this.	  	  Given	  that	  most	  citizens	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state	  institutions,	  then	  if	  those	  institutions	  threaten	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  others,	  most	  citizens	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  necessary	  for	  averting	  the	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  Because	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  co-­‐responsible	  for	  the	  aggressor	  state’s	  threat	  of	  unjust	  harm,	  they	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  prevent	  that	  harm	  from	  eventuating.	  	  Returning	  to	  Young,	  I	  think	  she	  gets	  this	  point	  partially	  right	  when	  she	  argues	  that	  we	  cannot	  avoid	  the	  imperative	  to	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  actions	  and	  events	  performed	  by	  institutions	  of	  our	  society,	  often	  in	  our	  name,	  and	  with	  our	  passive	  or	  active	  support.	  	  The	  imperative	  of	  political	  responsibility	  consists	  in	  watching	  these	  institutions,	  monitoring	  their	  effects	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  they	  are	  not	  grossly	  harmful	  …	  to	  prevent	  suffering.4	  	  As	  Young	  says,	  we	  are	  politically	  responsible	  for	  ensuring	  that	  our	  institutions	  don’t	  harm	  others	  because	  “we	  participate	  in	  and	  usually	  benefit	  from	  the	  operation	  of	  these	  institutions.”5	  	  Yet	  in	  my	  view,	  the	  problem	  with	  Young’s	  position	  is	  the	  conclusion	  she	  draws	  from	  this	  notion	  of	  institutional	  responsibility:	  If	  we	  see	  injustices	  or	  crimes	  being	  committed	  by	  the	  institutions	  of	  which	  we	  are	  a	  part,	  or	  believe	  that	  such	  crimes	  are	  being	  committed,	  then	  we	  have	  the	  responsibility	  to	  try	  to	  speak	  out	  against	  them	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  mobilizing	  others	  to	  oppose	  them,	  and	  to	  act	  together	  to	  transform	  the	  institutions	  to	  promote	  better	  ends.6	  	  Although	  I	  agree	  with	  Young’s	  reasoning	  in	  these	  passages,	  I	  think	  she	  draws	  too	  weak	  of	  a	  conclusion	  –	  at	  least	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  institutions	  are	  waging	  unjust	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Young,	  Responsibility	  for	  Justice,	  88.	  	  For	  a	  similar	  claim,	  see	  James	  Childress,	  “Just	  War	  Criteria,”	  in	  Moral	  Responsibility	  in	  Conflicts:	  Essays	  on	  Nonviolence,	  War,	  and	  
Conscience	  (Baton	  Rouge:	  Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  1982),	  68.	  5	  Young,	  Responsibility	  for	  Justice,	  92.	  6	  Ibid.	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war.	  	  When	  our	  state	  institutions	  threaten	  wrongful	  lethal	  harm	  to	  others,	  our	  responsibilities	  extend	  far	  beyond	  trying	  to	  agitate	  campus	  protests	  or	  writing	  op-­‐ed	  pieces	  to	  influence	  institutional	  reform.	  	  Although	  we	  may	  incur	  such	  long-­‐term	  obligations	  toward	  institutional	  reform,	  the	  more	  pressing	  duty	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  innocent	  people	  currently	  threatened.	  	   I	  think	  Victor	  Tadros,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  gets	  this	  issue	  exactly	  right.	  	  According	  to	  Tadros:	  Citizens	  who	  causally	  contribute	  to	  the	  might	  of	  the	  unjust	  state	  and	  benefit	  from	  it	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  prevent	  the	  wrongful	  actions	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  in	  virtue	  of	  that	  duty	  they	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  to	  some	  degree	  as	  a	  means	  of	  altering	  its	  policies.7	  	  And	  specifically	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  aggression,	  Tadros	  notes	  that	  “citizens	  have	  enforceable	  duties	  to	  avert	  the	  threats	  that	  result	  from	  the	  unjust	  war	  that	  their	  state	  perpetrates.”8	  	  So	  by	  causally	  contributing	  to	  and	  maintaining	  their	  state’s	  institutional	  military	  power,	  citizens	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  prevent	  that	  power	  from	  wrongfully	  harming	  innocent	  others.	  	  The	  duty	  to	  prevent	  institutional	  harm	  is	  grounded	  in	  considerations	  of	  fairness.	  	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  all	  agents	  have	  a	  prima	  facie	  duty	  to	  ensure	  their	  conduct	  does	  not	  wrongfully	  harm	  others.	  	  This	  is	  also	  true	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  actions	  of	  multiple	  agents	  are	  mediated	  through	  state	  institutions.	  	  If	  a	  group’s	  aggregated	  actions	  threaten	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people,	  and	  that	  harm	  was	  reasonably	  foreseeable,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  the	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  the	  threat	  should	  have	  to	  shoulder	  the	  costs	  and	  burdens	  of	  that	  harm	  rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  Tadros,	  “Duty	  and	  Liability,”	  274.	  	  See	  also	  Gerhard	  Øverland,	  "Dividing	  Harm,"	  
Journal	  of	  Moral	  Philosophy	  8,	  no.	  4	  (2011):	  555.	  8	  Tadros,	  “Duty	  and	  Liability,”	  275.	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the	  innocent	  parties.	  	  When	  a	  state’s	  institutions	  malfunction	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  threatened	  harm	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  individuals	  who	  participated	  in,	  sustained,	  and	  benefitted	  from	  those	  institutions.	  To	  deny	  this	  claim	  would	  require	  embracing	  some	  kind	  of	  asymmetric	  claim:	  if	  one’s	  state	  institutions	  produce	  goods	  such	  as	  safety	  and	  security,	  then	  one	  can	  enjoy	  those	  good	  effects,	  but	  if	  one’s	  state	  institutions	  produce	  bad	  or	  harmful	  effects,	  then	  one	  need	  not	  share	  in	  the	  costs	  or	  burdens	  of	  preventing	  those	  harms.	  	  Or	  maybe	  one	  is	  tempted	  to	  think	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  institutional	  harm,	  citizens	  do	  not	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  prevent	  their	  institutions	  from	  harming	  innocent	  others,	  but	  might	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  compensate	  for	  any	  wrongful	  harm	  after	  the	  fact	  should	  it	  eventuate.	  	  But	  why	  think	  this?	  	  If	  the	  harm	  hasn’t	  yet	  been	  distributed,	  wouldn’t	  it	  be	  fairer	  to	  redirect	  the	  harm	  to	  the	  people	  who	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  harm	  than	  to	  the	  innocent	  parties?	  Kai	  Draper	  captures	  the	  underlying	  principle	  of	  fairness	  at	  play	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  situations:	  Suppose	  that	  someone	  justifiably	  and	  for	  his	  own	  benefit	  creates	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  he	  or	  another	  innocent	  person	  must	  sustain	  a	  cost.	  	  Other	  things	  being	  equal,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  fairness	  prefers	  that	  the	  cost	  should	  fall	  on	  the	  individual	  who	  created	  this	  situation.9	  	  My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  we	  can	  extend	  Draper’s	  claim	  about	  individuals	  to	  situations	  involving	  mediated	  group	  actions.	  	  Similar	  to	  Draper’s	  description,	  unjust	  citizens	  who	  justifiably	  maintain	  their	  state	  institutions	  for	  personal	  benefit	  may	  create	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  either	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  or	  the	  just	  citizens	  in	  the	  victim	  state	  must	  sustain	  serious	  costs.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  should	  not	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  George	  Draper,	  "Fairness	  and	  Self-­‐Defense,"	  84.	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able	  to	  displace	  the	  associated	  negative	  costs	  of	  their	  institutions	  onto	  others,	  especially	  when	  those	  costs	  are	  lethal.	  	  One	  cannot	  possibly	  expect	  wrongfully	  threatened	  victims	  to	  accept	  the	  harm	  rather	  than	  redirect	  the	  harm	  toward	  those	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  the	  institutions	  that	  now	  pose	  a	  deadly	  threat.	  	  If	  the	  latter	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  former	  are	  not,	  then	  the	  harm	  should	  be	  redirected	  toward	  the	  latter.	  Interestingly,	  McMahan	  articulates	  pretty	  much	  the	  exact	  position	  I’ve	  just	  presented;	  it’s	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length:	  When	  the	  malfunctioning	  of	  political	  or	  military	  institutions	  that	  are	  fundamentally	  just	  results	  in	  unjust	  war,	  some	  people	  will	  have	  to	  suffer	  the	  costs	  of	  that	  malfunctioning.	  	  Who,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  ought	  they	  to	  be:	  those	  who	  are	  being	  unjustly	  warred	  against,	  or	  those	  whose	  institutions	  have	  gone	  off	  the	  rails?	  	  It	  seems	  that	  when	  an	  institution	  malfunctions	  in	  a	  harmful	  way,	  those	  who	  designed,	  direct,	  participate	  in,	  and	  normally	  benefit	  from	  it	  are	  liable	  to	  pay	  the	  costs.	  	  They	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  institution	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  established	  and	  administered	  it	  as	  a	  means	  of	  furthering	  their	  purposes.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unjust	  if	  they	  were	  to	  impose	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  malfunctioning	  on	  others.10	  	  The	  context	  for	  these	  comments	  is	  whether	  combatants	  might	  be	  justified	  in	  fighting	  in	  an	  unjust	  war	  so	  as	  to	  uphold	  and	  preserve	  an	  otherwise	  just	  institution	  that	  happens	  to	  be	  malfunctioning	  in	  this	  instance.	  	  McMahan’s	  conclusion	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impermissible	  for	  the	  combatants	  to	  fight	  in	  the	  unjust	  war	  because	  doing	  so	  would	  impose	  wrongful	  harm	  on	  innocent	  parties.	  	  That	  seems	  right.	  	   What’s	  surprising,	  however,	  is	  that	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  follow	  this	  very	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  and	  conclude	  that	  –	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  –	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  should	  have	  to	  shoulder	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  malfunctioning	  institutions	  rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  74.	  	  See	  also	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "On	  the	  Moral	  Equality	  of	  Combatants,"	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  14,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  385-­‐86.	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the	  victim	  state’s	  citizenry.	  	  Why,	  we	  might	  wonder,	  should	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  who	  “participate	  in,	  and	  normally	  benefit	  from”	  the	  malfunctioning	  institution	  that	  is	  now	  waging	  unjust	  war	  be	  allowed	  to	  sit	  idly	  by	  and	  let	  their	  military	  institution	  “impose	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  malfunctioning	  on	  others?”	  	  Instead,	  shouldn’t	  we	  think	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  avert	  the	  harm	  from	  befalling	  the	  innocent	  victims?	  
4.3	  Enforceable	  Duties	  Thus	  far,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  prevent	  or	  avert	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  from	  harming	  innocent	  people.	  	  But	  in	  what	  sense	  is	  this	  duty	  ‘enforceable’?	  	  Following	  Tadros,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  is	  a	  duty	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  be	  permissibly	  coerced	  to	  fulfill.11	  	  The	  underlying	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  one	  can	  force	  the	  duty-­‐bearer	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  that	  she	  is	  required	  to	  do.	  	  And	  when	  one	  permissibly	  coerces	  an	  agent	  to	  perform	  an	  act	  she	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  do,	  that	  agent	  is	  not	  wronged:	  she	  is	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  in	  that	  way.	  Erin	  Kelly	  argues	  that	  in	  order	  to	  avert	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties,	  the	  costs	  of	  averting	  those	  threats	  may	  be	  imposed	  on	  those	  persons	  “who	  are	  together	  causally	  responsible	  for	  the	  crisis	  than	  on	  persons	  who	  are	  not.”12	  	  To	  reframe	  Kelly’s	  point	  using	  Tadros’s	  language,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  threatened	  innocent	  victims	  may	  permissibly	  impose	  the	  costs	  of	  defending	  themselves	  onto	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  the	  situation	  because	  the	  latter	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  those	  costs.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Victor	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm:	  The	  Moral	  Foundations	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  131,	  188.	  12	  Erin	  Kelly,	  “The	  Burdens	  of	  Collective	  Liability,”	  124.	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McMahan	  concurs	  with	  Tadros’s	  general	  position.	  	  After	  acknowledging	  that	  agents	  can	  have	  the	  kinds	  of	  enforceable	  duties	  to	  bear	  costs	  and	  harms	  as	  Tadros	  claims,	  McMahan	  writes:	  When	  a	  person	  is	  willing	  to	  fulfill	  a	  duty	  to	  incur	  a	  harm,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  comparatively	  rare	  cases	  in	  which	  he	  cannot	  do	  it	  on	  his	  own	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  third	  parties	  to	  impose	  the	  harm	  on	  him.	  	  Except	  in	  such	  rare	  cases,	  only	  when	  a	  person	  resists	  her	  duty	  to	  incur	  a	  harm	  does	  it	  become	  permissible	  for	  third	  parties	  to	  enforce	  the	  duty	  by	  imposing	  the	  harm.	  …	  In	  refusing	  to	  fulfill	  his	  duty	  to	  incur	  a	  harm,	  the	  person	  has	  forfeited	  his	  right	  against	  third	  party	  intervention.	  	  His	  duty	  is	  enforceable	  and,	  by	  refusing	  to	  fulfill	  it	  himself,	  he	  makes	  himself	  liable	  to	  proportionate	  harm	  when	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  enforce	  his	  compliance.13	  	  As	  McMahan	  points	  out	  in	  this	  passage,	  there	  are	  two	  situations	  in	  which	  third	  parties	  may	  permissibly	  impose	  harm	  on	  agents	  who	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  bear	  such	  harm:	  either	  when	  the	  duty-­‐bearer	  refuses	  to	  fulfill	  her	  duty,	  or	  when	  the	  duty-­‐bearer	  is	  unable	  to	  fulfill	  the	  duty	  on	  her	  own.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  foregoing	  points,	  it	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  consider	  some	  examples.	  	  The	  first	  comes	  from	  Tadros,	  summarized	  here:	  
Culpable	  Dog	  Owner.	  	  Dog	  owner	  culpably	  unleashes	  his	  dangerous	  dog	  and	  sets	  dog	  to	  attack	  innocent	  victim.	  	  The	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  victim	  from	  being	  harmed	  is	  by	  pushing	  someone	  else	  in	  between	  the	  dog	  and	  the	  victim.14	  	  According	  to	  Tadros,	  the	  dog	  owner	  has	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  protect	  victim	  from	  the	  dog.	  	  Because	  owner	  created	  the	  threat	  of	  wrongful	  harm,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  he	  must	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  averting	  that	  threat	  rather	  than	  allowing	  it	  to	  fall	  to	  the	  victim.	  	  So	  let’s	  suppose	  that	  owner	  chooses	  not	  to	  place	  himself	  in	  the	  dog’s	  path.	  	  Given	  that	  owner	  has	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  accept	  the	  harm	  necessary	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  McMahan,	  “Individual	  Liability	  in	  War,”	  294.	  14	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  53.	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avert	  the	  attack	  but	  refuses	  to	  fulfill	  his	  duty,	  victim	  is	  permitted	  to	  push	  owner	  into	  the	  on-­‐coming	  dog.	  	  Moreover,	  a	  bystander	  would	  also	  be	  permitted	  to	  push	  owner	  into	  the	  dog’s	  path.	  	  The	  owner	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  protecting	  the	  victim,	  and	  others	  can	  coerce	  owner	  into	  fulfilling	  his	  duty	  should	  he	  refuse	  to	  do	  so	  on	  his	  own.	  	   Culpable	  Dog	  Owner	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  duty-­‐bearer	  who	  refuses	  to	  fulfill	  his	  duty	  can	  be	  coerced	  into	  doing	  so.	  	  Now	  let’s	  look	  at	  an	  example	  in	  which	  one	  is	  permitted	  to	  harm	  a	  duty-­‐bearer	  who	  cannot	  fulfill	  her	  duty	  on	  her	  own.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  I’ll	  offer	  a	  variant	  on	  Tadros’s	  original	  example:	  
Wheelchair	  Dog	  Owner.	  	  Wheelchair-­‐bound	  dog	  owner	  culpably	  sets	  his	  vicious	  dog	  onto	  victim.	  	  The	  only	  way	  to	  protect	  victim	  is	  by	  pushing	  someone	  into	  the	  path	  of	  the	  charging	  dog.	  	  Even	  if	  wheelchair	  dog	  owner	  decides	  to	  avert	  the	  attack,	  he	  cannot	  wheel	  himself	  quickly	  enough	  to	  intercept	  the	  dog.	  	  Wheelchair	  dog	  owner	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat	  and	  thus	  has	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  prevent	  the	  harm	  from	  befalling	  victim.	  	  However,	  once	  the	  threat	  is	  set	  in	  motion,	  owner	  cannot	  fulfill	  his	  duty	  even	  if	  he	  wishes	  to	  do	  so.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  I	  think	  victim	  (or	  a	  bystander)	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  pushing	  the	  owner’s	  wheelchair	  into	  the	  dog’s	  path	  so	  that	  owner	  gets	  attacked	  rather	  than	  victim.	  	  Again,	  owner	  has	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  harm	  necessary	  to	  avert	  the	  burden	  from	  befalling	  innocent	  victim.	  	  If	  owner	  is	  unable	  to	  avert	  the	  threat,	  others	  may	  harm	  him	  to	  prevent	  the	  unjust	  threat	  he	  is	  responsible	  for	  and,	  importantly,	  this	  harm	  does	  not	  wrong	  him.	  	   It’s	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  Culpable	  Dog	  Owner	  and	  Wheelchair	  Dog	  
Owner	  both	  involve	  agents	  who	  are	  culpably	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm.	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Because	  we’re	  interested	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  culpability,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  cases	  involving	  agents	  who	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  threats,	  but	  in	  non-­‐culpable	  ways.	  	  Continuing	  with	  a	  variant	  on	  the	  first	  example,	  consider:	  
Non-­‐Culpable	  Dog	  Owner.	  	  Non-­‐culpable	  dog	  owner	  owns	  a	  vicious	  dog.	  	  Owner	  takes	  due	  diligence	  to	  prevent	  the	  dog	  from	  getting	  loose	  by	  installing	  a	  sturdy	  high	  fence.	  	  Inexplicably,	  a	  strong	  zephyr	  blows	  down	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  fence	  and	  the	  dog	  rushes	  to	  attack	  a	  passerby.	  	  The	  owner	  is	  in	  the	  front	  yard,	  and	  the	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  the	  attack	  is	  to	  push	  the	  owner	  into	  the	  charging	  dog.	  	  The	  difference	  in	  this	  example	  is	  that	  the	  owner	  isn’t	  culpable;	  he	  neither	  commands	  the	  dog	  to	  attack,	  nor	  does	  he	  act	  recklessly	  or	  negligently.	  	  He	  takes	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  prevent	  an	  attack	  from	  occurring.	  	  Still,	  owning	  a	  dangerous	  dog	  is	  an	  inherently	  risky	  activity.	  	  It’s	  foreseeable	  that	  the	  dog	  could	  somehow	  get	  loose	  and	  threaten	  serious	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  If	  that	  threat	  should	  materialize,	  then,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  owner	  should	  have	  to	  suffer	  the	  harm	  rather	  than	  an	  innocent	  passerby	  who	  bears	  no	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  situation.	  	  Thus,	  once	  again,	  I	  think	  either	  victim	  or	  a	  bystander	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  pushing	  owner	  into	  the	  dog’s	  path	  so	  that	  the	  owner	  suffers	  the	  harm	  rather	  than	  victim.	  	  And	  this	  is	  true	  even	  though	  owner	  isn’t	  culpable	  or	  blameworthy.	  	   At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  think	  that	  what’s	  doing	  much	  of	  the	  justificatory	  work	  in	  the	  previous	  examples	  is	  that	  dog	  owners	  bear	  sole	  responsibility	  for	  owning	  their	  dogs,	  and	  thus	  each	  owner	  bears	  a	  high	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  any	  threat	  his	  or	  her	  dog	  poses.	  	  Their	  high	  level	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  in	  turn,	  is	  what	  permits	  others	  to	  harm	  the	  owners	  to	  prevent	  the	  threatened	  harm.	  	  But	  I	  don’t	  think	  that’s	  right.	  	  Although	  the	  sole	  dog	  owners	  may	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bear	  more	  moral	  responsibility,	  that	  doesn’t	  preclude	  any	  one	  of	  several	  joint	  owners	  from	  becoming	  liable	  to	  necessary	  defensive	  force.	  	  Here’s	  an	  example:	  
Apartment	  Dog	  Owners.	  	  After	  a	  string	  of	  recent	  nearby	  assaults,	  a	  group	  of	  renters	  in	  an	  apartment	  complex	  decides	  to	  keep	  a	  vicious	  dog	  for	  security	  purposes.	  	  Each	  renter	  chips	  in	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  dog’s	  food,	  veterinarian	  bills,	  and	  general	  upkeep.	  	  One	  day	  the	  dog	  gets	  loose	  and	  charges	  toward	  a	  bystander	  walking	  on	  the	  public	  sidewalk	  in	  front	  of	  the	  apartment	  complex.	  	  Let’s	  assume	  the	  apartment	  renters	  are	  permitted	  to	  own	  the	  dog,	  and	  have	  positive	  moral	  reason	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  Although	  they	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  keeping	  the	  dog,	  they	  cannot	  do	  so	  with	  moral	  impunity.	  	  As	  already	  noted,	  the	  keeping	  of	  a	  vicious	  dog	  foreseeably	  poses	  a	  threat	  of	  unjust	  harm	  to	  others.	  	  Thus,	  should	  that	  harm	  eventuate,	  each	  of	  the	  renters	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  to	  prevent	  the	  unjust	  attack	  given	  each	  renter’s	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  contributing	  to	  the	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Once	  again,	  I	  think	  victim	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  push	  any	  one	  of	  the	  renters	  (and	  perhaps	  several)	  into	  the	  dog’s	  path	  in	  order	  for	  victim	  to	  protect	  herself.	  	   Even	  if	  the	  foregoing	  claim	  is	  right,	  one	  might	  wonder	  how	  helpful	  the	  
Apartment	  Dog	  Owners	  case	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  for	  the	  topic	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  during	  war.	  	  Although	  the	  case	  involves	  multiple	  parties	  who	  jointly	  contribute	  to	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  the	  threat	  to	  which	  they	  causally	  contributed	  was	  private.	  	  So	  as	  a	  final	  point,	  let’s	  look	  at	  a	  case	  involving	  citizens	  whose	  causal	  contributions	  to	  an	  unjust	  threat	  are	  mediated	  through	  a	  state	  institution.	  	  Here’s	  an	  example:	  
Nuclear	  Reactor.	  	  State	  A	  operates	  a	  taxpayer-­‐funded	  nuclear	  power	  plant	  near	  the	  border	  of	  state	  B	  to	  augment	  A’s	  public	  power	  grid.	  	  Unexpectedly,	  the	  reactor	  begins	  leaking	  deadly	  nuclear	  material,	  and	  A	  has	  no	  way	  of	  shutting	  down	  the	  reactor.	  	  As	  the	  reactor	  spins	  out	  of	  control	  at	  an	  increasing	  rate,	  experts	  predict	  the	  reactor	  will	  implode	  and	  release	  massive	  amounts	  of	  deadly	  nuclear	  material	  high	  into	  the	  air.	  	  Due	  to	  projected	  wind	  patterns,	  most	  of	  the	  lethal	  material	  is	  expected	  to	  blow	  across	  the	  border	  into	  B.	  	  The	  only	  way	  to	  stop	  the	  threat	  to	  B’s	  citizens	  is	  to	  implode	  the	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facility,	  thereby	  entombing	  the	  reactor	  and	  keeping	  the	  contamination	  localized	  within	  A.	  	  A	  makes	  no	  attempt	  to	  implode	  the	  facility.	  	  B	  has	  the	  military	  capability	  to	  strike	  the	  site,	  but	  doing	  so	  will	  likely	  kill	  several	  of	  A’s	  citizens	  immediately,	  while	  also	  endangering	  a	  fair	  number	  of	  A’s	  citizens	  over	  time	  due	  to	  long-­‐term	  contamination.	  	  In	  this	  example,	  A’s	  citizens	  do	  not	  operate	  the	  nuclear	  facility,	  nor	  do	  they	  directly	  interact	  with	  the	  state	  employees	  who	  do.	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  still	  think	  A’s	  citizens	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat	  their	  state	  institution	  poses	  to	  B’s	  citizens.	  	  The	  explanation	  is	  as	  follows.	  	  A’s	  citizens	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  nuclear	  program	  by	  funding	  it	  through	  their	  taxes.	  	  As	  most	  citizens	  know	  (or	  should	  know),	  operating	  a	  nuclear	  program	  is	  a	  foreseeably	  risk-­‐imposing	  activity.15	  	  And	  A	  built	  and	  operated	  the	  facility	  in	  their	  citizens’	  names,	  and	  the	  latter	  benefitted	  from	  the	  energy	  production.	  	  Given	  their	  causal	  contribution,	  the	  foreseeability	  of	  the	  risk	  involved,	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  their	  state’s	  institution,	  I	  think	  most	  state	  A	  citizens	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat	  that	  B	  now	  faces.	  	  Accordingly,	  I	  think	  A’s	  citizens	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  and	  harms	  necessary	  to	  avert	  the	  contamination	  from	  befalling	  B’s	  innocent	  citizens.	  	  B	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  bombing	  A’s	  reactor	  and	  would	  not	  wrong	  any	  of	  A’s	  citizens	  in	  the	  process.	  	  The	  latter	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  in	  that	  way	  for	  purposes	  of	  averting	  the	  wrongful	  nuclear	  threat.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  B’s	  citizens	  should	  not	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  harm	  that	  A’s	  institutions	  created.	  
4.4	  The	  Duty	  to	  Prevent	  Harm	  During	  an	  Unjust	  War	  Hopefully,	  the	  takeaway	  from	  the	  preceding	  analysis	  is	  clear.	  	  Unjust	  citizens	  voluntarily	  participate	  in,	  financially	  support,	  and	  benefit	  from	  state	  institutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  obvious	  examples	  here	  are	  Chernobyl,	  Three	  Mile	  Island,	  and	  –	  more	  recently	  –	  Fukushima.	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that	  wield	  enormous	  power.	  	  These	  institutions	  act	  in	  the	  citizens’	  name,	  ostensibly	  on	  their	  behalf,	  and	  –	  given	  their	  power	  –	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risks	  threating	  unjust	  harm	  to	  others.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  most	  citizens	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state	  institutions	  and	  thus	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  prevent	  their	  institutions	  from	  wrongfully	  harming	  innocent	  people.	  	  If	  their	  institutions	  malfunction	  and	  initiate	  an	  unjust	  war,	  then	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  obligated	  to	  attempt	  to	  end	  the	  aggression	  and,	  should	  that	  attempt	  fail,	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  and	  harms	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  victim	  state’s	  citizenry.	  	   Yet	  as	  history	  confirms,	  unjust	  citizens	  rarely	  attempt	  to	  stop	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  Perhaps	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  citizenry	  is	  ignorant	  about	  the	  injustice	  of	  their	  state’s	  war.	  	  But	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  it’s	  fairly	  obvious	  that	  their	  state	  is	  committing	  aggression,	  unjust	  citizens	  generally	  do	  nothing,	  hoping	  instead	  to	  go	  about	  their	  daily	  lives	  without	  incident.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  them,	  fanatical	  ambivalence	  is	  not	  an	  option	  when	  their	  state	  is	  committing	  aggression	  –	  at	  least	  not	  one	  that	  defeats	  their	  liability.	  	  They	  don’t	  have	  the	  option	  to	  remain	  passive	  and	  indifferent	  while	  their	  institutions	  threaten	  innocent	  life.	  	  One	  cannot	  idly	  stand	  by	  and	  remain	  morally	  indifferent	  to	  an	  unjust	  harm	  that	  one	  has	  causally	  contributed	  to,	  especially	  when	  the	  unjust	  harm	  is	  done	  in	  one’s	  name.	  	   Unjust	  citizens	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  their	  state	  from	  wrongfully	  harming	  others.	  	  When	  they	  choose	  not	  to	  take	  up	  their	  responsibility,	  their	  duty	  can	  be	  enforced.	  	  But	  enforced	  by	  whom?	  	  As	  Frances	  Kamm	  explains,	  “In	  international	  relations,	  there	  is	  often	  no	  international	  agency	  that	  will	  enforce	  the	  duties	  of	  one	  state	  relative	  to	  another.	  	  And,	  arguably,	  when	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that	  is	  the	  case,	  a	  state	  may	  itself	  try	  to	  enforce	  the	  duties	  owed	  to	  it.”16	  	  Kamm’s	  claim	  here	  dovetails	  with	  McMahan’s	  earlier	  point:	  when	  others	  choose	  not	  to	  fulfill	  their	  enforceable	  duties,	  they	  can	  be	  justifiably	  coerced	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Because	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  averting	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  and	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  attempt	  to	  fulfill	  that	  duty,	  just	  combatants	  can	  enforce	  the	  unjust	  citizens’	  duty	  by	  imposing	  harm	  on	  them	  when	  necessary.	  	  Unjust	  citizens	  who	  choose	  not	  fulfill	  their	  duty	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  during	  war,	  and	  thus	  have	  no	  legitimate	  complaint	  when	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  harmed.	  	   Some	  readers	  will	  recoil	  from	  this	  conclusion.	  	  Just	  what,	  they	  might	  wonder,	  can	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  do	  in	  these	  circumstances?	  	  As	  McMahan	  suggests,	  “each	  citizen	  knows	  that	  nothing	  that	  he	  or	  she	  does	  can	  make	  more	  than	  a	  tiny,	  probably	  negligible,	  contribution	  to	  ending	  the	  war.”17	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  suggestion	  isn’t	  about	  refusing	  to	  do	  one’s	  duty;	  rather,	  the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  unjust	  citizens	  cannot	  fulfill	  their	  duty	  on	  their	  own.	  	   In	  reply	  to	  this	  concern,	  we	  should	  first	  note	  that	  McMahan’s	  claim	  is	  probably	  true	  for	  each	  individual	  citizen	  acting	  as	  an	  individual.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  likely	  no	  citizen	  can	  end	  his	  or	  her	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  while	  acting	  alone.	  	  But	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  aggregated	  actions	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  can	  have	  powerful,	  profound	  effects.	  	  If	  most	  citizens	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  avert	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  then	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  think	  they	  also	  have	  a	  subsidiary	  duty	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Frances	  Kamm,	  “Failures	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,”	  in	  The	  Moral	  Target:	  Aiming	  at	  
Right	  Conduct	  in	  War	  and	  Other	  Conflicts	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  67-­‐8.	  17	  McMahan,	  “Who	  is	  Morally	  Liable,”	  550.	  	  See	  also	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  215-­‐16.	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organize	  themselves	  and	  coordinate	  their	  efforts	  so	  that	  together	  they	  might	  fulfill	  their	  jointly	  held	  duty.18	  	  Though	  perhaps	  few	  in	  number,	  in	  some	  situations	  the	  coordinated	  efforts	  of	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  may	  succeed	  in	  halting	  an	  unjust	  war.	  	   But	  let’s	  assume	  the	  citizens	  make	  reasonable	  effort	  and	  fail.	  	  Does	  this	  absolve	  them	  of	  any	  liability	  they	  might	  otherwise	  have	  incurred?	  	  I	  think	  not.	  	  Their	  duty	  is	  to	  prevent	  their	  state	  institutions	  from	  killing	  innocent	  people.	  	  Should	  they	  fail	  in	  this	  duty	  or	  not	  even	  attempt	  to	  fulfill	  it,	  they	  still	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  averting	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats.	  	  Thus,	  others	  can	  still	  enforce	  the	  unjust	  citizens’	  duties;	  just	  combatants	  may	  still	  justifiably	  impose	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  defensive	  war	  onto	  most	  unjust	  citizens.19	  That	  conclusion	  may	  strike	  some	  readers	  as	  unfair.	  	  My	  claim,	  they	  will	  say,	  seems	  to	  suggest	  there	  is	  nothing	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  can	  do	  during	  the	  unjust	  war	  to	  escape	  liability.	  	  My	  reply	  is:	  that’s	  mostly	  true,	  but	  it’s	  not	  unfair.	  	  One	  can	  think	  of	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  as	  being	  in	  a	  position	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  driver	  in	  Conscientious	  
Driver.	  	  Once	  he’s	  careening	  out	  of	  control	  toward	  pedestrian,	  there’s	  nothing	  driver	  can	  do	  to	  escape	  liability	  to	  the	  pedestrian’s	  defensive	  harm.	  	  His	  liability	  is	  grounded	  in	  his	  early	  choice	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  foreseeably	  risk-­‐imposing	  activity.	  Similarly,	  there’s	  nothing	  a	  renter	  can	  do	  in	  the	  Apartment	  Dog	  Owners	  example	  to	  escape	  liability	  once	  the	  dog	  begins	  attacking	  the	  innocent	  passerby.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See,	  among	  others,	  Virginia	  Held,	  "Can	  a	  Random	  Collection	  of	  Individuals	  be	  Morally	  Responsible?"	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  67,	  no.	  14	  (1970):	  480.	  19	  Though	  to	  repeat	  a	  point	  from	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  harming	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  must	  reasonably	  be	  believed	  to	  be	  causally	  effective	  in	  averting	  the	  unjust	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  Thus,	  because	  intentionally	  killing	  civilians	  is	  almost	  never	  causally	  effective,	  most	  justifiable	  harm	  to	  unjust	  civilians	  will	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  collateral	  harm	  while	  striking	  military	  targets.	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The	  renter	  cannot	  simply	  say	  to	  the	  victim,	  “I	  will	  no	  longer	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  the	  dog,	  I	  will	  desist	  from	  paying	  his	  future	  keep,”	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Even	  if	  true,	  those	  future	  actions	  do	  nothing	  to	  protect	  the	  passerby	  from	  the	  unjust	  threat	  she	  currently	  faces	  –	  a	  threat	  the	  renter	  shares	  responsibility	  for	  bringing	  about.	  	  The	  renter’s	  liability	  to	  be	  harmed	  to	  protect	  the	  victim	  is	  grounded	  in	  his	  earlier	  decision	  to	  causally	  contribute	  to	  a	  risk-­‐imposing	  activity.	  In	  both	  of	  these	  cases,	  the	  driver’s	  and	  the	  renter’s	  prior	  actions	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  unjust	  threat	  render	  them	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm,	  and	  their	  liability	  extends	  throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  threats.	  	  So	  too,	  unjust	  citizens	  simply	  cannot	  argue	  that	  they	  shouldn’t	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  given	  that	  they	  can’t	  turn	  off	  their	  state’s	  war	  machine.	  	  Instead,	  their	  liability	  is	  grounded	  in	  their	  earlier	  decisions	  to	  maintain	  residency	  and	  citizenship	  in	  the	  unjust	  state,	  causally	  contribute	  to	  its	  powerful	  institutions,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  Now	  that	  those	  institutions	  are	  wrongfully	  harming	  others,	  they	  are	  liable	  to	  bear	  the	  necessary	  costs	  of	  averting	  that	  harm,	  and	  will	  remain	  so	  until	  their	  state	  no	  longer	  poses	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  The	  preceding	  discussion	  of	  the	  driver	  and	  renter	  examples	  also	  helps	  to	  show	  why	  protesting	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  disassociation	  are	  insufficient	  actions	  for	  avoiding	  liability.	  	  I	  argued	  earlier	  that	  part	  of	  what	  explains	  a	  citizen’s	  institutional	  responsibility	  is	  her	  association	  with	  her	  state’s	  institutions:	  she	  participates	  in	  and	  helps	  finance	  those	  institutions,	  and	  the	  latter	  in	  turn	  act	  in	  her	  name	  and	  on	  her	  behalf.	  	  So	  one	  might	  think	  that	  given	  this	  normative	  relationship,	  when	  state	  institutions	  commit	  massive	  injustice	  in	  a	  citizen’s	  name,	  she	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  disassociate	  herself	  from	  those	  institutions.	  	  As	  Thomas	  Hill	  argues,	  “A	  person	  can	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disassociate	  himself	  from	  a	  corrupt	  group	  both	  by	  acting	  to	  prevent	  their	  unjust	  acts	  and	  also,	  in	  appropriate	  contexts,	  by	  protesting,	  denouncing	  what	  they	  do,	  and	  taking	  a	  symbolic	  stand	  with	  the	  victims.”20	  	  I	  do	  think	  unjust	  citizens	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  protest	  and	  disassociate	  from	  their	  aggressing	  institutions.	  	  However,	  I	  don’t	  think	  those	  actions	  negate	  the	  unjust	  citizens’	  liability.	  As	  we’ve	  seen,	  once	  one	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  contributing	  to	  an	  unjust	  threat,	  one’s	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  for	  preventing	  that	  threat	  persists	  throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  threat.	  	  Just	  as	  driver	  and	  renter	  cannot	  escape	  liability	  by	  waiving	  off	  their	  association	  with	  the	  vehicle	  and	  the	  dog	  once	  those	  threats	  eventuate,	  so	  too	  unjust	  citizens	  cannot	  disassociate	  themselves	  from	  their	  state’s	  aggressive	  institutions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  defeats	  their	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm.	  	  Thus,	  even	  though	  unjust	  citizens	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  resist	  and	  disassociate	  themselves	  from	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  these	  efforts	  still	  do	  not	  negate	  their	  duty	  and	  subsequent	  liability.	  	  Rather,	  their	  duty	  persists	  throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  state’s	  aggressive	  war;	  they	  remain	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  until	  war’s	  end.	  
4.5	  Are	  Causal	  Contribution	  and	  Benefitting	  Sufficient	  for	  Liability?	  Based	  on	  the	  preceding	  arguments,	  I	  think	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  who	  causally	  contribute	  to	  the	  unjust	  state’s	  war-­‐fighting	  abilities	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  wartime	  harm.	  	  But	  not	  everyone	  who	  causally	  contributes	  is	  liable,	  nor	  is	  citizenship	  alone	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  liability.	  	  So	  what’s	  necessary	  now	  is	  to	  identify	  and	  explain	  why	  some	  parties	  escape	  wartime	  liability.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Thomas	  E.	  Hill,	  "Symbolic	  Protest	  and	  Calculated	  Silence,"	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  
Affairs	  (1979):	  90.	  
	   133	  
	   Let’s	  begin	  with	  a	  concern	  recently	  raised	  by	  McMahan.	  	  McMahan	  objects	  to	  the	  following	  claim	  made	  by	  Tadros:	  “Citizens	  who	  causally	  contribute	  to	  the	  might	  of	  the	  unjust	  state	  and	  benefit	  from	  it	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  prevent	  the	  wrongful	  actions	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  in	  virtue	  of	  that	  duty	  they	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.”21	  	  In	  reply,	  McMahan	  says	  he	  assumes	  Tadros’s	  claim	  is	  disjunctive:	  either	  contributing	  to	  or	  benefitting	  from	  state	  institutions	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  a	  duty	  to	  incur	  harm.22	  	  But	  that	  can’t	  be	  right,	  McMahan	  thinks.	  	  If	  causally	  contributing	  to	  a	  state’s	  economic	  strength	  (and	  thus	  war-­‐fighting	  ability)	  were	  sufficient,	  then	  given	  our	  system	  of	  global	  interdependent	  commerce,	  “a	  high	  proportion	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  world	  acquire	  a	  duty	  to	  incur	  harms	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  military	  action	  against	  that	  state.”23	  	  Similarly,	  if	  merely	  benefitting	  from	  a	  state’s	  institutions	  were	  sufficient,	  then:	   if	  the	  state	  fighting	  the	  unjust	  war	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  economic	  powers,	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  world	  have	  such	  a	  duty,	  since	  these	  people	  benefit	  from	  many	  of	  that	  state’s	  economic	  activities	  and	  have	  contributed	  to	  its	  wealth	  in	  various	  ways,	  through	  trade,	  labour,	  lending,	  the	  provision	  of	  services,	  and	  so	  on.24	  	  So	  if	  causally	  contributing	  to	  an	  aggressor	  state’s	  institutions	  or	  benefitting	  from	  them	  were	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm,	  then	  numerous	  people	  around	  the	  world	  would	  become	  liable	  based	  on	  their	  prior	  interactions	  with	  the	  unjust	  state.	  	  Thus,	  the	  conclusion	  goes,	  Tadros’s	  view	  is	  certainly	  mistaken.	  	   In	  reply	  to	  McMahan’s	  objection,	  I	  think	  it’s	  worth	  making	  two	  points,	  one	  minor	  and	  one	  more	  substantive.	  	  As	  a	  minor	  point,	  I	  think	  the	  better	  reading	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Tadros,	  “Duty	  and	  Liability,”	  274.	  22	  McMahan,	  “Individual	  Liability	  in	  War,”	  297.	  23	  Ibid.,	  298.	  24	  Ibid.	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Tadros’s	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  conjunction	  of	  contributing	  to	  and	  benefitting	  from	  state	  institutions	  grounds	  a	  duty.	  	  But	  the	  point	  is	  only	  minor	  because	  we	  can	  still	  come	  up	  with	  many	  examples	  of	  people	  who	  meet	  both	  conditions	  and	  yet	  intuitively	  don’t	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  For	  example,	  many	  Canadians	  financially	  contribute	  to	  U.S.	  wealth	  (and	  thus	  U.S.	  war-­‐fighting	  capability)	  through	  trade	  and	  banking.	  	  Many	  Canadians	  also	  benefit	  from	  those	  same	  transactions,	  and	  might	  also	  parasitically	  benefit	  from	  the	  deterrent	  effects	  of	  the	  local	  presence	  of	  U.S.	  military	  forces.	  	  Yet	  McMahan	  is	  right:	  few	  of	  us	  think	  these	  Canadians	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  any	  harm	  to	  prevent	  U.S.	  institutions	  from	  unjustly	  harming	  others.	  But	  this	  Canadian	  example	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  more	  important	  point:	  McMahan	  overlooks	  the	  fact	  that	  Tadros’s	  claim	  refers	  to	  citizens	  who	  contribute	  to	  and	  benefit	  from	  state	  institutions.	  	  Although	  many	  Canadians	  casually	  contribute	  to	  and	  benefit	  from	  U.S.	  institutions,	  these	  Canadian	  citizens	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  U.S.	  institutions	  because	  the	  latter	  do	  not	  act	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Canadians,	  nor	  generally	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  Canadian	  contributors	  and	  benefiters	  do	  not	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  normative	  relationship	  with	  U.S.	  institutions	  the	  way	  U.S.	  citizens	  do.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  U.S.	  state	  actions	  cannot	  be	  imputed	  to	  the	  Canadian	  citizens	  the	  way	  they	  can	  be	  imputed	  to	  most	  American	  citizens.	  	  The	  duty	  American	  citizens	  have	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  preventing	  or	  averting	  their	  institutions’	  unjust	  threats	  stems	  from	  their	  normative	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  –	  a	  relationship	  that	  non-­‐citizens	  lack.	  	  Citizens	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  states	  that	  do	  not	  act	  in	  their	  name	  and	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  So	  although	  many	  Canadians	  causally	  contribute	  to	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and	  benefit	  from	  U.S.	  institutions,	  they	  carry	  no	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  to	  prevent	  U.S.	  institutions	  from	  unjustly	  harming	  others.	  McMahan	  is	  surely	  right	  to	  argue	  that	  most	  people	  around	  the	  world	  don’t	  incur	  a	  duty	  to	  shoulder	  the	  harm	  necessary	  for	  averting	  an	  unjust	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  But	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  lack	  such	  a	  duty;	  they’ve	  causally	  contributed	  to	  and	  benefitted	  from	  the	  state	  institutions	  that	  act	  in	  their	  name.	  	  Knowing	  that	  the	  state	  acts	  in	  their	  name	  and	  by	  way	  of	  their	  support,	  citizens	  who	  choose	  to	  maintain	  their	  residency	  and	  citizenship,	  and	  participate	  in	  state	  institutions	  and	  finance	  them	  through	  taxes,	  take	  on	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  those	  institutions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  other	  people	  who	  merely	  commercially	  interact	  with	  the	  same	  state	  do	  not.	  
4.6	  Citizenship	  Alone	  Cannot	  Ground	  Liability	  One	  might	  conclude	  from	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  that	  citizenship	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  to	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  state	  institutions.	  	  But	  is	  citizenship	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  bearing	  institutional	  responsibility?	  	  Can	  citizenship	  alone	  ground	  a	  person’s	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  when	  necessary	  to	  avert	  his	  or	  her	  state’s	  unjust	  threats?	  	  Some	  have	  thought	  so.	  	  Kamm,	  for	  example,	  argues	  “civilians	  who	  have	  done	  nothing	  wrong	  (e.g.,	  have	  not	  supported	  an	  unjust	  regime)	  may	  be	  liable	  merely	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  citizens	  to	  bear	  some	  costs	  or	  risks	  in	  order	  that	  their	  country	  not	  be	  unjust.”25	  	  Hannah	  Arendt	  apparently	  held	  this	  same	  view.26	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Kamm,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,	  Proportionality,	  and	  Compensation,”	  in	  The	  Moral	  Target,	  162-­‐63.	  26	  See	  Young,	  Responsibility	  for	  Justice,	  78,	  85.	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   I	  disagree;	  citizenship	  alone	  is	  an	  insufficient	  ground	  for	  incurring	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm.	  	  To	  begin,	  recall	  that	  I’m	  arguing	  from	  within	  an	  individualist	  account	  of	  liability	  to	  wartime	  harm.	  	  Thus,	  individual	  liability	  must	  be	  grounded	  in	  individual	  choices	  and	  actions.	  	  Or	  put	  differently,	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  responsible	  agency.	  	  So	  on	  this	  point,	  I	  agree	  with	  McMahan	  who	  says	  that	  “the	  idea	  that	  people	  can	  be	  liable	  to	  attack,	  or	  immune	  from	  attack,	  merely	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  a	  group	  …	  is	  both	  false	  and	  morally	  repugnant.”27	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  liable	  to	  harm,	  a	  citizen	  must	  do	  something	  that	  causally	  contributes	  to	  her	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  Yet	  causal	  contribution	  by	  citizens	  is	  not	  enough.	  	  On	  the	  individualist	  account,	  the	  underlying	  basis	  for	  liability	  to	  harm	  is	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  So	  in	  addition	  to	  causally	  contributing	  to	  one’s	  state’s	  unjust	  war,	  one	  must	  also	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  that	  contribution.	  	  Thus,	  the	  problem	  with	  claiming	  that	  citizenship	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  liability	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  citizens	  don’t	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  in	  a	  way	  for	  which	  they	  are	  morally	  responsible.	  	  Young	  children,	  invalids,	  and	  the	  mentally	  challenged	  are	  examples	  here.	  	  It	  seems	  these	  citizens	  don’t	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  unjust	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  And	  even	  if	  one	  were	  to	  argue	  that	  their	  mere	  existence	  causally	  contributes	  by	  prompting	  parents	  and	  other	  citizens	  to	  fight	  on	  their	  behalf,	  the	  former	  parties	  aren’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  supposed	  contribution	  they	  make.	  	  Thus,	  one	  can	  be	  a	  citizen	  without	  being	  morally	  responsible	  for	  contributing	  to	  state	  institutions.	  	  If	  that’s	  true,	  then	  citizenship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  209.	  	  Iris	  Young	  argues	  the	  same	  point;	  see	  Responsibility	  
for	  Justice,	  85,	  123,	  137.	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alone	  cannot	  ground	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  in	  order	  to	  avert	  a	  state’s	  unjust	  threats.	  	  Instead,	  citizens	  must	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  causally	  contributing	  before	  they	  can	  become	  liable	  to	  harm.	  Although	  my	  position	  regarding	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  draws	  heavily	  from	  Tadros’s	  notion	  of	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  avert	  harm,	  I	  disagree	  with	  his	  claim	  that	  unjust	  civilians	  can	  have	  such	  a	  duty	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  causally	  contributing.	  	  For	  example,	  Tadros	  argues	  that	  citizens	  can	  be	  “collectively	  liable”	  for	  averting	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threat	  even	  though	  they	  may	  not	  be	  “collectively	  responsible”	  for	  the	  threat.28	  	  He	  elsewhere	  adds:	  “There	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  collective	  responsibility	  on	  the	  unjust	  side,	  where	  each	  citizen	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  bear	  some	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  war	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  war.”29	  	  For	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  I	  won’t	  argue	  against	  Tadros’s	  claim	  other	  than	  to	  point	  out	  that	  I	  think	  an	  individualist	  account	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  requires	  that	  one	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  her	  causal	  contribution.	  	  But	  as	  already	  argued,	  I	  think	  most	  citizens	  are	  in	  fact	  morally	  responsible	  for	  causally	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  given	  that	  they’ve	  voluntarily	  acted	  in	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  ways	  relative	  to	  state	  institutions	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  threating	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  others.	  	   And	  yet,	  not	  every	  aggressor	  state	  citizen	  who	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  causally	  contributing	  to	  his	  state’s	  aggression	  is	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Otherwise,	  we’d	  have	  to	  conclude	  that	  most	  German-­‐Jews	  were	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  given	  their	  institutional	  responsibility	  for	  Nazi	  aggression,	  and	  likewise	  that	  most	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Tadros,	  “Duty	  and	  Liability,”	  272.	  29	  Ibid.,	  275.	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Kurds	  were	  liable	  given	  their	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  Iraq’s	  actions	  in	  1990-­‐91.	  	  Most	  of	  us	  likely	  agree	  with	  David	  Miller	  that	  such	  conclusions	  would	  be	  “absurd.”30	  	  Instead,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  threshold	  at	  which	  citizens	  are	  no	  longer	  morally	  responsible	  for	  state	  actions,	  and	  that	  threshold	  is	  when	  citizens	  are	  actively	  persecuted	  by	  their	  own	  state.	  The	  explanation	  for	  why	  persecuted	  citizens	  aren’t	  institutionally	  responsible	  goes	  to	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  state	  itself.	  	  The	  justification	  for	  the	  state	  is	  to	  secure	  the	  presumptive	  goods	  of	  safety	  and	  security	  or,	  using	  different	  terminology,	  to	  protect	  our	  most	  basic	  rights.	  	  When	  a	  state	  actively	  violates	  the	  rights	  of	  some	  of	  its	  people,	  the	  state	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  said	  to	  be	  acting	  in	  their	  name.	  	  Instead,	  the	  persecuted	  citizens	  are	  victims	  within	  their	  own	  state;	  they	  are	  just	  as	  much	  victims	  of	  the	  unjust	  state	  as	  those	  citizens	  in	  the	  just	  state	  who	  have	  been	  attacked.	  	   So	  at	  the	  point	  when	  a	  citizen	  no	  longer	  benefits	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  her	  state,	  and	  in	  fact	  is	  made	  worse	  off	  by	  active	  state	  persecution,	  then	  the	  normal	  normative	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  citizen	  is	  absent	  and	  she	  no	  longer	  bears	  institutional	  responsibility	  for	  state	  actions.	  	  Although	  these	  citizens	  may	  causally	  contribute	  to	  their	  state	  institutions	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  paying	  their	  taxes,	  their	  contributions	  are	  helping	  to	  fund	  their	  own	  persecution.	  	  At	  some	  point,	  both	  the	  German	  Jews	  and	  the	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  ceased	  being	  responsible	  for	  their	  states’	  actions.	  	  So	  the	  end	  result	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  citizens	  who	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  causally	  contributing	  to	  their	  state’s	  institutions	  and	  who	  actually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  David	  Miller,	  National	  Responsibility	  and	  Global	  Justice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  132.	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benefit	  from	  those	  institutions	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  harm	  when	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  their	  institutions	  from	  wrongfully	  harming	  innocent	  others.	  
4.7	  Citizens	  Living	  Under	  Non-­‐Democratic	  Regimes	  The	  conclusion	  in	  the	  preceding	  section	  implies	  that	  most	  citizens	  living	  under	  autocratic	  rule	  will	  be	  institutionally	  responsible,	  so	  long	  as	  they’re	  not	  individually	  persecuted	  by	  their	  state.	  	  This	  implication	  will	  strike	  many	  as	  unfair.	  	  How,	  they	  might	  ask,	  can	  most	  citizens	  in	  an	  autocratic	  state	  be	  thought	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  state’s	  actions?	  	  Worse	  still,	  how	  can	  such	  a	  questionable	  claim	  of	  responsibility	  ground	  their	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  during	  their	  dictatorial	  state’s	  unjust	  war?	  	  Not	  only	  should	  the	  Kurds	  not	  have	  been	  liable	  for	  Iraq’s	  actions	  in	  the	  1990’s,	  they	  might	  argue,	  but	  the	  Shia	  population	  should	  not	  have	  been	  liable	  as	  well.	  	  Though	  not	  actively	  persecuted	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  the	  way	  the	  Kurds	  were,	  the	  Shia	  were	  denied	  most	  political	  offices,	  were	  disfavored	  by	  the	  Sunni	  ruling	  class,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Surely,	  an	  objector	  will	  conclude,	  these	  kinds	  of	  marginalized	  citizens	  should	  not	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  institutions.	  	  Instead,	  if	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  state	  institutions	  ever	  falls	  to	  citizens,	  that	  responsibility	  should	  fall	  only	  to	  the	  citizens	  of	  liberal	  democracies.	  	   My	  response	  to	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  to	  hold	  fast	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  dictatorial	  state	  citizens	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  institutions.	  	  Let’s	  begin	  with	  the	  concern	  that	  citizens	  in	  dictatorial	  states	  often	  denied	  political	  office,	  or	  lack	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  fully	  democratic	  electoral	  processes.	  	  Although	  true,	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  run	  for	  office	  or	  participate	  in	  a	  full	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democracy	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  bearing	  institutional	  responsibility.	  	  On	  this	  point,	  I	  follow	  Tadros,	  who	  writes:	  Some	  people	  believe	  that	  citizens	  of	  democratic	  states,	  but	  not	  undemocratic	  states,	  are	  liable	  for	  the	  unjust	  wars	  that	  their	  states	  prosecute….	  	  But	  democracy,	  I	  believe,	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  ground	  the	  liability	  of	  citizens	  of	  the	  unjust	  state.31	  	  Citizens	  can	  still	  become	  liable	  for	  unjust	  state	  actions	  even	  though	  they	  live	  under	  less	  than	  ideal	  political	  arrangements.	  The	  justification	  for	  the	  foregoing	  claim	  is	  that	  in	  most	  cases,	  citizens	  living	  under	  a	  dictatorial	  regime	  still	  have	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  normative	  relationship	  with	  their	  state	  to	  ground	  a	  duty	  to	  avert	  the	  state’s	  unjust	  threats	  to	  others.	  	  These	  citizens	  still	  participate	  in	  their	  state’s	  institutions	  and	  markets,	  pay	  taxes,	  and	  generally	  benefit	  from	  these	  institutions	  in	  the	  form	  of	  security	  and	  economic	  coordination.	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  example	  of	  Iraq,	  even	  McMahan	  acknowledges	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  ’03	  invasion	  of	  Iraq,	  most	  all	  Iraqis	  could	  lead	  stable	  and	  secure	  lives.32	  	  And	  that	  observation	  holds	  true	  not	  only	  for	  Sunnis,	  but	  for	  the	  Shia	  as	  well.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  being	  persecuted	  by	  the	  own	  state	  (such	  as	  the	  Kurds	  were),	  most	  Shia	  were	  all	  things	  considered	  better	  off	  living	  under	  the	  Iraqi	  state	  than	  they	  would	  have	  been	  in	  its	  absence.	  	  Although	  I	  disagree	  with	  Kamm’s	  claim	  that	  citizenship	  alone	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  liability,	  I	  agree	  with	  her	  observation	  that	  citizens	  can	  be	  liable	  even	  if	  their	  state	  does	  not	  treat	  them	  well.33	  	  A	  state	  that	  does	  not	  treat	  its	  people	  well	  doesn’t	  negate	  the	  latter’s	  institutional	  responsibility,	  though	  a	  state	  that	  actively	  persecutes	  its	  people	  does.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Tadros,	  “Duty	  and	  Liability,”	  276.	  32	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  111.	  33	  Kamm,	  “Failures	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,”	  66.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  in	  dictatorial	  states	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  institutions	  because	  they	  causally	  contribute	  to	  and	  benefit	  from	  them,	  we	  might	  also	  think	  part	  of	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they’ve	  allowed	  themselves	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  dictatorial	  regime	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  The	  underlying	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  citizens	  cannot	  ambivalently	  go	  about	  their	  daily	  lives,	  acquiescing	  along	  the	  way	  to	  an	  autocratic	  regime,	  and	  then	  point	  to	  the	  type	  of	  regime	  they	  live	  under	  in	  order	  to	  escape	  any	  liability	  they	  might	  otherwise	  incur	  because	  of	  the	  regime’s	  actions.	  	  Just	  as	  part	  of	  a	  drunk	  driver’s	  responsibility	  for	  running	  over	  a	  pedestrian	  reaches	  back	  to	  his	  earlier	  choice	  to	  allow	  himself	  to	  become	  drunk,	  so	  too	  part	  of	  the	  unjust	  citizenry’s	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  current	  unjust	  war	  reaches	  back	  to	  their	  prior	  acquiescence	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  dictator.	  	   In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  dictatorial	  regime,	  part	  of	  the	  citizens’	  responsibility	  points	  back	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  ceded	  the	  political	  space	  that	  allowed	  the	  dictator	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  further	  for	  allowing	  the	  autocratic	  regime	  to	  amass	  and	  maintain	  overwhelming	  political	  power.34	  	  George	  Fletcher	  underscores	  this	  point:	  No	  dictator	  rules	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  	  To	  muster	  power	  he	  must	  enjoy	  the	  support	  of	  the	  military,	  the	  implicit	  emotional	  consent	  of	  business	  leaders	  and	  professionals,	  and	  the	  tolerance	  of	  the	  public	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  a	  dissenting	  public	  incessantly	  banging	  on	  pots	  …	  	  or	  marching	  in	  the	  streets	  …	  no	  dictator	  can	  maintain	  power.35	  	  Fletcher	  may	  be	  somewhat	  overstating	  his	  claim	  about	  effective	  resistance,	  but	  I	  think	  his	  general	  point	  is	  right.	  	  The	  public’s	  tolerance	  provides	  the	  political	  space	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Reiman,	  “A	  Moral	  Equivalent,”	  371.	  35	  George	  P.	  Fletcher	  and	  Jens	  David	  Ohlin,	  Defending	  Humanity:	  When	  Force	  is	  
Justified	  and	  Why	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  159.	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and	  passive	  support	  that	  a	  dictator	  needs	  to	  wield	  political	  power.	  	  This	  tolerance	  is	  what	  helps	  ground	  most	  citizens’	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  dictatorial	  state’s	  institutions.	  	  Commenting	  on	  ambivalent	  citizens	  who	  tolerate	  such	  a	  government,	  Iris	  Young	  notes,	  “their	  passivity	  produces	  a	  political	  vacuum”	  which	  amounts	  to	  “passive	  support”	  for	  their	  regime.36	  	  Michael	  Green	  takes	  this	  thought	  a	  step	  further.	  	  After	  noting	  that	  people	  ought	  to	  resist	  and	  overthrow	  tyrannical	  regimes,	  Green	  argues:	  “Insofar,	  then,	  as	  the	  nation	  doesn’t	  oppose	  such	  a	  government,	  it	  thereby	  lends	  legitimacy	  to	  it	  and	  its	  actions	  so	  that	  it	  comes	  to	  express	  the	  general	  will	  of	  that	  people.”37	  	  Through	  their	  inaction	  and	  tolerance,	  citizens	  support	  and	  legitimate	  the	  autocratic	  regimes	  under	  which	  they	  live	  out	  their	  lives.	  	  Thus,	  such	  citizens	  bear	  political	  responsibility	  for	  how	  they’re	  governed,38	  and	  so	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  live	  under	  despotic	  rule	  does	  not	  negate	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  institutions.	  Still,	  some	  will	  counter	  this	  claim	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  citizens	  in	  these	  states	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  a	  dictator;	  the	  price	  for	  resisting	  tends	  to	  be	  too	  great.	  	  McMahan	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  concern,	  noting	  that	  there	  “are	  real	  dangers	  involved	  in	  resisting	  a	  dictatorial	  regime.”39	  	  Erin	  Kelly	  echoes	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Young,	  Responsibility	  for	  Justice,	  86.	  37	  Michael	  Green,	  "War,	  Innocence,	  and	  Theories	  of	  Sovereignty,"	  Social	  Theory	  and	  
Practice	  18,	  no.	  1	  (1992):	  52.	  38	  As	  Jaspers	  wrote	  to	  his	  fellow	  Germans	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  “we	  are	  politically	  responsible	  for	  our	  regime	  …	  and	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  leaders	  we	  allowed	  to	  rise	  among	  us.”	  	  Karl	  Jaspers,	  The	  Question	  of	  German	  Guilt,	  trans.	  E.	  B.	  Ashton	  (New	  York:	  Dial	  Press,	  1947),	  78.	  	  According	  to	  Jaspers,	  “Everybody	  is	  co-­‐responsible	  for	  the	  way	  he	  is	  governed.”	  	  Ibid.,	  31.	  39	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  215.	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sentiment:	  “We	  typically	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  be	  members	  of	  our	  political	  society,	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  leaving	  or	  engaging	  in	  serious	  political	  opposition	  may	  be	  high.”40	  McMahan	  and	  Kelly	  raise	  an	  obviously	  valid	  concern	  here,	  one	  with	  much	  intuitive	  pull.	  	  Resistance	  and	  emigration	  are	  difficult,	  highly	  burdensome	  options.	  	  Yet,	  what	  they	  highlight	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  dictatorial	  state	  citizens	  face	  much	  duress	  in	  trying	  to	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  government.	  	  Although	  true,	  duress	  is	  an	  excusing	  condition	  capable	  of	  negating	  culpability,	  not	  moral	  responsibility	  –	  a	  point	  that	  McMahan	  has	  argued	  for	  at	  great	  length	  (2.2.4).	  	  The	  duress	  unjust	  citizens	  face	  may	  lessen	  the	  amount	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  they	  bear	  for	  their	  state’s	  actions,	  but	  duress	  doesn’t	  fully	  defeat	  their	  responsibility.	  	  I	  think	  Parrish	  gets	  this	  point	  exactly	  right:	  “In	  non-­‐democratic	  and	  dictatorial	  states,	  fear	  of	  retaliation	  may	  diminish	  or	  lessen	  the	  citizens’	  moral	  responsibility	  …	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  negate	  it	  completely.”41	  	  Citizens	  living	  in	  an	  autocratic	  state	  may	  choose	  to	  do	  nothing	  about	  their	  political	  arrangements,	  but	  in	  so	  doing	  they	  do	  not	  escape	  the	  possibility	  of	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  when	  their	  subsequent	  actions	  contribute	  to	  their	  state’s	  killing	  of	  innocent	  people.	  	  
4.8	  Two	  Real-­‐World	  Examples	  We	  can	  briefly	  examine	  how	  the	  above	  theory	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  plays	  out	  by	  looking	  at	  two	  historical	  examples	  –	  both	  involving	  Iraq.	  	  First,	  consider	  Iraq’s	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait	  in	  1990.	  	  Even	  though	  Saddam’s	  regime	  ruled	  with	  an	  iron	  fist,	  I	  still	  think	  most	  Iraqis	  bore	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  invasion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Kelly,	  “The	  Burdens	  of	  Collective	  Liability,”	  128.	  41	  John	  M.	  Parrish,	  "Collective	  Responsibility	  and	  the	  State,"	  International	  Theory	  1,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  143.	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Even	  after	  the	  1980	  invasion	  of	  Iran	  and	  the	  genocidal	  campaign	  against	  the	  Kurds	  from	  1986-­‐1989,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Iraqi	  citizens	  chose	  to	  maintain	  their	  residency	  and	  citizenship.	  	  They	  continued	  to	  participate	  in,	  support,	  and	  benefit	  from	  Iraqi	  institutions.	  	  Given	  their	  regime’s	  belligerent	  history,	  it	  was	  obviously	  foreseeable	  to	  most	  citizens	  that	  their	  institutions	  might	  pose	  unjust	  threats	  of	  harm	  to	  others.	  	  When	  those	  threats	  eventuated	  in	  the	  unjustified	  invasion	  of	  Kuwait,	  I	  think	  most	  Iraqis	  had	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  avert	  that	  aggression,	  to	  include	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  any	  harm	  necessary	  for	  protecting	  the	  innocent	  Kuwaitis.	  	  Accordingly,	  Kuwaiti	  combatants	  (or	  others	  acting	  on	  their	  behalf)	  had	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  collaterally	  harming	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians.	  Most	  Iraqi	  Kurds,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  were	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  Iraqi	  invasion	  given	  their	  state’s	  active	  persecution	  of	  them.	  	  Most	  Kurds	  were	  victimized	  as	  much	  as	  the	  Kuwaiti	  citizenry	  was.	  	  If	  the	  just	  combatants	  harmed	  any	  Kurds	  during	  the	  war,	  the	  combatants	  would	  have	  harmed	  them	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification,	  not	  with	  a	  liability	  justification.	  	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  any	  other	  collaterally	  harmed	  bystanders	  such	  as	  neighboring	  neutral	  country	  citizens	  who	  happened	  to	  be	  visiting	  or	  travelling	  through	  Iraq	  when	  war	  broke	  out.	  	   Now	  let’s	  shift	  gears	  and	  look	  at	  the	  U.S.-­‐led	  invasion	  of	  Iraq	  in	  2003.	  	  The	  justness	  of	  that	  war	  is	  controversial,	  with	  many	  people	  believing	  the	  invasion	  to	  be	  unjust.	  	  For	  sake	  of	  argument,	  let’s	  assume	  for	  a	  moment	  that	  that	  claim	  is	  true.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  U.S.	  troops	  were	  unjust	  combatants,	  most	  U.S.	  civilians	  were	  unjust	  civilians,	  the	  Iraqi	  soldiers	  were	  just	  combatants,	  and	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  were	  just	  civilians.	  	  Given	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  invasion	  most	  U.S.	  citizens	  participated	  in,	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financially	  supported,	  and	  benefitted	  from	  their	  state’s	  institutions,	  most	  American	  citizens	  would	  have	  incurred	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  avert	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats	  against	  the	  Iraqi	  people.	  	  Since	  most	  U.S.	  citizens	  either	  chose	  to	  do	  nothing	  or	  were	  unable	  to	  avert	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats,	  the	  Iraqi	  just	  combatants	  would	  have	  been	  justified	  in	  enforcing	  their	  duty.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Iraqi	  military	  could	  have	  permissibly	  harmed	  most	  American	  citizens	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  the	  innocent	  Iraqi	  citizenry.42	  So	  for	  sake	  of	  illustration,	  let’s	  further	  imagine	  that	  in	  2003	  the	  Iraqis	  had	  possessed	  intercontinental	  S.C.U.D.	  missiles	  capable	  of	  striking	  targets	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  Given	  the	  preceding	  assumptions,	  the	  Iraqi	  forces	  would	  have	  been	  justified	  in	  targeting	  the	  Pentagon	  during	  the	  early	  hours	  of	  the	  war	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  throw	  the	  U.S.	  military’s	  command	  and	  control	  into	  disarray.	  	  Suppose	  Iraq	  in	  fact	  had	  bombed	  the	  Pentagon	  with	  multiple	  S.C.U.D.	  missiles,	  killing	  and	  injuring	  many	  nearby	  civilians.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  I	  think	  the	  Iraqis	  would	  have	  been	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  their	  attack,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  have	  had	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  most	  of	  the	  harm	  they	  caused	  because	  most	  U.S.	  citizens	  would	  have	  been	  liable	  to	  that	  collateral	  harm.	  	  I	  say	  ‘most’	  because	  the	  Washington	  D.C.	  area	  would	  have	  contained	  a	  large	  number	  of	  non-­‐U.S.	  citizens	  who	  lacked	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  U.S.	  institutions	  and	  actions,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  U.S.	  citizens	  who	  wouldn’t	  be	  institutionally	  responsible	  (such	  as	  children).	  	  If	  harming	  these	  latter	  parties	  had	  been	  justified,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  justified	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil	  relative	  to	  the	  strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Again,	  assuming	  that	  harming	  the	  U.S.	  citizens	  would	  have	  been	  causally	  effective,	  such	  as	  collaterally	  harming	  the	  citizens	  while	  striking	  legitimate	  military	  targets.	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importance	  of	  striking	  the	  target	  coupled	  with	  the	  expected	  benefit	  of	  its	  destruction.	  
4.9	  Chapter	  Conclusion	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  citizens	  who	  participate	  in,	  financially	  support,	  and	  benefit	  from	  state	  institutions	  create	  a	  normative	  relationship	  between	  themselves	  and	  their	  state.	  	  	  When	  a	  state’s	  institutions	  initiate	  an	  unjust	  war,	  most	  citizens	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  and	  incur	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  necessary	  costs	  for	  averting	  those	  unjust	  threats.	  	  The	  unjust	  citizens’	  duty	  is	  enforceable;	  if	  they	  choose	  not	  to	  avert	  the	  harm	  or	  cannot	  fulfill	  the	  duty	  on	  their	  own,	  others	  may	  permissibly	  enforce	  the	  duty	  by	  imposing	  harm	  on	  the	  unjust	  citizens.	  	  In	  short,	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  the	  just	  combatants’	  defensive	  force	  for	  purposes	  of	  protecting	  the	  just	  citizenry.	  	  Because	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  in	  this	  way,	  they	  are	  not	  wronged	  when	  so	  harmed.	  	  The	  exceptions	  to	  this	  general	  principle	  are	  citizens	  who	  lack	  the	  capacity	  for	  being	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  causal	  contributions,	  or	  citizens	  who	  are	  actively	  persecuted	  by	  their	  own	  state.	  	   If	  one	  denies	  that	  citizens	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  actions,	  one	  would	  need	  to	  justify	  an	  asymmetric	  claim:	  citizens	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  participate	  in	  and	  enjoy	  the	  benefits	  of	  state	  institutions	  so	  long	  as	  the	  institutions	  produce	  good	  outcomes,	  but	  those	  very	  same	  citizens	  should	  not	  be	  responsible	  for	  shouldering	  any	  harmful	  effects	  their	  institutions	  produce.	  	  Instead,	  the	  innocent	  victims	  should	  have	  to	  shoulder	  those	  costs.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  even	  though	  citizens	  financially	  support	  and	  maintain	  state	  institutions,	  the	  citizens	  should	  be	  able	  to	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reap	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  institutions	  while	  incurring	  no	  responsibility	  for	  ameliorating	  any	  unjust	  outcomes.	  	  Or	  as	  John	  Parrish	  nicely	  puts	  the	  matter:	  If	  states	  can	  act	  …	  without	  committing	  its	  citizens	  to	  responsibility	  for	  state	  actions,	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  can	  effectively	  become	  a	  very	  efficient	  responsibility-­‐laundering	  machine:	  takings	  actions	  in	  the	  world	  with	  the	  gravest	  consequences	  for	  which	  there	  is	  simply	  no	  one	  available	  to	  take	  responsibility.43	  	  Against	  this	  view,	  I	  argue	  that	  state	  actions	  can	  be	  imputed	  to	  most	  state	  citizens.	  	   But	  that’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  citizens	  are	  culpable	  or	  blameworthy.	  	  Rather,	  they	  are	  morally	  responsible.	  	  They	  causally	  contributed	  to	  institutions	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  Should	  those	  institutions	  malfunction	  and	  threaten	  unjust	  harm	  against	  innocent	  people,	  the	  citizens	  who’ve	  contributed	  to	  those	  institutions	  become	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Admittedly,	  their	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  is	  slight.	  	  But	  unfortunately	  for	  the	  unjust	  citizens,	  their	  state	  institutions	  have	  created	  a	  lethal	  forced	  choice	  situation.	  	  The	  just	  state’s	  citizenry	  must	  either	  accept	  the	  unjust	  harm,	  or	  employ	  defensive	  force	  that	  will	  harm	  some	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  latter	  bear	  some	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  the	  harm	  should	  fall	  to	  them.	  	  In	  forced	  choice	  situations,	  small	  moral	  asymmetries	  between	  parties	  can	  be	  decisive	  (2.2.4,	  3.5).	  	   The	  account	  of	  unjust	  civilian	  liability	  that	  I’ve	  just	  argued	  for	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  what	  a	  majority	  of	  just	  war	  theorists	  claim.	  	  McMahan,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  only	  if	  the	  latter	  have	  acted	  complicitously	  or	  made	  significant	  contributions	  toward	  their	  state’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Parrish,	  "Collective	  Responsibility	  and	  the	  State,"	  127.	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aggression.	  	  Since	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  neither	  act	  complicitously	  nor	  make	  significant	  contributions,	  they	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  Thus,	  for	  McMahan	  and	  most	  others,	  the	  justification	  for	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  during	  war	  must	  be	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  suggestion,	  however,	  is	  that	  harm	  justified	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil	  nevertheless	  wrongs	  the	  harmed	  parties.	  	  And	  normally,	  causing	  wrongful	  harm	  grounds	  robust	  obligations	  toward	  the	  wrongly	  harmed	  parties.	  	  So	  the	  difference	  between	  harming	  unjust	  civilians	  with	  a	  liability	  justification	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  harming	  them	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  on	  the	  other,	  will	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  when	  determining	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  We’ll	  begin	  examining	  this	  idea	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.
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CHAPTER	  5	  	   	  
5.	  Basic	  Groundwork	  for	  Postwar	  Obligations	  I	  argued	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  harm	  because	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  bear	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  If	  that	  claim	  is	  true,	  and	  if	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  for	  the	  unjust	  threats	  they	  pose,	  then	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  harming	  unjust	  combatants	  and	  most	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  And	  if	  that	  claim	  is	  true,	  we’re	  confronted	  with	  several	  interesting	  questions.	  	  Given	  that	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  harming	  most	  of	  their	  wartime	  victims,	  do	  just	  citizens	  incur	  any	  obligations	  requiring	  positive	  action	  at	  war’s	  end?	  	  If	  so,	  then	  for	  what	  reasons	  do	  they	  incur	  these	  obligations,	  and	  what	  is	  their	  content	  and	  scope?	  	   Other	  theorists	  who	  endorse	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  defensive	  harming	  (such	  as	  Montague,	  Draper,	  Segev,	  and	  Wallerstein)	  don’t	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation.	  	  Even	  McMahan,	  who	  has	  tendered	  the	  most	  complete	  justice-­‐based	  theory	  of	  defensive	  harm,	  never	  directly	  addresses	  this	  issue.	  	  Although	  he	  discusses	  the	  harms	  to	  which	  unjust	  citizens	  might	  be	  liable,	  such	  as	  occupation,	  property	  damage,	  and	  reparation	  payments,	  he	  doesn’t	  discuss	  obligations	  that	  might	  fall	  to	  the	  just	  state.	  	  For	  example,	  most	  aggressor	  state	  citizens	  might	  be	  liable	  to	  postwar	  occupation,	  but	  is	  such	  an	  occupation	  ever	  morally	  required	  of	  the	  victorious	  just	  state	  and,	  if	  so,	  why?	  Other	  related	  issues	  remain.	  	  In	  the	  course	  of	  waging	  a	  just	  war,	  just	  combatants	  will	  almost	  inevitably	  collaterally	  harm	  some	  non-­‐liable	  parties.	  	  Do	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victorious	  just	  states	  owe	  compensation	  to	  these	  people?	  	  Or	  suppose	  just	  combatants	  inadvertently	  contaminate	  the	  environment	  during	  war,	  or	  leave	  large	  amounts	  of	  unexploded	  ordnance	  behind.	  	  Are	  they	  obligated	  to	  neutralize	  these	  potential	  harms?	  	  Advocates	  of	  justice-­‐based	  theories	  of	  defensive	  harm	  haven’t	  yet	  tackled	  these	  questions.	  	  The	  goal	  for	  the	  remaining	  chapters	  will	  be	  an	  attempt	  to	  fill	  that	  gap	  in	  the	  literature.	  Before	  proceeding,	  however,	  I	  should	  clarify	  the	  framework	  from	  within	  which	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  project	  will	  unfold.	  	  As	  discussed,	  I	  largely	  follow	  McMahan’s	  Responsibility	  Account	  for	  defensive	  harming.	  	  However,	  the	  major	  exception	  is	  that	  I	  think	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm,	  whereas	  McMahan	  apparently	  thinks	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  collateral	  harm	  unless	  they	  have	  either	  acted	  complicitously,	  or	  have	  made	  significant	  contributions	  toward	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	  So	  to	  distinguish	  my	  position	  from	  McMahan’s,	  I’ll	  refer	  to	  mine	  as	  the	  Responsibility	  Account´.	  	  The	  reader	  should	  understand	  that	  the	  Responsibility	  Account´	  is	  McMahan’s	  broad	  justice-­‐based	  framework	  for	  defensive	  harming,	  with	  the	  notable	  exception	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harms.	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  begin	  extending	  the	  Responsibility	  Account´	  of	  defensive	  harm	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  postwar	  obligation.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  theoretical	  grounding	  that	  underlies	  post-­‐conflict	  duties.	  	  Once	  this	  framework	  is	  in	  place,	  subsequent	  chapters	  will	  further	  extend	  the	  account	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  specific	  obligations	  that	  just	  victors	  might	  incur	  at	  war’s	  end.	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5.1	  The	  Maximalist	  Account	  of	  Postwar	  Obligation	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  there	  are	  two	  broad	  approaches	  to	  jus	  post	  bellum.1	  	  Minimalist	  post	  bellum	  theories	  aim	  at	  restricting	  what	  victors	  are	  permitted	  to	  do	  once	  hostilities	  end.	  	  In	  contrast,	  maximalist	  post	  bellum	  theories	  argue	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  normative	  restrictions,	  victors	  sometimes	  also	  incur	  positive	  duties	  at	  war’s	  end	  –	  duties	  such	  as	  occupying	  the	  defeated	  state,	  or	  paying	  restitution	  to	  harmed	  bystanders.	  	   The	  problem	  for	  maximalist	  theories,	  Bellamy	  agues,	  is	  that	  “maximalism	  lacks	  a	  justification	  of	  why	  the	  victors	  acquire	  extra	  responsibilities.”2	  	  Whereas	  minimalist	  post	  bellum	  theories	  are	  grounded	  in	  traditional	  just	  war	  literature,	  “maximalist	  ideas	  are	  almost	  utterly	  alien	  to	  classical	  Just	  War	  considerations.”3	  	  I	  think	  Bellamy’s	  claim	  here	  is	  right,	  but	  on	  my	  view	  that	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  traditional	  just	  war	  theory	  has	  lacked	  completeness.	  	  So	  my	  goal	  in	  this	  and	  the	  following	  chapters	  will	  be	  to	  articulate	  and	  defend	  one	  such	  maximalist	  theory.	  	  In	  response	  to	  Bellamy’s	  claim,	  I	  will	  provide	  an	  explanatory	  account	  of	  why	  just	  citizens	  sometimes	  incur	  positive	  obligations	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  And	  as	  I	  see	  it,	  this	  explanatory	  account	  of	  postwar	  obligation	  will	  be	  but	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  Account´	  to	  include	  the	  postwar	  period.	  	   Before	  proceeding,	  two	  quick	  points	  are	  in	  order.	  	  The	  first	  regards	  terminology.	  	  In	  the	  ensuing	  discussions,	  I	  will	  employ	  the	  following	  terminology.	  	  “Unjust	  combatants”	  will	  refer	  to	  aggressor	  state	  combatants,	  “unjust	  civilians”	  will	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Bellamy,	  “The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory,”	  602.	  2	  Ibid.,	  619,	  original	  emphasis.	  3	  Ibid.,	  621.	  
	   152	  
refer	  to	  civilians	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  who	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  actions,	  and	  “unjust	  citizens”	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  conjunction	  of	  both.	  	  On	  the	  just	  side	  of	  the	  war,	  “just	  citizens”	  will	  refer	  collectively	  to	  just	  combatants	  and	  just	  civilians.	  	  Finally,	  “bystanders”	  will	  refer	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  (or	  neighboring	  states)	  who	  bear	  no	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unjust	  war,	  such	  as	  non-­‐nationals	  who	  happen	  to	  be	  located	  within	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  The	  bystander	  category	  also	  includes	  aggressor	  state	  citizens	  who	  are	  non-­‐liable,	  such	  as	  persecuted	  citizens	  or	  children	  (more	  will	  be	  said	  about	  this	  category	  shortly).	  	   The	  second	  point	  concerns	  the	  scope	  of	  project.	  	  Obviously,	  every	  situation	  at	  war’s	  end	  will	  differ.	  	  One	  cannot	  speak	  to	  every	  contingent	  scenario.	  	  Rather,	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  following	  chapters	  is	  sketch	  a	  broad	  normative	  framework	  for	  evaluating	  postwar	  obligations	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  moral	  principles	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  play	  in	  many	  postwar	  situations.	  	  Aiming	  for	  completeness	  is	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  project.	  	  Instead,	  I	  aim	  at	  the	  more	  modest	  goal	  of	  mapping	  the	  broad	  contours	  of	  the	  topic.	  
5.2	  Grounds	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Obligations	  in	  Domestic	  Cases	  According	  to	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  war,	  the	  moral	  principles	  governing	  national	  defense	  reduce	  to	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  governing	  individual	  defense.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  a	  helpful	  starting	  point	  for	  thinking	  about	  how	  defenders	  might	  incur	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  will	  be	  to	  look	  at	  individual	  defense	  cases.	  	  If	  we	  can	  identify	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  stemming	  from	  the	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  in	  domestic	  cases,	  then	  by	  the	  same	  moral	  principles	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  similar	  kinds	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  following	  defensive	  war.	  	  Naturally,	  such	  obligations	  will	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not	  be	  isomorphic	  given	  some	  genuine	  asymmetries	  between	  war	  and	  individual	  defense,	  but	  still	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  largely	  congruent	  overlap.	  At	  first	  glance,	  it	  seems	  successful	  defenders	  in	  domestic	  cases	  likely	  have	  no	  moral	  obligations	  after	  securing	  their	  defense.	  	  Consider	  a	  standard	  case	  of	  assault:	  
Standard	  Aggressor.	  	  Aggressor	  unjustly	  attacks	  victim.	  	  Acting	  in	  self-­‐defense,	  victim	  uses	  necessary	  and	  reasonable	  defensive	  force.	  	  Aggressor	  is	  hurt,	  but	  remains	  conscious	  and	  ambulatory.	  	  Once	  victim	  has	  defended	  herself,	  she	  stops	  harming	  aggressor.	  	  Reflecting	  on	  this	  case,	  the	  likely	  conclusion	  most	  people	  will	  draw	  is	  that	  victim	  can	  walk	  away	  without	  obligation.	  	  The	  reason	  why	  is	  straightforward.	  	  Aggressor	  made	  himself	  liable	  to	  victim’s	  defensive	  force;	  accordingly,	  victim	  did	  not	  wrong	  the	  aggressor	  in	  harming	  him.	  	  If	  victim	  did	  not	  wrong	  aggressor,	  then	  victim	  has	  no	  obligation	  toward	  aggressor.	  	   Here	  is	  a	  second	  example:	  
Rape	  Victim.	  	  A	  rape	  victim	  manages	  to	  harm	  her	  assailant	  by	  gouging	  at	  his	  eyes.	  	  Assailant	  halts	  his	  attack	  and	  backs	  off;	  victim	  does	  not	  pursue	  him.	  	  Assailant	  is	  able	  to	  walk	  off	  the	  scene,	  though	  he	  is	  left	  permanently	  blinded	  in	  one	  eye.	  	  The	  conclusion	  and	  analysis	  in	  this	  case	  mirror	  those	  in	  Standard	  Aggressor:	  victim	  can	  walk	  away	  without	  obligation	  because	  the	  rapist	  made	  himself	  liable	  to	  victim’s	  defensive	  harm.	  	  Even	  though	  assailant	  sustains	  a	  significant	  life-­‐long	  injury,	  victim	  owes	  him	  nothing	  because	  she	  did	  not	  wrong	  him.	  Let	  us	  proceed	  by	  taking	  the	  above	  cases	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  presumption	  against	  just	  defenders	  incurring	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations,	  assuming	  the	  harmed	  party	  was	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  and	  that	  the	  defender’s	  use	  of	  force	  was	  necessary	  and	  proportionate.	  	  Assuming	  that	  much	  is	  true,	  and	  also	  that	  the	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reductive	  account	  of	  war	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  is	  but	  a	  short	  step	  to	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  that	  just	  citizens	  do	  not	  incur	  obligations	  after	  successfully	  defending	  themselves	  by	  way	  of	  justified	  warfare,	  assuming	  the	  just	  combatants	  fought	  in	  accordance	  with	  jus	  
in	  bello	  restrictions.	  George	  Fletcher	  and	  Jens	  Ohlin	  articulate	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  when	  they	  write,	   What	  should	  an	  occupying	  country	  do	  after	  successfully	  repelling	  an	  aggressor?	  	  Should	  it	  simply	  withdraw	  its	  forces?	  	  If	  we	  follow	  the	  teachings	  of	  domestic	  self-­‐defense,	  we	  would	  have	  to	  say	  yes.4	  	  Paul	  Robinson	  strikes	  a	  similar	  note:	  	   Let	  us	  assume	  …	  that	  we	  are	  faced	  by	  a	  war	  which	  is	  just	  according	  to	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  and	  which	  the	  just	  side	  has	  won,	  having	  fought	  at	  all	  times	  justly	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  rules	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  	  It	  is	  not	  obvious	  why	  the	  victor	  in	  this	  case	  owes	  the	  defeated,	  unjust,	  enemy	  anything.5	  	  Robinson	  points	  out	  that	  “under	  normal	  interpretations	  of	  just	  war	  theory,	  the	  ideally	  just	  victor	  does	  not	  owe	  anything	  to	  his	  defeated	  enemies.”6	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  Bellamy,	  Fletcher,	  Ohlin,	  and	  Robinson	  draw	  the	  above	  skeptical	  conclusions	  about	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  If	  we	  reason	  from	  straightforward	  domestic	  cases	  such	  as	  Standard	  Aggressor	  and	  Rape	  Victim,	  then	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  think	  defenders	  don’t	  incur	  such	  duties.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  structure	  and	  facts	  of	  the	  Aggressor	  and	  Rape	  cases	  fail	  to	  capture	  the	  full	  realm	  of	  individual	  defense	  situations.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Fletcher	  and	  Ohlin,	  Defending	  Humanity,	  38.	  5	  Paul	  Robinson,	  “Is	  There	  an	  Obligation	  to	  Rebuild?”	  in	  Justice,	  Responsibility	  and	  
Reconciliation	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  Conflict,	  ed.	  Alice	  MacLachlan	  and	  Allen	  Speight,	  Vol.	  1	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2013),	  111.	  6	  Ibid.,	  106.	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After	  surveying	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  domestic	  self-­‐defense	  cases,	  I	  think	  most	  readers	  will	  agree	  that	  victims	  sometimes	  incur	  positive	  obligations	  after	  using	  defensive	  force.	  	  In	  fact,	  I	  think	  we	  can	  identify	  four	  situations	  that	  possibly	  give	  rise	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations.	  	  We	  will	  briefly	  survey	  these	  four	  situations,	  and	  then	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  we’ll	  consider	  analogous	  postwar	  scenarios.	  
5.2.1	  Unnecessary	  or	  Excessive	  Force	  Of	  the	  four	  possible	  grounds	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation,	  the	  first	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious:	  when	  a	  victim’s	  use	  of	  force	  is	  excessive	  or	  unnecessary.	  	  Consider	  first	  the	  use	  of	  excessive	  force.	  	  As	  discussed	  (2.2.3),	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm	  has	  an	  internal	  proportionality	  requirement.	  	  A	  person	  cannot	  be	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  h	  if	  h	  is	  disproportionately	  harmful	  relative	  to	  that	  person’s	  threat.	  	  For	  example,	  imagine	  aggressor	  threatens	  to	  slap	  victim	  and	  begins	  to	  swing	  his	  open	  hand	  toward	  victim’s	  face.	  	  In	  response,	  victim	  pulls	  out	  a	  revolver	  and	  shoots	  aggressor.	  	  Victim	  has	  wronged	  aggressor	  because	  aggressor	  was	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  shot.	  	  Though	  unpleasant,	  slapping	  is	  not	  a	  harmful	  enough	  threat	  to	  justify	  deadly	  force.	  	  So	  in	  this	  case,	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  would	  be	  disproportionate.	  	  Accordingly,	  because	  victim	  wrongs	  aggressor,	  victim	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  aggressor	  should	  he	  live,	  or	  compensate	  his	  family	  should	  he	  die.7	  	  (The	  issue	  of	  restitution	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.)	  A	  second	  example	  involves	  cases	  where	  victim’s	  initial	  use	  of	  force	  is	  proportionate,	  but	  victim	  then	  continues	  to	  use	  force	  when	  no	  longer	  necessary.	  	  As	  discussed	  (2.2.3),	  a	  person	  is	  liable	  to	  defensive	  harm	  only	  when	  harming	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  To	  be	  clear,	  my	  interest	  is	  whether	  defenders	  are	  morally	  obligated	  to	  render	  positive	  aid	  or	  restitution,	  not	  whether	  defenders	  are	  legally	  obligated	  to	  do	  so.	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person	  is	  necessary	  to	  avert	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  If	  harming	  a	  person	  is	  unnecessary	  for	  averting	  a	  threat,	  or	  if	  the	  threat	  is	  no	  longer	  present,	  then	  that	  person	  cannot	  be	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  Imagine	  aggressor	  attacks	  victim,	  beating	  him	  with	  his	  fists.	  	  In	  response,	  victim	  uses	  a	  Taser	  device	  to	  temporarily	  incapacitate	  aggressor.	  	  So	  far	  so	  good:	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  appears	  proportionate	  to	  the	  threat	  he	  attempts	  to	  avert.	  	  However,	  once	  aggressor	  is	  incapacitated,	  victim	  must	  cease	  harming.	  	  But	  suppose	  victim	  then	  picks	  up	  a	  large	  rock	  and	  bludgeons	  aggressor,	  crippling	  him	  for	  life.	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  original	  victim	  has	  ceased	  being	  a	  victim	  and	  has	  become	  an	  aggressor.	  	  Because	  his	  use	  of	  force	  turned	  from	  defensive	  force	  to	  gratuitous	  violence,	  victim	  wrongfully	  harmed	  aggressor.	  	  Accordingly,	  victim	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  aggressor.	  	  Aggressor,	  in	  turn,	  would	  also	  have	  a	  compensatory	  duty	  toward	  victim.8	  	   We	  should	  note	  that	  the	  above	  two	  domestic	  cases	  involve	  victims	  wrongfully	  harming	  aggressors.	  	  Wartime	  analogues	  to	  these	  domestic	  cases	  would	  include	  scenarios	  in	  which	  just	  combatants	  violate	  in	  bello	  restrictions	  by	  employing	  unnecessary	  or	  disproportionate	  force.	  	  One	  of	  my	  foundational	  assumptions	  for	  the	  project,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  fight	  in	  a	  just	  manner.	  	  	  So	  given	  the	  hypothetical	  absence	  of	  in	  bello	  restrictions,	  subsequent	  chapters	  will	  not	  examine	  this	  possible	  ground	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  their	  compensatory	  obligations	  might	  off-­‐set,	  or,	  given	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  harm	  that	  original	  victim	  inflicts,	  original	  victim’s	  compensatory	  obligation	  might	  be	  reduced	  by	  some	  amount	  given	  the	  original	  aggressing	  agent’s	  contributory	  wrongful	  inducement.	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5.2.2	  When	  Victim	  Imperils	  Aggressor’s	  Life	  The	  second	  ground	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation	  is	  when	  victim’s	  use	  of	  force	  imperils	  aggressor’s	  life.	  	  Consider	  again	  Standard	  Aggressor:	  aggressor	  unjustly	  attacks	  victim,	  and	  victim	  in	  turn	  employs	  proportionate	  defensive	  force.	  	  In	  that	  example,	  I	  stipulated	  that	  the	  aggressor	  was	  left	  conscious	  and	  ambulatory.	  	  I	  claimed	  that	  victim	  could	  walk	  away	  without	  obligation,	  which	  seems	  right.	  But	  suppose	  instead	  that	  victim’s	  use	  of	  force	  leaves	  aggressor	  in	  a	  life-­‐threatening,	  incapacitated	  condition:	  aggressor	  is	  unconscious	  and	  bleeding	  badly.	  	  Does	  victim	  incur	  an	  obligation	  to	  help	  aggressor?	  	  I	  think	  so,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  circumstances.	  	  If	  aggressor	  will	  die	  without	  victim’s	  aid,	  and	  the	  latter	  can	  render	  aid	  with	  no	  harm	  or	  unreasonable	  cost	  to	  self,	  then	  in	  those	  circumstances	  I	  think	  victim	  does	  incur	  an	  obligation	  to	  help.	  Some	  readers	  might	  find	  that	  last	  claim	  counter-­‐intuitive.	  	  If	  victim	  were	  initially	  justified	  in	  harming	  her	  culpable	  aggressor,	  why	  would	  victim	  later	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  save	  him?	  	  The	  reason	  why	  is	  because	  after	  the	  unjust	  attack	  is	  repelled,	  aggressor’s	  life	  presumably	  still	  has	  worth;	  his	  welfare	  still	  matters.	  	  After	  all,	  if	  aggressor’s	  life	  lacked	  all	  worth,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  talk	  about	  self-­‐defense	  restrictions	  such	  as	  necessity,	  proportionality,	  and	  minimal	  force.	  	  But	  defensive	  force	  is	  restricted	  in	  these	  ways	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  presumption	  that	  every	  life	  has	  some	  intrinsic	  value.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  the	  source	  of	  victim’s	  obligation	  is	  based	  on	  considerations	  about	  the	  worth	  of	  aggressor’s	  life,	  and	  not	  on	  any	  claim	  about	  victim’s	  wrongdoing.	  	  Because	  aggressor	  made	  himself	  liable	  to	  victim’s	  defensive	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force,	  she	  did	  not	  wrong	  the	  aggressor	  by	  imperiling	  him.	  	  Victim’s	  causal	  role	  does	  not	  provide	  her	  with	  an	  agent-­‐relative	  reason	  to	  help.	  	  Instead,	  victim’s	  obligation	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  same	  agent-­‐neutral	  reason	  that	  any	  party	  present	  would	  have:	  victim	  has	  a	  Samaritan	  obligation	  to	  save	  aggressor’s	  life	  if	  she	  can	  do	  so	  without	  significant	  threat	  or	  unreasonable	  cost	  to	  herself.	  But	  because	  victim	  has	  only	  a	  standard	  Samaritan	  obligation	  to	  help,	  she	  need	  not	  imperil	  her	  own	  life	  to	  save	  aggressor.	  	  In	  general,	  third	  parties	  are	  not	  required	  to	  risk	  their	  lives	  in	  order	  to	  save	  others.	  	  So	  victim	  need	  not	  jump	  into	  a	  fast	  moving	  river	  to	  save	  aggressor,	  nor	  need	  she	  resuscitate	  him	  if	  she	  has	  reason	  to	  believe	  he	  will	  attack	  again.	  	  But	  if	  aggressor	  is	  unconscious,	  immobilized,	  or	  otherwise	  no	  longer	  poses	  a	  threat,	  then	  victim	  is	  obligated	  to	  at	  least	  summon	  help.	  Perhaps	  some	  readers	  will	  remain	  skeptical.	  	  If	  so,	  one	  reason	  might	  be	  because	  of	  lingering	  doubts	  about	  the	  claim	  that	  victims	  have	  Samaritan	  obligations	  toward	  their	  culpable	  attackers.	  	  As	  Walzer	  says,	  “strangers	  (but	  not	  enemies)	  might	  be	  entitled	  to	  our	  hospitality,	  assistance,	  and	  good	  will.”9	  	  Perhaps	  Walzer	  is	  right;	  enemies	  aren’t	  entitled	  to	  our	  assistance.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  impact	  this	  denial	  would	  have	  against	  my	  broader	  argument	  for	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  For	  even	  if	  one	  denies	  that	  victims	  might	  have	  obligations	  toward	  aggressors,	  one	  should	  still	  think	  victims	  have	  obligations	  toward	  non-­‐culpable	  but	  morally	  responsible	  parties	  whom	  they’ve	  justifiably	  imperiled.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  agents	  whose	  liability	  is	  grounded	  in	  non-­‐culpable	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  unjust	  threats,	  we	  have	  compelling	  reason	  to	  help:	  they	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Michael	  Walzer,	  Spheres	  of	  Justice:	  A	  Defense	  of	  Pluralism	  and	  Equality	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1983),	  33,	  my	  emphasis.	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victims	  of	  bad	  circumstantial	  luck.	  	  Though	  we	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  harming	  them,	  we	  also	  have	  strong	  reason	  to	  help	  them	  afterward.	  	  A	  good	  example	  is	  Conscientious	  
Driver	  (2.2.4).	  	  In	  that	  case,	  pedestrian	  is	  justified	  in	  intentionally	  harming	  driver.	  	  Suppose	  pedestrian	  shoots	  the	  driver,	  and	  driver	  veers	  off	  into	  a	  ditch.	  	  If	  driver	  survives	  but	  is	  in	  critical	  condition,	  certainly	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  for	  pedestrian	  to	  walk	  away.	  	  Even	  though	  pedestrian	  is	  justified	  in	  harming	  driver,	  once	  pedestrian	  successfully	  defends	  her	  life	  she	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  try	  to	  save	  driver’s	  life.	  If	  so,	  this	  claim	  will	  prove	  important	  when	  we	  consider	  wartime	  analogues.	  	  As	  noted	  (2.2.7),	  many	  unjust	  combatants	  have	  excusing	  conditions	  that	  negate	  their	  culpability,	  such	  as	  when	  they	  act	  under	  duress	  or	  epistemic	  limitation.	  	  In	  those	  cases,	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threats	  they	  pose,	  but	  non-­‐culpably	  so.	  	  So	  if	  we	  think	  defenders	  incur	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  in	  domestic	  cases	  involving	  imperiled	  non-­‐culpable	  parties,	  the	  same	  should	  hold	  in	  postwar	  scenarios	  involving	  excused	  unjust	  combatants	  who	  are	  imperiled	  at	  war’s	  end.	   Finally,	  even	  if	  the	  reader	  holds	  fast	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  victims	  have	  no	  obligations	  to	  aid	  either	  former	  aggressors	  or	  non-­‐culpable	  but	  morally	  responsible	  parties,	  this	  denial	  still	  won’t	  greatly	  affect	  the	  overall	  conclusions	  in	  the	  coming	  chapters.	  	  The	  reason	  why	  is	  because	  most	  postwar	  obligations	  are	  actually	  grounded	  in	  wartime	  analogues	  to	  the	  following	  two	  kinds	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  duties.	  
5.2.3	  Harming	  and	  Imperiling	  Innocent	  Parties	  A	  third	  type	  of	  situation	  in	  which	  victims	  might	  incur	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  is	  when	  their	  defensive	  force	  imperils	  or	  harms	  bystanders.	  	  Because	  bystanders	  are	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by	  definition	  people	  who	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  harm,	  any	  harm	  they	  suffer	  wrongs	  them.	  	  For	  the	  moment,	  let	  us	  assume	  that	  victims	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms	  they	  inflict	  on	  bystanders	  (this	  issue	  will	  be	  revisited	  later).	  	  If	  victims	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  harming	  bystanders,	  and	  if	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  wrongs	  bystanders,	  then	  victims	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  inflicting	  wrongful	  harm	  on	  innocent	  persons.	  	   To	  illustrate,	  consider:	  
Hiker.	  	  Victim	  is	  hiking	  along	  the	  river	  in	  a	  remote	  park.	  	  As	  victim	  passes	  by,	  aggressor	  jumps	  out	  of	  the	  bushes	  and	  attacks	  victim	  with	  a	  knife.	  	  Victim	  kills	  aggressor	  by	  striking	  him	  on	  the	  head	  with	  a	  large	  rock.	  	  During	  the	  scuffle,	  victim	  also	  knocks	  a	  nearby	  bystander	  into	  the	  fast-­‐moving	  river	  below.	  	  No	  one	  else	  is	  nearby.	  	  And	  here	  is	  a	  second	  variant:	  	  
Hiker´.	  	  Victim	  is	  hiking	  in	  the	  park	  when	  he	  crosses	  paths	  with	  aggressor	  and	  his	  young	  son.	  	  Aggressor	  lunges	  at	  victim	  with	  a	  knife.	  	  Victim	  kills	  aggressor	  by	  smashing	  him	  over	  the	  head	  with	  a	  rock.	  	  The	  young	  child	  is	  unharmed.	  	  It	  is	  becoming	  dusk,	  and	  no	  one	  else	  is	  in	  the	  park.	  	  Let’s	  begin	  by	  first	  noting	  that	  in	  both	  Hiker	  and	  Hiker´,	  victim	  used	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  force	  against	  a	  culpable	  aggressor.	  	  Because	  aggressor	  made	  himself	  liable	  to	  victim’s	  lethal	  force,	  victim	  did	  not	  wrong	  aggressor.	  	   The	  interesting	  question	  is	  whether	  victim	  has	  an	  obligation	  toward	  the	  hiker	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  and	  toward	  the	  child	  in	  the	  second.	  	  I	  think	  so.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  obligation	  seems	  particularly	  robust	  in	  both	  cases.	  	  By	  claiming	  that	  victim’s	  obligation	  is	  robust,	  I	  mean	  to	  say	  that	  his	  obligation	  is	  weightier	  than	  a	  standard	  Samaritan	  obligation.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  instead	  victim	  had	  stumbled	  upon	  the	  scene	  to	  find	  the	  bystander	  in	  the	  river,	  or	  the	  child	  wandering	  alone,	  certainly	  he	  would	  have	  an	  agent-­‐neutral	  Samaritan	  obligation	  to	  help.	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   But	  in	  Hiker	  and	  Hiker´,	  victim	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  threatening	  bystander	  and	  child	  (the	  latter	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  become	  liable	  to	  the	  threats	  they	  now	  face).	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  victim	  voluntarily	  acted	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  Because	  victim	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  wrongful	  threats	  to	  both	  bystanders,	  victim	  has	  an	  agent-­‐relative	  reason	  to	  help	  the	  hiker	  and	  the	  child	  –	  an	  especially	  weighty	  reason	  above	  and	  beyond	  any	  agent-­‐neutral	  reasons	  anyone	  present	  would	  have	  for	  trying	  to	  save	  bystander’s	  life.	  	   The	  agent-­‐relative	  reason	  that	  victim	  has	  for	  saving	  the	  bystander	  in	  each	  case	  explains	  why	  victim	  has	  more	  than	  a	  Samaritan	  obligation	  to	  help.	  	  Samaritan	  obligations	  require	  agents	  to	  intervene	  only	  when	  doing	  so	  poses	  no	  unreasonable	  risk	  or	  cost	  to	  the	  intervening	  agent.	  	  But	  in	  Hiker	  and	  Hiker´,	  each	  victim’s	  actions	  threaten	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  those	  bystanders	  should	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  victim’s	  self-­‐defense.	  	  After	  all,	  victim	  was	  not	  obligated	  to	  defend	  himself.	  	  He	  voluntarily	  chose	  to	  do	  so,	  foreseeing	  that	  his	  actions	  might	  inflict	  wrongful	  harm	  on	  innocent	  others.	  	  When	  those	  harms	  or	  threats	  of	  harm	  eventuate,	  then	  victim	  must	  make	  every	  reasonable	  attempt	  to	  avert	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  from	  happening	  or,	  if	  the	  harm	  has	  already	  occurred,	  to	  compensate	  bystander	  for	  his	  harm.	  Moreover,	  victim	  must	  take	  some	  risk	  in	  attempting	  to	  save	  bystander’s	  life	  if	  necessary.	  	  Bystander	  can	  rightfully	  say	  to	  victim,	  ‘but	  for	  your	  defensive	  force,	  my	  life	  would	  not	  be	  imperiled	  –	  you	  need	  to	  take	  back	  this	  cost	  or	  burden,	  or	  at	  least	  share	  in	  it.’	  	  So	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Hiker,	  I	  think	  victim	  incurs	  a	  significant	  obligation	  to	  attempt	  to	  rescue	  the	  bystander	  whom	  he	  has	  knocked	  into	  the	  fast-­‐moving	  river,	  to	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include	  taking	  on	  some	  risk	  if	  necessary.	  	  Perhaps	  he	  may	  need	  to	  jump	  into	  the	  river	  himself.	  	  It	  is	  not	  obvious	  exactly	  how	  much	  risk	  the	  victim	  is	  expected	  to	  take	  on.	  	  But	  he	  certainly	  needs	  to	  go	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  general	  Samaritan	  obligation	  expected	  of	  any	  party	  present.	  	   Similarly,	  in	  Hiker´,	  victim	  incurs	  a	  robust	  obligation	  to	  help	  save	  child’s	  life.	  	  To	  begin,	  victim	  has	  the	  same	  obligation	  that	  any	  passerby	  would	  have	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  child	  dying	  from	  exposure.	  	  For	  example,	  anyone	  would	  be	  expected	  to	  call	  local	  authorities	  and	  await	  their	  arrival,	  or	  to	  give	  the	  child	  a	  ride	  back	  into	  town.	  	  But	  suppose	  there	  is	  no	  cell-­‐phone	  reception	  in	  the	  area,	  the	  temperature	  is	  dropping	  rapidly,	  and	  victim’s	  automobile	  is	  located	  across	  a	  fast-­‐moving	  stream.	  	  If	  victim	  must	  make	  a	  somewhat	  dangerous	  fording	  of	  the	  stream	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  child,	  that	  is	  a	  risk	  the	  victim	  likely	  must	  take.	  	  Again,	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  how	  much	  danger	  victim	  is	  required	  to	  court.	  	  It	  seems	  unreasonable	  to	  say	  that	  victim	  is	  required	  to	  sacrifice	  his	  life.	  	  But	  it	  also	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  victim	  must	  risk	  more	  danger	  than	  a	  mere	  uninvolved	  passerby.	  	   Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  if	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  causes	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  an	  innocent	  person	  or	  her	  property,	  then	  victim	  has	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  that	  party.	  	  So	  in	  Hiker,	  suppose	  instead	  of	  knocking	  bystander	  into	  the	  river,	  victim	  broke	  one	  of	  bystander’s	  fingers	  during	  the	  melee	  and	  also	  damaged	  her	  expensive	  watch.	  	  Setting	  aside	  for	  a	  moment	  any	  considerations	  concerning	  aggressor’s	  estate,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  victim	  owes	  bystander	  compensation	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  suffered.	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5.2.4	  Threatening	  Future	  Harm	  to	  Innocent	  Parties	  The	  fourth	  type	  of	  scenario	  in	  which	  victims	  might	  incur	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation	  involves	  cases	  where	  defender’s	  justified	  use	  of	  force	  threatens	  future	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  This	  category	  might	  actually	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  sub-­‐category	  of	  the	  previous	  one,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  is	  worth	  analyzing	  separately.	  	  This	  category	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  previous	  one	  in	  that	  it	  involves	  threats	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties.	  	  The	  difference,	  however,	  is	  that	  in	  this	  case	  the	  threat	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  is	  temporally	  distant	  from	  victim’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  force,	  whereas	  in	  the	  previous	  category	  the	  threat	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  non-­‐liable	  party	  was	  temporally	  proximate	  to	  defender’s	  use	  of	  force.	  	   Although	  these	  types	  of	  scenarios	  are	  common	  during	  war,	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  common	  in	  domestic	  defense	  cases.	  	  But	  we	  can	  imagine	  an	  individual	  defense	  case	  along	  these	  lines,	  even	  if	  somewhat	  contrived:	  
Booby	  Trap.	  	  Victim,	  while	  camping	  in	  a	  remote	  park,	  is	  unjustly	  attacked	  and	  pursued	  by	  aggressor.	  	  As	  victim	  escapes,	  aggressor	  vows	  to	  track	  down	  victim	  and	  kill	  him.	  	  Out	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  victim	  booby	  traps	  the	  two	  walkways	  leading	  to	  his	  camp	  because	  he	  is	  unsure	  which	  approach	  aggressor	  will	  take.	  	  Aggressor	  approaches	  down	  one	  of	  the	  walkways	  and	  is	  killed	  by	  a	  trap.	  	  Aggressor	  made	  himself	  liable	  to	  victim’s	  lethal	  defensive	  force.	  	  Victim	  did	  not	  wrong	  aggressor	  by	  killing	  him	  with	  the	  booby	  trap.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  other	  booby	  trap	  still	  poses	  a	  lethal	  threat.	  	   Although	  victim	  was	  justified	  in	  setting	  his	  traps,	  once	  he	  has	  successfully	  defended	  himself	  he	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  disarm	  or	  safe	  the	  other	  trap	  to	  avoid	  future	  harm	  to	  an	  innocent	  person.	  	  Victim	  would	  be	  morally	  at	  fault	  if	  he	  simply	  walked	  away	  and	  left	  the	  other	  deadly	  trap	  in	  place.	  	  In	  general,	  if	  one’s	  self-­‐
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defensive	  actions	  threaten	  future	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  one	  must	  attempt	  to	  avert	  that	  harm.	  	   Perhaps	  one	  might	  think	  that	  what’s	  doing	  some	  of	  the	  work	  in	  Booby	  Trap	  is	  that	  victim	  creates	  a	  threat	  of	  harm	  in	  a	  public	  space.	  	  That	  claim	  can’t	  be	  right	  though.	  	  Suppose	  instead	  that	  aggressor	  invites	  victim	  onto	  his	  property	  and	  then	  attempts	  to	  kill	  him.	  	  Victim	  manages	  to	  get	  away	  and	  set	  his	  defensive	  traps.	  	  As	  in	  the	  original	  case,	  aggressor	  is	  killed	  by	  one	  of	  the	  traps.	  Even	  in	  this	  case	  where	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  creates	  a	  threat	  on	  aggressor’s	  private	  property,	  victim	  still	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  disarm	  the	  traps	  after	  he	  defends	  his	  life.	  	  The	  explanation	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  original	  case:	  if	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  creates	  a	  risk	  of	  future	  harm	  to	  a	  non-­‐liable	  party,	  then	  victim	  must	  avert	  that	  harm.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  victim’s	  booby	  traps	  is	  that	  the	  traps	  don’t	  discriminate	  whom	  they	  will	  harm.	  	  Even	  though	  the	  traps	  are	  on	  aggressor’s	  property,	  any	  number	  of	  different	  innocent	  people	  could	  be	  killed	  or	  maimed,	  such	  as	  a	  county	  surveyor,	  mail	  carrier,	  solicitor,	  someone	  from	  the	  electric	  department	  checking	  the	  electric	  meter,	  a	  neighboring	  child,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Victim	  would	  be	  reckless	  should	  he	  knowingly	  leave	  behind	  his	  deadly	  traps	  knowing	  that	  they	  might	  kill	  or	  maim	  an	  innocent	  party.	  
5.3	  Extending	  the	  Grounds	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Obligations	  to	  War	  We’ve	  just	  surveyed	  four	  possible	  grounds	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligation	  in	  various	  domestic	  cases.	  	  The	  goal	  now	  is	  to	  extend	  these	  theoretical	  grounds	  to	  illuminate	  potential	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  in	  cases	  of	  war.	  	  As	  already	  noted,	  because	  the	  dissertation	  project	  begins	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  just	  state	  is	  fighting	  a	  just	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war	  in	  a	  just	  manner,	  the	  first	  of	  the	  four	  categories	  –	  obligations	  grounded	  in	  the	  use	  of	  excessive	  or	  unnecessary	  force	  –	  won’t	  be	  applicable.	  Of	  the	  remaining	  three	  categories,	  most	  postwar	  duties	  falling	  to	  the	  victor	  state	  will	  be	  grounded	  in	  situations	  analogous	  to	  the	  latter	  two	  categories,	  both	  of	  which	  involve	  wrongful	  harm	  or	  threats	  of	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  	  But	  before	  discussing	  these	  potential	  obligations,	  two	  issues	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  The	  first	  regards	  the	  important	  category	  of	  bystanders.	  	  Thus	  far	  I’ve	  gone	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  argue	  that	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war	  and,	  consequently,	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  collaterally	  harmed	  by	  just	  combatants’	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  force.	  	  So	  if	  most	  postwar	  obligations	  are	  grounded	  in	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  we	  first	  need	  to	  get	  clear	  about	  who	  comprises	  the	  bystander	  category.	  The	  second	  important	  issue	  centers	  on	  my	  claim	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  they	  inflict	  on	  bystanders.	  	  Although	  I	  think	  that	  is	  right,	  the	  claim	  is	  but	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  	  Many	  other	  people	  might	  also	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  wrongful	  harm,	  and	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  clarify	  this	  issue.	  	  So	  the	  next	  section	  will	  address	  the	  status	  of	  bystanders,	  and	  the	  sections	  after	  will	  conclude	  the	  chapter	  by	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wartime	  harming	  of	  bystanders.	  
5.4	  Wartime	  Bystanders	  So	  far,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  all	  unjust	  combatants	  and	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  are	  liable	  to	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  defensive	  harm.	  	  But	  some	  people	  harmed	  during	  war	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  They	  are	  called	  bystanders.	  	  Several	  different	  groups	  of	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people	  comprise	  the	  bystander	  category,	  which	  we	  can	  sort	  into	  two	  broad	  classes	  based	  on	  citizenship.	  	   Non-­‐citizens	  comprise	  the	  first	  group	  of	  bystanders.	  	  Common	  examples	  here	  include	  non-­‐nationals	  travelling	  through	  the	  aggressor	  state,	  those	  visiting	  on	  holiday,	  and	  those	  conducting	  business.	  	  Although	  these	  people	  benefit	  temporarily	  from	  aggressor	  state	  institutions	  (such	  as	  military	  protection	  from	  external	  threats,	  and	  police	  protection	  from	  internal	  threats),	  they	  don’t	  have	  the	  right	  kind	  of	  normative	  relationship	  with	  the	  state	  to	  ground	  responsibility	  for	  state	  actions.	  	  They	  lack	  a	  duty	  to	  monitor	  aggressor	  state	  institutions,	  and	  can’t	  be	  expected	  to	  attempt	  to	  avert	  unjust	  harm	  should	  those	  institutions	  malfunction	  in	  the	  form	  of	  unjust	  war.	  	  These	  people	  remain	  innocent.	  	  Any	  harm	  they	  suffer	  during	  war	  wrongs	  them.	  And	  yet,	  non-­‐citizenship	  alone	  isn’t	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  non-­‐liability	  status.	  Those	  who	  reside	  long-­‐term	  and	  pay	  taxes	  seemingly	  meet	  the	  criteria,	  assuming	  they	  participate	  in	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  aggressor	  state	  institutions.	  	  What	  the	  exact	  threshold	  is	  in	  these	  cases	  isn’t	  obvious.	  	  But	  at	  some	  point,	  when	  non-­‐nationals	  have	  resided	  long	  enough,	  and	  participated	  in	  and	  benefitted	  from	  state	  institutions	  enough,	  and	  paid	  taxes,	  these	  people	  take	  on	  some	  responsibility	  for	  state	  actions.	  	  Ex-­‐pat	  communities	  are	  an	  obvious	  example	  here.	  	  Though	  not	  citizens	  of	  the	  host	  state,	  they	  approach	  a	  status	  very	  near	  citizenship.	  	  Importantly,	  they	  have	  formed	  enough	  of	  a	  normative	  relationship	  with	  the	  aggressor	  state	  to	  take	  on	  responsibility	  for	  its	  actions.	  	  People	  meeting	  this	  criterion	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  equivalent	  of	  unjust	  civilians,	  and	  treated	  accordingly.	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As	  should	  be	  obvious,	  citizens	  of	  neighboring	  states	  are	  also	  bystanders	  –	  assuming	  their	  state	  remains	  neutral	  during	  the	  war.	  	  Although	  often	  overlooked,	  these	  bystanders	  are	  also	  sometimes	  harmed	  during	  war,	  such	  as	  when	  just	  combatants	  strike	  a	  military	  target	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  near	  the	  border	  with	  a	  neighboring	  neutral	  state.	  	  Just	  combatants	  might	  be	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  striking	  the	  target	  even	  though	  they	  foresee	  the	  possibility	  of	  harming	  some	  innocent	  neutral	  state	  citizens,	  but	  the	  combatants’	  justification	  for	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil,	  not	  as	  a	  liability	  justification.	  	  Various	  aggressor	  state	  citizens	  comprise	  the	  second	  broad	  group	  of	  bystanders.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  obvious	  examples	  are	  citizens	  who	  can’t	  exercise	  agency	  in	  the	  way	  necessary	  for	  being	  morally	  responsible.	  	  Children	  are	  the	  paradigmatic	  example	  here,	  but	  others	  include	  the	  insane	  or	  the	  mentally	  challenged.	  	  Because	  these	  individuals	  lack	  the	  requisite	  type	  of	  agency,	  they	  lack	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats,	  and	  thus	  lack	  liability	  to	  defensive	  harm.	  Citizens	  persecuted	  by	  their	  own	  state	  are	  also	  bystanders	  by	  my	  usage	  of	  the	  term.	  	  The	  underlying	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  citizens	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  their	  state’s	  institutions	  if	  those	  same	  institutions	  threaten	  those	  citizens’	  lives.	  	  As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  what	  grounds	  a	  citizen’s	  institutional	  responsibility	  is	  the	  reciprocal	  nature	  of	  the	  normative	  relationship	  between	  citizen	  and	  state.	  	  Although	  persecuted	  citizens	  participate	  in	  and	  help	  maintain	  state	  institutions	  (via	  taxes),	  they	  do	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  institutions,	  and	  in	  fact	  are	  made	  worse	  off	  by	  them.	  	  This	  fact	  negates	  any	  responsibility	  these	  citizens	  otherwise	  might	  have.	  	  To	  use	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examples	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  German	  Jews	  and	  Iraqi	  Kurds	  didn’t	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  respective	  state’s	  unjust	  machinations.	  	   Although	  the	  number	  of	  bystanders	  in	  any	  given	  war	  sounds	  significant,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  bystanders	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  will	  in	  most	  cases	  be	  relatively	  small	  compared	  to	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  So	  in	  proportionality	  calculations,	  just	  combatants	  typically	  will	  be	  justified	  in	  believing	  their	  actions	  likely	  will	  harm	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  liable	  unjust	  combatants	  and	  unjust	  civilians	  than	  the	  number	  of	  harmed	  bystanders.	  
5.5	  Obligations	  to	  Assist	  and	  Compensate	  Harmed	  Bystanders	  Because	  wartime	  bystanders	  are	  innocent,	  any	  harm	  or	  threats	  of	  harm	  they	  suffer	  during	  war	  wrongs	  them.	  	  And	  normally	  when	  innocent	  people	  are	  wronged,	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  inflicting	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  incur	  obligations	  toward	  the	  wronged	  innocent	  parties.	  	  When	  bystanders	  are	  threatened	  with	  wrongful	  harm,	  they	  are	  owed	  assistance	  in	  averting	  that	  harm.	  	  If	  the	  harm	  has	  already	  occurred,	  then	  the	  bystanders	  are	  owed	  compensation.	  	  But	  the	  important	  issue	  is	  to	  determine	  to	  whom	  these	  obligations	  should	  fall.	  So	  the	  main	  issue	  we’re	  concerned	  with	  now	  is	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Who	  is	  morally	  responsible	  to	  aid	  or	  compensate	  harmed	  bystanders?	  	  Following	  Robert	  Goodin,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  this	  forward-­‐looking	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  ‘task	  responsibility.’10	  	  A	  natural	  way	  to	  go	  about	  answering	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Robert	  E.	  Goodin,	  Protecting	  the	  Vulnerable:	  A	  Reanalysis	  of	  our	  Social	  
Responsibilities	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1985),	  127,	  131.	  	  David	  Miller	  refers	  to	  this	  same	  type	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  “remedial	  responsibility.”	  	  See	  David	  Miller,	  "Distributing	  Responsibilities,"	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  9,	  no.	  4	  (2001):	  454;	  Miller,	  National	  Responsibility	  and	  Global	  Justice,	  84.	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the	  question	  of	  task	  responsibility	  is	  to	  begin	  from	  the	  backward-­‐looking	  sense	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Retrospectively,	  who	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  causing	  the	  wrongful	  harm?	  	  It	  seems	  natural	  to	  think	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  wrongfully	  harming	  the	  bystanders	  should	  also	  be	  the	  parties	  who	  incur	  positive	  obligations	  to	  assist	  or	  compensate	  the	  bystanders.11	  	  The	  goal	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  retrospective	  issue:	  who	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wartime	  harm	  inflicted	  on	  bystanders?	  	  Determining	  this	  attribution	  question	  will	  take	  us	  a	  long	  way	  toward	  figuring	  out	  which	  postwar	  obligations	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  victor	  state.	  	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  will	  then	  take	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  prospective	  task	  responsibility.	  
5.6	  Moral	  Responsibility	  for	  Wartime	  Harm	  to	  Bystanders	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  retrospective	  issue	  of	  who	  bears	  responsibility	  for	  wartime	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  we	  should	  begin	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  just	  combatants	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  they	  inflict	  on	  the	  innocent.	  	  During	  most	  wars,	  just	  combatants	  foresee	  that	  their	  military	  attacks	  will	  inevitably	  kill	  or	  harm	  some	  bystanders.	  	  And	  almost	  all	  theorists	  agree	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  nevertheless	  justified	  in	  doing	  so,	  either	  by	  way	  of	  lesser	  evil	  or	  double	  effect	  reasoning.	  	  But	  even	  though	  I	  think	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  justified	  in	  their	  use	  of	  force,	  my	  claim	  is	  that	  they	  still	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  they	  cause.	  	  Apparently,	  some	  theorists	  would	  deny	  my	  claim.	  	  Paul	  Robinson,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  “under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  double	  effect,	  which	  forms	  an	  important	  part	  of	  just	  war	  theory,	  one	  is	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  innocent	  who	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See,	  for	  example,	  David	  Miller,	  “Distributing	  Responsibilities,”	  455.	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harmed	  by	  one’s	  attacks,	  as	  long	  as	  one	  did	  not	  intentionally	  harm	  them	  and	  as	  long	  as	  one	  took	  reasonable	  measures	  to	  avoid	  doing	  so.”12	  Robinson	  is	  surely	  right	  to	  say	  that	  within	  traditional	  just	  war	  theory,	  double	  effect	  reasoning	  plays	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  justifying	  collateral	  harm.	  	  What	  is	  less	  clear,	  however,	  is	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  actual	  consensus	  among	  just	  war	  theorists	  that	  just	  combatants	  bear	  no	  responsibility	  for	  collaterally	  harmed	  bystanders.	  	  The	  problem	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  theorists	  focus	  on	  justifying	  the	  combatants’	  actions	  without	  discussing	  the	  further	  issue	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  ensuing	  wrongful	  harm	  bystanders	  suffer.	  	  If	  in	  fact	  Robinson	  is	  right	  and	  the	  common	  view	  is	  that	  just	  combatants	  aren’t	  responsible	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  they	  cause,	  then	  I	  think	  the	  common	  view	  is	  mistaken	  and	  in	  need	  of	  revision.	  	   For	  sake	  of	  brevity,	  I	  won’t	  argue	  against	  Robinson’s	  non-­‐responsibility	  claim,	  other	  than	  to	  point	  out	  a	  criticism	  raised	  by	  Thomas	  Cavanaugh,	  among	  others.	  	  As	  Cavanaugh	  points	  out,	  almost	  every	  single	  version	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  double	  effect	  (DDE)	  includes	  some	  variant	  of	  an	  internal	  proportionality	  requirement:	  the	  intended	  good	  effect	  of	  the	  contemplated	  action	  must	  sufficiently	  outweigh	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  bad	  effect(s).13	  	  And	  yet,	  if	  an	  agent	  isn’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  bad	  effects,	  then	  why	  do	  most	  all	  versions	  of	  DDE	  include	  an	  internal	  proportionality	  criterion?	  	  Why	  one	  would	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Paul	  Robinson,	  “Is	  There	  an	  Obligation	  to	  Rebuild?”	  112.	  	  For	  a	  similar	  claim,	  see	  Colm	  McKeogh,	  “Civilian	  Immunity	  in	  War:	  Augustine	  to	  Vattel,”	  in	  Civilian	  Immunity	  
in	  War,	  ed.	  Igor	  Primoratz	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  112.	  13	  T.	  A.	  Cavanaugh,	  Double-­‐Effect	  Reasoning:	  Doing	  Good	  and	  Avoiding	  Evil	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2006),	  48.	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expected	  to	  calculate	  harms	  for	  which	  one	  isn’t	  responsible	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  contemplated	  act	  is	  permitted?	  Instead,	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  DDE	  normally	  has	  an	  internal	  proportionality	  requirement	  because	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  agent	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  permitted	  to	  perform	  an	  action,	  the	  agent	  must	  compare	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  outcomes	  (one	  intended	  and	  the	  other	  foreseen	  but	  unintended)	  both	  of	  which	  he	  will	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  creating.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  he	  will	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  both	  sets	  of	  effects	  is	  precisely	  why	  he	  must	  ensure	  that	  the	  good	  effect	  must	  outweigh	  the	  bad	  effect	  in	  order	  for	  the	  act	  to	  be	  all	  things	  considered	  justified.	  Against	  what	  Robinson	  calls	  the	  common	  view,	  I	  argue	  that	  agents	  who	  justifiably	  infringe	  other	  peoples’	  rights	  are	  nonetheless	  responsible	  for	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms.	  	  One	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  performing	  action	  x,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  one	  knowingly	  chooses	  to	  infringe	  (or	  knowingly	  take	  the	  risk	  thereof)	  a	  non-­‐liable	  party’s	  rights.	  	  Because	  one	  knowingly	  threatens	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  an	  innocent	  person,	  she	  is	  responsible	  for	  that	  harm	  should	  it	  materialize.	  So	  the	  theoretical	  position	  that	  I’ll	  be	  working	  from	  is	  this:	  agents	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms	  they	  cause,	  whether	  their	  actions	  are	  judged	  permissible	  by	  either	  DDE	  or	  lesser	  evil	  justification.	  	  And	  even	  if	  this	  is	  not	  the	  common	  view,	  as	  Robinson	  alleges,	  the	  position	  is	  certainly	  not	  without	  supporters.	  David	  Rodin,	  for	  example,	  says	  that	  a	  farmer	  who	  intentionally	  burns	  his	  neighbor’s	  field	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  town	  is	  justified	  in	  doing	  so	  as	  the	  lesser	  evil,	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but	  notes,	  “despite	  the	  justified	  nature	  of	  the	  farmer’s	  act,	  the	  neighbor	  is	  still	  owed	  some	  compensation,	  redress,	  or	  apology.”14	  	  Similarly,	  in	  considering	  the	  case	  of	  tactical	  bombers	  who	  foresee	  that	  their	  actions	  will	  kill	  some	  innocent	  civilians	  in	  the	  process	  of	  destroying	  a	  valuable	  military	  target,	  Rodin	  writes:	  The	  bomber	  pilots	  are	  objectively	  justified	  in	  inflicting	  incidental	  harm	  on	  the	  civilians.	  	  Their	  actions	  are	  not	  wrong,	  all	  things	  considered,	  but	  still	  they	  wrong	  the	  civilians,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  infringe	  their	  rights.15	  	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  Alex	  Bellamy	  observes	  that	  according	  to	  the	  lesser	  evil	  doctrine,	  “a	  wrongful	  act	  remains	  wrong	  even	  if	  it	  produces	  the	  least	  worst	  of	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  consequences.”16	  	   Similarly,	  several	  theorists	  argue	  that	  agents	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms	  they	  cause	  when	  performing	  actions	  justified	  by	  double	  effect	  reasoning.	  	  For	  example,	  Whitley	  Kaufman	  writes:	  DDE	  would	  seem	  to	  entail	  that	  one	  is	  indeed	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harm.	  	  Thus	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  hold	  that	  one	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  mitigate	  that	  harm	  after	  the	  fact	  to	  the	  extent	  reasonably	  possible.17	  	  And	  as	  Gregory	  Reichberg	  and	  Henrik	  Syse	  argue,	  DDE	  “does	  not	  say	  that	  the	  unintended	  side-­‐effects	  are	  not	  imputable	  to	  the	  agent,”	  but	  rather	  “he	  or	  she	  knowingly	  and	  willingly	  accepts	  them.”18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  Self-­‐Defense,	  28.	  15	  Rodin,	  “Justifying	  Harm,”	  87.	  16	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy,	  "Dirty	  Hands	  and	  Lesser	  Evils	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,"	  The	  British	  
Journal	  of	  Politics	  &	  International	  Relations	  9,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  514.	  17	  Kaufman,	  Justified	  Killing,	  76.	  18	  Gregory	  Reichberg	  and	  Henrik	  Syse,	  "Protecting	  the	  Natural	  Environment	  in	  Wartime:	  Ethical	  Considerations	  from	  the	  Just	  War	  Tradition,"	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  
Research	  37,	  no.	  4	  (2000):	  465.	  	  See	  also	  Cavanaugh,	  Double-­‐Effect	  Reasoning,	  48.	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The	  rationale	  for	  the	  foregoing	  claims	  regarding	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms	  has	  already	  been	  touched	  upon.	  	  In	  general,	  when	  agents	  voluntarily	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  bring	  about	  certain	  states	  of	  affairs,	  those	  agents	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  all	  the	  effects	  that	  were	  foreseeable	  –	  whether	  intended	  or	  not.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  an	  agent	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  whatever	  effects	  she	  knowingly	  causes.	  	  Given	  her	  informed,	  voluntary	  choice,	  we	  can	  impute	  the	  ensuing	  effects	  to	  her	  as	  a	  result	  of	  her	  agency.	  	  But	  for	  her	  voluntary	  choice	  to	  act	  as	  she	  did,	  the	  bad	  effect	  would	  not	  have	  eventuated.	  	   In	  cases	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  it	  is	  unfortunate	  that	  through	  circumstantial	  luck	  the	  victim	  finds	  herself	  in	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation:	  she	  must	  either	  accept	  the	  harm,	  or	  use	  violence	  to	  protect	  herself.	  	  But	  however	  unfortunate	  the	  situation	  may	  be,	  a	  victim	  cannot	  use	  defensive	  force	  with	  moral	  impunity	  if	  in	  doing	  so	  she	  foreseeably	  threatens	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  an	  innocent	  party.	  	  The	  reason	  victim	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unintended	  harm	  is	  because	  victim	  is	  permitted	  –	  but	  not	  
required	  –	  to	  defend	  herself.	  	  After	  all,	  victim	  could	  have	  avoided	  the	  foreseen	  harm	  to	  the	  bystander	  by	  choosing	  not	  to	  act	  as	  she	  did;	  victim	  had	  the	  option	  to	  accept	  the	  originally	  threatened	  harm.	  	  But	  assuming	  her	  defensive	  force	  is	  necessary	  and	  proportionate,	  victim	  nonetheless	  is	  permitted	  to	  defend	  herself.	  	  But	  she	  cannot	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  might	  harm	  a	  bystander	  without	  also	  assuming	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  that	  wrongful	  harm	  should	  it	  come	  to	  fruition.	  	   So	  regarding	  defensive	  warfare,	  my	  claim	  is	  that	  just	  combatants	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  they	  cause	  to	  bystanders.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  just	  citizens	  were	  permitted	  –	  though	  not	  required	  –	  to	  defend	  themselves.	  	  Since	  they	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voluntarily	  chose	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  the	  just	  combatants	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  unintended	  harm.	  Before	  moving	  on,	  it	  is	  worth	  clarifying	  one	  quick	  point.	  	  In	  order	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  morally	  responsible	  for	  a	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harm,	  what’s	  required	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  be	  foreseeable	  –	  not	  that	  the	  harm	  be	  actually	  foreseen.	  	  If	  the	  latter	  were	  true,	  then	  many	  actors	  would	  be	  absolved	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  they	  knowingly	  cause.	  	  For	  example,	  artillerists,	  cruise	  missile	  operators,	  and	  bomber	  pilots	  almost	  never	  see	  the	  military	  targets	  they	  attack,	  let	  alone	  whether	  bystanders	  happen	  to	  be	  nearby.	  	  Yet	  this	  epistemic	  limitation	  doesn’t	  absolve	  the	  combatants	  of	  responsibility	  when	  their	  strikes	  harm	  innocent	  parties.	  	  Rather,	  the	  foreseeability	  condition	  regarding	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm	  is	  that	  the	  unintended	  wrongful	  harm	  was	  foreseeable	  –	  not	  that	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  must	  have	  been	  actually	  foreseen.	  During	  war,	  I	  think	  the	  foreseeability	  requirement	  is	  almost	  always	  met.	  	  While	  it	  may	  be	  true	  that	  the	  bomber	  pilot,	  artillerist,	  or	  cruise	  missile	  operator	  don’t	  actually	  foresee	  the	  bystanders	  whom	  they	  threaten	  with	  wrongful	  harm,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  obvious	  that	  the	  type	  of	  action	  they	  engage	  in	  foreseeably	  does.	  	  Defensive	  violence	  –	  as	  a	  type	  of	  action	  –	  almost	  always	  foreseeably	  poses	  some	  risk	  of	  harming	  innocent	  people,	  especially	  when	  the	  violence	  involves	  discharging	  weapons,	  dropping	  bombs,	  and	  so	  forth	  More	  generally,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  using	  any	  powerful	  weapon	  such	  as	  a	  gun,	  grenade,	  or	  bomb	  meets	  the	  foreseeability	  criterion	  given	  the	  inherent	  danger	  such	  weapons	  pose.	  	  The	  same	  point	  holds	  in	  domestic	  cases.	  	  When	  four	  young	  men	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allegedly	  attempted	  to	  mug	  Bernhard	  Goetz	  on	  a	  New	  York	  subway	  in	  1984,	  he	  pulled	  his	  revolver	  and	  fired	  five	  shots.	  	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  subway	  car	  was	  filled	  with	  several	  other	  passengers.	  	  But	  suppose	  instead	  that	  the	  car	  had	  been	  empty.	  	  Even	  in	  that	  case,	  Goetz	  would	  have	  been	  morally	  responsible	  had	  one	  of	  his	  bullets	  somehow	  struck	  a	  bystander.	  	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  it	  was	  foreseeable	  that	  discharging	  a	  weapon	  might	  result	  in	  a	  stray	  bullet	  striking	  someone	  in	  the	  next	  car,	  or	  someone	  on	  the	  station	  terminal	  waiting	  for	  the	  next	  train.	  
5.6.1	  Shared	  Responsibility	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  argued	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  they	  inflict	  on	  bystanders.	  	  Although	  true,	  that	  conclusion	  tells	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story.	  	  For	  even	  though	  just	  combatants	  voluntarily	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  risk	  collateral	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  the	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  bear	  sole	  responsibility	  for	  that	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  In	  fact,	  on	  my	  view	  they	  don’t	  even	  bear	  significant	  responsibility.	  	  So	  instead	  of	  saying	  that	  just	  combatants	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  what	  I	  should	  have	  said	  is	  that	  just	  combatants	  share	  responsibility	  for	  that	  harm.	  	  They	  are	  partially	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm,	  but	  to	  a	  significantly	  lesser	  degree	  than	  other	  parties.	  Before	  explaining	  who	  bears	  most	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  let	  me	  first	  clarify	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘shared	  responsibility,’	  and	  distinguish	  this	  idea	  from	  the	  related	  notion	  of	  ‘collective	  responsibility.’	  	  Shared	  responsibility	  refers	  to	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  a	  harm	  in	  a	  way	  that	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  distributes	  to	  each	  member	  of	  the	  group.19	  	  The	  group	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Larry	  May,	  Sharing	  Responsibility	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1992),	  38.	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itself	  need	  not	  be	  intentionally	  formed;	  the	  group	  may	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  aggregation	  of	  agents	  responsible	  for	  causing	  a	  particular	  harm.	  But	  to	  say	  that	  responsibility	  distributes	  to	  each	  member	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  distributes	  equally.	  	  As	  Larry	  May	  writes,	  “shared	  responsibility	  concerns	  the	  aggregated	  responsibilities	  of	  individuals,	  all	  of	  whom	  contribute	  to	  a	  result	  and	  for	  that	  reason	  are	  personally	  responsible,	  albeit	  often	  to	  different	  degrees,	  for	  a	  given	  harmful	  result.”20	  	  Imagine,	  for	  example,	  that	  five	  men	  coordinate	  their	  efforts	  to	  rape	  a	  victim.	  	  Of	  the	  five,	  one	  man	  participated	  only	  as	  a	  lookout.	  	  All	  five	  men	  together	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  crime,	  with	  each	  of	  the	  four	  main	  participants	  sharing	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  than	  the	  lookout.	  In	  contrast,	  collective	  responsibility	  refers	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  group	  of	  people	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  particular	  harm,	  but	  where	  the	  responsibility	  does	  not	  distribute	  to	  all	  of	  the	  group’s	  members,	  or	  perhaps	  not	  even	  to	  any	  of	  the	  members.21	  	  Good	  examples	  of	  collective	  responsibility	  often	  involve	  groups	  such	  as	  corporations.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  corporation	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  particular	  harm,	  even	  though	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  doesn’t	  individually	  distribute	  to	  most	  of	  the	  corporate	  members.	  	  With	  this	  distinction	  between	  shared	  and	  collective	  responsibility	  in	  mind,	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  wartime	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  dissertation	  project	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  just	  states	  incur	  obligations	  to	  render	  positive	  assistance	  or	  compensation	  after	  winning	  a	  just	  war.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid.,	  106.	  21	  Ibid.,	  38.	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Earlier	  in	  the	  chapter	  I	  indicated	  that	  if	  victorious	  states	  incur	  postwar	  obligations,	  those	  obligations	  likely	  would	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  just	  combatants’	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  harming	  bystanders	  during	  war.	  	  And	  in	  fact,	  I	  think	  in	  most	  modern	  wars	  just	  combatants	  tend	  to	  harm	  innocent	  people.	  	  But	  from	  those	  facts	  we	  should	  not	  hastily	  conclude	  that	  the	  just	  state	  incurs	  positive	  obligations	  toward	  the	  bystanders.	  	  Instead,	  we	  should	  recognize	  that	  several	  different	  parties	  together	  share	  varying	  degrees	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  –	  a	  fact	  that	  will	  significantly	  affect	  adjudications	  about	  postwar	  obligation.	  	  But	  before	  proceeding	  to	  that	  discussion,	  we	  first	  need	  to	  analyze	  the	  claim	  of	  shared	  responsibility.	  
5.6.2	  Shifted	  Responsibility	  If	  just	  combatants	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  risk	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  and	  if	  just	  combatants	  could	  have	  avoided	  harming	  bystanders	  by	  not	  using	  defensive	  force,	  then	  why	  should	  we	  think	  other	  parties	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm?	  	  The	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  just	  combatants	  voluntarily	  act	  in	  ways	  the	  cause	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people,	  most	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  transfers	  to	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation	  to	  which	  the	  just	  combatants	  responded.	  	  Following	  Francis	  Kamm,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  this	  idea	  as	  shifted	  responsibility.22	  We	  can	  begin	  the	  discussion	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  by	  considering	  a	  brief	  domestic	  example.	  	  Suppose	  an	  aggressor,	  with	  knife	  in	  hand,	  unjustly	  lunges	  toward	  defender	  walking	  with	  his	  children.	  	  Although	  defender	  notices	  a	  bystander	  in	  the	  background,	  defender	  draws	  his	  revolver	  and	  shoots	  aggressor.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Kamm,	  “Failures	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,”	  72-­‐3.	  	  Kamm’s	  shifted	  responsibility	  argument	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  
	   178	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  bullet	  passes	  through	  aggressor’s	  torso	  and	  strikes	  bystander	  in	  the	  leg.	  	  Bystander	  clearly	  suffers	  a	  wrongful	  harm;	  she	  did	  nothing	  to	  make	  herself	  liable	  to	  defender’s	  defensive	  force.	  	  The	  question	  is	  who	  bears	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm?	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  although	  defender	  inflicted	  wrongful	  harm	  onto	  bystander,	  
most	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  shifts	  to	  the	  aggressor.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  shift	  in	  responsibility	  is	  because	  aggressor	  culpably	  created	  the	  lethal	  forced	  choice	  situation	  confronting	  defender.	  	  Defender	  was	  permitted	  to	  defend	  himself	  and	  his	  family,	  even	  though	  he	  foresaw	  but	  did	  not	  intend	  the	  possibility	  of	  injuring	  bystander.	  	  Nevertheless,	  defender	  shares	  some	  (much	  lesser)	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  This	  last	  point	  is	  important,	  but	  one	  which	  will	  be	  set	  aside	  until	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	  
5.6.3	  Shifted	  Responsibility	  in	  War	  If	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  war	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  concept	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  at	  play	  in	  the	  previous	  domestic	  example	  should	  also	  help	  sort	  out	  the	  issue	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  wartime	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  if	  the	  political	  and	  military	  leaders	  of	  the	  unjust	  state	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  initiating	  and	  prosecuting	  an	  unjust	  war,	  then	  they	  should	  bear	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  bystanders	  suffer.	  	  Moreover,	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  unjust	  combatants	  also	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  then	  they	  too	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  bystander	  harm.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  conclusion	  I’ll	  argue	  for	  is	  that	  unjust	  culpable	  agents	  bear	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm,	  non-­‐culpable	  but	  morally	  responsible	  parties	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such	  as	  unjust	  civilians	  bear	  some	  responsibility,	  and	  the	  innocent	  just	  combatants	  who	  redistribute	  the	  unjust	  harm	  bear	  the	  least	  responsibility.	  	   Before	  proceeding	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  shifted	  responsibility,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  others	  in	  the	  just	  war	  tradition	  embrace	  the	  concept.	  	  Even	  theorists	  with	  as	  widely	  divergent	  views	  as	  Michael	  Walzer	  and	  Jeff	  McMahan	  endorse	  some	  version	  of	  shifted	  responsibility.	  	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  responsibility	  for	  just	  combatant	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties,	  McMahan	  writes:	  The	  unjust	  combatants	  …	  went	  to	  war	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  expose	  their	  civilian	  population	  to	  risks	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  have	  existed,	  such	  as	  risks	  of	  harm	  as	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  justified,	  defensive	  attacks	  by	  just	  combatants.	  	  They,	  not	  the	  just	  combatants,	  therefore	  bear	  ultimate	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  threat	  their	  innocent	  civilians	  face.23	  	  McMahan	  later	  enlarges	  his	  claim	  by	  noting	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  unjust	  combatants,	  unjust	  state	  leaders	  also	  bear	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  threats	  that	  just	  combatants	  pose	  to	  the	  innocent	  civilians.24	  	  Although	  McMahan	  doesn’t	  use	  the	  expression	  ‘shifted	  responsibility’,	  clearly	  this	  is	  the	  idea	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  when	  attributing	  responsibility	  to	  unjust	  agents	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  that	  just	  combatants	  cause.	  	   Walzer	  expresses	  similar	  responsibility	  attributions	  for	  collateral	  harm.	  	  He	  notes	  that	  if	  French	  pilots	  had	  flown	  at	  higher	  altitudes	  during	  WWII	  to	  minimize	  their	  vulnerability	  while	  striking	  targets	  within	  occupied	  France,	  the	  pilots	  “would	  have	  shared	  responsibility	  with	  the	  Germans”	  for	  the	  increased	  civilian	  deaths.25	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  239,	  my	  emphasis.	  	  On	  the	  same	  point,	  see	  also	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  49.	  24	  McMahan,	  “Debate:	  Justification	  and	  Liability,”	  242.	  25	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  158,	  my	  emphasis.	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   Even	  more	  illuminating	  are	  Walzer’s	  comments	  about	  harms	  to	  civilians	  during	  siege	  warfare.	  	  He	  imagines	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  an	  army	  retreats	  within	  the	  walls	  of	  a	  city	  and	  defends	  the	  city	  against	  the	  will	  of	  the	  inhabitants.	  	  Walzer	  imagines	  that	  the	  pursuing	  army	  offers	  terms	  of	  surrender,	  which	  are	  refused.	  	  Should	  the	  pursing	  army	  choose	  to	  bombard	  and	  attack	  the	  city,	  foreseeing	  that	  civilians	  will	  die,	  Walzer	  argues	  that	  although	  the	  besieging	  combatants	  will	  kill	  some	  civilians,	  “these	  deaths	  are,	  in	  an	  important	  sense,	  not	  their	  ‘doing.’”26	  	  Rather,	  Walzer	  argues	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  deaths	  “is	  shifted	  onto	  the	  
defending	  army,	  which	  has	  made	  surrender	  impossible.”27	  	   I	  agree	  with	  McMahan’s	  and	  Walzer’s	  shifted	  responsibility	  claims	  in	  the	  preceding	  passages.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  both	  theorists	  seemingly	  embrace	  the	  notion	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  without	  providing	  an	  underlying	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  responsibility	  should	  be	  shifted	  in	  these	  cases.	  	  Perhaps	  a	  helpful	  way	  to	  better	  understand	  McMahan’s	  and	  Walzer’s	  shifted	  responsibility	  claims	  is	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  shield	  cases.	  
5.6.4	  Shifted	  Responsibility	  for	  Harming	  Shields	  My	  suggestion	  is	  that	  we	  can	  look	  to	  innocent	  shield	  situations	  as	  a	  workable	  model	  for	  understanding	  shifted	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  two	  cases	  offered	  by	  Kamm	  and	  Walzer.	  	  In	  a	  short	  passage	  on	  shifted	  responsibility,	  Kamm	  writes:	  One	  form	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  occurs	  when	  A	  may	  permissibly	  transfer	  its	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  negative	  effects	  of	  its	  acts	  to	  B.	  	  A	  recognized	  example	  is	  when	  a	  country	  itself	  puts	  bystanders	  in	  the	  way	  of	  what	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  163.	  27	  Ibid.,	  my	  emphasis.	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otherwise	  be	  a	  just	  response	  to	  its	  threat.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  deaths	  caused	  by	  A’s	  permissible	  bombing	  is	  attributable	  to	  B	  who	  moved	  people	  into	  harm’s	  way.28	  	  Walzer	  offers	  an	  historical	  example	  with	  the	  same	  basic	  structure.29	  	  During	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  of	  1870,	  French	  forces	  were	  attacking	  German	  army	  supply	  trains	  behind	  German	  lines.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  German	  commanders	  positioned	  coerced	  civilians	  onto	  to	  the	  trains	  to	  deter	  French	  attacks.	  	  On	  Walzer’s	  view,	  responsibility	  for	  the	  civilian	  deaths	  shifted	  to	  the	  German	  commanders	  even	  though	  the	  civilians	  were	  killed	  by	  French	  attacks	  on	  the	  trains.	  	   In	  these	  two	  examples,	  Kamm	  and	  Walzer	  refer	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  combatants	  intentionally	  moved	  bystanders	  into	  harm’s	  way	  for	  purposes	  of	  deterring	  the	  opposing	  side	  from	  using	  defensive	  force.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  Kamm	  and	  Walzer	  are	  talking	  about	  standard	  shield	  situations	  –	  situations	  involving	  the	  intentional,	  opportunistic	  use	  of	  innocent	  people.30	  There	  are	  two	  different	  types	  of	  standard	  shield	  cases.	  	  The	  first	  type	  is	  when	  an	  agent	  uses	  a	  bystander	  to	  physically	  block	  a	  physical	  threat	  such	  as	  a	  projectile.	  	  The	  second	  type	  is	  when	  agents	  use	  bystanders	  as	  deterrents,	  with	  hopes	  that	  the	  enemy	  will	  refrain	  from	  using	  defensive	  force	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  harming	  the	  innocent	  party.	  	  Following	  Cecile	  Fabre,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  former	  type	  as	  “shields-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Frances	  Kamm,	  "Failures	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory:	  Terror,	  Harm,	  and	  Justice,"	  Ethics	  114,	  no.	  4	  (2004):	  689.	  29	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  174,	  footnote.	  30	  The	  exception	  here	  would	  be	  cases	  of	  voluntary	  shields,	  but	  those	  instances	  need	  not	  concern	  us	  because	  in	  those	  cases	  the	  agents	  are	  no	  longer	  bystanders;	  instead,	  voluntary	  shields	  take	  on	  combatant	  status	  given	  that	  they	  intend	  to	  advance	  or	  facilitate	  an	  unjust	  threat.	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as-­‐targets,”	  and	  the	  latter	  type	  as	  “shields-­‐as-­‐deterrents.”31	  	  Using	  this	  distinction,	  Kamm’s	  and	  Walzer’s	  examples	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  shields-­‐as-­‐deterrent.	  	   Many	  people	  agree	  that	  victims	  are	  permitted	  to	  defend	  themselves	  in	  shields-­‐as-­‐deterrent	  situations,	  and	  also	  that	  if	  the	  bystanders	  are	  harmed,	  primary	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  that	  harm	  shifts	  to	  the	  culpable	  party	  who	  initially	  created	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation.	  	  As	  Coady	  says,	  “innocent	  shield	  cases	  do	  seem	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  category	  in	  which	  responsibility	  for	  the	  outcome	  must	  lie	  heavily	  with	  those	  who	  force	  a	  choice	  between	  bad	  outcomes	  onto	  others.”32	  But	  we	  need	  to	  realize	  that	  standard	  shield	  cases	  don’t	  exhaust	  the	  grounds	  of	  shifted	  responsibility.	  	  Note	  how	  Walzer’s	  WWII	  French	  pilots	  case	  (hereafter	  
French	  Pilots)	  differs	  from	  his	  example	  of	  the	  German	  commanders	  who	  placed	  innocent	  civilians	  on	  German	  trains	  during	  the	  Franco-­‐Prussian	  War	  (hereafter	  
German	  Trains).	  	  German	  Trains	  is	  a	  standard	  shields-­‐as-­‐deterrent	  case	  –	  the	  commanders	  intentionally	  put	  the	  bystanders	  at	  risk,	  using	  them	  for	  deterrent	  purposes.	  But	  that	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  French	  Pilots.	  	  Germany	  didn’t	  invade	  France	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  use	  the	  French	  civilians	  as	  a	  deterrent	  against	  defensive	  attacks.	  	  Rather,	  Germany	  invaded	  France	  for	  other	  intended	  reasons,	  all	  the	  while	  
foreseeing	  that	  the	  invasion	  would	  likely	  expose	  the	  French	  civilians	  to	  risk	  of	  being	  collaterally	  harmed.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  invading	  France,	  the	  German	  forces	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  258.	  	  Gerhard	  Overland	  makes	  the	  same	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  shields;	  see	  Gerhard	  Øverland,	  "Killing	  Civilians,"	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  13,	  no.	  3	  (2005):	  362,	  footnote	  30.	  32	  C.	  A.	  J.	  Coady,	  Morality	  and	  Political	  Violence	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  152.	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knowingly	  but	  unintentionally	  put	  the	  French	  civilians	  at	  risk.	  	  And	  knowingly	  putting	  civilians	  at	  risk	  obviously	  differs	  from	  intentionally	  putting	  them	  at	  risk.	  	  And	  if	  we	  agree	  that	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm	  to	  the	  civilians	  in	  the	  
French	  Pilots	  should	  shift	  to	  the	  German	  commanders,	  then	  intentionality	  must	  not	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  shifted	  responsibility.	  	  So	  in	  addition	  to	  intentionally	  putting	  a	  bystander	  at	  risk	  of	  collateral	  harm,	  it	  must	  also	  be	  true	  that	  knowingly	  putting	  a	  bystander	  at	  risk	  of	  collateral	  harm	  can	  also	  ground	  a	  claim	  of	  shifted	  responsibility.	  
5.6.5	  Incidental	  Shields	  If	  the	  reader	  agrees	  that	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  harm	  lies	  with	  the	  German	  forces	  in	  both	  French	  Pilots	  and	  German	  Trains,	  the	  likely	  explanation	  is	  because	  both	  examples	  share	  the	  same	  basic	  underlying	  structure.	  	  In	  each	  case,	  combatants	  are	  forced	  to	  choose	  between	  either	  accepting	  the	  opposing	  forces’	  harm,	  or	  using	  defensive	  force	  that	  foreseeably	  threatens	  collateral	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  	  Whether	  German	  forces	  put	  the	  bystanders	  at	  risk	  intentionally	  (as	  in	  
German	  Trains)	  or	  knowingly	  but	  unintentionally	  (as	  in	  French	  Pilots),	  the	  broad	  effect	  remains	  the	  same.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  German	  forces	  voluntarily	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  imperil	  innocent	  civilians.	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  civilians’	  presence	  alongside	  the	  German	  combatants	  functions	  as	  a	  deterrent	  against	  the	  opposing	  forces’	  military	  response.	  	  Thus,	  French	  Pilots	  and	  German	  Trains	  both	  have	  the	  structure	  of	  shield	  cases,	  as	  do	  the	  earlier	  examples	  by	  McMahan	  and	  Kamm.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  in	  all	  of	  these	  shield	  cases,	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  harm	  should	  shift	  to	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the	  party	  who	  initially	  put	  the	  bystanders	  at	  risk.	  	  However,	  we	  still	  need	  to	  provide	  an	  explanatory	  account	  justifying	  this	  shifted	  responsibility	  claim.	  	   But	  before	  proceeding	  to	  that	  argument,	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  introduce	  some	  terminology	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  two	  different	  types	  of	  shield	  cases	  discussed	  above.	  	  We	  can	  continue	  to	  refer	  to	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  party	  intentionally	  puts	  bystanders	  at	  risk	  as	  “standard	  shield	  cases.”	  	  German	  Trains	  is	  such	  an	  example.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  party	  knowingly	  but	  unintentionally	  puts	  bystanders	  at	  risk	  as	  “incidental	  shield	  cases.”	  	  French	  Pilots	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  incidental	  shield	  case	  because	  although	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  French	  civilians	  was	  a	  deterrent	  consideration	  against	  the	  French	  pilots	  attacking	  their	  targets,	  the	  German	  forces	  didn’t	  intend	  to	  use	  the	  civilians	  for	  that	  purpose.	  The	  reason	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  civilians	  in	  French	  Pilots	  as	  incidental	  shields	  is	  because	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  civilians	  was	  foreseeable.	  	  Incidental	  harms	  are	  harms	  that	  are	  foreseeable	  but	  unintended.	  	  Accidental	  harms,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  harms	  that	  are	  both	  unforeseeable	  and	  unintended.33	  	  So	  if	  the	  harms	  to	  the	  French	  civilians	  had	  been	  unforeseeable	  for	  some	  reason,	  then	  the	  civilians	  would	  have	  been	  accidental	  shields.	  This	  distinction	  between	  incidental	  and	  accidental	  harm	  is	  important	  because	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  a	  wrongful	  harm	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  must	  have	  been	  foreseeable.	  	  To	  see	  this	  point,	  recall	  McMahan’s	  Cell	  
Phone	  Operator	  (2.2.4)	  in	  which	  the	  agent’s	  pressing	  of	  the	  ‘send’	  button	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  For	  the	  distinction	  between	  incidental	  and	  accidental	  harms,	  I	  draw	  from	  Coady’s	  “Collateral	  Immunity	  in	  War	  and	  Terrorism,”	  in	  Civilian Immunity in War, ed. Igor 
Primoratz, 141-42.	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unexpectedly	  sets	  off	  a	  bomb.	  	  In	  that	  example,	  the	  cell	  phone	  operator	  wasn’t	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  subsequent	  harm	  because	  that	  harm	  wasn’t	  foreseeable.	  But	  things	  are	  different	  in	  the	  French	  Pilots	  case.	  	  German	  forces	  foresaw	  –	  or	  should	  have	  foreseen	  –	  that	  invading	  France	  would	  expose	  the	  local	  civilians	  to	  risk	  of	  collateral	  harm.	  	  Because	  the	  German	  forces	  foresaw	  this	  risk	  but	  chose	  to	  invade	  anyway,	  the	  French	  civilians	  became	  incidental	  shields,	  not	  accidental.	  	  And	  placing	  innocent	  people	  at	  risk	  as	  incidental	  shields	  is	  what	  grounds	  a	  claim	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  the	  shields	  suffer.	  With	  the	  distinction	  between	  standard	  and	  incidental	  shield	  cases	  in	  place,	  we	  now	  need	  an	  explanatory	  account	  for	  shifted	  responsibility	  in	  both	  types	  of	  cases.	  	  As	  previously	  pointed	  out,	  McMahan,	  Kamm,	  and	  Walzer	  each	  appeal	  to	  intuitive	  cases	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  without	  providing	  the	  grounds	  for	  such	  a	  claim.	  	  Eric	  Mack,	  however,	  has	  provided	  a	  justice-­‐based	  explanation	  for	  shifted	  responsibility	  in	  cases	  where	  self-­‐defense	  results	  in	  collateral	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  
5.6.6	  An	  Explanatory	  Account	  of	  Shifted	  Responsibility	  Mack’s	  account	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  is	  straightforward	  yet	  compelling.34	  	  Focusing	  on	  self-­‐defense	  cases,	  Mack	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  defenders	  only	  redistribute	  an	  unjust	  harm	  that	  another	  party	  created.	  	  Confronted	  with	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation,	  victims	  must	  either	  accept	  the	  unjust	  harm	  or	  attempt	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Eric	  Mack,	  "Three	  Ways	  to	  Kill	  Innocent	  Bystanders:	  Some	  Conundrums	  Concerning	  the	  Morality	  of	  War,"	  Social	  Philosophy	  and	  Policy	  3,	  no.	  01	  (1985):	  1-­‐26.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  Mack’s	  paper	  is	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  principle	  to	  the	  doctrine	  of	  double	  effect	  –	  a	  principle	  that	  he	  calls	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Antecedent	  Causation	  (AC).	  	  Thus,	  Mack’s	  explanatory	  account	  for	  shifted	  responsibility	  is	  but	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  argument	  advocating	  AC	  over	  DDE.	  	  Although	  AC	  has	  much	  intuitive	  appeal,	  for	  present	  purposes	  I	  wish	  only	  to	  harvest	  Mack’s	  shifted	  responsibility	  account;	  I	  take	  no	  stance	  on	  his	  AC/DDE	  debate.	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redistribute	  it.	  	  For	  Mack,	  the	  crucial	  point	  in	  these	  situations	  is	  that	  the	  aggressor	  is	  morally	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  evil	  that	  victim	  redistributes.	  	  If	  victim	  foresees	  but	  does	  not	  intend	  that	  some	  of	  the	  redistributed	  harm	  will	  wrongly	  fall	  to	  bystander,	  then	  that	  wrongful	  harm	  should	  trace	  back	  to	  the	  aggressor	  who	  forced	  the	  choice,	  not	  the	  victim	  who	  redistributed	  the	  harm.	  	  But	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  primary	  responsibility	  always	  traces	  back	  to	  the	  aggressor.	  	   For	  Mack,	  the	  key	  issue	  regarding	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm	  in	  self-­‐defense	  cases	  hinges	  on	  whether	  the	  victim’s	  intervening	  agency	  (i.e.,	  his	  use	  of	  defensive	  force)	  negates	  the	  aggressor’s	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  initial	  evil.	  	  His	  answer	  is	  that	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  negates	  the	  aggressor’s	  responsibility	  only	  in	  cases	  where	  victim	  intends	  to	  harm	  bystander	  –	  whether	  as	  a	  means	  to	  the	  victim’s	  defense,	  or	  as	  an	  end	  itself.	  	  But	  if	  victim	  foresaw	  but	  did	  not	  intend	  harming	  bystander,	  and	  assuming	  victim’s	  defensive	  force	  was	  both	  necessary	  and	  proportionate,	  Mack	  concludes	  that	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystander’s	  wrongful	  harm	  shifts	  back	  to	  the	  aggressor.	  	  As	  Mack	  explains,	  the	  causal	  connection	  between	  the	  eventual	  harm	  and	  the	  situation	  which	  necessitated	  some	  distribution	  of	  an	  evil	  is	  negatived	  by	  an	  agent’s	  intermediate	  action	  only	  if	  the	  agent	  does	  that	  evil	  to	  whom	  it	  befalls,	  rather	  than	  simply	  acting	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  gets	  distributed	  to	  him.	  	  And	  I	  take	  it	  that	  the	  agent	  does	  that	  evil	  to	  the	  party	  to	  whom	  it	  befalls	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  that	  evil	  result	  is	  intended	  as	  an	  end	  or	  as	  a	  means	  in	  the	  agent’s	  plan	  of	  action.35	  	  In	  forced	  choice	  self-­‐defense	  situations,	  if	  victim	  redistributes	  the	  unjust	  threat	  while	  foreseeing	  but	  not	  intending	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  then	  “responsibility	  for	  the	  ensuing	  deaths	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  …	  an	  author	  of	  those	  circumstances.”36	  	  In	  cases	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Mack,	  “Three	  Ways	  to	  Kill,”	  21-­‐22.	  36	  Ibid.,	  20-­‐21.	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of	  self-­‐defense,	  it	  is	  aggressor’s	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  lethal	  forced	  choice	  that	  justifies	  shifting	  to	  him	  responsibility	  for	  any	  subsequent	  harm	  that	  victim	  incidentally	  distributes	  to	  bystander(s).	  	   Mack’s	  account	  explains	  our	  intuitions	  that	  aggressors	  should	  bear	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  in	  both	  standard	  and	  incidental	  shield	  situations.	  	  If	  aggressor	  is	  responsible	  for	  collateral	  harm	  in	  standard	  shield	  cases,	  then	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  aggressor	  wouldn’t	  also	  be	  responsible	  for	  similar	  collateral	  harm	  in	  incidental	  shield	  cases.	  	  Even	  if	  aggressor	  doesn’t	  intend	  to	  put	  bystander	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  collaterally	  harmed,	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  knowingly	  and	  voluntarily	  does	  so	  should	  likewise	  ground	  his	  responsibility	  for	  the	  situation.	  This	  last	  claim	  that	  aggressors	  who	  knowingly	  put	  innocent	  parties	  at	  risk	  should	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  harm	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise.	  	  After	  all,	  I’ve	  already	  argued	  that	  defenders	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harm	  they	  cause	  to	  bystanders	  during	  their	  defense,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  victims	  act	  with	  double	  effect	  or	  lesser	  evil	  justification.	  	  Assuming	  that	  claim	  is	  true,	  then	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice	  situation	  to	  which	  victim	  responds	  should	  also	  be	  responsible.	  	  And	  if	  aggressor	  and	  victim	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystander’s	  harm,	  then	  certainly	  the	  aggressor	  should	  bear	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  responsibility	  given	  that	  he	  culpably	  created	  the	  unjust	  harm	  that	  victim	  justifiably	  redistributed.	  But	  my	  claim	  that	  victims	  still	  bear	  some	  (though	  lesser)	  responsibility	  for	  bystander’s	  harm	  also	  forces	  me	  to	  disagree	  with	  Mack	  on	  an	  important	  point.	  	  Mack	  apparently	  believes	  that	  all	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  shifts	  to	  the	  party	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responsible	  for	  the	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice.	  	  On	  Mack’s	  view,	  defenders	  acquire	  responsibility	  only	  if	  they	  intend	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  –	  either	  as	  a	  means	  or	  as	  an	  end.	  	  But	  assuming	  that	  the	  defender	  foresees	  but	  does	  not	  intend	  the	  foreseen	  collateral	  harm,	  on	  Mack’s	  view	  defender	  bears	  no	  responsibility	  for	  that	  harm.	  	  Instead,	  all	  the	  responsibility	  traces	  back	  to	  the	  aggressor	  who	  initially	  created	  the	  evil	  that	  victim	  redistributes.37	  On	  this	  point,	  I	  can	  only	  refer	  back	  to	  the	  previous	  discussion	  about	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  foreseen	  but	  unintended	  harms	  (5.6).	  	  Victim	  is	  permitted	  to	  defend	  himself,	  but	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  do	  so.	  	  One	  cannot	  voluntarily	  choose	  to	  defend	  one’s	  life	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risks	  harming	  an	  innocent	  party	  without	  at	  the	  same	  time	  assuming	  responsibility	  should	  the	  foreseeable	  harm	  fall	  to	  an	  innocent	  person.	  	  So	  on	  this	  point,	  I	  think	  Walzer	  and	  McMahan	  got	  things	  right	  in	  their	  earlier	  quotes	  when	  they	  wrote	  of	  “shared	  responsibility”	  and	  “primary	  responsibility”	  (assuming	  primary	  responsibility	  means	  to	  bear	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  responsibility,	  but	  not	  all).	  	  The	  party	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  forced	  choice	  evil	  inherits	  most	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  bystander’s	  wrongful	  harm,	  though	  defender	  does	  share	  some	  residual	  amount	  of	  responsibility.	  
5.6.7	  Shifted	  Responsibility	  During	  War	  If	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  war	  is	  true,	  then	  Mack’s	  account	  explains	  not	  only	  shifted	  responsibility	  for	  bystander	  harm	  in	  domestic	  cases,	  but	  also	  shifted	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm	  during	  war.	  	  By	  aggressing	  against	  another	  state,	  the	  unjust	  state	  political	  and	  military	  leaders	  (“unjust	  regime”	  for	  short)	  bear	  moral	  responsibility	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Mack,	  “Three	  Ways	  to	  Kill,”	  25-­‐26.	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for	  creating	  a	  lethal	  forced	  choice	  situation.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  unjust	  regime	  foresaw	  that	  their	  aggression	  likely	  would	  prompt	  the	  victim	  state	  to	  retaliate	  in	  force,	  thus	  imperiling	  bystanders’	  lives.	  	  And	  yet	  the	  unjust	  regime	  chose	  to	  aggress	  anyway,	  knowingly	  placing	  the	  bystanders	  at	  risk.	  	  Given	  that	  they	  knowingly	  created	  a	  forced	  choice	  situation	  while	  recklessly	  exposing	  bystanders	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  collateral	  harm,	  the	  unjust	  regime	  carries	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  any	  incidental	  harm	  to	  bystanders.	  	   Unfortunately	  for	  the	  just	  combatants,	  they	  likely	  cannot	  defend	  themselves	  and	  their	  fellow	  citizens	  without	  incidentally	  killing	  some	  innocent	  people.	  	  By	  knowingly	  placing	  the	  bystanders	  at	  risk,	  the	  unjust	  regime	  has	  effectively	  transformed	  the	  bystanders	  into	  incidental	  shields:	  their	  presence	  deters	  against	  the	  just	  combatants’	  use	  of	  defensive	  force.	  	  Still,	  the	  victim	  state	  is	  justified	  in	  responding	  militarily,	  assuming	  their	  force	  is	  necessary	  and	  proportionate.	  	  Just	  combatants	  foresee	  that	  they	  will	  incidentally	  harm	  some	  bystanders	  during	  war.	  	  But	  the	  just	  combatants	  didn’t	  create	  that	  wrongful	  harm;	  instead,	  they	  redistribute	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  that	  the	  unjust	  regime	  created.	  	  If	  the	  just	  combatants	  foresee	  but	  do	  not	  intend	  the	  collateral	  harm	  as	  either	  a	  means	  or	  as	  an	  end,	  then	  their	  intervening	  military	  action	  does	  not	  sever	  the	  unjust	  regime’s	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  harm.	  	  Thus,	  ultimate	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  wartime	  collateral	  harm	  traces	  back	  to	  the	  unjust	  regime.	  	   And	  yet,	  the	  just	  citizenry	  was	  not	  obligated	  to	  defend	  themselves.	  	  They	  were	  permitted	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Because	  they	  voluntarily	  chose	  to	  defend	  themselves	  while	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foreseeing	  that	  their	  use	  of	  force	  would	  likely	  harm	  innocent	  people,	  the	  just	  citizens	  also	  share	  some	  lesser	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  The	  preceding	  discussion	  is	  incomplete,	  however,	  for	  it	  overlooked	  two	  groups	  of	  agents	  who	  also	  share	  some	  responsibility	  for	  bystander	  harm:	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  unjust	  combatants.	  	  As	  argued	  at	  length,	  I	  think	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  and	  that	  unjust	  soldiers	  also	  share	  some	  responsibility	  grounded	  in	  their	  participation	  in	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	  Neither	  group	  is	  especially	  blameworthy	  –	  if	  they	  are	  blameworthy	  at	  all.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  unjust	  civilians,	  they	  are	  institutionally	  responsible	  for	  their	  state’s	  actions	  given	  the	  causal	  contributions	  they	  have	  made,	  and	  they	  also	  likely	  did	  nothing	  to	  avert	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  threats.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  unjust	  combatants,	  though	  they	  may	  have	  acted	  under	  duress	  or	  epistemic	  limitation,	  they	  are	  almost	  never	  fully	  excused	  such	  that	  they	  don’t	  bear	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  actions.	  Together,	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  most	  unjust	  combatants	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  unjust	  war.	  	  Certainly	  they	  bear	  less	  responsibility	  than	  the	  unjust	  regime.	  	  But	  they	  bear	  more	  responsibility	  than	  the	  just	  civilians	  and	  just	  combatants.	  	  The	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  unjust	  combatants	  share	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  unjust	  harm	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  redistributed.	  	  Assuming	  again	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  did	  not	  intend	  for	  the	  redistributed	  harm	  to	  fall	  to	  bystanders	  as	  either	  a	  means	  or	  as	  an	  end,	  then	  some	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  traces	  back	  to	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  the	  unjust	  combatants.	  	   In	  other	  words,	  responsibility	  for	  harming	  the	  bystanders	  shifts	  to	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  original	  harmful	  situation	  –	  responsibility	  for	  the	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collateral	  harm	  ultimately	  resides	  with	  the	  unjust	  citizens,	  most	  especially	  their	  leaders,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  unjust	  soldiers.	  The	  just	  combatants’	  intervening	  agency	  does	  not	  negate	  the	  unjust	  citizens’	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  harm	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  redistributed.	  
5.6.8	  Tripartite	  Division	  of	  Responsibility	  We	  began	  the	  current	  discussion	  by	  considering	  which	  parties	  bear	  retrospective	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  bystanders	  suffer	  during	  war.	  	  Given	  the	  preceding	  analysis,	  I	  think	  the	  complete	  answer	  involves	  a	  tripartite	  division	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  	  Taking	  shifted	  responsibility	  into	  consideration,	  we	  can	  begin	  by	  saying	  that	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  bystander	  harm	  resides	  with	  the	  culpable	  unjust	  regime	  who	  initiated	  the	  unjust	  war	  while	  foreseeing	  that	  doing	  so	  would	  expose	  bystanders	  to	  great	  risk	  of	  collateral	  harm.	  	   Secondary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  falls	  to	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  who	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  and	  to	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  who	  share	  responsibility	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  unjust	  war.	  	   Finally,	  just	  combatants	  incur	  tertiary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  that	  they	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  inflict.	  	  Although	  the	  just	  combatants’	  defensive	  force	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  justified,	  this	  does	  not	  absolve	  them	  of	  all	  responsibility	  because	  they	  still	  chose	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  harming	  innocent	  people.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  were	  permitted	  but	  not	  required	  to	  use	  defensive	  force;	  that	  they	  voluntarily	  chose	  to	  do	  so	  grounds	  their	  responsibility	  for	  some	  of	  the	  subsequent	  wrongful	  harm.	  	  The	  just	  citizenry	  cannot	  solve	  its	  problems	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  innocent	  bystanders	  without	  some	  moral	  consequence.	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   On	  my	  view,	  the	  tripartite	  division	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  is	  a	  scalar	  construct.	  	  The	  just	  regime	  bears	  most	  of	  the	  responsibility,	  a	  lesser	  amount	  falls	  to	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  combatants,	  and	  the	  least	  amount	  resides	  with	  the	  just	  citizens.	  	  This	  division	  of	  responsibility	  is	  important	  because	  the	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  parties	  bear	  for	  wrongfully	  harming	  innocent	  bystanders	  will	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  determining	  which	  party	  should	  incur	  the	  prospective	  task	  for	  assisting	  or	  compensating	  the	  bystanders.	  So	  as	  we	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  general	  aim	  of	  determining	  which	  postwar	  obligations	  fall	  to	  the	  victorious	  just	  citizenry,	  doing	  so	  will	  be	  considered	  against	  this	  backdrop	  of	  the	  shared	  moral	  responsibility	  the	  various	  parties	  have	  for	  harming	  bystanders.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  such	  obligations	  should	  generally	  fall	  to	  the	  parties	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm	  to	  be	  averted,	  or	  the	  harms	  needing	  to	  be	  remedied.	  But	  although	  I	  claim	  that	  the	  unjust	  regime	  bears	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  this	  fact	  does	  not	  absolve	  just	  citizens	  from	  having	  any	  positive	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  most	  culpable	  or	  most	  responsible	  party.	  	  But	  if	  the	  unjust	  parties	  are	  unable	  to	  fulfill	  those	  obligations,	  then	  the	  obligations	  may	  fall	  to	  the	  just	  citizenry.	  	  The	  latter	  are	  much	  less	  responsible,	  but	  if	  the	  primary	  and	  secondary	  parties	  are	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  assist,	  then	  sometimes	  these	  obligations	  will	  fall	  to	  the	  tertiary	  party.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  allow	  the	  costs	  to	  fall	  solely	  to	  the	  innocent	  bystanders	  if	  any	  of	  the	  responsible	  parties	  is	  able	  to	  share	  the	  burden.	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5.7	  Chapter	  Conclusion	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  identified	  four	  domestic	  situations	  in	  which	  victims	  might	  incur	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  following	  successful	  self-­‐defense.	  	  Assuming	  the	  reductive	  account	  of	  war	  is	  true,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  possible	  parallel	  cases	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  following	  successful	  self-­‐defensive	  warfare.	  	  Of	  the	  four	  possible	  sources	  of	  postwar	  obligation,	  most	  will	  likely	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  just	  combatants	  have	  harmed	  or	  imperiled	  innocent	  bystanders.	  	  Yet	  as	  also	  argued,	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  bear	  sole	  responsibility	  for	  such	  collateral	  harm.	  	  In	  fact,	  most	  responsibility	  for	  bystander	  harm	  will	  fall	  to	  the	  unjust	  regime,	  with	  a	  lesser	  amount	  falling	  to	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  and	  unjust	  combatants.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  bear	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  for	  bystander	  harm	  but,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  even	  small	  amounts	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  wrongful	  harm	  can	  ground	  obligations	  to	  aid	  or	  compensate	  the	  wronged	  parties.	  	   The	  aim	  for	  the	  next	  two	  chapters	  is	  to	  complete	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  Responsibility	  Account´	  to	  determine	  a	  just	  state’s	  postwar	  obligations.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  for	  a	  maximalist	  position:	  my	  claim	  is	  that	  victorious	  states	  that	  have	  successfully	  defended	  themselves	  sometimes	  do	  incur	  positive	  obligations	  to	  assist	  others	  at	  war’s	  end.
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CHAPTER	  6	  	  
6.	  Specific	  Postwar	  Obligations	  Now	  that	  we’ve	  surveyed	  the	  possible	  grounds	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  shifted	  responsibility	  for	  wartime	  harm,	  we’re	  ready	  to	  determine	  which	  obligations	  states	  might	  incur	  after	  winning	  a	  just	  war.	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we’ll	  consider	  whether	  victorious	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  provide	  safety	  and	  security	  in	  the	  vanquished	  state	  at	  war’s	  end,	  and	  also	  whether	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  mitigate	  potential	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we’ll	  consider	  additional	  potential	  obligations	  including	  restitution,	  physical	  reconstruction,	  transitional	  justice,	  and	  political	  reconstruction.	  
6.1	  The	  Obligation	  to	  Provide	  Transitional	  Security	  We’ll	  begin	  with	  the	  most	  pressing	  problem	  at	  war’s	  end:	  defeated	  states	  teetering	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  anarchy.	  	  Weakened	  by	  war,	  vanquished	  regimes	  sometimes	  collapse	  internally.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  just	  states	  intentionally	  topple	  belligerent	  regimes.	  	  And	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  aggressor	  regime	  is	  left	  intact,	  its	  military	  and	  police	  forces	  may	  be	  too	  decimated	  to	  maintain	  postwar	  order.	  	  In	  all	  these	  situations,	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  same:	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  stable	  government	  institutions,	  many	  people	  are	  left	  vulnerable	  to	  chaos.	  	   By	  “vulnerable,”	  I	  mean	  that	  people	  are	  left	  at	  risk	  of	  death	  or	  serious	  bodily	  harm.1	  	  In	  war’s	  aftermath,	  such	  vulnerability	  might	  take	  many	  forms,	  including	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  religious	  persecution,	  civil	  war,	  genocide,	  bandits,	  looters,	  rapists,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Goodin,	  Protecting	  the	  Vulnerable,	  110.	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as	  well	  as	  predation	  by	  neighboring	  states.	  	  Humanitarian	  threats	  such	  as	  disease	  and	  starvation	  often	  follow	  not	  far	  behind.	  	   Given	  such	  dire	  circumstances,	  one	  should	  wonder	  whether	  the	  victorious	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  protect	  these	  imperiled	  parties	  by	  providing	  safety	  and	  security.	  	  Borrowing	  from	  Joris	  Voorhoeve,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  the	  substance	  of	  this	  potential	  obligation	  as	  “transitional	  security,”	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  the	  restoration	  of	  public	  order	  and	  the	  stopping	  of	  violence	  after	  war.2	  	  The	  obligation	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  is	  distinct	  from	  other	  closely	  related	  obligations	  such	  as	  political	  rehabilitation	  (installing	  a	  new	  government),	  physical	  reconstruction	  (rebuilding	  infrastructure),	  and	  transitional	  justice	  (holding	  parties	  accountable	  for	  the	  wrongs	  of	  war).	  	  I	  will	  discuss	  these	  latter	  issues	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	   For	  now,	  let’s	  just	  focus	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  transitional	  security.	  	  We	  can	  begin	  by	  imagining	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  an	  aggressor	  state	  unjustly	  invades	  a	  neighboring	  victim	  state.	  	  The	  victim	  state,	  in	  turn,	  wages	  a	  self-­‐defensive	  war	  and	  defeats	  aggressor	  state	  by	  toppling	  the	  unjust	  regime	  and	  defeating	  its	  military	  forces.	  	  Given	  this	  newly	  created	  vacuum	  of	  authority,	  the	  aggressor	  state	  slowly	  slips	  into	  a	  chaotic	  scene	  rife	  with	  ethnic	  tension,	  looting,	  and	  lawlessness.	  	  Widespread	  violence	  breaks	  out.	  	  In	  a	  situation	  such	  as	  this,	  are	  the	  just	  combatants	  obligated	  to	  step	  in	  and	  establish	  order?	  	   In	  such	  dire	  circumstances,	  a	  majority	  of	  theorists	  argue	  that	  just	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  establish	  safety	  and	  security	  to	  protect	  the	  at-­‐risk	  populations.	  	  Walzer,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  “the	  positive	  obligations	  of	  just	  warriors	  after	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Joris	  Voorhoeve,	  From	  War	  to	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law:	  Peacebuilding	  After	  Violent	  Conflicts,	  Vol.	  16	  (Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  54.	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overthrow	  an	  aggressive	  or	  murderous	  regime	  and	  stop	  the	  killing	  begin	  with	  what	  we	  can	  think	  of	  as	  provision,”	  which	  includes	  providing	  “law	  and	  order,	  food	  and	  shelter.”3	  	  “The	  crucial	  requirement	  of	  jus	  post	  bellum,”	  Walzer	  adds,	  is	  “the	  preservation	  of	  life.”4	  	   Eric	  Patterson	  argues	  the	  same:	  “The	  first	  and	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  jus	  
post	  bellum	  is	  Order,”	  meaning	  “the	  end	  of	  a	  war	  should	  be	  a	  situation	  of	  stability	  and	  security.”5	  	  Louis	  Iasiello	  nicely	  sums	  up	  the	  majority	  view	  on	  this	  topic:	  Victors	  have	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  and	  stabilization	  of	  a	  defeated	  nation.	  …	  Great	  care	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  provide	  both	  security	  and	  life	  support	  to	  all,	  and	  special	  attention	  must	  be	  afforded	  a	  society’s	  most	  vulnerable	  groups:	  children,	  the	  elderly,	  women,	  displaced	  persons,	  and	  the	  infirm.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  at-­‐risk	  groups	  will	  be	  totally	  dependent	  on	  others	  for	  food,	  water,	  medicine,	  shelter,	  and,	  of	  course,	  their	  security.6	  	  Iasiello	  points	  to	  the	  same	  considerations	  that	  Walzer	  and	  Patterson	  highlight:	  at	  war’s	  end,	  some	  people	  are	  left	  vulnerable	  and	  in	  need	  of	  protection.	  	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  Iasiello,	  Walzer,	  and	  Patterson	  fail	  to	  explain	  why	  victorious	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  provide	  the	  needed	  security	  in	  these	  situations.	  	  So	  although	  I	  agree	  with	  the	  preceding	  claims,	  what	  we	  need	  is	  an	  explanatory	  account	  grounding	  this	  obligation.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Michael	  Walzer,	  “The	  Aftermath	  of	  War,”	  in	  Ethics	  Beyond	  War's	  End,	  ed.	  Eric	  Patterson	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  43.	  4	  Ibid.,	  45.	  5	  Eric	  Patterson,	  Just	  War	  Thinking:	  Morality	  and	  Pragmatism	  in	  the	  Struggle	  Against	  
Contemporary	  Threats	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2007),	  84.	  6	  Louis	  V.	  Iasiello,	  "Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  The	  Moral	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victors	  in	  War,"	  
Naval	  War	  College	  Review	  57,	  no.	  3	  (2004):	  42.	  7	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  preceding	  general	  claims	  about	  transitional	  security	  obligations	  are	  also	  reflected	  in	  various	  international	  laws	  of	  war.	  	  See	  1907	  Hague	  Convention	  IV;	  1949	  Geneva	  Convention	  IV,	  Art.	  55;	  see	  also	  1977	  Geneva	  Protocol	  I.	  	  As	  one	  might	  expect,	  those	  international	  documents	  merely	  prescribe	  behavior	  without	  theoretical	  explanation.	  	  For	  U.S.	  policy	  documents	  on	  the	  same	  subject,	  see	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   So	  what	  reasons	  might	  ground	  a	  victorious	  state’s	  positive	  duty	  to	  aid	  imperiled	  parties	  at	  war’s	  end?	  	  An	  obvious	  starting	  point	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  people	  are	  left	  in	  harm’s	  way.	  	  Their	  imperiled	  condition	  makes	  a	  normative	  claim	  on	  others	  to	  intervene.	  	  Yet	  this	  consideration	  alone	  doesn’t	  uniquely	  single	  out	  the	  just	  combatants	  as	  the	  agents	  who	  should	  be	  obligated.	  	  Instead,	  the	  imperiled	  parties’	  vulnerability	  only	  provides	  agent	  neutral	  reasons	  counting	  in	  favor	  of	  any	  party	  to	  intervene.	  But	  two	  additional	  reasons	  do	  seem	  to	  single	  out	  the	  just	  combatants	  as	  the	  appropriate	  duty-­‐bearers.	  	  First,	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  uniquely	  positioned	  to	  help.	  	  Their	  physical	  proximity	  to	  the	  situation	  singles	  them	  out	  from	  other	  potential	  intervening	  agents.	  	  Second,	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  likely	  capable	  of	  establishing	  order	  and	  saving	  lives	  given	  their	  training,	  organization,	  weapons,	  and	  supplies.	  	  So	  taken	  together,	  the	  just	  combatants’	  proximity	  and	  ability	  might	  ground	  their	  obligation	  to	  intervene.	  	   James	  Griffin	  employs	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  to	  ground	  duties	  of	  rescue.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  “being	  in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  can	  impose	  moral	  responsibilities	  –	  and	  nothing	  more	  special	  to	  the	  situation	  than	  that	  may	  bring	  the	  responsibility.”8	  	  As	  Griffin	  says,	  “ability	  is	  one	  reason-­‐generating	  consideration	  in	  cases	  of	  aid.”9	  	  Robert	  Goodin	  agrees,	  arguing	  that	  a	  special	  ability	  to	  help	  is	  a	  “crucial	  factor”	  in	  imposing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department’s	  Guiding	  Principles;	  U.S.	  Army	  Field	  Manual	  for	  
Stabilization	  Operations;	  DoD	  Directive	  3000.05,	  Stability	  Operations.	  	  For	  a	  helpful	  overview	  of	  these	  U.S.	  policy	  documents,	  see	  Eric	  Patterson,	  Ending	  Wars	  Well:	  
Order,	  Justice,	  and	  Conciliation	  in	  Contemporary	  Post-­‐Conflict	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  Ch.	  7.	  8	  James	  Griffin,	  On	  Human	  Rights	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  102.	  9	  Ibid.,	  103.	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duties	  to	  intervene.	  	  Henry	  Shue	  refers	  to	  this	  reason	  to	  help	  as	  “responsibility	  through	  ability.”10	  	   There’s	  much	  intuitive	  force	  behind	  Griffin’s,	  Goodin’s,	  and	  Shue’s	  claims.	  Close	  proximity	  to	  an	  at-­‐risk	  party	  –	  coupled	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  help	  –	  does	  seem	  to	  generate	  a	  robust	  obligation	  to	  aid	  the	  distressed	  party.	  	  Recall	  the	  Hiker´	  example	  from	  the	  previous	  chapter	  (5.2.3),	  where	  victim	  justifiably	  kills	  aggressor	  but	  also	  thereby	  imperils	  aggressor’s	  son.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  much	  of	  the	  normative	  force	  behind	  the	  victim’s	  obligation	  to	  render	  aid	  hinges	  on	  his	  unique	  position	  and	  ability	  to	  protect	  the	  child.	  	  He	  can	  summon	  local	  authorities,	  or	  give	  the	  child	  a	  ride	  back	  to	  town.	  	  Although	  victim’s	  role	  in	  causing	  the	  child’s	  imperilment	  is	  important,	  that	  feature	  takes	  a	  backseat	  to	  the	  more	  decisive	  fact	  that	  victim	  is	  present	  and	  able	  to	  protect	  the	  child.	  	   Unfortunately,	  this	  “responsibility	  through	  ability”	  argument	  seems	  unable	  to	  ground	  an	  obligation	  to	  provide	  postwar	  transitional	  security.	  	  Notice	  that	  on	  its	  own,	  the	  conjunction	  of	  physical	  proximity	  and	  ability	  to	  help	  ground	  only	  a	  Samaritan	  obligation	  to	  help.	  	  As	  discussed,	  Samaritan	  duties	  only	  require	  agents	  to	  intervene	  when	  doing	  so	  poses	  little	  threat	  or	  unreasonable	  cost	  to	  the	  intervening	  party.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  intervention	  carries	  more	  than	  a	  negligible	  amount	  of	  risk,	  other	  agents	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  intervene	  even	  when	  proximate	  and	  able	  to	  help.	  	   Now	  we	  should	  pause	  here	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  “responsibility	  through	  ability”	  argument	  sometimes	  can	  sufficiently	  ground	  an	  obligation	  to	  provide	  postwar	  security	  –	  namely	  in	  situations	  involving	  negligible	  post-­‐conflict	  violence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Henry	  Shue,	  "Exporting	  Hazards,"	  Ethics	  91,	  no.	  4	  (1981):	  604.	  
	   199	  
In	  such	  cases,	  the	  fact	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  physically	  proximate	  and	  able	  to	  help	  –	  and	  can	  do	  so	  at	  little	  risk	  to	  themselves	  –	  does	  ground	  an	  obligation	  to	  intervene.	  	  Perhaps	  post-­‐WWII	  Germany	  is	  an	  example	  here.	  	  Once	  the	  Nazi	  regime	  was	  toppled	  and	  major	  hostilities	  ended,	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  remaining	  Allied	  troops	  was	  fairly	  minimal.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  it	  does	  seem	  that	  the	  Allied	  forces	  were	  obligated	  to	  establish	  order	  and	  provide	  security	  based	  on	  considerations	  of	  proximity	  and	  ability	  alone.	  Unfortunately,	  many	  postwar	  scenarios	  are	  far	  more	  dangerous	  than	  post-­‐WWII	  Germany.	  	  Many	  postwar	  situations	  are	  shot	  through	  with	  risk	  and	  danger.	  	  In	  a	  vacuum	  of	  authority,	  some	  states	  devolve	  into	  anarchy	  and	  chaos,	  with	  rival	  factions	  competing	  for	  power.	  	  In	  these	  deadlier	  situations,	  the	  “responsibility	  through	  ability”	  argument	  fails	  to	  ground	  an	  obligation	  to	  intervene	  because	  proximity	  and	  ability	  only	  require	  intervention	  when	  the	  risk	  to	  intervening	  agents	  is	  minimal.	  	  But	  assuming	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  just	  combatants	  is	  more	  than	  negligible,	  why	  think	  they	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  stay	  to	  do	  this	  dangerous	  work?	  One	  possible	  answer	  is	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  parties	  in	  dangerous	  situations	  because	  that’s	  part	  of	  their	  role	  as	  combatants.	  	  Part	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  combatant	  is	  the	  requirement	  to	  take	  on	  risk.	  	  And	  if	  risk-­‐taking	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  imperiled	  bystanders,	  then	  combatants	  have	  a	  role-­‐based	  reason	  to	  accept	  that	  danger.	  	  As	  Walzer	  says,	  “soldiers	  are	  destined	  for	  dangerous	  places.”11	  	  McMahan	  concurs:	  “The	  reason	  why	  combatants	  are	  required	  to	  expose	  themselves	  to	  risk	  in	  the	  course	  of	  defending	  those	  who	  are	  threatened	  with	  wrongful	  harm	  is	  simply	  that	  it	  is	  their	  job	  to	  do	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Michael	  Walzer,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Rescue,”	  in	  Walzer,	  Arguing	  About	  War,	  73.	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it	  is	  what	  they	  have	  pledged	  to	  do	  and	  are	  paid	  to	  do.	  	  It	  is	  part	  of	  their	  professional	  role.”12	  	  So	  drawing	  from	  Walzer’s	  and	  McMahan’s	  assertions,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  proximity	  and	  ability,	  coupled	  with	  role-­‐based	  duties	  to	  assume	  risk,	  ground	  the	  just	  combatants’	  obligation	  to	  intervene	  in	  dangerous	  postwar	  situations.	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  carries	  much	  intuitive	  appeal.	  	  Of	  course	  soldiers	  are	  destined	  for	  dangerous	  places	  –	  that	  much	  is	  a	  truism.	  	  Moreover,	  McMahan	  is	  right	  to	  aver	  that	  soldiers	  have	  role-­‐based	  duties	  to	  accept	  danger.	  	  And	  if	  that‘s	  true,	  then	  just	  combatants	  who	  are	  proximate	  to	  and	  able	  to	  assist	  imperiled	  bystanders	  appear	  obligated	  to	  establish	  security	  in	  dangerous	  postwar	  situations.	  Unfortunately,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  argument	  works.	  	  To	  see	  why,	  let’s	  return	  to	  McMahan’s	  quote.	  	  He	  says	  combatants	  are	  required	  to	  accept	  danger	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  innocent	  people	  because	  it	  is	  what	  the	  combatants	  “have	  pledged	  to	  do	  and	  are	  paid	  to	  do.”	  	  That	  much	  sounds	  right.	  	  But	  it	  sounds	  right	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  protecting	  their	  own	  state’s	  citizens.	  The	  problem	  stems	  from	  McMahan’s	  conception	  of	  a	  soldier’s	  role.	  	  Soldiers	  are,	  as	  McMahan	  puts	  it,	  like	  other	  professional	  defenders	  such	  as	  police	  or	  bodyguards.13	  	  But	  this	  analogy	  seems	  inapt.	  	  The	  reason	  police	  must	  take	  on	  extra	  danger	  is	  because	  they’ve	  agreed	  to	  serve	  and	  protect	  all	  the	  residents	  in	  their	  district.	  	  Likewise,	  bodyguards	  must	  take	  risk	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  clients	  they’ve	  agreed	  to	  serve.	  	  Thus,	  police	  and	  bodyguards	  have	  role-­‐based	  obligations	  to	  accept	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  McMahan,	  “The	  Just	  Distribution	  of	  Harm,”	  366.	  	  It’s	  worth	  pointing	  out,	  however,	  that	  McMahan’s	  remarks	  were	  made	  about	  combatant	  risk-­‐taking	  during	  war.	  	  It’s	  unclear	  whether	  he	  would	  argue	  that	  combatants	  have	  a	  role-­‐based	  obligation	  to	  accept	  risks	  after	  war	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  bystanders.	  	  13	  Ibid.,	  367.	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risk	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  people	  they	  serve.	  	  But	  soldiers	  don’t	  pledge	  to	  serve	  all	  citizens	  in	  all	  states,14	  nor	  is	  that	  what	  they	  get	  paid	  to	  do.	  	  They	  must	  accept	  danger	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  fellow	  citizens	  they	  serve,	  but	  they	  don’t	  have	  role-­‐based	  obligations	  to	  court	  danger	  to	  protect	  the	  world’s	  population	  writ	  large.	  So	  in	  short,	  the	  role-­‐based	  argument	  for	  combatant	  risk-­‐taking	  can’t	  help	  ground	  the	  just	  combatants’	  obligation	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  in	  dangerous	  postwar	  situations.	  	  Proximity,	  ability,	  and	  combatant	  status	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  intervention,	  but	  together	  aren’t	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  an	  outright	  obligation.	  Even	  so,	  I	  do	  think	  just	  combatants	  are	  sometimes	  required	  to	  preserve	  the	  lives	  of	  imperiled	  bystanders	  in	  dangerous	  postwar	  situations.	  	  The	  explanation	  why	  is	  based	  on	  a	  moral	  reason	  above	  and	  beyond	  proximity,	  capability,	  and	  combatant	  status.	  
6.1.1	  Grounding	  the	  Just	  State’s	  Obligation	  to	  Protect	  So	  why	  should	  we	  think	  victorious	  just	  combatants	  are	  sometimes	  obligated	  to	  establish	  transitional	  security	  in	  dangerous	  situations?	  	  Their	  obligation	  to	  intervene	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  responsibility	  they	  bear	  for	  causing	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  	  As	  discussed,	  many	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  themselves	  liable	  to	  wartime	  harm,	  nor	  do	  these	  people	  bear	  institutional	  responsibility	  for	  state	  actions.	  	  Third	  party	  nationals	  visiting	  or	  travelling	  through	  the	  aggressor	  state	  are	  examples	  here,	  as	  are	  children.	  	  Because	  the	  just	  forces	  foresaw	  –	  or	  should	  have	  foreseen	  –	  that	  their	  defensive	  force	  would	  put	  some	  of	  these	  innocent	  parties	  at	  risk,	  the	  just	  combatants	  incur	  a	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  U.N.	  peacekeepers	  would	  be	  an	  exception.	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help	  alleviate	  their	  vulnerability.	  	  And	  the	  combatants	  must	  do	  so	  even	  if	  it	  requires	  them	  to	  take	  on	  more	  than	  a	  negligible	  amount	  of	  risk.	  	   The	  line	  of	  reasoning	  I’m	  invoking	  here	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  given	  in	  the	  Hiker	  and	  Hiker´	  scenarios.	  	  In	  those	  cases,	  I	  argued	  that	  victims	  bore	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  imperiling	  an	  innocent	  bystander	  (by	  knocking	  bystander	  into	  the	  river	  in	  Hiker;	  by	  causing	  child’s	  vulnerability	  to	  the	  elements	  in	  Hiker´).	  	  Even	  though	  victim’s	  use	  of	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  force	  was	  justified	  in	  each	  case,	  both	  victims	  incur	  a	  robust	  obligation	  to	  save	  bystander’s	  life.	  	  If	  one’s	  voluntary	  defensive	  action	  foreseeably	  risks	  harming	  an	  innocent	  party	  and	  that	  harm	  materializes,	  then	  one	  has	  an	  especially	  weighty	  agent-­‐relative	  reason	  to	  save	  or	  protect	  the	  threatened	  party.	  	  As	  McMahan	  nicely	  puts	  it,	  “responsibility	  for	  a	  person’s	  need	  for	  aid	  normally	  does	  give	  one	  a	  special	  reason	  to	  provide	  that	  aid.”15	  	   In	  the	  Hiker	  and	  Hiker´	  scenarios,	  most	  of	  us	  wouldn’t	  expect	  an	  uninvolved	  passerby	  to	  risk	  his	  or	  her	  life	  to	  save	  the	  imperiled	  parties.	  	  Third	  parties	  have	  Samaritan	  obligations	  to	  intervene:	  they	  are	  obligated	  to	  act	  only	  if	  they	  can	  do	  so	  at	  little	  risk.	  	  But	  things	  are	  different	  with	  the	  defending	  victims;	  they	  voluntarily	  acted	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  put	  the	  bystanders	  in	  harm’s	  way.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  defenders	  are	  obligated	  to	  attempt	  to	  save	  the	  vulnerable	  parties,	  even	  if	  they	  must	  expose	  themselves	  to	  danger	  in	  the	  process.	  	   On	  my	  view,	  an	  analogous	  obligation	  arises	  in	  chaotic	  postwar	  situations.	  	  The	  mere	  fact	  that	  some	  people	  are	  vulnerable	  at	  war’s	  end	  cannot	  ground	  an	  obligation	  to	  intervene	  if	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  dangerous	  –	  even	  if	  the	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  McMahan,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Killing,	  367.	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combatants	  are	  proximate	  and	  able	  to	  establish	  security.	  	  But	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  factor	  in	  the	  just	  combatants’	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  creating	  the	  bystanders’	  vulnerability,	  we	  now	  arrive	  at	  an	  adequate	  grounding	  for	  a	  robust	  obligation	  to	  intervene.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  have	  voluntarily	  acted	  in	  ways	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  imperiling	  innocent	  people;	  now	  that	  those	  bystanders	  are	  actually	  imperiled,	  the	  just	  soldiers	  are	  prima	  facie	  obligated	  to	  protect	  the	  bystanders’	  lives,	  even	  if	  doing	  so	  will	  pose	  some	  risk	  to	  those	  intervening	  forces.	  	  If	  one’s	  justified	  conduct	  threatens	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties,	  then	  one	  must	  make	  reasonable	  attempt	  to	  protect	  those	  people.	  	   At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  object	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  shifted	  responsibility	  account	  I	  offered	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  For	  if	  that	  tripartite	  division	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  wartime	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  is	  right,	  then	  just	  combatants	  bear	  only	  a	  small	  degree	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  wrongful	  imperilment	  –	  with	  primary	  responsibility	  falling	  to	  the	  unjust	  regime,	  and	  secondary	  responsibility	  falling	  to	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  and	  the	  unjust	  civilians.	  	  If	  that’s	  right,	  then	  the	  obligation	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  should	  fall	  to	  those	  more	  responsible	  parties;	  the	  just	  combatants	  shouldn’t	  be	  expected	  to	  risk	  their	  lives.	   In	  reply,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  in	  the	  cases	  currently	  under	  consideration,	  the	  parties	  bearing	  primary	  and	  secondary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  imperilment	  are	  either	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  protect	  the	  at-­‐risk	  parties.	  	  In	  situations	  involving	  failed	  states	  or	  toppled	  regimes,	  the	  former	  unjust	  regime	  is	  by	  definition	  no	  longer	  in	  power.	  	  Thus,	  even	  though	  the	  political	  and	  military	  leaders	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bear	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  culpably	  forcing	  the	  choice	  that	  ultimately	  put	  the	  innocent	  parties	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  those	  leaders	  no	  longer	  have	  the	  power	  to	  protect	  the	  innocent.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  parties	  bearing	  secondary	  responsibility,	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  likely	  don’t	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  establish	  security	  on	  their	  own;	  they	  lack	  the	  training,	  weaponry,	  and	  resources.	  	  The	  unjust	  combatants,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  by	  hypothesis	  either	  too	  decimated	  at	  war’s	  end	  to	  maintain	  law	  and	  order,	  or	  are	  unwilling	  to	  do	  so	  (perhaps	  they	  have	  turned	  against	  parts	  of	  their	  own	  population,	  etc.).	  	  Now	  if	  in	  fact	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  were	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  establish	  security	  and	  prevent	  widespread	  death	  and	  suffering,	  then	  the	  just	  combatants	  wouldn’t	  incur	  an	  obligation	  to	  intervene.	  	  But	  the	  scenarios	  we’re	  currently	  considering	  just	  are	  those	  in	  which	  large	  numbers	  of	  innocent	  people	  are	  at	  risk.	  So	  let’s	  assume	  the	  parties	  bearing	  primary	  and	  secondary	  responsibility	  are	  either	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  security.	  	  If	  so,	  my	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  step	  in	  and	  establish	  that	  security.	  	  But	  why,	  one	  might	  ask,	  should	  this	  obligation	  fall	  to	  the	  minimally	  responsible	  unjust	  combatants?	  	  Isn’t	  it	  a	  bit	  unfair	  to	  ask	  minimally	  responsible	  parties	  to	  risk	  their	  lives	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  others?	  The	  reason	  why	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  provide	  postwar	  security	  is	  because	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  bystanders	  would	  not	  be	  imperiled	  but	  for	  the	  just	  combatants’	  defensive	  force.	  	  In	  defending	  themselves	  (and	  their	  citizenry),	  the	  just	  combatants	  voluntarily	  shifted	  some	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  defense	  onto	  the	  bystanders.	  	  I	  say	  “voluntarily”	  because	  the	  just	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citizens	  were	  not	  required	  to	  defend	  themselves;	  they	  could	  have	  accepted	  the	  initial	  aggression.	  	  By	  choosing	  to	  use	  defensive	  force	  that	  foreseeably	  risked	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties,	  the	  just	  combatants	  imposed	  risks	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  onto	  the	  bystanders.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  own	  some	  of	  the	  risk	  they	  created;	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  leave	  the	  vulnerable	  bystanders	  to	  shoulder	  the	  risk	  themselves.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  defending	  victims	  in	  Hiker	  and	  Hiker´	  are	  obligated	  to	  help	  save	  the	  bystander	  knocked	  into	  the	  river	  and	  the	  child	  rendered	  vulnerable	  to	  exposure,	  so	  too	  just	  combatants	  must	  protect	  the	  innocent	  people	  they’ve	  imperiled	  with	  their	  defensive	  force.	  
6.1.2	  Fiduciary	  Duties	  Jean	  Elshtain	  argues	  for	  a	  position	  close	  to	  the	  one	  I’m	  advocating.	  	  She	  writes:	  “If	  a	  country	  has	  been	  disarmed,	  the	  occupying	  power	  has	  taken	  on	  responsibility	  for	  its	  security	  and	  protection	  from	  external	  and	  internal	  enemies.”16	  	  On	  my	  reading,	  Elshtain’s	  argument	  is	  that	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  protect	  the	  vulnerable	  citizens	  because	  the	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  creating	  their	  vulnerability.	  	  And	  the	  reason	  the	  combatants	  are	  morally	  responsible	  for	  the	  vulnerability	  is	  because	  intentionally	  disarming	  a	  state	  foreseeably	  puts	  that	  state’s	  citizens	  at	  risk.	  	  Thus,	  as	  Elshtain	  rightly	  argues,	  occupying	  forces	  have	  assumed	  responsibility	  for	  providing	  security	  within	  the	  disarmed	  state.	  Perhaps	  a	  helpful	  way	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  combatants’	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  in	  cases	  such	  as	  Elshtain’s	  is	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  fiduciary	  duty.	  	  Larry	  May,	  for	  example,	  writes	  that	  fiduciary	  relationships	  “can	  also	  arise	  when	  one	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Jean	  Elshtain,	  “Just	  War	  and	  an	  Ethics	  of	  Responsibility,”	  in	  Patterson,	  Ethics	  
Beyond	  War's	  End,	  128.	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person	  has	  been	  placed	  in	  a	  position	  of	  dependence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  another	  person.”17	  	  Although	  he	  begins	  with	  the	  example	  of	  captors	  having	  fiduciary	  duties	  toward	  POWs,	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  complete	  dependence	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  fiduciary	  duty.18	  	  Lesser	  forms	  of	  dependency	  can	  also	  ground	  fiduciary	  duties,	  especially	  dependencies	  involving	  significant	  danger	  such	  as	  when	  vulnerable	  people	  must	  rely	  on	  others	  for	  their	  protection	  and	  care.19	  	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  idea	  behind	  Elshtain’s	  claim:	  by	  disarming	  the	  defeated	  state,	  the	  just	  combatants	  create	  a	  relation	  where	  the	  vulnerable	  citizenry	  must	  rely	  on	  the	  victorious	  forces	  for	  protection.	  	  	   Other	  theorists	  also	  argue	  for	  postwar	  obligations	  grounded	  in	  the	  fiduciary-­‐like	  relations	  between	  the	  victorious	  and	  defeated	  states.	  	  Iasiello,	  for	  example,	  refers	  to	  the	  victor’s	  obligation	  to	  provide	  security	  for	  the	  defeated	  society	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  “protectorship.”20	  	  Walzer	  describes	  the	  victor’s	  postwar	  relations	  with	  the	  vanquished	  as	  a	  “trusteeship,	  ”	  as	  does	  Noah	  Feldman.21	  	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  refer	  to	  these	  various	  relationships	  as	  fiduciaries,	  trusteeships,	  or	  protectorates,	  the	  broad	  underlying	  idea	  is	  the	  same:	  in	  each	  of	  these	  claims	  the	  victor	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  secure	  the	  vulnerable	  people	  in	  the	  defeated	  state	  given	  the	  causal	  role	  the	  combatants	  played	  in	  creating	  the	  vulnerability.	  	  By	  imperiling	  innocent	  others,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Larry	  May,	  War	  Crimes	  and	  Just	  War	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  150.	  	  	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  Ibid.,	  151.	  20	  Iasiello,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  42.	  21	  Walzer,	  Arguing	  About	  War,	  xiii;	  Noah	  Feldman,	  What	  We	  Owe	  Iraq:	  War	  and	  the	  
Ethics	  of	  Nation	  Building	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  Ch.	  2.	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one	  creates	  a	  normative	  relationship	  that	  grounds	  a	  prima	  facie	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  protect	  the	  imperiled	  party.	  
6.1.3	  The	  Obligation	  to	  Provide	  Up	  to	  this	  point,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  parties	  sharing	  primary	  and	  secondary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  wrongful	  threats	  against	  the	  bystanders	  are	  unable	  to	  protect	  those	  innocent	  parties,	  then	  the	  obligation	  falls	  to	  the	  just	  combatants.	  	  But	  what	  exactly	  does	  this	  obligation	  entail?	  	  In	  short,	  I	  think	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  make	  every	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  protect	  and	  preserve	  the	  bystanders’	  lives.	  	  Although	  I’ve	  referred	  to	  this	  obligation	  as	  one	  of	  transitional	  security,	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  obligation	  is	  much	  broader	  than	  mere	  security.	  	   In	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  bystanders’	  lives,	  the	  victorious	  forces	  must	  attempt	  to	  provide	  those	  things	  necessary	  for	  living.	  	  Following	  Klosko,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  these	  things	  as	  “presumptive	  goods”	  –	  those	  goods	  that	  we	  can	  presume	  all	  people	  both	  need	  and	  want.22	  	  For	  our	  purposes,	  we	  can	  sort	  presumptive	  goods	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  security	  and	  provision.	  	  Security	  means	  that	  vulnerable	  people	  must	  be	  protected	  from	  threats	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  state.	  	  Provision,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  refers	  to	  those	  physical	  needs	  that	  all	  people	  require	  to	  live:	  food,	  water,	  clothing,	  shelter,	  and	  medical	  care.	  	   Let’s	  consider	  provisioning	  first.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  after	  war	  ends,	  just	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  attempt	  to	  help	  innocent	  parties	  in	  need	  of	  basic	  provisions.	  	  If	  the	  combatants	  are	  able	  to	  share	  their	  food	  with	  those	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  starvation,	  they	  should.	  	  If	  the	  combatants	  can	  provide	  tents	  to	  those	  without	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  George	  Klosko,	  "Presumptive	  Benefit,	  Fairness,	  and	  Political	  Obligation,"	  
Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  16,	  no.	  3	  (1987):	  246.	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shelter,	  they	  should.	  	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  medical	  care	  and	  potable	  water.	  	  In	  short,	  just	  combatants	  should	  do	  whatever	  they	  reasonably	  can	  do	  to	  prevent	  death	  and	  ameliorate	  suffering	  at	  war’s	  end.23	  	  There	  are	  limits	  to	  what	  can	  be	  expected	  of	  the	  victorious	  troops,	  but	  we’ll	  return	  to	  that	  issue	  shortly.	  Unfortunately,	  just	  forces	  tend	  to	  be	  limited	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  provide	  provisioning.	  	  Defensive	  forces	  are	  often	  forward	  deployed	  across	  state	  boundaries;	  their	  supply	  lines	  tend	  to	  be	  too	  long	  and	  too	  thin	  to	  handle	  large-­‐scale	  humanitarian	  crises.	  	  But	  in	  dire	  circumstances,	  all	  states	  have	  agent-­‐neutral	  reasons	  to	  help	  provide	  the	  necessary	  provisioning.	  	  International	  aid	  organizations	  are	  also	  able	  to	  assist.	  	  Often	  what	  these	  organizations	  need	  to	  perform	  their	  mission	  is	  simply	  a	  secure	  environment	  in	  which	  to	  distribute	  goods	  –	  and	  this	  is	  a	  need	  just	  combatants	  can	  oftentimes	  fill.	  Aside	  from	  basic	  provisioning,	  just	  combatants	  might	  also	  incur	  an	  obligation	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need	  because	  the	  combatants	  possess	  special	  capabilities.	  	  For	  example,	  most	  modern	  militaries	  deploy	  medical	  personnel	  specifically	  trained	  to	  treat	  gun	  shot	  wounds	  or	  administer	  amputations.	  	  These	  professionals	  should	  help	  treat	  the	  local	  populace	  when	  necessary.	  	  Similarly,	  public	  health	  units	  can	  help	  fight	  disease	  outbreaks,	  and	  civil	  engineering	  units	  can	  help	  bring	  potable	  water	  back	  online	  for	  the	  local	  populace.	  	  In	  all	  of	  these	  and	  numerous	  other	  ways,	  the	  just	  state	  should	  do	  whatever	  it	  can	  to	  preserve	  lives	  within	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  foregoing	  points	  are	  largely	  codified	  in	  the	  international	  laws	  of	  war.	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  1949	  Geneva	  Convention	  IV,	  Articles	  54,	  55,	  and	  59;	  1977	  Geneva	  Protocol	  I,	  Article	  69.	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6.1.4	  Providing	  Security	  Although	  just	  combatants	  might	  not	  be	  especially	  well	  equipped	  to	  provision	  a	  needy	  local	  populace,	  combatants	  tend	  to	  be	  good	  at	  providing	  needed	  security.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  use	  of	  their	  unique	  military	  capabilities	  helped	  cause	  the	  imperiled	  bystanders’	  plight,	  the	  combatants	  must	  now	  use	  those	  same	  capabilities	  to	  protect	  the	  local	  populace.	  	  Their	  obligation	  consists	  of	  securing	  the	  vulnerable	  people	  against	  threats	  from	  others,	  whether	  those	  threats	  originate	  inside	  or	  outside	  the	  vanquished	  state.	  	   Ideally,	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  establish	  some	  level	  of	  order.	  	  They	  must	  prevent	  the	  looting,	  raping,	  revenge	  killing,	  and	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  attacks	  that	  often	  follow	  in	  war’s	  wake,	  as	  well	  as	  staving	  off	  predation	  from	  neighboring	  political	  communities.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  attempt	  to	  establish	  safety	  and	  maintain	  stability.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  situation,	  the	  combatants	  may	  need	  to	  perform	  a	  variety	  of	  tasks,	  running	  the	  gamut	  from	  establishing	  border	  security	  in	  remote	  areas	  to	  patrolling	  local	  city	  streets.	  	  Soldiers	  are	  generally	  trained	  to	  perform	  these	  functions,	  and	  they	  should	  when	  necessary	  to	  avert	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	   In	  some	  cases,	  the	  just	  combatants	  might	  be	  able	  to	  fulfill	  this	  security	  obligation	  by	  augmenting	  the	  defeated	  regime’s	  efforts.	  	  But	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  security	  in	  situations	  involving	  collapsed	  or	  toppled	  regimes,	  the	  victorious	  forces	  may	  need	  to	  occupy	  the	  defeated	  state.	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6.2	  Occupation	  as	  Obligation	  Before	  discussing	  the	  possibility	  of	  occupation	  as	  an	  obligation,	  we	  should	  first	  clarify	  the	  concept.	  	  Following	  Kristen	  Boon,	  we	  can	  define	  an	  occupation	  as	  the	  “de	  facto	  control	  over	  a	  territory	  by	  a	  hostile	  army.”24	  	  As	  the	  word	  “hostile”	  in	  the	  preceding	  sentence	  indicates,	  an	  occupation	  is	  backed	  by	  threat	  of	  military	  force.25	  	  Further,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between	  three	  types	  of	  occupations:	  occupations	  that	  are	  prohibited,	  occupations	  that	  are	  permitted	  but	  not	  required,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  required.	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  prohibited	  occupation	  would	  be	  an	  aggressor’s	  control	  of	  a	  defeated	  state	  after	  an	  unjust	  war.	  	  An	  example	  of	  a	  permitted	  but	  not	  required	  occupation	  would	  be	  when	  a	  victorious	  just	  state	  occupies	  its	  defeated	  adversary	  for	  pragmatic	  reasons	  such	  as	  justified	  disarmament.	  	  I	  wish	  to	  focus	  only	  on	  the	  third	  type	  –	  those	  in	  which	  the	  victor	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  occupy	  the	  vanquished	  state.	  So	  when	  might	  a	  victorious	  just	  state	  be	  obligated	  to	  control	  the	  territory	  of	  its	  former	  adversary?	  	  If	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  protect	  innocent	  people	  at	  war’s	  end,	  and	  the	  just	  combatants	  can	  do	  so	  only	  by	  occupying	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  just	  state	  has	  a	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  to	  occupy.	  	  Occupation	  is	  morally	  required	  when	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  innocent	  life.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  occupation,	  ensuring	  security	  may	  well	  be	  impossible;	  so	  the	  two	  will	  often	  need	  to	  be	  coextensive,	  with	  the	  obligation	  to	  occupy	  parasitic	  on	  the	  obligation	  to	  protect.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Kristen	  E.	  Boon,	  "Obligations	  of	  the	  New	  Occupier:	  The	  Contours	  of	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,"	  Loy.LA	  Int'L	  &	  Comp.L.Rev.	  31	  (2009):	  60.	  25	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  101.	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The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  that	  occupation	  harms.	  	  As	  McMahan	  points	  out,	  occupation	  is	  highly	  burdensome	  to	  the	  occupied	  people:	  it	  undermines	  their	  individual	  and	  collective	  self-­‐determination.26	  	  Because	  occupation	  harms,	  there	  is	  a	  presumption	  against	  it.	  	  So	  at	  first	  glance,	  the	  obligation	  to	  occupy	  the	  defeated	  state	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  occupation	  will	  harm	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people.	  	  The	  tension	  is	  between	  the	  duty	  to	  protect	  and	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  harm.	  Yet	  upon	  further	  reflection,	  there	  isn’t	  much	  tension	  after	  all.	  	  Although	  the	  occupying	  forces	  will	  harm	  many	  people	  by	  occupying	  their	  territory,	  the	  combatants	  don’t	  wrongfully	  harm	  most	  of	  those	  people.27	  	  McMahan’s	  theory	  is	  especially	  helpful	  on	  this	  point,	  and	  I	  largely	  follow	  his	  framework	  regarding	  the	  morality	  of	  occupation.28	  	  As	  McMahan	  notes,	  combatants	  can	  have	  a	  combination	  of	  liability,	  consent,	  and	  lesser	  evil	  justifications	  for	  the	  harms	  they	  cause	  during	  occupation.29	  	  I	  will	  briefly	  discuss	  each	  justification	  in	  turn.	  Let’s	  start	  by	  considering	  the	  imperiled	  bystanders	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  These	  people	  are	  vulnerable,	  and	  it	  is	  their	  vulnerability	  that	  grounds	  the	  combatants’	  obligation	  to	  occupy	  the	  aggressor	  state	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Occupation	  aims	  to	  protect	  them.	  	  Thus,	  presumably	  the	  bystanders	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  occupation.	  	  And	  as	  McMahan	  says,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  believe	  that	  those	  who	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  occupation	  would	  consent	  to	  the	  occupation.	  	  So	  although	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  McMahan,	  "The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,"	  103.	  27	  This	  assumes	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  conduct	  the	  occupation	  in	  a	  reasonably	  just	  manner.	  28	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out,	  however,	  that	  McMahan	  only	  considers	  the	  issue	  of	  liability	  to	  occupation;	  he	  doesn’t	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  when	  occupations	  might	  be	  morally	  required.	  29	  Ibid.,	  104.	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soldiers	  will	  in	  some	  sense	  harm	  the	  imperiled	  bystanders	  by	  burdening	  them	  with	  occupation,	  the	  combatants	  have	  a	  presumed	  consent	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  And	  if	  that’s	  true,	  then	  the	  occupying	  forces	  do	  not	  wrong	  the	  bystanders	  even	  if	  the	  latter	  are	  harmed	  to	  some	  extent.	  In	  addition	  to	  consent	  justification,	  just	  combatants	  also	  have	  liability	  justification	  for	  harming	  most	  people	  during	  occupation.	  	  According	  to	  McMahan,	  individuals	  who	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  the	  occupation	  aims	  to	  prevent	  are	  “liable	  to	  suffer	  the	  effects	  of	  occupation.”30	  	  By	  contributing	  to	  the	  conditions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  dangerous	  postwar	  situation,	  these	  parties	  are	  not	  wronged	  when	  occupied.	  	  Because	  of	  their	  shared	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  perilous	  conditions	  following	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  these	  parties	  have	  no	  legitimate	  complaint	  against	  being	  occupied	  when	  necessary	  to	  protect	  innocent,	  non-­‐responsible	  bystanders.	  	  So	  on	  my	  view,	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  occupying	  all	  unjust	  leadership,	  all	  unjust	  combatants,	  and	  most	  unjust	  civilians.31	  The	  final	  type	  of	  justification	  for	  harming	  people	  during	  occupation	  is	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil.	  	  This	  justification	  would	  permit	  harming	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  who	  won’t	  benefit	  from	  the	  occupation,	  i.e.,	  non-­‐imperiled	  bystanders.	  	  An	  example	  might	  be	  third	  party	  nationals	  temporarily	  living	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  who	  aren’t	  threatened	  by	  postwar	  ethnic	  violence	  (let’s	  assume	  they’re	  in	  the	  ethnic	  majority).	  	  Because	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  McMahan,	  "The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,"	  103;	  see	  also	  McMahan,	  Killing	  
in	  War,	  219.	  31	  Moreover,	  if	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  so	  dire	  as	  to	  require	  occupation,	  then	  most	  civilians	  will	  also	  likely	  benefit	  from	  the	  occupation,	  and	  thus	  the	  combatants	  would	  also	  have	  a	  consent-­‐based	  justification	  for	  occupying	  them.	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occupation	  would	  harm	  these	  non-­‐liable	  people	  but	  not	  benefit	  them,	  the	  justification	  for	  occupying	  them	  must	  be	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  harming	  these	  non-­‐liable	  people	  is	  necessary	  to	  avert	  much	  greater	  harm	  to	  the	  imperiled	  bystanders,	  then	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  doing	  so.	  The	  reason	  it	  might	  be	  necessary	  to	  occupy	  some	  non-­‐liable	  people	  is	  because	  occupation	  tends	  to	  be	  an	  all	  or	  nothing	  endeavor.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unreasonably	  burdensome	  –	  if	  not	  impossible	  –	  for	  the	  occupying	  forces	  to	  make	  enough	  fine-­‐grained	  discriminations	  to	  ensure	  this	  third	  category	  of	  people	  isn’t	  harmed	  during	  occupation.	  	  Instead,	  the	  only	  alternative	  is	  to	  allow	  these	  people	  to	  get	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  net	  of	  occupation,	  with	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  As	  McMahan	  argues,	  “when	  innocent	  people	  are	  harmed,	  or	  wronged,	  by	  an	  occupation,	  the	  occupation	  may	  still	  be	  just	  if	  most	  of	  those	  under	  occupation	  are	  liable	  to	  suffer	  its	  effects	  and	  the	  harm	  to	  those	  who	  are	  not	  is	  unintended	  and	  proportionate.”32	  Now,	  given	  the	  liability	  theory	  I	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  few	  chapters,33	  I	  think	  few	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  will	  be	  non-­‐liable	  to	  occupation	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  wouldn’t	  benefit	  from	  one.	  	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this	  claim.	  	  First,	  because	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  they	  become	  liable	  to	  occupation	  when	  necessary	  to	  protect	  threatened	  bystanders	  within	  their	  state.	  	  Second,	  if	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  were	  dire	  enough	  to	  warrant	  occupation,	  then	  most	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  stability	  occupation	  likely	  would	  bring,	  and	  thus	  presumably	  they	  would	  consent.	  	  Given	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  "The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,"	  105.	  33	  Responsibility	  Model´.	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combination	  of	  these	  liability	  and	  consent	  justifications,	  just	  combatants	  will	  seldom	  have	  to	  harmfully	  occupy	  innocent	  people	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil	  in	  order	  to	  avert	  a	  much	  greater	  harm	  to	  other	  bystanders.34	  	  But	  it’s	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  on	  McMahan’s	  account,	  just	  combatants	  might	  have	  to	  harm	  countless	  people	  by	  occupying	  them	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  imperiled	  bystanders.	  	  Recall	  that	  for	  McMahan,	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression	  only	  if	  they	  acted	  complicitously	  or	  made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  unjust	  war.	  	  If	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  have	  done	  neither,	  then	  they	  cannot	  be	  liable	  to	  postwar	  occupation	  given	  their	  lack	  of	  responsibility.	  This	  point	  is	  underscored	  by	  McMahan’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  1980	  Iraqi	  invasion	  of	  Iran.	  	  Because	  the	  Iraqi	  people	  did	  not	  popularly	  support	  the	  invasion	  or	  create	  the	  culture	  that	  led	  to	  war,	  and	  because	  resisting	  Saddam’s	  regime	  would	  have	  been	  dangerous,	  McMahan	  concludes	  the	  Iraqi	  civilians	  bore	  no	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  war	  and	  thus	  would	  not	  have	  been	  liable	  to	  postwar	  occupation.35	  	  But	  had	  Iran	  toppled	  Saddam’s	  regime	  and	  a	  postwar	  occupation	  had	  been	  necessary	  to	  protect	  at-­‐risk	  people,	  presumably	  McMahan	  would	  say	  that	  it	  could	  have	  been	  justified	  only	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil	  given	  that	  few	  Iraqis	  were	  liable	  to	  occupation.	  	  I	  disagree.	  	  I	  think	  most	  Iraqi	  civilians	  bore	  some	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  and	  thus	  would	  not	  have	  been	  wronged	  if	  occupied	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  people	  within	  their	  territory.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This	  conclusion	  applies	  only	  to	  occupations	  required	  to	  stem	  widespread	  violence	  against	  bystanders.	  35	  McMahan,	  "The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,"	  106.	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6.3	  Limits	  on	  the	  Obligation	  to	  Protect	  In	  the	  preceding	  sections,	  I	  claimed	  that	  just	  combatants	  must	  provide	  security	  and	  facilitate	  humanitarian	  aid	  for	  a	  “reasonable”	  amount	  of	  time,	  while	  taking	  on	  a	  “reasonable”	  amount	  of	  risk.	  	  These	  qualifications	  suggest	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  what’s	  required	  of	  the	  just	  combatants.	  	  This	  issue	  of	  limits	  applies	  not	  just	  to	  occupation,	  but	  to	  the	  broader	  obligation	  to	  protect	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  But	  how	  much	  risk	  must	  the	  combatants	  take	  on,	  and	  for	  how	  long,	  and	  at	  what	  expense?	  	   Before	  answering	  these	  questions,	  we	  should	  begin	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  will	  not	  arise	  in	  many	  postwar	  situations;	  the	  obligation	  will	  be	  triggered	  only	  in	  extreme	  cases.	  	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  a	  just	  state’s	  defensive	  force	  will	  leave	  a	  minimally	  stable	  regime	  in	  place.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  it	  does	  seem	  morally	  permissible	  for	  the	  just	  combatants	  to	  withdraw	  immediately.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  vulnerability	  and	  dependency,	  there	  is	  no	  special	  obligation	  to	  help	  provide	  transitional	  security.	  	   Also,	  the	  obligation	  to	  protect	  might	  not	  arise	  even	  in	  postwar	  situations	  involving	  widespread	  vulnerability	  if	  the	  victorious	  state	  lacks	  the	  ability	  or	  resources.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  ought	  implies	  can,	  and	  the	  just	  state	  simply	  can’t,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  required	  to	  intervene.	  	   But	  in	  cases	  of	  widespread	  vulnerability	  involving	  toppled,	  collapsed,	  and	  degraded	  regimes,	  and	  where	  the	  just	  combatants	  possess	  the	  ability	  and	  resources	  to	  intervene,	  then	  they	  must	  do	  so.	  	  Still,	  there	  are	  limits	  as	  to	  what	  morality	  requires	  of	  the	  just	  state	  regarding	  the	  preservation	  of	  bystander	  lives.	  	  The	  first	  limit	  concerns	  the	  amount	  of	  danger	  just	  combatants	  must	  take	  on,	  and	  the	  second	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centers	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  expense	  the	  just	  state	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  expend.	  	  I’ll	  discuss	  each	  in	  turn.	  
6.3.1	  Danger	  as	  a	  Limiting	  Factor	  I	  previously	  argued	  that	  just	  combatants	  are	  prima	  facie	  obligated	  to	  protect	  bystanders	  whom	  the	  combatants	  have	  put	  in	  harm’s	  way.	  	  The	  obligation	  is	  prima	  facie	  because	  it	  can	  be	  overridden	  by	  countervailing	  considerations	  –	  namely	  when	  attempting	  to	  protect	  the	  bystanders	  becomes	  unreasonable.	  	  Mark	  Evans	  nicely	  captures	  this	  point:	  “Occupiers	  should	  do	  all	  that	  could	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  of	  them	  in	  trying	  to	  discharge	  their	  full	  range	  of	  post	  bellum	  responsibilities;	  after	  that,	  withdrawal	  is	  morally	  justified.”36	  	  But	  why	  think	  “reasonableness”	  is	  the	  right	  criterion?	  	  What	  we	  need	  is	  an	  explanation	  justifying	  this	  reasonableness	  standard.	  	   A	  combination	  of	  several	  considerations	  together	  justifies	  the	  reasonableness	  criterion.	  	  First,	  we	  must	  remember	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  acted	  with	  all	  things	  considered	  justification	  in	  using	  defensive	  force.	  	  Assuming	  they	  did	  not	  violate	  in	  
bello	  restrictions	  while	  fighting,	  the	  combatants	  did	  not	  culpably	  contribute	  to	  the	  bystanders’	  imperilment.	  	  Given	  their	  lack	  of	  culpability,	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  morally	  innocent,	  and	  their	  innocence	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  only	  requiring	  them	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  protect	  the	  bystanders.	  	   Second,	  the	  just	  citizens	  have	  already	  been	  harmed	  by	  being	  attacked	  and	  forced	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  lives.	  	  Like	  the	  bystanders,	  the	  just	  citizenry	  has	  also	  been	  victimized.	  	  This	  too	  factors	  into	  limiting	  what’s	  expected	  of	  the	  just	  state	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Mark	  Evans,	  "Moral	  Responsibilities	  and	  the	  Conflicting	  Demands	  of	  Jus	  Post	  
Bellum,"	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs	  23,	  no.	  2	  (2009):	  161,	  my	  emphasis.	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   Third,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  the	  just	  combatants	  bear	  only	  minimal	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  unfortunate	  plight.	  	  As	  previously	  argued	  in	  the	  shifted	  responsibility	  discussion,	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  responsible	  only	  for	  redirecting	  an	  unjust	  harm	  that	  the	  unjust	  state	  culpably	  created.	  	  Although	  we	  should	  expect	  culpable	  parties	  to	  take	  on	  unlimited	  risk	  to	  protect	  the	  innocent,	  the	  just	  combatants	  can	  only	  be	  expected	  to	  take	  on	  a	  lesser,	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  risk	  given	  their	  minimal	  responsibility.	  	   In	  conjunction,	  the	  three	  preceding	  considerations	  explain	  why	  the	  just	  forces	  need	  only	  take	  a	  reasonable	  risk	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  bystanders.	  	  Minimally	  responsible	  parties	  who	  themselves	  were	  innocent	  victims	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  self-­‐sacrifice	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  others.	  	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  underscore	  this	  claim	  by	  considering	  a	  domestic	  analogue.	  Imagine	  a	  small	  group	  of	  individuals	  threatened	  by	  a	  culpable	  aggressor.	  	  The	  group	  can	  only	  defend	  itself	  in	  a	  way	  that	  foreseeably	  risks	  imperiling	  a	  bystander.	  	  Suppose	  the	  group	  chooses	  to	  defend,	  and	  the	  bystander	  is	  in	  fact	  imperiled.	  	  Given	  their	  responsibility	  for	  putting	  the	  bystander	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  the	  group	  is	  obligated	  to	  take	  on	  more	  than	  a	  negligible	  amount	  of	  risk	  to	  save	  the	  bystander.	  	  Suppose	  they	  attempt	  rescue	  but	  their	  efforts	  fall	  short.	  	  Suppose	  further	  that	  a	  second	  rescue	  attempt	  would	  likely	  kill	  several	  group	  members.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  original	  victims	  should	  not	  have	  to	  self-­‐sacrifice	  to	  save	  the	  bystander.	  I	  think	  the	  same	  claim	  holds	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  just	  combatants’	  defensive	  force	  imperils	  innocent	  parties	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  Though	  the	  combatants	  must	  take	  some	  risk	  to	  protect	  the	  bystanders,	  the	  combatants	  need	  only	  take	  reasonable	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risk.	  	  The	  explanation	  for	  the	  preceding	  judgments	  in	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  national	  defense	  cases	  is	  the	  same.	  	  Once	  the	  victims	  have	  taken	  reasonable	  risk,	  they	  have	  fulfilled	  their	  obligation;	  there	  is	  no	  further	  obligation	  to	  take	  on	  extreme	  risk	  to	  attempt	  rescue.	  But	  even	  if	  that	  explanation	  is	  right,	  we’re	  still	  left	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  determining	  what	  constitutes	  “reasonable”	  in	  these	  situations.	  	  Admittedly,	  there	  is	  a	  line	  drawing	  problem	  here.	  	  Where	  exactly	  the	  line	  is	  drawn	  between	  the	  reasonable	  and	  the	  unreasonable	  is	  unclear.	  	  But	  surely	  at	  some	  point	  the	  amount	  of	  risk	  becomes	  too	  significant,	  and	  at	  that	  point	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  morally	  justified	  in	  withdrawing.	  	  The	  best	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  difficult	  practical	  judgments	  will	  need	  to	  be	  made	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	  No	  doubt	  some	  readers	  will	  be	  dissatisfied	  with	  that	  vague	  characterization.	  	  Yet	  as	  Aristotle	  noted,	  we	  should	  only	  expect	  as	  much	  precision	  as	  the	  subject	  matter	  admits.37	  
6.3.2	  Time	  and	  Expense	  as	  Limiting	  Factors	  Suppose	  the	  postwar	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  safe	  enough	  for	  just	  combatants	  to	  remain	  without	  incurring	  significant	  losses,	  but	  widespread	  vulnerabilities	  persist	  over	  time,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  governmental	  infighting,	  institutional	  impotence,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  As	  their	  security	  efforts	  drag	  on,	  the	  just	  forces’	  time	  commitments	  and	  mounting	  expenses	  will	  become	  overly	  burdensome	  at	  some	  point.	  	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  can	  the	  just	  combatants	  be	  expected	  to	  stay	  the	  course	  indefinitely?	  	  And	  can	  the	  just	  citizenry	  be	  expected	  to	  fund	  the	  effort	  without	  end?	  	  It	  seems	  not.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	  1094b24.	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Just	  as	  just	  combatants	  should	  only	  be	  obligated	  to	  expose	  themselves	  to	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  risk,	  so	  too	  the	  just	  state	  should	  only	  be	  expected	  to	  expend	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  cost.	  	  We	  don’t	  expect	  justified	  defenders	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  lives	  to	  save	  at-­‐risk	  bystanders;	  so	  too,	  we	  shouldn’t	  expect	  victims	  to	  be	  wedded	  to	  a	  situation	  indefinitely	  and	  at	  unlimited	  cost.	  	  There	  are	  limits	  to	  what	  we	  require	  of	  victims	  who	  justifiably	  employ	  defensive	  force,	  even	  if	  cases	  where	  that	  force	  threatens	  innocent	  parties.	  	  The	  rationale	  explaining	  why	  this	  is	  so	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  offered	  regarding	  the	  limits	  of	  risk:	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  morally	  innocent,	  have	  already	  been	  victimized	  themselves,	  and	  bear	  only	  minimal	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  Given	  these	  considerations,	  the	  victor	  state	  need	  not	  bankrupt	  itself	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security,	  nor	  need	  the	  state	  be	  wedded	  to	  the	  situation	  indefinitely.	  	  Through	  justified	  self-­‐defensive	  actions,	  parties	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  incur	  unlimited,	  overly	  burdensome	  obligations.	  	  The	  same	  point	  holds	  in	  parallel	  domestic	  cases.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  don’t	  expect	  the	  hiker	  in	  Hiker´	  to	  take	  care	  of	  the	  deceased	  aggressor’s	  son	  for	  life.	  	  The	  victim	  need	  not	  adopt	  the	  child,	  nor	  incur	  unlimited	  debt	  to	  secure	  the	  child’s	  future.	  	  Just	  as	  we	  think	  these	  more	  long-­‐term	  costly	  obligations	  should	  shift	  to	  the	  state	  in	  the	  domestic	  case,	  so	  too	  if	  costly,	  long-­‐term	  security	  obligations	  are	  required	  in	  the	  postwar	  case,	  these	  obligations	  should	  shift	  to	  the	  international	  community.	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  shift	  in	  obligation	  is	  because	  at	  some	  point,	  the	  just	  state	  will	  have	  fulfilled	  its	  obligation.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  eventually	  the	  victorious	  state’s	  agent-­‐relative	  reasons	  for	  assisting	  will	  cease,	  and	  agent-­‐neutral	  reasons	  that	  
	   220	  
all	  parties	  have	  will	  take	  effect.	  	  If	  aid	  is	  still	  necessary	  at	  that	  point,	  and	  assuming	  all	  states	  have	  the	  same	  agent	  neutral	  reasons	  to	  help	  stabilize	  the	  defeated	  country,	  then	  other	  states	  should	  help	  share	  the	  costs.	  	  If	  urgent	  needs	  still	  exist,	  their	  fulfillment	  will	  become	  a	  general	  duty	  that	  all	  parties	  have	  for	  alleviating	  the	  harm.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  just	  combatants	  should	  stay	  to	  maintain	  security	  and	  the	  international	  community	  could	  then	  help	  pay	  the	  costs.	  	  Or	  instead,	  maybe	  an	  international	  peacekeeping	  force	  should	  take	  over.	  	  More	  importantly,	  the	  obligation	  to	  maintain	  security	  must	  be	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  vanquished	  people	  themselves	  at	  some	  point.	  	  Although	  those	  will	  be	  contingent	  matters,	  the	  general	  point	  remains:	  the	  time	  and	  expense	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  required	  to	  expend	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  must	  be	  reasonable.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  risk	  as	  a	  limiting	  factor,	  there	  will	  be	  line	  drawing	  problems	  regarding	  time	  and	  expense	  as	  well.	  	  Nevertheless,	  lines	  will	  have	  to	  be	  drawn	  somewhere.	  	  As	  Walzer	  notes,	  “the	  post	  in	  jus	  post	  bellum	  is	  not	  of	  indefinite	  duration.”38	  	  Nor,	  I	  would	  add,	  is	  it	  of	  unlimited	  expense.	  	  At	  some	  point,	  the	  just	  forces	  will	  be	  justified	  in	  withdrawing.	  	  Should	  innocent	  bystanders	  subsequently	  be	  harmed	  after	  the	  just	  forces	  withdraw,	  then	  responsibility	  for	  that	  harm	  will	  fall	  to	  the	  aggressor	  regime	  that	  initially	  put	  everyone	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  at	  risk,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  intervening	  agents	  who	  caused	  the	  postwar	  harm.	  
6.4	  The	  Obligation	  to	  Mitigate	  Postwar	  Environmental	  Threats	  The	  next	  postwar	  duty	  I’d	  like	  to	  discuss	  is	  a	  just	  state’s	  potential	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  future	  harm	  from	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  In	  individual	  defense	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Walzer,	  “The	  Aftermath	  of	  War,”	  46.	  
	   221	  
situations,	  one	  normally	  stops	  harming	  once	  one	  ceases	  to	  use	  defensive	  force.	  	  Rarely	  does	  individual	  defensive	  force	  threaten	  future	  harm.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  introduced	  the	  Booby	  Trap	  case	  to	  discuss	  a	  domestic	  case	  that	  did	  threaten	  future	  harm.	  	  But	  that	  example	  was	  highly	  contrived.	  	   Unfortunately,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  contrive	  national	  defense	  cases	  where	  the	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  involves	  threats	  of	  future	  harm.	  	  Rather,	  on	  this	  point	  we	  find	  a	  significant	  asymmetry	  between	  individual	  and	  national	  defense.	  	  Whereas	  individual	  defensive	  force	  rarely	  threatens	  future	  harm,	  the	  opposite	  holds	  true	  for	  national	  defense.	  	  After	  the	  last	  battle	  ends,	  war	  remnants	  continue	  to	  kill	  and	  maim	  unsuspecting	  parties.	  	  We’re	  reminded	  of	  this	  fact	  every	  time	  a	  child	  steps	  on	  a	  20-­‐	  or	  30-­‐year	  old	  landmine	  and	  looses	  her	  legs	  or	  her	  life.	  These	  kinds	  of	  environmental	  postwar	  hazards	  tend	  to	  be	  of	  two	  broad	  types:	  unexploded	  ordnance	  and	  environmental	  contamination.	  	  Unexploded	  ordnance	  includes	  undetonated	  rockets,	  artillery	  shells,	  aircraft	  bombs,	  cluster	  munitions,	  and	  landmines.	  	  Contamination	  threats	  can	  come	  from	  ordnance	  itself,	  such	  as	  the	  suspected	  environmental	  harms	  associated	  with	  armor	  piercing	  depleted	  uranium	  rounds.39	  	  Or	  contamination	  might	  come	  from	  destroyed	  targets,	  such	  as	  when	  NATO	  air	  strikes	  destroyed	  oil,	  petrochemical,	  and	  nitrogen-­‐processing	  plants	  near	  Belgrade	  in	  1999,	  releasing	  toxic	  chemicals	  into	  the	  Danube	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Some	  research	  has	  linked	  the	  presence	  of	  depleted	  uranium	  rounds	  with	  increased	  rates	  of	  cancer	  and	  birthing	  complications.	  	  See	  Iasiello,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  45;	  Mark	  Allman	  and	  Tobias	  Winright,	  After	  the	  Smoke	  Clears:	  The	  just	  War	  Tradition	  
and	  Post	  War	  Justice	  (Maryknoll,	  NY:	  Orbis	  Books,	  2010),	  166-­‐67.	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River.40	  	  Given	  the	  severity	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  threats,	  there’s	  a	  fairly	  broad	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  someone	  must	  mitigate	  these	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.41	  
6.4.1	  The	  Aggressor	  State’s	  Obligation	  to	  Mitigate	  But	  who	  should	  inherit	  these	  obligations	  to	  mitigate	  postwar	  environmental	  threats?	  	  Initially,	  two	  reasons	  suggest	  the	  obligation	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  First,	  according	  to	  shifted	  responsibility	  theory,	  aggressor	  state	  leadership	  and	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  bear	  primary	  and	  secondary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  Essentially,	  the	  aggressor	  state	  citizenry	  is	  responsible	  for	  bringing	  harm	  onto	  its	  own	  lands.	  	  This	  fact	  strongly	  tells	  in	  favor	  of	  requiring	  the	  defeated	  state	  to	  clean	  up	  its	  own	  territory.	  	   The	  second	  reason	  why	  the	  aggressor	  state	  should	  bear	  the	  obligation	  to	  safe	  its	  environment	  is	  because	  it	  holds	  sovereignty	  over	  its	  territory.	  	  Since	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  “Responsibility	  to	  Protect”	  literature,	  sovereignty	  is	  now	  widely	  viewed	  to	  entail	  not	  just	  a	  claim	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  from	  outside	  states,	  but	  also	  to	  entail	  the	  sovereign	  state’s	  responsibility	  to	  secure	  and	  protect	  the	  people	  within	  its	  own	  borders.42	  	  With	  sovereignty	  comes	  responsibility.	  So	  if	  the	  defeated	  state	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  people	  within	  its	  borders,	  coupled	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  aggressor	  state	  is	  responsible	  for	  waging	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Douglas	  Lackey,	  “Postwar	  Environmental	  Damage:	  A	  Study	  in	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  in	  
International	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Philosophy,	  ed.	  Larry	  May	  and	  Zachary	  Hoskins	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  141.	  41	  See,	  among	  others,	  Schuck,	  “When	  the	  Shooting	  Stops,”	  983;	  George	  M.	  Clifford	  III,	  "Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  Foundational	  Principles	  and	  a	  Proposed	  Model,"	  Journal	  of	  Military	  
Ethics	  11,	  no.	  1	  (2012):	  51;	  Iasiello,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  42;	  Allman	  and	  Winright,	  After	  
the	  Smoke	  Clears,	  165-­‐72.	  42	  International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  State	  Sovereignty,	  The	  
Responsibility	  to	  Protect:	  Report	  of	  the	  International	  Commission	  on	  Intervention	  and	  
State	  Sovereignty	  (Ottawa:	  International	  Development	  Research	  Centre,	  2001),	  Ch.	  2.	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unjust	  war,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  presumption	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  aggressor	  state	  bearing	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  mitigating	  postwar	  environmental	  hazards	  within	  its	  territory.	  	  Thus,	  if	  the	  aggressor	  state	  possesses	  the	  ability	  to	  remove	  or	  otherwise	  mitigate	  its	  postwar	  environmental	  threats,	  it	  is	  obligated	  to	  do	  so.	  
6.4.2	  The	  Just	  State’s	  Prima	  Facie	  Obligation	  to	  Mitigate	  Postwar	  Hazards	  But	  suppose	  the	  vanquished	  state	  lacks	  the	  ability	  to	  clean	  up	  these	  environmental	  hazards.	  	  The	  question	  we	  must	  now	  consider	  is:	  is	  the	  just	  state	  obligated	  to	  help	  mitigate	  postwar	  environmental	  harms	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state?	  	  In	  short,	  I	  think	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘yes.’	  	   To	  work	  through	  this	  issue,	  let’s	  begin	  from	  the	  somewhat	  intuitive	  claim	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  shouldn’t	  incur	  any	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  future	  harm	  from	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  One	  might	  argue,	  for	  example,	  that	  if	  the	  just	  combatants’	  defensive	  force	  was	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  during	  the	  war,	  then	  employing	  that	  force	  shouldn’t	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  that	  use	  of	  force	  from	  further	  harming	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	   To	  illuminate	  the	  preceding	  point,	  consider	  the	  following	  scenario	  called	  
Airstrike.	  	  Suppose	  during	  war,	  just	  combatants	  employ	  defensive	  means	  X	  (e.g.,	  airstrikes)	  against	  strategic	  target	  Y	  (within	  aggressor	  state)	  at	  time	  t1.	  	  Although	  the	  airstrikes	  are	  anticipated	  to	  kill	  200	  people	  (a	  mixture	  of	  unjust	  combatants	  and	  unjust	  civilians),	  their	  deaths	  are	  considered	  proportionate	  given	  the	  importance	  that	  Y’s	  destruction	  will	  make	  toward	  ending	  the	  war.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  are	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  using	  X	  to	  destroy	  Y;	  they	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  Suppose	  the	  just	  combatants	  proceed	  with	  the	  attack.	  	  All	  their	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munitions	  detonate	  on	  target,	  destroying	  Y	  and	  killing	  the	  200	  people.	  	  Subsequently,	  given	  the	  destruction	  of	  Y,	  along	  with	  the	  justified	  destruction	  of	  other	  targets	  at	  t1,	  the	  just	  state	  prevails	  and	  the	  war	  ends	  at	  t2.	  	   Now	  consider	  Airstrike´.	  	  All	  the	  details	  are	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Airstrike,	  except	  that	  in	  Airstrike´	  only	  some	  of	  the	  munitions	  detonate	  upon	  striking	  Y	  (though	  Y	  is	  still	  adequately	  destroyed,	  and	  the	  war	  still	  ends	  at	  t2).	  	  The	  initial	  airstrikes	  kill	  100	  people;	  after	  the	  war	  ends,	  the	  remaining	  unexploded	  ordnance	  will	  continue	  to	  kill	  100	  additional	  people	  over	  timespan	  t3…tn.	  The	  issue	  now	  is	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  just	  combatants	  would	  incur	  an	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  the	  additional	  100	  postwar	  deaths	  (assuming	  the	  aggressor	  state	  can’t	  perform	  that	  function).	  	  If	  killing	  all	  200	  people	  at	  t1	  is	  proportionate	  in	  
Airstrike,	  then	  killing	  200	  people	  from	  t1…tn	  in	  Airstrike´	  should	  likewise	  be	  proportionate.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  result	  is	  the	  same	  (200	  people	  killed,	  the	  war	  is	  won),	  then	  the	  temporal	  proximity	  between	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  the	  ensuing	  200	  deaths	  shouldn’t	  affect	  proportionality	  determinations,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  And	  if	  using	  X	  in	  Airstrike´	  is	  no	  more	  disproportionate	  than	  using	  X	  in	  Airstrike,	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  the	  additional	  100	  postwar	  deaths	  in	  Airstrike´.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  some	  of	  X’s	  ordnance	  failed	  to	  detonate	  at	  
t1	  provides	  no	  grounding	  for	  an	  obligation	  to	  mitigate	  the	  future	  threats	  X	  poses	  beginning	  at	  t3.	  In	  reply,	  I	  think	  if	  the	  aggressor	  state	  is	  unable	  to	  prevent	  the	  additional	  100	  deaths	  in	  Airstrike´,	  then	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  attempt	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Two	  reasons	  support	  this	  claim.	  	  First,	  recall	  that	  in	  self-­‐defense	  situations,	  once	  victims	  achieve	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successful	  defense,	  victims	  must	  cease	  harming.	  	  Continuing	  to	  harm	  when	  no	  longer	  necessary	  is	  morally	  prohibited.	  	  So	  in	  Airstrike´,	  once	  the	  war	  has	  been	  won	  at	  t2,	  the	  additional	  100	  deaths	  become	  unnecessary.	  	  Thus,	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  positive	  reason	  at	  t3	  to	  prevent	  the	  future	  unnecessary	  deaths.	  The	  mistake	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  previous	  section	  was	  to	  reason	  that	  since	  killing	  the	  200	  people	  at	  t1	  seemed	  proportionate	  in	  Airstrike,	  then	  killing	  200	  people	  in	  Airstrike´	  from	  t1…tn	  would	  also	  be	  proportionate	  –	  and	  thus	  wouldn’t	  ground	  a	  postwar	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  the	  additional	  100	  deaths.	  	  But	  we	  can	  now	  see	  that	  the	  just	  state’s	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  postwar	  environmental	  harm	  is	  grounded	  not	  in	  proportionality	  restrictions,	  but	  rather	  in	  necessity	  restrictions.	  	  The	  collateral	  harming	  of	  the	  additional	  100	  people	  contributes	  nothing	  to	  the	  just	  state’s	  defense,	  and	  thus	  should	  be	  prevented	  when	  possible.43	  	   At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  object	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  (both	  combatants	  and	  civilian)	  were	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  X.	  	  And	  to	  repeat	  a	  point	  made	  earlier,	  the	  temporal	  proximity	  between	  the	  use	  of	  X	  and	  the	  ensuing	  harm	  to	  the	  liable	  parties	  shouldn’t	  matter.	  	  If	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  were	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  X,	  then	  any	  harm	  from	  X	  does	  not	  wrong	  the	  unjust	  citizens.	  	  And	  if	  the	  just	  combatants	  haven’t	  wronged	  the	  unjust	  citizens,	  then	  the	  combatants	  shouldn’t	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  X	  from	  harming	  the	  citizens.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  The	  rationale	  behind	  the	  principle	  of	  necessity	  has	  already	  been	  discussed.	  	  Assuming	  all	  human	  life	  has	  worth,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  presumption	  against	  harming	  others	  –	  a	  presumption	  captured	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐maleficence.	  	  Self-­‐defense	  justifiably	  overrides	  this	  presumption,	  but	  once	  self-­‐defense	  is	  achieved,	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐maleficence	  is	  back	  in	  force,	  thus	  providing	  strong	  moral	  reason	  to	  prevent	  any	  further	  unnecessary	  harm.	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   In	  reply	  to	  this	  line	  of	  objection,	  it’s	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  liability	  to	  harm	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  unjust	  threat.	  	  Once	  the	  unjust	  threat	  ceases,	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  threat	  no	  longer	  bear	  liability	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  So	  in	  Airstrike´,	  unjust	  citizen	  liability	  is	  coextensive	  with	  their	  state’s	  active	  harming;	  their	  liability	  terminates	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  previously	  liable	  parties	  take	  on	  bystander	  status.	  	  And	  as	  I’ve	  argued	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  if	  one’s	  defensive	  force	  imperils	  bystanders,	  then	  one	  incurs	  a	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  that	  harm	  from	  occurring.	  But	  maybe	  instead	  what	  the	  objector	  wants	  to	  say	  is	  that	  when	  the	  just	  combatants	  use	  X	  at	  t1,	  they	  have	  a	  liability	  justification	  for	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  killed	  immediately,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  for	  any	  unjust	  citizens	  killed	  by	  X	  after	  the	  war	  ends.	  	  Yet,	  even	  if	  that	  were	  true,	  having	  a	  lesser	  evil	  justification	  to	  use	  X	  at	  t1	  wouldn’t	  negate	  the	  just	  combatants’	  obligation	  to	  avert	  the	  unintended	  evil	  beginning	  at	  t3	  –	  assuming	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  so.	  	  For	  if	  the	  postwar	  killing	  of	  the	  additional	  unjust	  citizens	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  evil,	  then	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  threats	  to	  the	  citizens	  must	  make	  every	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  avert	  that	  evil.	  	  	   Still,	  some	  readers	  might	  resist	  the	  preceding	  arguments	  and	  instead	  claim	  that	  if	  the	  unjust	  citizenry’s	  actions	  necessitated	  the	  justified	  use	  of	  X	  at	  t1,	  then	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  has	  made	  itself	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  X	  from	  t1…tn.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  unjust	  citizenry’s	  liability	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  X	  persists	  indefinitely.	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The	  reply	  to	  this	  suggestion	  highlights	  the	  second	  reason	  why	  the	  just	  state	  is	  prima	  facie	  obligated	  to	  mitigate	  postwar	  threats.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  unjust	  citizens’	  liability	  to	  be	  harmed	  by	  X	  persists	  indefinitely	  beyond	  war’s	  end,	  X	  will	  simultaneously	  threaten	  harm	  to	  liable	  parties	  and	  bystanders	  alike.	  	  As	  history	  confirms,	  deadly	  war	  remnants	  don’t	  discriminate	  among	  their	  victims	  based	  on	  liability	  status.	  	  Thus,	  innocent	  children,	  third	  party	  nationals,	  and	  future	  generations	  are	  just	  as	  likely	  to	  lose	  life	  or	  limb	  as	  the	  liable	  citizenry	  is.	  	  Because	  these	  current	  and	  future	  bystanders	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  make	  them	  liable	  to	  harm,	  any	  postwar	  harm	  they	  suffer	  will	  wrong	  them.	  	  Therefore,	  given	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  which	  people	  the	  war	  remnants	  will	  harm,	  the	  just	  combatants	  must	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  averting	  those	  potential	  harms.	  The	  underlying	  structure	  of	  the	  problem	  in	  Airstrike´	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  in	  
Booby	  Trap.	  	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  victim	  was	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  setting	  the	  two	  traps.	  	  However,	  once	  the	  first	  trap	  harms	  aggressor	  and	  secures	  victim’s	  defense,	  victim	  cannot	  leave	  behind	  the	  second	  trap.	  	  To	  create	  and	  knowingly	  leave	  behind	  a	  foreseeable	  threat	  of	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people	  would	  be	  reckless.44	  	  Thus,	  victim	  is	  obligated	  to	  disable	  the	  second	  trap.	  	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  holds	  true	  not	  only	  in	  Airstrike´,	  but	  also	  more	  generally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  According	  to	  legal	  definition,	  recklessness	  is	  conduct	  that	  reflects	  “disregard	  of	  or	  indifference	  to	  consequences,	  under	  circumstances	  involving	  danger	  to	  life	  or	  safety	  of	  others,	  although	  no	  harm	  was	  intended.”	  	  Black’s	  Law	  Dictionary,	  6th	  ed.,	  s.v.	  “Recklessness.”	  	  According	  to	  Feinberg,	  recklessness	  is	  the	  conscious	  disregard	  of	  a	  known	  risk	  of	  harm	  that	  one	  has	  created.	  	  See	  Joel	  Feinberg,	  Doing	  &	  Deserving;	  
Essays	  in	  the	  Theory	  of	  Responsibility	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1970),	  192-­‐93.	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regarding	  the	  use	  of	  all	  wartime	  defensive	  force.	  45	  	  Although	  just	  combatants	  may	  be	  justified	  in	  their	  use	  of	  force,	  if	  the	  means	  by	  which	  they	  wage	  war	  threatens	  future	  postwar	  harm	  to	  bystanders,	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  prima	  facie	  obligated	  to	  help	  avert	  those	  harms	  from	  materializing	  if	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state	  lacks	  that	  ability.	  
6.4.3	  Additional	  Considerations	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  just	  state’s	  use	  of	  defensive	  force	  threatens	  future	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  the	  just	  state	  is	  prima	  facie	  obligated	  to	  prevent	  those	  foreseeable	  postwar	  harms.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  that	  argument,	  two	  other	  considerations	  might	  also	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  just	  state	  incurring	  this	  obligation.	  	   First,	  the	  just	  combatants	  might	  possess	  special	  capabilities	  that	  the	  defeated	  state	  lacks.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  victorious	  forces	  may	  have	  better	  trained	  and	  better	  equipped	  EOD,	  detox,	  and	  decontamination	  teams.	  	  We	  can	  easily	  imagine	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  for	  postwar	  environmental	  obligations	  grounded	  in	  the	  need	  to	  avoid	  future	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  persons.	  	  For	  alternative,	  non-­‐anthropocentric	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  obligations	  grounded	  in	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  environment	  itself,	  see	  Douglas	  Lackey,	  “Postwar	  Environmental	  Damage”;	  Jay	  Austin	  and	  Carl	  Bruch,	  The	  Environmental	  Consequences	  of	  War:	  Legal,	  
Economic,	  and	  Scientific	  Perspectives,	  “Introduction.”	  	  Lackey’s	  approach	  is	  especially	  interesting	  in	  that	  he	  likens	  the	  environment	  to	  a	  neutral	  bystander	  harmed	  during	  war.	  	  Lackey	  recommends	  a	  strict	  liability	  approach	  regarding	  such	  excused	  harms	  to	  the	  environment,	  concluding	  that	  wartime	  agents	  are	  morally	  required	  to	  restore	  
all	  environmental	  damage	  they	  cause	  –	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  fought	  on	  the	  just	  or	  unjust	  side	  of	  the	  war.	  	  I	  disagree	  with	  Lackey’s	  approach	  for	  the	  obvious	  reason	  that	  the	  Responsibility	  Model´	  is	  premised	  on	  moral	  responsibility	  rather	  than	  strict	  liability.	  	  Relatedly,	  Mark	  Woods	  considers	  environmentalists’	  claims	  that	  the	  environment	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  a	  noncombatant,	  and	  then	  raises	  the	  interesting	  question	  whether	  that	  claim	  might	  justify	  something	  equivalent	  to	  a	  humanitarian	  intervention	  for	  purposes	  of	  protecting	  a	  threatened	  environment	  (such	  as	  the	  Amazon	  rainforest).	  	  See	  Mark	  Woods,	  “The	  Nature	  of	  War	  and	  Peace:	  Just	  War	  Thinking,	  Environmental	  Ethics,	  and	  Environmental	  Justice,”	  in	  Rethinking	  the	  Just	  
War	  Tradition,	  eds.	  Brough,	  Lango,	  and	  Harry	  van	  der	  Linden	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2007).	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militarily	  advanced	  state	  defeating	  a	  lesser-­‐developed	  aggressor	  state.	  	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  victor	  state’s	  unique	  capabilities	  for	  preventing	  environmental	  harms	  would	  provide	  another	  moral	  reason	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  victor	  state	  incurring	  an	  obligation	  to	  make	  the	  postwar	  environment	  safe.	  	   Second,	  the	  just	  state	  might	  possess	  special	  knowledge	  that	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state	  lacks,	  such	  as	  specific	  information	  about	  unexploded	  ordnance	  locations.	  	  For	  example,	  sometimes	  forward	  observers	  call	  in	  airstrikes	  against	  enemy	  positions,	  only	  to	  report	  back	  that	  the	  ordnance	  failed	  to	  detonate.	  	  Because	  the	  spotters	  often	  request	  the	  aircrew	  to	  “revisit”	  the	  target,	  the	  location	  information	  is	  usually	  tracked.	  	  Such	  information	  can	  be	  crucial	  at	  war’s	  end	  when	  trying	  to	  locate	  and	  defuse	  unexploded	  munitions.	  	  Additionally,	  just	  combatants	  likely	  possess	  acute	  knowledge	  about	  the	  mechanical	  workings	  of	  their	  own	  weapons	  systems	  and	  how	  best	  to	  safe	  them.	  	  Such	  specialized	  knowledge	  can	  save	  lives	  when	  trying	  to	  clean	  up	  the	  postwar	  environment.	  
6.4.4	  The	  Just	  State’s	  Role	  Previously,	  I	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  defeated	  state	  possesses	  the	  ability	  to	  alleviate	  the	  postwar	  environmental	  threats	  within	  its	  territory,	  the	  obligation	  to	  do	  so	  should	  fall	  entirely	  to	  that	  state.	  	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  that	  claim	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  primary	  responsibility	  the	  aggressor	  state	  bore	  for	  initiating	  the	  unjust	  war,	  coupled	  with	  that	  state’s	  sovereignty	  responsibility	  to	  provide	  a	  safe	  and	  secure	  environment	  for	  the	  people	  within	  its	  borders.	  But	  we	  should	  also	  consider	  two	  additional	  scenarios.	  	  The	  first	  scenario	  involves	  the	  unlikely	  postwar	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state	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possesses	  virtually	  no	  ability	  to	  make	  its	  environment	  safe.	  	  We	  might	  imagine,	  for	  example,	  a	  defeated	  belligerent	  state	  utterly	  in	  ruins	  after	  losing	  a	  devastating,	  protracted	  war	  of	  aggression.	  	  In	  such	  a	  dire	  situation,	  I	  think	  the	  victorious	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  make	  a	  reasonable	  attempt	  to	  neutralize	  the	  postwar	  hazards	  within	  the	  aggressor	  territory	  –	  assuming	  the	  just	  state	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  reason	  why	  is	  one	  of	  shifted	  responsibility.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  –	  along	  with	  unjust	  state	  leadership	  and	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  –	  share	  responsibility	  for	  the	  postwar	  hazards	  that	  threaten	  bystanders.	  	  This	  shared	  responsibility	  grounds	  the	  just	  state’s	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  postwar	  environmental	  harms	  to	  bystanders.	  	  If	  the	  parties	  bearing	  primary	  and	  secondary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  postwar	  hazards	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  the	  environment	  safe,	  and	  if	  the	  just	  combatants	  do	  possess	  that	  ability,46	  then	  the	  obligation	  to	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  the	  postwar	  threats	  falls	  to	  the	  just	  state.	  	  As	  with	  the	  obligation	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security,	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  what	  is	  expected	  of	  the	  just	  state	  in	  fulfilling	  its	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  postwar	  harm	  to	  the	  bystanders.	  	  We’ll	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point.	   The	  second	  scenario	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  vanquished	  state	  possesses	  some	  ability	  to	  make	  its	  postwar	  environment	  safe,	  but	  not	  enough	  to	  do	  so	  effectively	  on	  its	  own.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  primary	  responsibility	  to	  safe	  the	  environment	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  aggressor	  state	  as	  the	  party	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  postwar	  hazards,	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  For	  purposes	  of	  discussion,	  I	  assume	  the	  victor	  state	  has	  some	  capacity	  to	  clean	  up	  the	  postwar	  environment.	  	  But	  we	  can	  imagine	  two	  poor,	  under-­‐developed	  countries	  warring	  with	  neither	  possessing	  the	  ability	  to	  clean	  up	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  I	  think	  the	  international	  community	  probably	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  help.	  	  That	  topic,	  however,	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project.	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just	  state	  incurring	  a	  lesser	  responsibility	  to	  augment	  the	  aggressor	  state’s	  efforts.	  	  The	  aggressor	  state	  should	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  terms	  of	  effort,	  time,	  and	  expense.	  	  The	  just	  state	  should	  offer	  its	  unique	  capabilities	  and	  knowledge	  when	  necessary.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  imagine	  a	  postwar	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  aggressor	  state	  is	  able	  to	  dispose	  of	  regular	  wartime	  ordnance,	  but	  lacks	  the	  ability	  to	  handle	  a	  large-­‐scale	  environmental	  contamination	  threatening	  the	  local	  population’s	  water	  source.	  	  If	  the	  just	  state	  played	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  producing	  the	  contamination,	  and	  also	  possesses	  the	  ability	  to	  help	  mitigate	  that	  threat,	  then	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  help	  the	  aggressor	  state	  in	  its	  decontamination	  efforts.	  Or	  suppose	  instead	  that	  the	  defeated	  state	  can	  defuse	  more	  traditional	  munitions,	  but	  lacks	  the	  ability	  to	  handle	  a	  new	  smart	  weapons	  technology.	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  just	  forces’	  EOD	  teams	  should	  help	  secure	  the	  ordnance.	  	  Or	  in	  other	  cases,	  perhaps	  the	  just	  combatants	  need	  only	  share	  the	  locations	  of	  known	  environmental	  threats,	  such	  as	  unexploded	  ordnance	  located	  in	  harbors	  and	  shipping	  lanes.	  Michael	  Schuck	  argues	  much	  the	  same:	  “As	  a	  minimal	  requirement,	  victors	  must	  return	  to	  the	  fields	  of	  battle	  and	  help	  remove	  the	  instruments	  of	  war.”47	  Similarly,	  Iasiello	  writes:	  “Both	  the	  victors	  and	  the	  defeated	  should	  share	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  restoring	  the	  battlefield.48	  	  To	  these	  comments,	  I	  would	  simply	  add	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  help	  only	  if	  the	  aggressor	  state	  is	  unable	  to	  do	  so	  itself.	  	  Also,	  although	  in	  these	  latter	  cases	  the	  just	  and	  aggressor	  states	  share	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Schuck,	  “When	  the	  Shooting	  Stops,”	  983,	  my	  emphasis.	  48	  Iasiello,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  47,	  my	  emphasis.	  	  Though	  to	  be	  clear,	  I	  agree	  with	  Iasiello’s	  notion	  of	  shared	  responsibility	  only	  regarding	  the	  mitigation	  of	  environmental	  threats.	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responsibility	  for	  cleaning	  up	  the	  environment,	  the	  responsibility	  should	  not	  be	  divided	  evenly;	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  responsibility	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  aggressor	  state,	  with	  augmenting	  responsibility	  falling	  to	  the	  just	  state.	  
6.5	  Limits	  on	  the	  Obligation	  to	  Prevent	  Postwar	  Environmental	  Harms	  Let’s	  assume	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  at	  war’s	  end	  to	  mitigate	  (or	  help	  mitigate)	  postwar	  environmental	  harms	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  The	  substance	  of	  the	  obligation	  is	  fairly	  straightforward:	  to	  make	  the	  environment	  relatively	  safe,	  secure,	  and	  minimally	  habitable	  by	  defusing	  unexploded	  ordnance	  and/or	  neutralizing	  any	  significant	  contaminations.49	  	  One	  issue	  remains,	  however:	  what	  limits	  apply	  to	  this	  obligation?	  	   The	  quick	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  same	  limits	  of	  risk,	  time,	  and	  expense	  that	  applied	  to	  the	  obligation	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  likewise	  apply	  to	  the	  obligation	  to	  mitigate	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  To	  avoid	  redundancy,	  I	  won’t	  repeat	  that	  theoretical	  discussion	  here,	  other	  than	  to	  say	  that	  fulfilling	  the	  obligation	  must	  be	  reasonable.	  	  Here	  again	  we	  have	  a	  line-­‐drawing	  problem	  about	  what	  constitutes	  “reasonable.”	  	  In	  response	  to	  those	  readers	  looking	  for	  a	  clearer	  criterion,	  all	  that	  can	  be	  said	  is	  that	  difficult	  practical	  judgments	  will	  need	  to	  be	  made	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	   But	  in	  general,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  required	  time,	  effort,	  costs,	  and	  risk	  must	  not	  be	  excessive.	  	  It	  would	  be	  unreasonable,	  for	  example,	  to	  expect	  the	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  As	  noted,	  the	  preceding	  discussions	  assume	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  fought	  in	  accordance	  with	  in	  bello	  requirements.	  	  Special	  obligations	  would	  arise	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  just	  combatants	  violated	  necessity	  by	  wanton	  destruction	  or	  degradation	  of	  the	  environment,	  or	  violated	  proportionality	  by	  causing	  massive	  environmental	  destruction	  to	  achieve	  a	  minor	  military	  goal.	  	  For	  a	  helpful	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues,	  see	  Reichberg	  and	  Syse,	  “Protecting	  the	  Natural	  Environment,”	  449-­‐68.	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combatants	  to	  scour	  the	  countryside	  looking	  for	  every	  last	  single	  unexploded	  round.	  	  Instead,	  the	  just	  soldiers	  are	  required	  to	  make	  a	  good	  faith	  effort	  to	  make	  the	  environment	  safe,	  and	  then	  they	  should	  leave.50	  	  If	  at	  any	  point	  fulfilling	  the	  obligation	  becomes	  too	  dangerous	  (insurgency	  attacks,	  etc.),	  then	  the	  just	  combatants	  would	  be	  justified	  in	  withdrawing.	  	   Moreover,	  the	  obligation	  to	  prevent	  postwar	  environmental	  harms	  is	  limited	  to	  those	  postwar	  hazards	  the	  just	  combatants	  played	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  producing.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  just	  forces	  are	  only	  obligated	  to	  alleviate	  the	  hazards	  that	  they	  created.	  	  The	  basis	  for	  the	  just	  combatants’	  obligation	  is	  that	  they	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  some	  of	  the	  postwar	  hazards	  that	  threaten	  bystanders.	  	  Given	  that	  their	  use	  of	  force	  foreseeably	  would	  produce	  such	  postwar	  hazards,	  they	  share	  some	  responsibility	  for	  mitigating	  those	  threats.	  	  But	  those	  hazards	  are,	  strictly	  speaking,	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  obligation.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  don’t	  share	  responsibility	  for	  pre-­‐existing	  threats	  (maybe	  from	  a	  previous	  war),	  nor	  for	  threats	  clearly	  created	  by	  the	  aggressor	  state.	  	  And	  if	  the	  just	  combatants	  don’t	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  these	  hazards,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  ground	  for	  the	  just	  troops	  having	  an	  obligation	  to	  mitigate	  them.	  	   One	  might	  think,	  however,	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  a	  weighty	  Samaritan	  duty	  to	  mitigate	  these	  hazards	  created	  by	  others.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  One	  must	  recognize	  the	  natural	  tension	  between,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  remaining	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  to	  mitigate	  environmental	  hazards	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  need	  to	  depart	  the	  aggressor	  state	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  recognize	  and	  respect	  the	  unjust	  citizenry’s	  sovereignty.	  	  As	  Gary	  Bass	  says,	  “the	  primary	  jus	  post	  
bellum	  responsibility	  of	  a	  victorious	  state	  is	  to	  get	  out	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.”	  	  Gary	  J.	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  32,	  no.	  4	  (2004):	  412.	  	  See	  also	  Evans,	  “Moral	  Responsibilities	  and	  Conflicting	  Demands,”	  157.	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may	  be	  physically	  proximate	  to	  the	  threats,	  and	  possess	  the	  ability	  to	  neutralize	  the	  hazards.	  	  We	  should	  recall,	  however,	  that	  agents	  bear	  Samaritan	  duties	  only	  when	  doing	  so	  poses	  little	  to	  no	  risk	  to	  the	  intervening	  agents.	  	  Yet,	  in	  many	  cases	  disarming	  unstable	  thousand-­‐pound	  bombs	  obviously	  carries	  inherent	  risk.	  	  In	  those	  risky	  cases	  involving	  threats	  the	  just	  combatants	  didn’t	  create,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  they	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  risk	  their	  lives.	  	   The	  natural	  reply	  would	  be	  to	  point	  out	  that	  EOD	  personnel	  have	  assumed	  that	  risk	  by	  performing	  the	  function	  they	  do.	  	  But	  as	  previously	  discussed,	  members	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  generally	  assume	  risks	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  benefitting	  their	  own	  state	  citizens,	  not	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  benefitting	  all	  citizens	  everywhere.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  just	  state	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  minimize	  the	  risks	  to	  which	  it	  exposes	  its	  own	  soldiers.	  	  So	  we	  can’t	  say	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  are	  obligated	  to	  clean	  up	  postwar	  hazards	  created	  by	  others,	  though	  of	  course	  it	  would	  be	  good	  of	  them	  to	  take	  on	  that	  task.	  	  But	  that	  would	  constitute	  a	  supererogatory	  act,	  not	  an	  obligatory	  one.	  	  However,	  if	  there	  are	  postwar	  hazards	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  can	  help	  avert	  with	  little	  danger	  to	  self,	  and	  if	  the	  aggressor	  state	  lacks	  that	  ability,	  then	  the	  just	  forces	  do	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  weighty	  Samaritan	  duty	  to	  help	  prevent	  the	  harm	  from	  befalling	  the	  local	  populace.	  
6.6	  Chapter	  Conclusion	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  just	  war	  victors	  are	  sometimes	  obligated	  to	  provide	  transitional	  security	  in	  the	  vanquished	  state	  at	  war’s	  end,	  and	  also	  are	  sometimes	  obligated	  to	  mitigate	  postwar	  environmental	  threats.	  	  The	  general	  principle	  underlying	  both	  of	  these	  postwar	  obligations	  is	  the	  same:	  when	  the	  use	  of	  defensive	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force	  threatens	  harm	  to	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  the	  just	  state	  is	  prima	  facie	  obligated	  to	  prevent	  that	  harm	  from	  occurring.	  	  Although	  these	  obligations	  initially	  fall	  to	  the	  unjust	  regime	  and	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  responsible	  for	  the	  unjust	  war,	  if	  those	  parties	  are	  unable	  to	  avert	  the	  harm,	  then	  the	  just	  state	  must	  step	  in	  and	  make	  every	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  do	  so.
	   236	  
CHAPTER	  7	  	  
7.	  Specific	  Postwar	  Obligations,	  Continued	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we’ll	  finish	  our	  analysis	  by	  considering	  whether	  victorious	  just	  states	  incur	  postwar	  obligations	  regarding	  restitution,	  physical	  and	  institutional	  reconstruction,	  transitional	  justice,	  and	  political	  reconstruction.	  	  We’ll	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  restitution.	  
7.1	  Restitution	  Restitution	  involves	  compensating	  victims	  for	  wrongful	  harms	  or	  losses.1	  	  Reparations	  are	  a	  type	  of	  restitution	  paid	  by	  the	  unjust	  state	  to	  compensate	  the	  just	  state	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  war.2	  	  Because	  I	  aim	  to	  determine	  which	  obligations	  a	  just	  state	  might	  incur	  at	  war’s	  end,	  I	  won’t	  address	  the	  vanquished	  aggressor	  state’s	  reparative	  duties.	  	  Instead,	  I’ll	  focus	  on	  whether	  a	  victorious	  just	  state	  incurs	  restitutive	  obligations	  for	  any	  of	  the	  harm	  its	  combatants	  have	  caused	  during	  war.	  
7.1.1	  Liability	  and	  Restitution	  We	  can	  begin	  by	  ruling	  out	  compensatory	  obligations	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people:	  those	  individuals	  who	  were	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  That’s	  because	  wrongful	  harm	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  restitution.3	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  wrongful	  harm,	  obligations	  of	  restitution	  do	  not	  arise.	  	  When	  one	  harms	  with	  liability	  justification,	  the	  harm	  one	  inflicts	  is	  not	  wrongful.	  	  Thus,	  liability	  justification	  precludes	  restitutive	  obligations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Eric	  Patterson,	  Ending	  Wars	  Well,	  164-­‐65.	  2	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  297.	  3	  Larry	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends:	  A	  Philosophical	  Perspective	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  186.	  	  See	  also	  Joel	  Feinberg,	  “Voluntary	  Euthanasia,”	  in	  
Rights,	  Justice,	  and	  Liberty,	  230.	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Consider	  a	  domestic	  case.	  	  Suppose	  aggressor	  unjustly	  attacks	  victim	  and,	  in	  defending	  herself,	  victim	  physically	  harms	  aggressor	  while	  also	  damaging	  aggressor’s	  bicycle.	  	  Because	  aggressor	  was	  liable	  to	  defensive	  force,	  victim	  incurs	  no	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  aggressor	  –	  neither	  for	  harm	  to	  his	  person,	  nor	  for	  harm	  to	  his	  property.	  	   The	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning	  holds	  true	  for	  wartime	  harming.	  	  If	  just	  combatants	  have	  liability	  justifications	  for	  harming	  all	  unjust	  regime	  leadership,	  all	  unjust	  combatants,	  and	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  (collectively,	  call	  them	  “unjust	  citizens”),	  then	  harming	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  does	  not	  wrong	  them.	  	  The	  just	  combatants	  neither	  violate	  nor	  infringe	  the	  citizens’	  rights	  not	  to	  be	  harmed	  since	  the	  latter	  are	  liable	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  And	  if	  the	  harmed	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  not	  wronged,	  then	  the	  just	  state	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  them.	  	  Kamm,	  I	  think,	  gets	  this	  point	  exactly	  right.	  	  She	  notes	  that	  when	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  liable	  to	  suffer	  collateral	  harm	  when	  necessary	  to	  avert	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  “they	  might	  not	  be	  owed	  efforts	  …	  to	  compensate	  for	  these	  side	  effects	  of	  war,	  even	  if	  the	  victor	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  it.”4	  	  Although	  Kamm	  is	  here	  referring	  to	  unjust	  civilians,	  obviously	  the	  same	  claim	  can	  be	  said	  about	  the	  unjust	  regime	  that	  initiated	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  unjust	  combatants	  who	  waged	  it.	  
7.1.2	  Infringing	  Peoples’	  Rights	  Although	  just	  combatants	  have	  liability	  justifications	  for	  most	  of	  the	  wartime	  harm	  they	  cause,	  nevertheless	  they	  almost	  always	  harm	  some	  innocent	  parties	  as	  well.	  	  We	  can	  divide	  such	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  rights	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Kamm,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  in	  Kamm,	  The	  Moral	  Target,	  163.	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violations	  and	  rights	  infringements.	  	  McMahan	  nicely	  summarizes	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two:	  “When	  one	  permissibly	  acts	  against	  a	  right,	  I	  will	  say	  that	  one	  
infringes	  that	  right,	  whereas	  when	  one	  impermissibly	  does	  what	  another	  has	  a	  right	  that	  one	  not	  do,	  one	  violates	  that	  right.”5	  	  So	  the	  difference	  between	  rights	  violations	  and	  rights	  infringements	  hinges	  on	  culpability;	  if	  one	  unjustifiably	  transgresses	  another’s	  rights,	  one	  has	  violated	  those	  rights.	  	  If	  one	  justifiably	  transgresses	  another’s	  rights,	  one	  has	  infringed	  those	  rights.	  In	  order	  for	  just	  combatants	  to	  violate	  bystanders’	  rights	  during	  war,	  the	  combatants	  would	  have	  to	  violate	  jus	  in	  bello	  restrictions	  such	  as	  violating	  necessity,	  discrimination,	  or	  proportionality	  requirements.	  	  But	  because	  one	  of	  my	  starting	  assumptions	  is	  that	  the	  just	  state	  prosecutes	  a	  just	  war	  in	  a	  just	  manner,	  the	  just	  combatants	  do	  not	  harm	  culpably.	  	  Thus,	  the	  just	  state	  will	  not	  incur	  compensatory	  obligations	  grounded	  in	  rights	  violations.6	  	   Just	  combatants	  do,	  however,	  frequently	  infringe	  bystanders’	  rights	  during	  war.	  	  By	  collaterally	  harming	  bystanders,	  the	  just	  combatants	  may	  act	  with	  all	  things	  considered	  justification,	  yet	  still	  they	  infringe	  the	  bystanders’	  rights	  by	  inflicting	  wrongful	  harm	  on	  them.	  	  So	  the	  issue	  we	  must	  now	  consider	  is	  whether	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  pay	  restitution	  for	  inflicting	  wrongful	  wartime	  harm	  on	  innocent	  people.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  10.	  	  See	  also	  Judith	  Jarvis	  Thomson,	  “Some	  Ruminations	  on	  Rights,”	  in	  Rights,	  Restitution,	  and	  Risk,	  51.	  6	  Though	  to	  be	  clear,	  any	  in	  bello	  violation	  would	  ground	  a	  restitutive	  obligation.	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7.1.3	  Compensating	  Rights	  Infringements	  Normally,	  infringing	  an	  innocent	  person’s	  rights	  gives	  rise	  to	  an	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  the	  wronged	  party.	  	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  grounding	  this	  obligation	  is	  one	  of	  corrective	  justice.	  	  As	  Jules	  Coleman	  puts	  the	  matter,	  “each	  of	  us	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  repair	  the	  wrongful	  losses	  for	  which	  we	  are	  responsible.”7	  	  When	  bystanders’	  rights	  are	  infringed,	  the	  bystanders	  are	  owed	  restitution	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  they	  suffer.	  That	  rights	  infringements	  entail	  an	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  is	  a	  common	  view	  in	  the	  literature.8	  	  Rodin,	  for	  example,	  holds	  that	  “when	  a	  right	  is	  justifiably	  infringed	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil,	  it	  grounds	  a	  claim	  for	  compensation	  or	  redress.”9	  	  Similarly,	  McMahan	  writes:	  “Even	  though	  an	  agent	  acts	  permissibly	  in	  infringing	  a	  right,	  the	  victim	  is	  nonetheless	  wronged	  and	  may	  thus	  be	  owed	  compensation.”10	  So	  if	  just	  combatants	  routinely	  infringe	  bystanders’	  rights	  during	  war,	  and	  if	  rights	  infringements	  normally	  entail	  an	  obligation	  to	  pay	  redress,	  does	  it	  follow	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  collaterally	  harmed	  bystanders?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Jules	  Coleman,	  “Tort	  Law	  and	  Tort	  Theory:	  Preliminary	  Reflections	  on	  Method,”	  in	  
Philosophy	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Torts,	  ed.	  Gerald	  Postema	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  203.	  8	  An	  oft-­‐cited	  example	  is	  Feinberg’s	  case	  of	  a	  hiker	  who	  breaks	  into	  a	  vacant	  cabin	  during	  a	  blizzard.	  	  According	  to	  Feinberg,	  the	  hiker	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  infringing	  the	  cabin	  owner’s	  rights	  by	  eating	  his	  food	  and	  burning	  his	  furniture,	  but	  nonetheless	  the	  hiker	  is	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  owner	  for	  his	  losses.	  	  See	  “Voluntary	  Euthanasia,”	  in	  Feinberg,	  Rights,	  Justice,	  and	  Liberty,	  230.	  	  For	  a	  similar	  example,	  see	  Robert	  Schopp,	  “Self-­‐Defense,”	  in	  In	  Harm's	  Way:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  Joel	  
Feinberg,	  ed.	  Jules	  L.	  Coleman	  and	  Allen	  E.	  Buchanan	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  262.	  9	  Rodin,	  “Justifying	  Harm,”	  107.	  	  On	  the	  same	  point,	  see	  also	  Rodin,	  War	  and	  Self-­‐
Defense,	  52.	  10	  McMahan,	  Killing	  in	  War,	  10;	  McMahan,	  “The	  Morality	  of	  Military	  Occupation,”	  108.	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7.1.4	  Strict	  Liability	  for	  Rights	  Infringements	  Some	  commentators	  argue	  that	  just	  states	  are	  always	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  for	  wrongful	  bystander	  harm	  during	  war.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  just	  combatants	  inflict	  wrongful	  harm,	  this	  harm	  grounds	  an	  all	  things	  considered	  obligation	  to	  compensate.	  	  Several	  theorists	  embrace	  some	  variation	  of	  this	  approach.	  	  Consider	  the	  following	  representative	  passages.	  The	  first,	  by	  Thomas	  Cavanaugh,	  is	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length.	  	  Cavanaugh	  notes	  that	  in	  collateral	  harm	  cases,	  just	  combatants	  permissibly	  injure	  in	  a	  way	  that	  calls	  for	  repair.	  	  He	  writes:	  In	  the	  case	  of	  tactical	  bombing	  …	  maimed	  victims	  can	  be	  helped.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  relatives	  of	  dead	  non-­‐combatants	  will	  be	  harmed	  in	  their	  loss,	  for	  example,	  of	  a	  provider.	  	  Here	  one	  finds	  injuries	  for	  which	  one	  has	  full	  
responsibility.	  	  Clearly,	  while	  justice	  does	  not	  prohibit	  one’s	  act,	  because	  of	  one’s	  complete	  responsibility,	  it	  does	  require	  repair.	  	  Having	  evaluated	  such	  an	  act	  as	  permissible,	  one	  now	  obligatorily	  assists	  those	  whom	  one	  has	  harmed.	  	  Yet,	  who	  owes	  reparations?	  	  Does	  the	  tactical	  bomber	  himself?	  	  No.	  	  For	  he	  acts	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  his	  country.	  	  Presuming	  that	  his	  country	  wages	  a	  just	  war	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  just	  peace,	  it	  will	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  his	  country	  and	  others	  answerable	  for	  establishing	  a	  just	  peace	  to	  compensate	  non-­‐combatant	  victims.	  	  This	  includes	  the	  victors,	  the	  vanquished,	  and	  those	  benefiting	  from	  the	  consequent	  peace	  who	  can	  assist	  the	  harmed.11	  	  Although	  Cavanaugh	  thinks	  justice	  permits	  the	  tactical	  bombers	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  mission,	  the	  bombers	  nevertheless	  bear	  “full”	  and	  “complete”	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  they	  cause	  to	  bystanders,	  and	  thus	  owe	  the	  latter	  compensation.	  	  And	  if	  restitution	  is	  owed,	  it	  is	  owed	  by	  the	  just	  state	  on	  whose	  behalf	  the	  pilots	  acted.	  	   The	  second	  example	  comes	  from	  Seth	  Lazar,	  who	  offers	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  very	  similar	  to	  Cavanaugh’s.	  	  According	  to	  Lazar,	  if	  postwar	  restitution	  is	  grounded	  in	  corrective	  justice,	  then	  the	  just	  state	  should	  incur	  crushing	  restitutive	  burdens:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Cavanaugh,	  Double-­‐Effect	  Reasoning,	  165-­‐66,	  my	  emphasis.	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On	  the	  most	  plausible	  accounts	  of	  corrective	  justice,	  compensation	  is	  owed	  not	  merely	  for	  all	  things	  considered	  wrongdoing,	  but	  for	  pro	  tanto	  wrongdoing	  as	  well,	  even	  when	  it	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  justified.	  	  …	  On	  this	  far	  more	  plausible	  account	  of	  liability,	  even	  just	  belligerents	  will	  be	  liable	  for	  significant	  amounts	  of	  compensation.12	  	  Though	  stated	  in	  different	  language,	  Lazar’s	  take	  on	  the	  collateral	  harm	  issue	  appears	  the	  same	  as	  Cavanaugh’s.	  	  Lazar	  agrees	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  may	  be	  all	  things	  considered	  justified	  in	  inflicting	  collateral	  harm.	  	  But,	  he	  adds,	  the	  just	  combatants	  still	  engage	  in	  pro	  tanto	  wrongdoing,	  and	  for	  that	  they	  bear	  an	  obligation	  to	  pay	  restitution	  for	  all	  the	  unintended	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties.	  In	  these	  two	  passages,	  Lazar	  and	  Cavanaugh	  seem	  to	  be	  advocating	  for	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  strict	  liability	  for	  wartime	  rights	  infringements.	  	  Because	  just	  combatants	  are	  responsible	  for	  inflicting	  wrongful	  harm	  on	  bystanders,	  the	  just	  state	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  wrongly	  harmed	  parties.13	  	   Yet	  I	  think	  this	  suggested	  approach	  misses	  something	  important	  about	  corrective	  justice,	  at	  least	  in	  these	  collateral	  harm	  cases.	  	  In	  these	  situations,	  surely	  the	  aggressor’s	  responsibility	  affects	  the	  just	  combatants’	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  the	  harmed	  bystanders.	  	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  just	  state	  should	  be	  straightforwardly	  liable	  for	  any	  bystander	  harm	  its	  combatants	  cause	  seems	  both	  unfair	  and	  counterintuitive.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Seth	  Lazar,	  “Skepticism	  about	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  208.	  13	  Though	  to	  be	  clear,	  Lazar’s	  ultimate	  conclusion	  is	  that	  compensation	  should	  take	  a	  backseat	  to	  the	  more	  important	  forward-­‐looking	  tasks	  of	  reconstruction	  and	  establishing	  a	  lasting	  peace.	  	  Prioritizing	  compensation,	  Lazar	  argues,	  draws	  resources	  away	  from	  other	  more	  important	  postwar	  goals.	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To	  support	  the	  preceding	  claim,	  consider	  a	  domestic	  analogue.	  	  Suppose	  an	  aggressor	  culpably	  attacks	  an	  innocent	  victim.	  	  In	  defending	  against	  aggressor’s	  attack,	  victim	  foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally	  harms	  bystander.	  	  By	  Cavanaugh’s	  and	  Lazar’s	  reasoning,	  victim	  should	  be	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  harmed	  bystander	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  the	  bystander	  has	  suffered.	  	  Yet	  that	  conclusion	  seems	  counterintuitive.	  	  Aggressor	  is	  culpably	  responsible	  for	  forcing	  the	  violent	  situation;	  victim	  is	  responsible	  for	  permissibly	  redirecting	  aggressor’s	  harm.	  	  Given	  this	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties,	  it	  seems	  fairer	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  aggressor	  –	  and	  
only	  the	  aggressor	  –	  should	  be	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  bystander	  (assuming	  aggressor	  is	  able	  to	  pay;	  we’ll	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point).	  	  But	  if	  that’s	  true,	  why	  shouldn’t	  we	  think	  the	  same	  holds	  in	  cases	  of	  compensating	  bystanders	  collaterally	  harmed	  during	  war?	  But	  in	  fairness	  to	  Cavanaugh,	  he	  does	  seem	  to	  concede	  that	  the	  unjust	  state	  also	  bears	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  his	  passage,	  Cavanaugh	  suggests	  that	  the	  vanquished	  state	  shares	  in	  the	  compensatory	  obligation.	  	  However,	  that’s	  a	  puzzling	  conclusion.	  	  After	  all,	  he	  started	  out	  by	  saying	  the	  just	  combatants	  bear	  “full”	  and	  “complete”	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  	  But	  if	  the	  just	  combatants	  were	  fully	  responsible	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm,	  why	  would	  the	  unjust	  state	  incur	  an	  obligation	  to	  share	  the	  compensatory	  burden?	  	  The	  fact	  that	  Cavanaugh	  recognizes	  that	  the	  unjust	  state	  has	  a	  compensatory	  obligation	  suggests	  he	  also	  recognizes	  they	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  	  But	  even	  so,	  Cavanaugh	  still	  thinks	  the	  just	  state	  is	  strictly	  obligated	  to	  help	  pay	  the	  restitutive	  bill.	  	  That	  conclusion	  seems	  off	  target.	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7.1.5	  Shifted	  Responsibility	  and	  Restitution	  The	  problem	  with	  Lazar’s	  and	  Cavanaugh’s	  suggested	  strict	  liability	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  glosses	  over	  important	  differences	  in	  responsibility	  for	  collateral	  harm.	  	  In	  short,	  they	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  shifted	  responsibility	  (or	  in	  Cavanaugh’s	  case,	  to	  account	  for	  it	  adequately).	  	  Instead,	  they	  merely	  suggest	  that	  any	  party	  who	  inflicts	  wrongful	  harm	  should	  compensate	  for	  that	  harm.	  	  But	  that	  approach	  lacks	  important	  nuance.	  	  Although	  Cavanaugh	  and	  Lazar	  are	  right	  to	  say	  that	  just	  combatants	  sometimes	  inflict	  wrongful	  harm	  on	  bystanders,	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  therefore	  all	  things	  considered	  obligated	  to	  pay.	  	   Instead,	  compensatory	  obligations	  should	  be	  allocated	  in	  a	  principled	  way	  that	  takes	  shifted	  responsibility	  into	  account.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  wrongfully	  harmed	  bystanders	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  parties	  most	  responsible.	  	  And	  since	  most	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  harm	  shifts	  to	  the	  culpable	  leadership	  and	  to	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  but	  morally	  responsible	  unjust	  citizens	  responsible	  for	  the	  war,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  the	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  the	  harmed	  bystanders	  should	  fall	  to	  those	  parties	  first.	  
7.1.6	  Primary	  Obligation	  to	  Pay	  Restitution	  If	  the	  fairest	  way	  to	  allocate	  restitutive	  obligations	  is	  based	  on	  responsibility,	  then	  the	  primary	  obligation	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  culpable	  parties	  who	  initiated	  and	  prosecuted	  the	  aggression	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  senior	  unjust	  civilian	  and	  military	  leaders.	  	  Since	  they	  bear	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  putting	  the	  bystanders	  in	  harm’s	  way,	  they	  should	  also	  bear	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  compensating	  the	  bystanders’	  harm.	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  In	  support	  of	  this	  claim,	  consider	  the	  following	  domestic	  case	  offered	  by	  Kamm.	  	  She	  describes	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  B	  unjustly	  attempts	  to	  kill	  A.	  	  In	  defending	  herself	  against	  B,	  A’s	  defensive	  force	  damages	  a	  bystander’s	  car.	  	  Kamm	  then	  argues:	  “Given	  that	  B	  unjustly	  put	  A	  in	  the	  position	  of	  having	  to	  defend	  himself,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  B	  has	  a	  duty	  to	  compensate	  everyone	  if	  he	  survives.”14	  	  Clearly	  Kamm	  is	  invoking	  shifted	  responsibility	  to	  explain	  her	  conclusion.	  	  Even	  though	  A	  damages	  the	  bystander’s	  car,	  B	  incurs	  the	  obligation	  to	  pay	  bystander	  restitution	  given	  that	  B	  was	  culpably	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  situation.	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  Kamm’s	  suggested	  allocation	  of	  restitutive	  obligations	  for	  collateral	  harm	  in	  domestic	  cases	  also	  holds	  for	  collateral	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  during	  war.	  	  In	  Kamm’s	  domestic	  case,	  B	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  harm	  that	  A	  permissibly	  redirects,	  even	  though	  A	  does	  so	  with	  the	  unintended	  effect	  of	  damaging	  bystander’s	  property.	  	  Accordingly,	  given	  B’s	  responsibility	  for	  the	  situation,	  B	  should	  have	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  that	  bystander	  suffers.	  	  Similarly,	  in	  cases	  of	  war,	  unjust	  state	  leadership	  is	  responsible	  for	  creating	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  permissibly	  redirect,	  even	  though	  the	  combatants	  do	  so	  with	  the	  unintended	  effect	  of	  harming	  some	  bystanders	  or	  their	  property.	  	  Given	  the	  unjust	  leaders’	  responsibility	  for	  the	  situation,	  they	  should	  have	  to	  compensate	  the	  bystanders	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  they	  suffer.	  On	  the	  topic	  of	  reparations,	  Orend	  suggests	  “monetary	  compensation	  due	  to	  Victim	  [state]	  ought	  to	  come,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  from	  the	  personal	  wealth	  of	  those	  political	  and	  military	  elites	  in	  Aggressor	  [state]	  who	  were	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Kamm,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  in	  The	  Moral	  Target,	  157,	  original	  emphasis.	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crime	  of	  aggression.”15	  	  Similarly,	  Gary	  Bass	  argues	  that	  reparation	  bills	  should	  be	  “footed	  directly	  from	  the	  bank	  accounts	  of	  the	  aggressor	  leaders,”	  as	  well	  as	  “war	  supporters	  and	  profiteers.”16	  	  I	  agree,	  although	  I	  think	  their	  claim	  holds	  not	  only	  for	  reparations,	  but	  also	  for	  restitution	  to	  harmed	  bystanders.	  	  If	  the	  aggressor	  state	  leadership	  and	  culpable	  supporters	  are	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  victim	  state	  for	  the	  costs	  of	  war,	  then	  by	  the	  same	  reasoning	  they	  should	  also	  be	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  those	  wrongly	  harmed	  parties	  within	  its	  own	  territory	  or	  in	  neighboring	  states.	  	   The	  general	  point	  is	  this:	  if	  the	  culpable	  unjust	  leaders	  are	  able	  to	  compensate	  for	  all	  the	  bystanders’	  harm,	  they	  should.	  	  And	  sometimes	  they	  may	  be	  able	  to	  do	  just	  that	  if	  they	  are	  former	  oligarchs,	  or	  a	  ruling	  family	  that	  has	  siphoned	  wealth	  off	  the	  population	  for	  generations.	  	  Or	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  in	  cases	  of	  shorter,	  less	  devastating	  wars.	  	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  restitutive	  obligations	  should	  fall	  exclusively	  to	  the	  unjust	  leadership.17	  	  But	  what	  if	  –	  as	  is	  more	  likely	  –	  the	  culpable	  parties	  lack	  the	  resources	  to	  pay	  full	  compensation	  by	  themselves?	  
7.1.7	  Secondary	  Obligation	  to	  Pay	  Restitution	  Imagine	  a	  protracted	  war	  that	  results	  in	  widespread	  devastation,	  with	  numerous	  bystanders	  harmed	  during	  the	  fighting.	  	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  there’s	  good	  chance	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Brian	  Orend,	  The	  Morality	  of	  War	  (Peterborough,	  Ont:	  Broadview	  Press,	  2006):	  166.	  16	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  408.	  17	  In	  cases	  where	  unjust	  leaders	  or	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  obligated	  to	  pay	  restitution,	  the	  just	  state	  might	  have	  a	  parasitic	  obligation	  to	  ensure	  the	  liable	  parties	  fulfill	  their	  compensatory	  obligations.	  	  This	  obligation	  might	  arise,	  for	  example,	  in	  postwar	  situations	  where	  the	  just	  state	  occupies	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state	  and	  temporarily	  oversees	  state	  financial	  institutions	  such	  as	  banking	  and	  finance.	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culpable	  unjust	  leaders	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  compensate	  the	  harmed	  bystanders	  adequately	  at	  war’s	  end.18	  	  But	  if	  the	  bystanders	  are	  nevertheless	  owed	  restitution,	  to	  whom	  should	  the	  remaining	  obligation	  fall?	  	   If	  the	  primary	  parties	  cannot	  pay,	  then	  the	  obligation	  should	  shift	  to	  the	  secondary	  parties	  who	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression:	  the	  unjust	  citizenry.	  	  Given	  their	  institutional	  responsibility,	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  financially	  responsible	  for	  state	  actions;	  the	  state	  acts	  in	  their	  name,	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  unjust	  civilians	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  state’s	  aggression,	  and	  this	  duty	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  paying	  the	  financial	  costs	  of	  the	  war.	  	  They	  are	  liable	  to	  pay	  restitution	  and	  reparations;	  so	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  the	  obligation	  to	  compensate	  harmed	  bystanders	  should	  fall	  to	  them	  before	  falling	  to	  the	  just	  citizens.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  latter	  were	  completely	  innocent	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war,	  whereas	  the	  former	  bore	  at	  least	  some	  responsibility.	  But	  in	  order	  for	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  to	  pay	  restitution,	  the	  funds	  likely	  will	  need	  to	  come	  from	  state	  tax	  coffers	  –	  a	  fact	  which	  might	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  objection.	  	  Because	  taxes	  fall	  to	  the	  entire	  populace,	  innocent	  parties	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  pay.	  	  As	  Coady	  points	  out,	  the	  tax	  burden	  would	  “fall	  on	  the	  guilty	  and	  the	  innocent	  alike.”19	  	  According	  to	  Lazar,	  “innocent	  people	  will	  inevitably	  pay	  a	  steep	  price	  for	  the	  crimes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Gary	  J.	  Bass,	  "Jus	  Post	  Bellum,"	  408;	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends,	  186.	  19	  C.A.J.	  Coady,	  “The	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  in	  New	  Wars	  and	  New	  Soldiers:	  Military	  Ethics	  
in	  the	  Contemporary	  World,	  ed.	  Paolo	  Tripodi	  and	  Jessica	  Wolfendale	  (Burlington,	  VT:	  Ashgate,	  2011),	  58.	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of	  others.”20	  	  Orend	  agrees,	  arguing	  that	  taxing	  the	  entire	  unjust	  state	  fails	  to	  discriminate	  adequately.21	  I	  think	  this	  objection	  can	  be	  overcome	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  First,	  as	  I’ve	  already	  argued	  at	  length,	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  share	  responsibility	  for	  their	  state’s	  aggression.	  	  Given	  their	  institutional	  responsibility,	  they	  are	  liable	  to	  pay	  restitution	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  their	  state	  has	  caused.	  	  And	  if	  that’s	  right,	  then	  most	  unjust	  citizens	  will	  not	  be	  wronged	  when	  taxed	  for	  restitutive	  purposes.	  	  Thus,	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  innocent	  people	  harmed	  by	  taxation	  will	  in	  fact	  be	  quite	  small.	  Second,	  although	  some	  bystanders	  will	  be	  taxed,	  taxing	  them	  is	  justified	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil.	  	  Otherwise,	  if	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  weren’t	  forced	  to	  pay,	  then	  either	  the	  entire	  just	  citizenry	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  or,	  worse	  still,	  the	  harmed	  bystanders	  would	  simply	  go	  uncompensated.	  	  Assuming	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  worst	  option,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  either	  the	  entire	  just	  citizenry	  or	  the	  entire	  unjust	  citizenry	  will	  have	  to	  be	  taxed.	  	  But	  if	  most	  unjust	  civilians	  share	  some	  responsibility	  for	  the	  war	  and	  no	  just	  citizens	  do,	  then	  taxing	  the	  unjust	  citizens	  would	  be	  a	  lesser	  evil	  than	  taxing	  the	  just	  citizens	  (assuming	  that	  taxing	  either	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  wrongly	  harm	  innocent	  people).	  Walzer	  argues	  along	  this	  same	  line	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  reparations.	  	  He	  writes:	  Reparations	  are	  surely	  due	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  aggressive	  war,	  and	  they	  can	  hardly	  be	  collected	  only	  from	  those	  members	  of	  the	  defeated	  state	  who	  were	  active	  supporters	  of	  the	  aggression.	  	  Instead,	  the	  costs	  are	  distributed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Lazar,	  “Skepticism	  About	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  210.	  21	  Orend,	  The	  Morality	  of	  War,	  167.	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through	  the	  tax	  system,	  and	  through	  the	  economic	  system	  generally,	  among	  all	  the	  citizens….22	  	  Recognizing	  that	  some	  innocent	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  contribute,	  Walzer	  justifies	  the	  taxation	  as	  a	  “consequence	  of	  citizenship.”23	  	  Although	  Walzer	  doesn’t	  expressly	  justify	  this	  ‘consequence’	  as	  a	  lesser	  evil,	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  what	  he	  has	  in	  mind:	  We	  penalize	  innocent	  people,	  including	  children,	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  in	  a	  constrained	  way,	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  innocent	  people	  in	  the	  state	  that	  was	  unjustly	  attacked.	  	  And	  that	  is	  jus	  post	  bellum:	  not	  perfect,	  but	  as	  good	  as	  it	  can	  be.24	  	  Although	  Walzer’s	  comments	  are	  about	  reparations,	  the	  same	  reasoning	  should	  also	  justify	  taxing	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  to	  pay	  restitution.	  	  Taxing	  the	  entire	  unjust	  citizenry	  –	  even	  though	  it	  will	  tax	  some	  innocent	  people	  –	  is	  a	  lesser	  evil	  than	  either	  taxing	  the	  entire	  just	  citizenry,	  or	  allowing	  the	  harmed	  bystanders	  to	  go	  uncompensated.	  
7.1.8	  The	  Just	  State’s	  Obligation	  to	  Pay	  Restitution	  Thus	  far	  I’ve	  argued	  that	  unjust	  state	  leaders	  are	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  harmed	  bystanders	  and,	  should	  those	  leaders	  be	  unable	  to	  compensate,	  then	  the	  compensatory	  obligation	  should	  shift	  to	  the	  unjust	  citizenry.	  	  But	  what	  if	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  also	  is	  unable	  to	  compensate	  innocent	  parties	  for	  the	  wrongful	  losses	  they’ve	  suffered?	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  war,	  the	  defeated	  state	  may	  simply	  lack	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Walzer,	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars,	  297.	  	  See	  also	  Walzer,	  “The	  Aftermath	  of	  War,”	  42.	  23	  Ibid.	  	  Echoing	  Walzer’s	  sentiment,	  Gary	  Bass	  remarks	  that	  taxing	  the	  unjust	  state	  might	  be	  a	  “partial	  national	  price”	  to	  pay	  for	  state	  sovereignty.	  	  	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  408.	  24	  Walzer,	  “The	  Aftermath	  of	  War,”	  42.	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requisite	  funds	  to	  compensate	  harmed	  bystanders.25	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  I	  do	  think	  the	  just	  state	  incurs	  an	  obligation	  to	  pay	  some	  restitution	  to	  the	  non-­‐liable	  parties	  whom	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  harmed.	  Once	  again,	  we	  can	  begin	  the	  analysis	  by	  looking	  at	  a	  domestic	  case:	  
Destitute	  Aggressor.	  	  Destitute	  aggressor	  culpably	  attacks	  victim	  with	  lethal	  force.	  	  Victim	  can	  defend	  herself	  only	  in	  a	  way	  that	  also	  risks	  harming	  a	  nearby	  bystander.	  	  Victim	  chooses	  to	  defend	  herself;	  she	  kills	  aggressor,	  and	  harms	  bystander	  in	  the	  process.	  	  In	  Destitute	  Aggressor,	  bystander	  suffers	  wrongful	  harm	  and	  deserves	  to	  be	  compensated.	  	  Normally,	  that	  compensatory	  obligation	  would	  shift	  to	  the	  aggressor	  who	  culpably	  created	  the	  situation.	  	  Yet	  in	  this	  case,	  aggressor	  is	  deceased,	  destitute,	  and	  unable	  to	  pay.	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  I	  think	  victim	  is	  obligated	  to	  compensate	  the	  bystander.	  	  Although	  victim	  was	  permitted	  to	  defend	  herself,	  she’s	  morally	  responsible	  for	  infringing	  bystander’s	  right	  not	  to	  be	  harmed.	  	  Because	  no	  party	  bearing	  more	  responsibility	  for	  the	  rights	  infringement	  is	  able	  to	  pay,	  victim	  is	  all	  things	  considered	  obligated	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  rationale	  underlying	  victim’s	  compensatory	  obligation	  is	  one	  of	  corrective	  justice.	  	  As	  Coleman	  and	  Ripstein	  argue,	  “each	  of	  us	  should	  bear	  the	  costs	  our	  conduct	  imposes	  on	  others;	  otherwise,	  we	  force	  others	  to	  bear	  costs	  which	  are	  properly	  ours	  –	  the	  costs	  resulting	  from	  the	  expression	  of	  our	  agency	  through	  our	  decisions	  and	  choices.”26	  	  Victim	  cannot	  choose	  to	  solve	  her	  problem	  at	  bystander’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Patterson,	  “Ending	  Wars	  Well,”	  140-­‐41;	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends,	  192.	  26	  Jules	  Coleman	  and	  Arthur	  Ripstein,	  "Mischief	  and	  Misfortune,"	  McGill	  LJ	  41	  (1995):	  94.	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expense	  with	  complete	  impunity.27	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  victim	  cannot	  shift	  the	  costs	  of	  her	  defense	  onto	  an	  innocent	  party	  and	  simply	  allow	  the	  burden	  to	  remain	  there.	  	  Infringing	  the	  rights	  of	  an	  innocent	  party	  during	  self-­‐defense	  creates	  a	  residual	  injustice	  that	  must	  be	  righted.	  Just	  as	  the	  victim	  in	  Destitute	  Aggressor	  has	  a	  restitutive	  obligation	  towards	  bystander,	  so	  too	  just	  states	  sometimes	  may	  have	  restitutive	  obligations	  toward	  bystanders	  whom	  they’ve	  harmed	  during	  war.	  	  Although	  just	  combatants	  are	  permitted	  to	  defend	  themselves	  and	  their	  fellow	  citizens,	  they	  still	  share	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  they	  cause.	  	  The	  just	  state	  cannot	  simply	  defend	  itself	  at	  the	  bystanders’	  expense.	  	  Given	  that	  the	  just	  combatants	  share	  responsibility	  for	  those	  rights	  infringements,	  the	  just	  state	  incurs	  a	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  to	  compensate.	  In	  most	  cases,	  this	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  would	  not	  become	  an	  all	  things	  considered	  obligation	  to	  compensate.	  	  Instead,	  the	  just	  state’s	  prima	  facie	  obligation	  would	  be	  overridden	  by	  the	  unjust	  leaders’	  and	  unjust	  citizens’	  obligation	  to	  render	  restitution.	  	  But	  in	  cases	  where	  those	  parties	  lack	  sufficient	  resources,	  some	  compensatory	  obligation	  will	  shift	  to	  the	  just	  state.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  harmed	  innocent	  parties	  would	  go	  uncompensated	  unless	  indemnified	  by	  the	  just	  citizenry,	  then	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  the	  just	  citizenry	  should	  be	  obligated	  to	  pay	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  As	  Epstein	  puts	  the	  point,	  “prima	  facie,	  one	  man	  should	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  solve	  his	  own	  problems	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  physical	  harm	  to	  another.”	  	  Richard	  A.	  Epstein,	  "Defenses	  and	  Subsequent	  Pleas	  in	  a	  System	  of	  Strict	  Liability,"	  J.Legal	  Stud.	  3	  (1974):	  169.	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restitution.28	  	  The	  just	  state	  cannot	  let	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  defense	  lie	  with	  the	  harmed	  innocent	  bystanders.	  However,	  that’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  on	  the	  hook	  for	  the	  entire	  restitution	  amount	  that	  the	  bystanders	  are	  due.	  	  After	  all,	  postwar	  compensation	  is	  divisible,	  and	  need	  not	  be	  all	  or	  nothing.	  	  So	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness	  to	  the	  just	  citizens,	  their	  compensatory	  burden	  should	  correspond	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  responsibility	  their	  state	  bears	  for	  the	  bystanders’	  plight.	  	  Given	  their	  reduced	  level	  of	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collateral	  harm	  (relative	  to	  the	  other	  parties),	  the	  just	  citizenry	  should	  only	  be	  required	  to	  pay	  a	  correspondingly	  reduced	  amount	  of	  restitution.	  Exactly	  how	  much	  restitution	  the	  just	  state	  should	  pay	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  debate.	  	  Lazar	  estimates	  that	  compensating	  the	  family	  of	  a	  deceased	  person	  killed	  in	  war	  would	  “amount	  to	  millions	  of	  dollars	  per	  victim”	  based	  on	  lost	  earnings	  and	  suffering.29	  	  But	  assuming	  the	  just	  state	  pays	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  what	  is	  ideally	  owed,	  the	  total	  amount	  may	  be	  manageable.	  	  Yet	  as	  Lazar	  rightly	  warns,	  the	  compensation	  amount	  quickly	  threatens	  to	  become	  a	  “crippling	  compensatory	  burden.”30	  	  In	  reply,	  I	  think	  the	  best	  we	  can	  say	  is	  that	  the	  just	  state’s	  restitutive	  obligation	  must	  be	  reasonable.31	  	  The	  just	  state	  need	  not	  bankrupt	  itself	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  harmed	  innocent	  parties.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  An	  interesting	  question	  that	  I	  won’t	  pursue	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  just	  state’s	  restitutive	  payments	  are	  an	  additional	  cost	  of	  war	  for	  which	  the	  just	  state	  might	  rightly	  seek	  future	  reparative	  compensation	  from	  the	  unjust	  state.	  29	  Lazar,	  “Skepticism	  about	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  207.	  30	  Ibid.,	  208.	  31	  A	  separate	  issue	  –	  though	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  –	  is	  whether	  the	  harmed	  bystanders	  might	  have	  a	  claim	  for	  future	  restitutive	  payment	  from	  the	  unjust	  state	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7.2	  Physical	  and	  Institutional	  Reconstruction	  Obligation	  We’ll	  now	  shift	  focus	  and	  consider	  whether	  victorious	  just	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  help	  physically	  reconstruct	  defeated	  aggressor	  states	  at	  war’s	  end.	  	  By	  “reconstruction”	  I	  mean	  the	  rebuilding	  or	  restoration	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  other	  public	  goods	  and	  non-­‐essential	  institutions.32	  	  Common	  examples	  include	  roads,	  bridges,	  public	  utilities,	  government	  buildings,	  and	  financial	  institutions	  and	  markets.	  	   According	  to	  Cecile	  Fabre,	  the	  moral	  principle	  that	  “victorious	  belligerents	  ought	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  vanquished	  country/countries”	  is	  “relatively	  canonical.”33	  	  If	  Fabre	  is	  right	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  reconstruction	  is	  the	  orthodox	  view,	  then	  I	  find	  the	  orthodox	  view	  problematic,	  unjustified,	  and	  in	  need	  of	  revision.	  	  As	  we’ll	  see,	  though,	  Fabre	  is	  right	  to	  claim	  that	  many	  theorists	  agree	  that	  victorious	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  help	  reconstruct	  defeated	  states.	  	  The	  justifications	  they	  offer	  to	  ground	  this	  obligation	  fall	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  one	  based	  on	  the	  just	  state’s	  right	  intention	  for	  going	  to	  war,	  and	  the	  other	  based	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  wartime	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people.	  	  We’ll	  look	  at	  each	  in	  turn.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  should	  it	  become	  able	  to	  pay.	  	  This	  suggestion	  might	  be	  problematic	  for	  two	  reasons.	  	  First,	  at	  some	  point	  future	  restitutive	  obligations	  will	  begin	  to	  harm	  innocent	  parties.	  	  Second,	  as	  a	  pragmatic	  concern,	  significant	  reparative	  burdens	  extending	  far	  into	  the	  future	  may	  sow	  the	  seeds	  for	  future	  conflict,	  such	  as	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  did	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I.	  	  Regardless,	  even	  if	  innocent	  parties	  harmed	  during	  war	  have	  a	  reasonable	  amount	  of	  future	  claims	  against	  the	  unjust	  state,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  such	  compensation	  would	  fall	  to	  the	  international	  community,	  not	  to	  the	  victorious	  just	  state.	  32	  Life	  essential	  services	  would	  fall	  under	  the	  discussion	  of	  transitional	  security	  and	  humanitarian	  aid.	  33	  Fabre,	  Cosmopolitan	  War,	  4-­‐5.	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7.2.1	  Right	  Intention	  Approach	  Many	  theorists	  appeal	  to	  the	  jus	  as	  bellum	  criterion	  of	  right	  intention	  as	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  underlying	  the	  just	  state’s	  reconstructive	  obligations.	  	  The	  right	  intention	  for	  going	  to	  war,	  they	  argue,	  is	  to	  secure	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace.	  	  And	  given	  that	  one	  intends	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace,	  one	  must	  necessarily	  engage	  in	  reconstructive	  efforts	  to	  help	  the	  defeated	  state	  overcome	  its	  devastation.	  	  The	  apparent	  unstated	  assumption	  in	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  postwar	  peace	  between	  victors	  and	  vanquished	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  until	  the	  defeated	  state	  is	  adequately	  rebuilt.	  	  But	  the	  general	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  just	  state’s	  postwar	  reconstruction	  obligation	  is	  derivative	  from	  the	  just	  state’s	  right	  intention	  for	  going	  to	  war	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  to	  establish	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace.	  	   This	  right	  intention	  argument	  appears	  somewhat	  frequently	  in	  the	  postwar	  reconstruction	  literature.	  	  Allman	  and	  Winright,	  for	  example,	  hold	  that	  “reconstruction	  is	  neither	  a	  gift	  or	  a	  donation,	  nor	  is	  it	  optional.”	  	  Rather,	  they	  argue,	  reconstruction	  is	  “a	  constitutive	  dimension	  of	  just	  cause	  and	  right	  intent….”34	  They	  later	  remark:	  In	  destroying	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  a	  nation	  and	  crippling	  its	  economy	  through	  war,	  even	  if	  one	  has	  justified	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so,	  a	  nation	  automatically	  assumes	  responsibility	  for	  the	  economic	  recovery	  of	  the	  vanquished.	  	  If	  the	  aim	  of	  a	  just	  war	  is	  the	  tranquility	  that	  comes	  from	  order,	  then	  the	  jobs,	  infrastructure,	  and	  banking	  and	  financial	  institutions	  needed	  to	  bring	  economic	  stability	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  concomitant	  duties	  implicit	  in	  the	  
reasons	  cited	  for	  going	  to	  war	  in	  the	  first	  place.35	  	  Mark	  Evans	  employs	  the	  same	  line	  of	  reasoning.	  	  He	  writes:	  “Postwar	  reconstruction	  is	  not	  a	  supererogatory	  act	  of	  charity	  to	  one’s	  vanquished	  enemies,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Allman	  and	  Winright,	  After	  the	  Smoke	  Clears,	  144.	  35	  Ibid.,	  163,	  my	  emphasis.	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but	  rather	  a	  manifestation	  of	  a	  duty,	  derived	  from	  the	  original	  taking-­‐up	  of	  arms,	  to	  do	  what	  one	  can	  to	  build	  a	  new,	  durably	  peaceful,	  and	  just	  world.”36	  	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that,	  “to	  secure	  the	  post	  bellum	  justice	  sought	  in	  the	  resort	  to	  war,	  just	  combatants	  must	  be	  prepared	  to	  …	  take	  full	  responsibility	  for	  their	  share	  of	  the	  material	  burdens	  of	  the	  conflict’s	  aftermath	  in	  constructing	  a	  just	  and	  stable	  peace.”37	  Similarly,	  Iasiello	  argues	  that	  because	  all	  just	  wars	  are	  fought	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  producing	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace,	  victors	  must	  help	  rebuild	  the	  defeated	  society,	  to	  include	  public	  utilities,	  schools,	  places	  of	  worship,	  transportation,	  and	  communications.38	  	  Iasiello’s	  claim	  here	  closely	  follows	  Allman,	  Winright,	  and	  Evans.	  	  All	  of	  these	  commentators	  agree	  that	  because	  the	  just	  state	  goes	  to	  war	  intending	  to	  establish	  a	  lasting	  peace,	  the	  just	  state	  must	  help	  reverse	  the	  damage	  its	  troops	  have	  inflicted	  on	  the	  unjust	  state’s	  economy	  and	  infrastructure.	  
7.2.2	  Skepticism	  about	  the	  Right	  Intention	  Approach	  Although	  the	  right	  intention	  justification	  for	  reconstructive	  duties	  has	  some	  intuitive	  appeal,	  nevertheless	  I	  think	  it	  fails.	  	  The	  weakness	  of	  the	  right	  intention	  argument	  is	  its	  hypothetical	  imperative	  structure:	  if	  one	  intends	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace,	  then	  one	  must	  do	  what’s	  necessary	  toward	  that	  end,	  such	  as	  reconstructing	  the	  defeated	  state.	  	  But	  this	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  reconstruct	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Evans,	  “Moral	  Responsibilities	  and	  Conflicting	  Demands,”	  154.	  37	  Ibid.,	  155.	  38	  Iasiello,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  43.	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conditional	  upon	  the	  intent	  to	  secure	  a	  lasting	  peace.	  	  So	  if	  one	  lacks	  the	  antecedent	  intent	  to	  secure	  a	  lasting	  peace,	  there’s	  no	  subsequent	  imperative	  to	  rebuild.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  right	  intention	  relied	  upon	  is	  questionable.	  	  As	  Roger	  Williams	  and	  Dan	  Caldwell	  point	  out,	  “right	  intention	  is	  subject	  to	  diverse	  interpretations,	  none	  of	  which	  has	  ever	  assumed	  a	  clearly	  preeminent	  position	  among	  theorists	  and	  policy	  makers.”39	  	  In	  fact,	  there’s	  support	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  what	  one	  rightly	  intends	  when	  initiating	  war	  is	  something	  short	  of	  a	  just	  and	  lasting	  peace.	  	  According	  to	  Vattel,	  the	  object	  of	  waging	  war	  is	  to	  protect	  from	  injury	  and	  to	  repel	  violence.40	  	  Or	  as	  Gary	  Bass	  puts	  it,	  sometimes	  one’s	  goal	  in	  waging	  war	  is	  “mere	  self-­‐defense.”41	  	  The	  preceding	  claim	  should	  not	  surprise	  us.	  	  In	  domestic	  assault	  cases,	  we	  wouldn’t	  fault	  attack	  victims	  if	  they	  intended	  only	  to	  defend	  themselves.	  	  Victims	  aren’t	  expected	  to	  defend	  with	  an	  eye	  toward	  forging	  pacific	  relations	  with	  their	  former	  assailants	  –	  at	  least	  not	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  saddle	  the	  victims	  with	  post-­‐conflict	  duties	  to	  rebuild	  their	  attackers’	  lives	  and	  property.	  In	  domestic	  self-­‐defense	  cases,	  the	  right	  intention	  for	  using	  defensive	  force	  is	  simply	  to	  repel	  aggression.	  	  The	  same	  holds	  true	  for	  national	  defense	  situations.	  	  A	  just	  state’s	  right	  intention	  should	  be	  to	  halt	  the	  aggression	  that	  grounded	  its	  just	  cause	  for	  going	  to	  war.	  	  If	  that	  is	  right,	  this	  fact	  seems	  to	  undercut	  the	  argument	  that	  postwar	  reconstructive	  obligations	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  principle	  of	  right	  intention.	  	  If	  the	  just	  state	  intends	  only	  to	  ward	  off	  aggression,	  then	  it’s	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Robert	  Williams	  Jr.	  and	  Dan	  Caldwell,	  "Jus	  Post	  Bellum:	  Just	  War	  Theory	  and	  the	  Principles	  of	  Just	  Peace,"	  International	  Studies	  Perspectives	  7,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  312.	  40	  de	  Vattel,	  The	  Law	  of	  Nations,	  484.	  41	  Gary	  Bass,	  "Jus	  Post	  Bellum,"	  393.	  
	   256	  
clear	  why	  such	  a	  state	  would	  incur	  a	  postwar	  obligation	  to	  help	  reconstruct	  the	  defeated	  state.	  
7.2.3	  Wrongful	  Harm	  Approach	  Although	  some	  theorists	  appeal	  to	  right	  intention	  to	  ground	  reconstruction	  obligations,	  a	  majority	  point	  to	  wartime	  harm	  to	  innocent	  people	  as	  the	  proper	  grounds.	  	  The	  general	  idea	  is	  this:	  by	  damaging	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions,	  the	  just	  combatants	  have	  harmed	  everyone	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  –	  to	  include	  innocent	  people.	  	  And	  because	  the	  just	  state	  has	  harmed	  innocent	  people,	  it	  incurs	  an	  obligation	  to	  help	  reconstruct	  the	  defeated	  state	  to	  undo	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  the	  bystanders	  suffered.	  Numerous	  theorists	  endorse	  this	  approach.	  	  Gary	  Bass	  writes:	  Wartime	  damage	  inflicts	  a	  collective	  harm	  on	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  country,	  including	  upon	  citizens	  who	  did	  not	  consent	  to	  the	  war	  or	  who	  played	  a	  trivial	  role	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  that	  does	  not	  merit	  the	  kind	  of	  suffering	  they	  endured	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  policies	  adopted	  in	  foreign	  ministries	  and	  cabinet	  meetings.42	  	  From	  this,	  Bass	  concludes	  that	  victors	  incur	  “some	  obligation	  to	  restore	  wartime	  damage,”	  including	  “economic	  restoration.”43	  	   Tony	  Coady	  echoes	  Bass’s	  suggestion,	  noting:	  It	  may	  seem	  paradoxical	  that	  just	  victors	  should	  acquire	  obligations	  to	  restore	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  unjust,	  defeated	  enemy,	  but	  several	  considerations	  support	  this.	  	  One	  is	  that	  …	  very	  many	  enemy	  citizens	  will	  not	  be	  seriously	  responsible	  for	  the	  war	  and	  deserve	  help	  in	  recovering	  from	  the	  distress	  of	  it;	  another	  is	  that	  where	  the	  enemy	  country	  has	  been	  attacked,	  much	  collateral	  damage	  will	  have	  been	  created	  to	  civilian	  property,	  health	  and	  livelihood,	  and	  even	  where	  this	  was	  licit	  (sanctioned	  by	  double	  effect	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  407.	  43	  Ibid.,	  406.	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whatever)	  it	  is	  damage	  that	  should	  be	  repaired,	  preferably	  by	  those	  who	  inflicted	  it.44	  	  Similarly,	  Lazar	  suggests,	  “even	  justified	  warfighting	  involves	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  pro	  
tanto	  wrongdoing	  –	  perhaps	  this	  can	  ground	  just	  belligerents’	  liability	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  reconstruction.”45	  	   A	  final	  example	  of	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  approach	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Frowe,	  who	  writes:	  Even	  just,	  defensive	  wars	  inflict	  harms	  upon	  innocent	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  the	  aggressor	  nation.	  …	  Since,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  defending	  themselves,	  the	  victors	  have	  inflicted	  harms	  upon	  innocent	  people,	  they	  may	  owe	  it	  to	  those	  people	  to	  help	  rebuild	  their	  state	  as	  a	  form	  of	  apology	  or	  compensation.46	  	  The	  underlying	  claim	  in	  each	  of	  these	  quotes	  is	  the	  same.	  	  By	  damaging	  state	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions,	  just	  combatants	  inevitably	  harm	  innocent	  and	  non-­‐innocent	  parties	  alike.	  	  And	  it	  is	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  innocent	  parties	  that	  generates	  the	  just	  state’s	  postwar	  obligation	  to	  help	  rebuild	  the	  defeated	  state.	  
7.2.4	  Skepticism	  about	  the	  Wrongful	  Harm	  Approach	  In	  response	  to	  this	  proposed	  wrongful	  harm	  approach,	  two	  points	  are	  worth	  making.	  	  First,	  unlike	  the	  theorists	  cited	  above,	  I	  think	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  liable	  to	  the	  harm	  inflicted	  by	  the	  just	  state.	  	  Whether	  the	  just	  combatants	  damage	  public	  or	  personal	  property	  makes	  no	  difference;	  unjust	  citizens	  are	  liable	  to	  both.	  	  Because	  the	  just	  citizenry	  was	  defending	  against	  aggression	  from	  unjust	  state	  institutions,	  those	  unjust	  state	  assets	  were	  liable	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Coady,	  “The	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  62.	  45	  Lazar,	  “Skepticism	  about	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,	  216.	  46	  Frowe,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  213.	  	  Though	  to	  be	  clear,	  Frowe’s	  text	  surveys	  different	  positions,	  and	  it’s	  not	  clear	  whether	  Frowe	  actually	  embraces	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  approach	  herself.	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destroyed.	  	  Thus,	  relative	  to	  most	  citizens,	  the	  just	  combatants	  destroy	  public	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions	  with	  liability	  justification.	  	  So	  even	  if	  one	  thinks	  the	  public	  shares	  ownership	  of	  state	  infrastructure,	  most	  of	  the	  public	  was	  liable	  to	  suffer	  its	  destruction	  and	  thus	  was	  not	  wronged.	  	  And	  as	  previously	  discussed,	  harm	  inflicted	  with	  liability	  justification	  doesn’t	  ground	  an	  obligation	  of	  restitution	  or	  restoration.	  	   Nevertheless,	  the	  above	  theorists	  will	  argue	  that	  some	  people	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state	  are	  completely	  innocent	  during	  war,	  and	  surely	  these	  bystanders	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  degradation	  of	  public	  goods.	  	  As	  a	  quick	  response,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  because	  many	  bystanders	  are	  non-­‐citizens	  visiting,	  travelling	  through,	  or	  temporarily	  working	  in	  the	  aggressor	  state,	  they	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  no	  legitimate	  claim	  for	  reconstruction	  of	  state	  goods	  in	  a	  state	  not	  their	  own.	  	  And	  in	  the	  case	  of	  children,	  one	  might	  argue	  they	  have	  no	  legitimate	  claim	  regarding	  the	  restoration	  of	  public	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions	  to	  which	  they	  have	  not	  contributed.	  But	  let’s	  assume	  bystanders	  do	  have	  legitimate	  claims	  for	  the	  restoration	  of	  non-­‐essential	  public	  goods.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  undo	  some	  of	  the	  public	  harm	  that	  has	  befallen	  the	  bystanders.47	  	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  second	  point	  that	  cuts	  against	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  justification:	  shifted	  responsibility	  points	  to	  the	  unjust	  state	  as	  the	  proper	  bearer	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  restore	  public	  goods.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  As	  I’ve	  argued	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  bystanders	  may	  be	  owed	  restitution	  to	  compensate	  them	  for	  the	  personal	  harms	  and	  losses	  they	  suffer.	  	  The	  issue	  under	  consideration	  now	  is	  whether	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  rebuild	  the	  aggressor	  state	  in	  order	  to	  undo	  harm	  to	  bystanders	  stemming	  from	  the	  destruction	  of	  public	  goods.	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If	  bystanders	  have	  a	  claim	  for	  public	  reconstruction,	  their	  claim	  is	  against	  the	  parties	  responsible	  for	  bringing	  harm	  to	  the	  aggressor	  state	  –	  namely,	  the	  culpable	  unjust	  regime,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  unjust	  citizenry	  who	  bears	  responsibility	  for	  the	  state	  institutions	  that	  malfunctioned.	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fairness,	  those	  culpable	  and	  responsible	  parties	  should	  have	  to	  shoulder	  the	  costs	  of	  rebuilding	  rather	  than	  the	  just	  state	  citizens	  forced	  to	  defend	  themselves.	  	  Just	  as	  we	  expect	  parties	  responsible	  for	  domestic	  aggression	  to	  shoulder	  the	  costs	  of	  their	  unjust	  actions,	  so	  too	  the	  unjust	  state	  should	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  costs	  of	  its	  aggression.	  	  As	  May	  rightly	  observes,	  “when	  a	  vanquished	  state	  has	  caused	  damage	  to	  its	  own	  people,	  …	  it	  must	  rebuild	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice.”48	  But,	  one	  might	  ask,	  what	  if	  the	  unjust	  state	  lacks	  the	  resources	  to	  reconstruct	  itself?	  	  In	  that	  case,	  shouldn’t	  the	  burden	  shift	  to	  the	  just	  state	  if	  it	  is	  able	  to	  do	  so?	  	  That’s	  a	  reasonable	  suggestion,	  especially	  because	  I’ve	  already	  argued	  that	  some	  postwar	  obligations	  –	  such	  as	  providing	  transitional	  security	  or	  preventing	  environmental	  harms	  –	  sometimes	  shift	  to	  the	  just	  state	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  primary	  and	  secondary	  parties	  are	  unable	  to	  do	  so.	  	  But	  the	  decisive	  consideration	  in	  those	  cases	  was	  that	  life	  or	  limb	  was	  hanging	  in	  the	  balance.	  	  Yet	  here,	  we’re	  talking	  about	  non-­‐essential	  public	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions	  –	  situations	  in	  which	  life	  and	  limb	  aren’t	  at	  stake.	  	  And	  if	  life	  and	  limb	  aren’t	  at	  stake,	  then	  it’s	  not	  obvious	  why	  the	  reconstructive	  costs	  should	  fall	  to	  the	  defending	  citizenry.	  Undeterred,	  an	  objector	  further	  might	  point	  out	  that	  I’ve	  previously	  argued	  restitutive	  obligations	  sometimes	  shift	  to	  the	  defending	  citizenry,	  and	  the	  payment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends,	  189.	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of	  compensation	  generally	  doesn’t	  involve	  life	  or	  limb.	  	  Although	  that	  may	  be	  right,	  I	  think	  there’s	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  restitution	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  restoration	  of	  public	  goods	  on	  the	  other.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  restitution,	  the	  bystander	  had	  a	  right	  to	  be	  free	  of	  harm,	  and	  a	  right	  that	  his	  property	  not	  be	  destroyed.	  	  Because	  these	  rights	  were	  transgressed,	  the	  bystander	  is	  rightly	  owed	  compensation.	  	  But	  I’m	  skeptical	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  citizens	  have	  a	  right	  to	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  public	  goods.	  	  Though	  they	  may	  be	  inconvenienced	  by	  damaged	  infrastructure	  and	  degraded	  institutions,	  this	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  type	  of	  harm	  that	  transgresses	  any	  of	  the	  bystander’s	  personal	  rights.	  	  Thus,	  it’s	  not	  clear	  on	  what	  grounds	  the	  bystander	  would	  have	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  just	  citizenry.	  Moreover,	  two	  other	  considerations	  tell	  against	  the	  just	  state	  being	  obligated	  to	  reconstruct	  its	  defeated	  adversary.	  	  First,	  requiring	  the	  victim	  state	  to	  rebuild	  or	  otherwise	  compensate	  the	  aggressor	  state	  for	  harm	  caused	  during	  war	  would	  be	  tantamount	  to	  harming	  the	  victim	  state’s	  citizens	  a	  second	  time	  over:	  first,	  by	  being	  attacked	  and	  forced	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  lives;	  and	  second,	  by	  being	  saddled	  with	  the	  bill	  for	  rebuilding	  its	  former	  enemy.	  	  And	  let’s	  not	  forget	  that	  the	  just	  state	  will	  likely	  have	  its	  own	  reconstruction	  projects	  at	  home.	  	  It	  was,	  after	  all,	  the	  state	  originally	  attacked.	  Second,	  requiring	  just	  states	  to	  rebuild	  their	  former	  adversaries	  would	  remove	  an	  important	  deterrent	  against	  aggression.	  	  For	  a	  rogue	  regime	  that	  might	  be	  contemplating	  an	  unjust	  attack,	  the	  potential	  costs	  of	  having	  to	  rebuild	  its	  state	  should	  it	  lose	  the	  unjust	  war	  provides	  a	  strong	  incentive	  against	  committing	  aggression	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  But	  imagine	  if	  just	  war	  victors	  were	  required	  to	  rebuild	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their	  defeated	  adversaries.	  	  In	  that	  case,	  if	  an	  aggressor	  state	  wins	  its	  unjust	  war,	  it	  stands	  to	  keep	  the	  spoils	  of	  war.	  	  Conversely,	  if	  the	  aggressor	  state	  loses	  its	  unjust	  war,	  the	  victim	  state	  would	  be	  required	  to	  undo	  much	  of	  the	  defeated	  state’s	  wartime	  damage.	  	  Oddly,	  in	  this	  case	  much	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  unjust	  state’s	  wrongdoing	  would	  end	  up	  being	  subsidized	  by	  their	  intended	  victims.	  	  That	  result	  can’t	  possibly	  be	  right,	  for	  then	  aggressors	  would	  have	  little	  remaining	  reason	  not	  to	  attempt	  invasion,	  annexation,	  and	  so	  on.	  Relatedly,	  the	  anticipated	  obligation	  to	  rebuild	  one’s	  own	  state	  after	  an	  unjust	  war	  also	  incentivizes	  citizens	  to	  watch	  over	  their	  state	  institutions	  and	  attempt	  to	  control	  or	  influence	  them	  when	  they	  appear	  ready	  to	  commit	  wrong.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  realization	  that	  a	  state	  will	  have	  to	  rebuild	  itself	  after	  losing	  an	  unjust	  war	  also	  encourages	  institutional	  accountability.	  
7.2.5	  Other	  Possibilities	  For	  the	  foregoing	  reasons,	  I	  think	  victorious	  just	  states	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  physically	  reconstruct	  their	  defeated	  adversaries’	  infrastructure	  and	  non-­‐essential	  institutions.	  	  But	  that’s	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  prohibited	  from	  helping.	  	  Just	  citizens	  may	  opt	  to	  help	  with	  reconstruction	  efforts	  as	  an	  act	  of	  beneficence,	  and	  they	  might	  also	  have	  prudential	  reasons	  for	  assisting	  (a	  reconstructed	  state	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  war	  again,	  or	  might	  become	  an	  ally	  or	  trading	  partner).	  	  The	  Allied	  reconstruction	  of	  post-­‐WWII	  Germany	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  good	  example	  of	  both.	  	   Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  international	  community	  may	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  help	  rebuild	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state.	  	  Larry	  May,	  for	  example,	  argues	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  rebuild	  vanquished	  states	  “is	  a	  form	  of	  collective	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responsibility	  that	  falls	  in	  a	  distributed	  way	  on	  the	  society	  of	  States.”49	  	  Coady	  agrees:	  “It	  should	  be	  expected	  that	  other	  nations,	  not	  involved	  in	  the	  war,	  have	  some	  moral	  obligations	  to	  help,	  just	  as	  they	  do	  with	  natural	  disasters.”50	  	  Because	  I’m	  not	  attempting	  to	  determine	  which	  obligations	  the	  international	  community	  might	  have	  at	  war’s	  end,	  I	  won’t	  pursue	  May’s	  and	  Coady’s	  suggestion	  here.	  	  However,	  I	  will	  say	  that	  if	  the	  obligation	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  defeated	  state	  must	  fall	  to	  someone	  other	  than	  the	  aggressor	  regime	  or	  unjust	  citizenry,	  then	  there’s	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  it	  shouldn’t	  fall	  to	  the	  international	  community	  in	  general	  before	  it	  falls	  to	  the	  just	  state	  uniquely.	  
7.3	  Postwar	  Accountability	  and	  Justice	  The	  next	  issue	  we’ll	  consider	  is	  whether	  a	  just	  state	  incurs	  any	  postwar	  justice	  obligations.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  postwar	  justice	  is	  to	  hold	  individual	  agents	  accountable	  for	  wrongful	  actions	  they’ve	  committed	  during	  war.51	  Although	  this	  accountability	  normally	  involves	  punishment,	  my	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  justify	  punishment	  for	  wrongs	  committed	  during	  war	  (I	  will	  assume	  such	  punishment	  is	  justified).	  	  Instead,	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  victorious	  just	  state	  is	  ever	  obligated	  to	  pursue	  postwar	  accountability.	  Many	  theorists	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  pursuance	  of	  postwar	  accountability	  is	  obligatory.	  	  There’s	  a	  sizable	  consensus	  that	  wrongdoers	  must	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  the	  crimes	  they	  commit	  during	  war.	  	  Walzer,	  for	  example,	  claims:	  “There	  can	  be	  no	  justice	  in	  war	  if	  there	  are	  not,	  ultimately,	  responsible	  men	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends,	  19.	  50	  Coady,	  “The	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  62.	  51	  Patterson,	  Just	  War	  Thinking,	  43.	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women.”52	  	  According	  to	  Patterson,	  “jus	  post	  bellum	  requires	  moral	  accountability.”53	  For	  Gary	  Bass,	  “war	  crimes	  trials	  are	  morally	  mandated.”54	  	  Bellamy	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say,	  “the	  idea	  of	  prosecuting	  war	  criminals	  …	  has	  assumed	  the	  status	  of	  a	  post-­‐war	  duty.”55	  Perhaps	  the	  strongest	  language	  on	  this	  point	  comes	  from	  Davida	  Kellogg,	  who	  writes:	  The	  meting	  out	  of	  punishment	  for	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  and	  war	  crimes,	  whether	  in	  international	  tribunals	  or	  in	  our	  own	  civil	  courts,	  courts-­‐martial,	  or	  military	  tribunals,	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  natural,	  logical,	  and	  morally	  indispensable	  end	  state	  of	  Just	  War.56	  	  	  Kellogg’s	  sentiment	  here	  echoes	  Walzer’s:	  a	  just	  war	  demands	  that	  wartime	  criminals	  be	  brought	  to	  justice.	  	  In	  fact,	  Kellogg	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  failing	  to	  punish	  responsible	  parties	  is	  “to	  condone	  evil.”57	  	   Let’s	  assume	  the	  consensus	  view	  is	  right;	  war	  criminals	  must	  be	  held	  accountable.	  	  The	  question	  now	  is:	  what	  corresponding	  obligations	  does	  the	  just	  state	  incur	  relative	  to	  this	  mandate?	  	  Is	  the	  victorious	  state	  absolutely	  required	  to	  prosecute	  war	  criminals	  at	  war’s	  end?	  In	  order	  to	  best	  answer	  these	  questions,	  it	  might	  be	  helpful	  to	  divide	  wartime	  crimes	  into	  two	  broad	  categories.	  	  The	  first	  category	  consists	  of	  ad	  bellum	  violations,	  while	  the	  second	  consists	  of	  in	  bello	  violations.	  	  I’ll	  discuss	  each	  category	  in	  turn.	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7.3.1	  The	  Crime	  of	  Aggression	  When	  state	  leaders	  violate	  ad	  bellum	  restrictions	  and	  initiate	  an	  unjust	  war,	  they	  commit	  the	  ‘crime	  of	  aggression,’58	  also	  sometimes	  called	  a	  ‘crime	  against	  peace.’59	  	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  these	  leaders	  should	  be	  held	  accountable.	  	  But	  which	  responsible	  parties	  are	  we	  referring	  to	  here?	  	  As	  Walzer	  explains,	  “the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  falls	  to	  parties	  who	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  planning,	  preparations,	  initiation,	  and	  waging	  of	  aggressive	  war.”60	  	  I’ve	  previously	  referred	  to	  this	  collective	  group	  of	  people	  as	  the	  ‘unjust	  regime,’	  comprised	  of	  the	  political	  leaders	  who	  ultimately	  make	  the	  state	  decision	  to	  initiate	  war,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  higher-­‐level	  political	  and	  military	  leaders	  who	  advise	  them.	  	  Together,	  they	  should	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  the	  carnage	  and	  devastation	  their	  decisions	  have	  wrought.	  	  They	  should	  be	  treated,	  as	  the	  literature	  commonly	  holds,	  as	  criminals.	  	  Rawls	  captures	  this	  basic	  sentiment	  when	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  aggressing	  state	  “leaders	  and	  officials	  are	  responsible;	  they	  willed	  the	  war,	  and	  for	  doing	  that,	  they	  are	  criminals.”61	  	  But	  the	  interesting	  question	  is,	  exactly	  who	  should	  hold	  the	  unjust	  regime	  accountable?	  One	  possible	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  that	  the	  victorious	  just	  state	  should	  hold	  the	  unjust	  regime	  accountable.	  	  Francisco	  de	  Vitoria	  –	  one	  of	  the	  just	  war	  tradition’s	  founding	  theorists	  –	  strongly	  advocated	  this	  approach.	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the	  sixteenth	  century,	  Vitoria	  argues:	  “The	  prince	  who	  wages	  a	  just	  war	  becomes	  
ipso	  jure	  the	  judge	  of	  the	  enemy,	  and	  may	  punish	  them	  judicially	  and	  sentence	  them	  according	  to	  their	  offence.”62	  	  Later,	  in	  his	  highly	  influential	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  War,	  Vitoria	  notes	  that	  after	  victory	  has	  been	  won,	  “the	  victor	  must	  think	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  judge	  sitting	  in	  judgment	  between	  two	  commonwealths,	  one	  the	  injured	  party	  and	  the	  other	  the	  offender;	  he	  must	  not	  pass	  sentence	  as	  the	  prosecutor,	  but	  as	  a	  judge.”63	  	  	  	   Unfortunately,	  the	  problem	  with	  Vitoria’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  just	  state	  should	  punish	  the	  defeated	  aggressor	  state	  is	  underscored	  by	  his	  own	  further	  comments.	  	  Elsewhere,	  he	  writes	  that	  even	  after	  the	  just	  state	  has	  prevailed	  in	  war,	  “it	  is	  lawful	  to	  avenge	  the	  injury	  done	  by	  the	  enemy,	  and	  to	  teach	  the	  enemy	  a	  lesson	  by	  punishing	  them,”64	  which	  for	  Vitoria	  includes	  executing	  all	  enemy	  combatants,65	  and	  depriving	  the	  just	  state	  of	  part	  of	  their	  land	  out	  of	  revenge.66	  	  How,	  one	  might	  wonder,	  can	  someone	  stand	  as	  an	  impartial	  judge	  over	  the	  defeated	  state	  while	  keeping	  an	  eye	  toward	  avenging	  his	  own	  state’s	  injuries	  and	  teaching	  the	  enemy	  a	  lesson?	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  a	  concern	  about	  impartiality	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  We	  can	  sense	  in	  Vitoria’s	  comments	  the	  real	  danger	  of	  victor’s	  justice,	  which	  too	  easily	  inclines	  toward	  victor’s	  revenge.	  	  Yet	  justice	  isn’t	  about	  revenge;	  it’s	  about	  impartial	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accountability.	  	  But	  how	  can	  we	  expect	  the	  state	  initially	  attacked	  and	  forced	  to	  fight	  for	  its	  citizens’	  lives	  to	  remain	  impartial	  while	  judging	  their	  former	  aggressors?	  As	  Lazar	  points	  out,	  impartiality	  requires	  that	  the	  “judge,	  jury,	  and	  executioner	  must	  have	  nothing	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  trial’s	  outcome,	  and	  they	  must	  have	  no	  prejudices	  about	  the	  plaintiffs.”67	  	  Rodin	  echoes	  the	  same	  concerns,	  arguing	  that	  legitimate	  punishment	  requires	  “a	  legitimate	  punitive	  authority	  which	  at	  the	  very	  minimum	  must	  display	  independence,	  neutrality	  and	  impartiality.”68	  	  Given	  these	  concerns	  about	  impartiality	  and	  legitimacy,	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  just	  state	  can	  legitimately	  prosecute	  unjust	  leaders.	  	  And	  if	  that’s	  right,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  just	  state	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  prosecute	  unjust	  regime	  members	  for	  crimes	  of	  aggression.	  
7.3.2	  International	  Tribunals	  The	  obvious	  way	  to	  mitigate	  the	  forgoing	  impartiality	  and	  legitimacy	  concerns	  is	  for	  the	  international	  community	  to	  hold	  the	  unjust	  leadership	  accountable	  by	  way	  of	  international	  tribunal.	  	  Although	  this	  approach	  was	  not	  a	  viable	  option	  during	  Vitoria’s	  time,	  it	  is	  today	  with	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  ad	  hoc	  tribunals	  (Yugoslavia	  in	  1993,	  Rwanda	  in	  1994),	  and	  especially	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  permanent	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  (ICC).	  The	  international	  tribunal	  approach	  is	  gaining	  momentum	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  prosecution	  of	  crimes	  against	  peace.69	  	  Under	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  1998	  Rome	  Statute	  that	  created	  the	  court	  (later	  ratified	  in	  2002),	  the	  ICC	  holds	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  example,	  Kellogg,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	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specific	  jurisdiction	  for	  crimes	  of	  aggression,	  as	  well	  as	  war	  crimes,	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  and	  genocide.	  	  Although	  120	  countries	  signed	  the	  Rome	  Statute,	  7	  countries	  voted	  against,	  with	  21	  abstaining.	  	  However,	  with	  the	  subsequent	  ratification	  of	  the	  treaty,	  Article	  13(b)	  grants	  the	  court	  jurisdiction	  over	  non-­‐parties	  to	  the	  treaty	  if	  the	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  refers	  the	  case	  –	  though	  referral	  is	  subject	  to	  Security	  Council	  veto	  (an	  obvious	  Achilles	  heel	  for	  some	  potential	  cases).	  So	  given	  the	  ICC’s	  potential	  jurisdiction,	  coupled	  with	  its	  international	  and	  procedural	  structure,	  the	  court	  holds	  the	  promise	  of	  delivering	  the	  transparency	  and	  impartiality	  so	  sorely	  lacking	  when	  victorious	  just	  states	  prosecute	  on	  their	  own.	  	  Moreover,	  crimes	  against	  peace	  might	  be	  thought	  an	  obligation	  of	  justice	  for	  the	  international	  community	  writ	  large	  rather	  than	  for	  individual	  victim	  states.	  	  So	  based	  on	  the	  these	  considerations,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  if	  any	  entity	  should	  be	  obligated	  to	  hold	  the	  aggressor	  regime	  accountable,	  it	  should	  be	  the	  international	  community.	  	  In	  turn,	  the	  original	  victim	  state	  might	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  assist	  the	  international	  community’s	  efforts	  based	  on	  a	  general	  obligation	  to	  help	  uphold	  just	  institutions.	  So	  let’s	  suppose	  the	  international	  community	  chooses	  to	  pursue	  an	  unjust	  aggressor	  regime	  for	  crimes	  against	  peace.	  	  What	  might	  the	  just	  state’s	  corresponding	  obligations	  be?	  	  The	  most	  obvious	  answer	  is	  that	  if	  the	  just	  state	  were	  occupying	  the	  defeated	  state,	  then	  the	  former	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  help	  facilitate	  any	  tribunal	  investigations	  and	  prosecutions.	  	  This	  assistance	  might	  take	  the	  form	  of	  turning	  over	  suspected	  war	  criminals,	  as	  well	  as	  any	  relevant	  evidence.	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Just	  combatants	  might	  also	  be	  required	  to	  escort	  and	  provide	  security	  to	  investigators	  and	  tribunal	  staff	  while	  in	  country.	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  judicial	  hearings	  are	  held	  outside	  the	  aggressor	  state,	  the	  just	  state	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  facilitate	  the	  extradition	  of	  suspects.	  	  May	  endorses	  this	  view:	  “There	  is	  an	  obligation	  to	  extradite	  heads	  of	  State	  to	  international	  courts,	  if	  valid	  international	  indictments	  and	  arrest	  warrants	  have	  been	  issued.”70	  	  Although	  I	  agree	  with	  May,	  this	  extradition	  obligation	  must	  include	  not	  only	  heads	  of	  state,	  but	  also	  any	  culpable	  staff	  members	  who	  played	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  initiating	  aggression.	  
7.3.3	  Is	  the	  Just	  State	  Obligated	  to	  Pursue	  Aggressor	  Accountability?	  But	  what	  if	  the	  international	  community	  chooses	  not	  to	  pursue	  postwar	  accountability;	  is	  the	  just	  state	  then	  obligated	  to	  do	  so	  on	  its	  own?	  	  Two	  reasons	  tell	  against	  the	  just	  state	  incurring	  such	  an	  obligation.	  First,	  the	  decision	  whether	  to	  pursue	  aggressor	  accountability	  properly	  lies	  within	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  just	  state.	  	  Larry	  May	  traces	  this	  position	  back	  to	  Grotius,	  who	  held	  that	  although	  punishment	  is	  generally	  permitted,	  one	  does	  not	  fail	  to	  do	  what	  one	  ought	  to	  do	  by	  choosing	  to	  forgo	  punishment.71	  	  Bellamy	  concurs	  with	  the	  Grotian	  view:	  It	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  entitlements	  and	  obligations.	  	  Entitlements	  are	  things	  that	  the	  victors	  may	  choose	  to	  do,	  but	  are	  not	  committing	  a	  wrong	  if	  they	  choose	  not	  to.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  a	  state	  that	  is	  unjustly	  attacked	  does	  wrong	  if,	  after	  defending	  itself,	  it	  chooses	  not	  to	  prosecute	  suspected	  war	  criminals	  (absent	  a	  global	  process)….72	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends,	  20,	  36.	  71	  Ibid.,	  37.	  72	  Bellamy,	  “The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory,”	  624.	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As	  Christopher	  Wellman	  points	  out,	  a	  state’s	  decision	  whether	  to	  pursue	  justice	  in	  domestic	  cases	  is	  “squarely	  within	  a	  state’s	  legitimate	  sphere	  of	  sovereignty	  over	  its	  exercise	  of	  the	  criminal	  law.”73	  	  There’s	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  the	  same	  doesn’t	  hold	  true	  regarding	  aggressor	  state	  postwar	  accountability.	  One	  might	  reply	  by	  arguing	  that	  victims	  have	  a	  right	  that	  the	  unjust	  regime	  be	  held	  accountable.	  	  But	  in	  response	  to	  this	  charge,	  Wellman	  argues	  that	  citizens	  don’t	  have	  a	  right	  that	  every	  criminal	  be	  punished.74	  	  Rather,	  the	  state	  has	  a	  broad	  obligation	  to	  protect	  the	  citizens’	  basic	  rights	  –	  a	  function	  the	  state	  can	  perform	  even	  though	  it	  may	  not	  hold	  every	  criminal	  accountable.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  state	  can	  prosecute	  a	  criminal	  even	  though	  the	  victim	  wishes	  otherwise,	  so	  too	  the	  state	  can	  forgo	  prosecution	  even	  though	  the	  victim	  desires	  it.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  just	  state	  might	  have	  compelling	  reason	  to	  dispense	  with	  prosecution,	  which	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  next	  consideration.	  Second,	  the	  just	  state	  may	  have	  compelling	  practical	  reason	  for	  not	  pursuing	  aggressor	  regime	  accountability.	  	  To	  begin,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  postwar	  justice	  can	  be	  expensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming,	  and	  the	  just	  state	  may	  prefer	  to	  invest	  its	  time	  and	  resources	  elsewhere	  –	  such	  as	  its	  own	  postwar	  reconstruction.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  pursuance	  of	  postwar	  justice	  might	  produce	  festering	  resentment	  among	  the	  unjust	  populace,	  thus	  retarding	  the	  possibility	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	  and	  reconciliation.75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Wellman,	  “Amnesties	  and	  International	  Law,”	  in	  War:	  Essays	  in	  Political	  
Philosophy,	  ed.	  Larry	  May	  and	  Emily	  Crookston	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008b),	  254.	  74	  Ibid.,	  253.	  75	  See	  May,	  After	  War	  Ends,	  Ch.	  2;	  Frowe,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  224-­‐26;	  Michael	  Clark	  and	  Peter	  Cave,	  “No	  Where	  to	  Run?	  	  Punishing	  War	  Crimes,”	  Res	  
Publica	  16,	  no.	  2	  (2010):	  205.	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We	  see	  here	  a	  tension	  here	  between	  justice	  and	  accountability	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  considerations	  about	  reconciliation,	  peace,	  and	  self-­‐interest	  on	  the	  other.	  	  We	  should	  not	  think	  that	  the	  just	  state	  is	  obligated	  to	  pursue	  the	  former;	  rather,	  the	  victorious	  state	  may	  justifiably	  exercise	  its	  discretion	  to	  pursue	  the	  latter.	  	  This	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  although	  there	  may	  be	  a	  prima	  facie	  presumption	  that	  aggressors	  should	  be	  held	  accountable,	  that	  presumption	  does	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  an	  all	  things	  considered	  obligation	  to	  pursue	  such	  accountability.	  	  Oftentimes,	  countervailing	  considerations,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  state	  discretion,	  permit	  non-­‐pursuit	  of	  postwar	  justice.	  	  Thus,	  the	  just	  state	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  prosecute	  unjust	  leaders	  for	  crimes	  against	  aggression	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  pursuit	  of	  the	  matter.	  
7.3.4	  War	  Crimes	  When	  just	  combatants	  violate	  the	  in	  bello	  rules	  of	  war	  –	  necessity,	  proportionality,	  and	  discrimination	  –	  they	  commit	  war	  crimes.	  	  Thus,	  when	  just	  soldiers	  kill	  wantonly,	  or	  cause	  disproportionate	  harm	  while	  pursuing	  their	  military	  objectives,	  or	  make	  no	  effort	  to	  distinguish	  between	  liable	  and	  non-­‐liable	  parties,	  they	  engage	  in	  moral	  and	  criminal	  wrongdoing.	  	  Accordingly,	  they	  should	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  culpable	  acts.	  	   But	  who	  should	  hold	  these	  soldiers	  accountable?	  	  One	  might	  think	  the	  same	  international	  tribunals	  that	  try	  crimes	  of	  aggression	  should	  also	  try	  war	  crimes.	  	  Orend,	  for	  example,	  advocates	  for	  a	  permanent	  international	  tribunal	  to	  hear	  all	  in	  
bello	  war	  crimes	  charges.76	  	  Although	  this	  approach	  might	  be	  ideal	  regarding	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Orend,	  War	  and	  International	  Justice,	  231,	  243-­‐46.	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impartiality	  and	  legitimacy,	  no	  such	  international	  tribunal	  currently	  exists	  to	  try	  individual	  soldiers	  for	  suspected	  war	  crimes.	  	  	  	  And	  although	  in	  theory	  the	  ICC	  can	  hold	  war	  crimes	  trials,	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  ICC	  doesn’t	  hear	  smaller-­‐scale	  offenses.	  	  According	  to	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute,	  the	  ICC’s	  jurisdiction	  extends	  only	  over	  “the	  most	  serious	  crimes	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  international	  community	  as	  a	  whole.”	  	  And	  as	  Luban	  points	  out,	  Article	  8	  grants	  the	  court	  jurisdiction	  for	  war	  crimes	  only	  committed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  plan	  or	  policy.77	  	  Thus,	  when	  individual	  soldiers	  commit	  wartime	  criminal	  acts,	  their	  acts	  likely	  will	  fall	  outside	  the	  ICC’s	  jurisdiction	  unless	  their	  acts	  concern	  the	  entire	  international	  community	  (highly	  unlikely),	  or	  if	  the	  soldiers	  are	  participating	  in	  policy-­‐driven	  systematic	  in	  bello	  violations	  (such	  as	  a	  genocidal	  campaign).	  	  Moreover,	  by	  design	  the	  ICC	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  court	  of	  last	  resort,	  with	  lower	  level	  crimes	  being	  tried	  at	  the	  state	  level	  so	  long	  as	  the	  individual	  state	  has	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  suspects.78	  	  So	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  ICC	  will	  tend	  to	  have	  jurisdiction	  over	  almost	  no	  combatants	  suspected	  of	  violating	  the	  in	  bello	  rules	  of	  war.	  
7.3.5	  The	  Just	  State’s	  Obligation	  to	  Hold	  its	  Soldiers	  Accountable	  If	  the	  international	  community	  lacks	  the	  jurisdiction,	  ability,	  or	  resolve	  to	  hold	  suspected	  war	  criminals	  from	  the	  just	  state	  accountable,	  does	  this	  obligation	  then	  fall	  to	  the	  just	  state	  itself?	  	  I	  think	  so,	  and	  there’s	  compelling	  reason	  to	  support	  this	  claim.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Luban,	  “War	  Crimes:	  The	  Laws	  of	  Hell,”	  in	  May	  and	  Crookston,	  War:	  Essays	  in	  
Political	  Philosophy,	  274.	  78	  See	  1998	  Rome	  Statute,	  Article	  17(a)(b).	  	  See	  also	  J.	  Angelo	  Corlett,	  "US	  Responsibility	  for	  War	  Crimes	  in	  Iraq,"	  Res	  Publica	  16,	  no.	  2	  (2010):	  232-­‐33.	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   To	  begin,	  one	  can	  make	  the	  simple	  argument	  that	  because	  war	  criminals	  deserve	  to	  be	  held	  accountable,	  and	  because	  the	  just	  state	  clearly	  holds	  jurisdiction	  and	  authority	  over	  its	  combatants	  in	  a	  way	  that	  others	  do	  not,	  then	  the	  just	  state	  must	  hold	  its	  criminal	  combatants	  accountable.	  	  Otherwise,	  the	  wrongdoers	  would	  go	  unpunished.	  	  So	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  the	  just	  state	  should	  hold	  them	  accountable.	  	   But	  one	  might	  wonder,	  why	  shouldn’t	  we	  think	  it	  within	  the	  just	  state’s	  discretion	  whether	  to	  prosecute	  their	  troops?	  	  After	  all,	  that’s	  what	  was	  argued	  regarding	  the	  prosecution	  of	  unjust	  leadership.	  	  In	  response,	  it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  there’s	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  not	  holding	  one’s	  aggressor	  accountable	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  harboring	  and	  shielding	  suspected	  criminals	  employed	  by	  oneself	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Whereas	  the	  former	  seems	  to	  admit	  of	  discretion,	  the	  latter	  does	  not.	  	   By	  arming	  and	  equipping	  men	  and	  women	  for	  war,	  states	  incur	  a	  special	  obligation	  to	  hold	  their	  soldiers	  individually	  responsible	  should	  they	  commit	  crimes	  while	  acting	  in	  the	  state’s	  name.	  	  Because	  just	  combatants	  are	  deployed	  to	  fight	  on	  their	  state’s	  behalf,	  when	  those	  combatants	  wrongly	  harm	  others,	  the	  just	  state	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  the	  victims	  specifically	  –	  and	  to	  the	  international	  community	  more	  generally	  –	  to	  hold	  the	  perpetrators	  accountable.	  	  Individual	  soldiers	  are	  morally	  and	  criminally	  liable	  for	  their	  actions,	  and	  since	  they	  acted	  in	  their	  state’s	  name,	  their	  state	  must	  hold	  them	  accountable	  for	  their	  individual	  wrongdoing.	  But	  this	  solution	  is	  less	  than	  ideal.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  truly	  impartial	  international	  tribunal,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  concerns	  about	  partiality	  and	  leniency.	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There’s	  good	  reason	  for	  skepticism	  about	  whether	  just	  states	  will	  be	  keen	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  soldiers.	  	  Unfortunately,	  this	  approach	  seems	  the	  best	  available	  –	  even	  though	  far	  from	  ideal.	  	  Should	  just	  states	  fail	  to	  hold	  their	  criminal	  soldiers	  accountable,	  those	  states	  are	  morally	  at	  fault.	  
7.4	  Political	  Reconstruction	  One	  final	  issue	  remains,	  and	  that’s	  determining	  whether	  victorious	  just	  states	  have	  a	  postwar	  obligation	  to	  help	  defeated	  states	  in	  need	  of	  political	  reconstruction.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  cases	  of	  toppled	  or	  collapsed	  aggressor	  regimes,	  what	  are	  the	  victor’s	  responsibilities?	  	  Is	  politically	  reconstructing	  the	  defeated	  state	  an	  obligation?	  	   Some	  theorists	  draw	  a	  soft	  line	  on	  this	  issue,	  suggesting	  that	  just	  war	  victors	  are	  permitted	  to	  politically	  rehabilitate	  their	  defeated	  adversaries	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  future	  aggression.79	  	  But	  that’s	  a	  prudential	  matter.	  	  My	  focus	  is	  not	  on	  what	  the	  just	  state	  is	  permitted	  to	  do,	  but	  rather	  what	  the	  just	  state	  is	  required	  to	  do.	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  commentators	  who	  draw	  a	  harder	  line	  on	  the	  issue	  and	  argue	  that	  victorious	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  politically	  reconstruct	  their	  defeated	  foes	  in	  cases	  of	  defunct	  regimes.	  	  Gary	  Bass,	  for	  example,	  writes:	  The	  defeat	  of	  a	  dictatorial	  regime	  will	  sometimes	  leave	  a	  population	  that	  wants	  political	  change	  but	  cannot	  by	  itself	  create	  a	  stable	  and	  peaceful	  political	  system.	  	  So	  the	  victors	  will	  have	  at	  least	  a	  right,	  and	  perhaps	  an	  
outright	  duty,	  to	  assist	  in	  political	  …	  reconstruction.80	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Orend,	  War	  and	  International	  Justice,	  225;	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  412.	  80	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  403,	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  emphasis.	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Note	  Bass’s	  tentative	  conclusion	  that	  just	  victors	  might	  have	  an	  outright	  duty	  to	  politically	  reconstruct	  the	  defeated	  state.	  	  Walzer,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  less	  tentative	  in	  declaring	  the	  victorious	  state’s	  obligation:	  	  	  	  	  Once	  immediate	  necessities	  are	  provided,	  the	  critical	  obligation	  of	  the	  invading	  and	  occupying	  forces	  is	  political	  reconstruction.	  …	  It	  is	  a	  difficult	  obligation	  because	  what	  is	  required	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  regime	  that	  can	  dispense	  with	  its	  creators	  –	  that	  can,	  literally,	  order	  them	  to	  leave.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  reconstruction	  is	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  legitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  its	  own	  citizens,	  and	  an	  equal	  member	  of	  the	  international	  society	  of	  states.81	  	  Note	  also	  that	  whereas	  Bass	  say	  the	  victors	  must	  assist	  in	  political	  reconstruction,	  Walzer’s	  language	  suggests	  the	  just	  state	  is	  critically	  obligated	  to	  create	  a	  new	  regime.	  	  So	  the	  question	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  is,	  what	  role	  –	  if	  any	  –	  must	  a	  just	  state	  perform	  during	  the	  aggressor	  state’s	  transition	  to	  a	  new	  government?	  
7.4.1	  Impartiality	  and	  Legitimacy,	  Revisited	  As	  Walzer	  rightly	  points	  out	  in	  the	  quote	  above,	  political	  reconstruction	  raises	  concerns	  about	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  legitimacy.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  external	  legitimacy,	  the	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  just	  state	  will	  act	  in	  its	  own	  interests	  when	  reconstructing	  the	  vanquished	  state.	  	  The	  just	  state	  may,	  for	  example,	  install	  a	  self-­‐serving	  puppet	  regime	  aimed	  at	  representing	  the	  just	  state’s	  interests	  rather	  than	  the	  local	  populace’s.	  	  Worse	  still,	  the	  resulting	  government	  might	  be	  view	  as	  illegitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world	  community.	  Coady	  nicely	  captures	  this	  worry	  about	  political	  colonization	  by	  highlighting	  the	  Soviet	  political	  restructuring	  of	  East	  Germany	  following	  victory	  over	  the	  Nazi	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Walzer,	  “The	  Aftermath	  of	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regime.82	  	  Similarly,	  reflecting	  on	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Pol	  Pot’s	  heinous	  regime,	  Walzer	  observes:	  In	  Cambodia,	  the	  Vietnamese	  shut	  down	  the	  killing	  fields,	  which	  was	  certainly	  a	  good	  thing	  to	  do,	  but	  they	  then	  went	  on	  to	  set	  up	  a	  satellite	  government,	  keyed	  to	  their	  own	  interests,	  which	  never	  won	  legitimacy	  either	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  Cambodia	  and	  brought	  no	  closure	  to	  the	  country’s	  internal	  conflicts.83	  	  Paul	  Robinson	  shares	  Walzer’s	  judgment,	  noting,	  “We	  didn’t	  want	  the	  Vietnamese	  government	  to	  rehabilitate	  Cambodia.”84	  	  The	  concern	  expressed	  in	  these	  quotes	  is	  the	  same:	  victorious	  states	  cannot	  be	  trusted	  to	  politically	  reconstruct	  defeated	  states	  in	  an	  impartial	  manner.	  	  Too	  often,	  the	  temptations	  of	  imperialism	  –	  or	  at	  least	  of	  partiality	  –	  will	  be	  too	  great.	  	  And	  even	  if	  the	  victor	  state	  doesn’t	  attempt	  to	  install	  its	  own	  quasi-­‐satellite	  government,	  it	  may	  still	  act	  in	  other	  self-­‐interested	  ways,	  such	  as	  funneling	  home	  lucrative	  government	  contracts	  (i.e.,	  profiteering).85	  	   In	  addition	  to	  raising	  external	  legitimacy	  concerns,	  political	  reconstruction	  by	  the	  victorious	  state	  also	  raises	  internal	  legitimacy	  concerns,	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  how	  the	  defeated	  populace	  views	  its	  own	  political	  reconstruction.	  	  The	  key	  issue	  underlying	  this	  worry	  is	  the	  defeated	  populace’s	  sovereignty.	  	  Although	  suspended	  during	  war,	  the	  defeated	  citizenry’s	  sovereignty	  must	  be	  restored	  at	  war’s	  end	  –	  or	  at	  least	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  	  Importantly,	  this	  includes	  their	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination	  and	  political	  autonomy.	  	  Pursuant	  with	  these	  sovereignty	  rights,	  the	  just	  state	  should	  not	  unilaterally	  and	  independently	  seat	  a	  government,	  as	  Walzer	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  Coady,	  “The	  Just	  Post	  Bellum,”	  57,	  62.	  83	  Walzer,	  “The	  Triumph	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,”	  in	  Arguing	  About	  War,”	  19-­‐20.	  84	  Robinson,	  “Is	  There	  an	  Obligation	  to	  Rebuild?”	  107.	  85	  Evans,	  “Moral	  Responsibility	  and	  the	  Conflicting	  Demands,”	  150;	  Walzer,	  “Just	  and	  Unjust	  Occupations,”	  62;	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  391,	  408;	  Coady,	  “The	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  54.	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seems	  to	  have	  suggested.	  	  Instead,	  Coady	  strikes	  the	  approach,	  suggesting	  the	  just	  state	  should	  aim	  “to	  contribute	  to	  an	  independent	  political	  life”	  for	  the	  defeated	  enemy.86	  	  Otherwise,	  they	  may	  view	  an	  externally	  installed	  regime	  as	  illegitimate.	  
7.4.2	  International	  Political	  Reconstruction	  These	  concerns	  about	  impartiality	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  previously	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  about	  postwar	  accountability	  for	  crimes	  of	  aggression.	  	  So	  unsurprisingly,	  the	  best	  approach	  for	  allaying	  these	  concerns	  in	  the	  case	  of	  political	  reconstruction	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  advocated	  for	  regarding	  crimes	  of	  aggression:	  international	  community	  involvement.	  The	  best	  way	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  defeated	  state’s	  new	  government	  is	  legitimate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  both	  the	  international	  community	  and	  the	  vanquished	  state	  citizenry	  is	  to	  have	  the	  process	  conducted	  under	  the	  oversight	  of	  an	  impartial,	  international	  entity,	  most	  likely	  the	  U.N.,	  but	  perhaps	  under	  a	  regional	  multinational	  organization	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  NATO	  or	  the	  African	  Union.	  	  Under	  the	  guidance	  and	  watchful	  eyes	  of	  a	  broad	  and	  impartial	  community,	  the	  defeated	  citizenry	  could	  install	  its	  own	  government	  –	  one	  considered	  both	  internally	  and	  externally	  legitimate.87	  	   So	  let’s	  suppose	  the	  international	  community	  does	  take	  the	  lead	  role	  in	  politically	  restructuring	  the	  vanquished	  state.	  	  If	  so,	  would	  any	  obligations	  fall	  specifically	  to	  the	  just	  state?	  	  Perhaps	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  just	  state	  is	  occupying	  the	  defeated	  state,	  one	  might	  think	  the	  just	  combatants	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  provide	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  Coady,	  “The	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  56.	  87	  This	  approach	  is	  embraced,	  among	  others,	  by	  Bellamy,	  “The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Victory,”	  623;	  Lazar,	  “Skepticism	  about	  Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  215;	  Bass,	  “Jus	  Post	  Bellum,”	  403.	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safety	  and	  security	  during	  the	  governmental	  transition.	  	  Yet	  as	  discussed	  (6.1.5),	  providing	  security	  is	  already	  a	  required	  function	  during	  occupation,	  so	  this	  isn’t	  a	  new	  obligation	  in	  general.	  	  However,	  it’s	  reasonable	  to	  think	  the	  just	  forces	  must	  take	  on	  additional	  obligations	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  international	  oversight	  such	  as	  providing	  safe	  passage	  for	  committee	  staff	  members,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  additional	  security	  during	  elections	  if	  the	  latter	  are	  held	  soon	  enough	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  just	  combatants’	  withdrawal.	  	  Beyond	  these	  two	  possible	  functions,	  it’s	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  the	  just	  state	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  play	  any	  additional	  role.	  	   Finally,	  we	  should	  ask	  what	  the	  victors’	  responsibilities	  might	  be	  should	  the	  international	  community	  choose	  not	  to	  be	  involved.88	  	  I	  think	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  simple	  but	  unattractive	  answer	  is:	  nothing.	  	  As	  previously	  argued,	  victorious	  states	  are	  not	  wedded	  to	  postwar	  situations	  indefinitely.	  	  There	  are	  time,	  expense,	  and	  danger	  limits	  to	  what’s	  required	  of	  victims	  who	  defend	  themselves,	  both	  in	  individual-­‐	  and	  national-­‐defense	  situations.	  	  Just	  combatants	  should	  be	  required	  to	  make	  reasonable	  effort	  to	  help	  stabilize	  a	  defeated	  society	  and	  protect	  vulnerable	  people.	  	  Yet	  at	  some	  point,	  the	  just	  combatants	  will	  be	  justified	  in	  withdrawing.	  	  They	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  stay	  for	  purposes	  of	  political	  reconstruction.	  	  Should	  the	  international	  community	  choose	  not	  to	  get	  involved	  at	  that	  point,	  the	  local	  citizenry	  must	  take	  up	  the	  responsibility	  to	  solve	  its	  own	  political	  problems	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  its	  state’s	  disastrous	  war.	  	  That	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  sovereign	  people.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  As	  Gheciu	  and	  Welsh	  point	  out,	  historically	  the	  U.N.	  has	  lacked	  resolve	  on	  many	  operational	  issues.	  	  The	  U.N.	  also	  has	  a	  questionable	  track	  record	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  peace	  building	  efforts	  in	  war	  torn	  societies.	  	  See	  Alexandra	  Gheciu	  and	  Jennifer	  Welsh,	  “The	  Imperative	  to	  Rebuild:	  Assessing	  the	  Normative	  Case	  for	  Postconflict	  Reconstruction,”	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs	  23,	  no.	  2	  (2009):	  135-­‐36.	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